Search

Begin New Search Topic 2023 Gaza War Political Geography Gaza

71. Palestine Is One Vote Short in the Security Council from Being Recognised as a State

Author:
Yossi Mekelberg
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The total stalemate in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires new thinking and weaning off of old paradigms. Currently as the result of the Hamas attack on October 7, the ensuring war in Gaza, and the deterioration of security in the occupied West Bank, the relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians are at their worst since 1948 and seem the least conducive to a new a peace process. However, events have demonstrated to the international community that allowing this conflict to fester has had disastrous consequences not only for Israelis and Palestinians, but it has also had far-reaching implications across the region and the rest of the international community. This paper argues that an important step to break the deadlock is recognition of Palestinian statehood by individual countries and by international organizations, in particular the UN Security Council. Such recognition should incentivize both sides to negotiate peace based on a two-state solution, as it would overcome the asymmetry in the negotiations between a recognized state and movement representing its people. It will empower the pragmatic elements in both societies who are invested in peace, and will also send a clear message of sincerity from the international community that a two-state solution is the one it is behind and it will support.
Topic:
Sovereignty, United Nations, State, UN Security Council, 2023 Gaza War, and Peace Process
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

72. Exaggerations, Obstacles and Opportunities: The Saudi Arabian Position in the Gaza War

Author:
Aziz Alghashian
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The paper aims to shed light on the obstacles and opportunities of Saudi involvement in a future Palestinian-Israeli peace process. It first explains the enigmatic nature of Saudi communication towards Israel and explains why Saudi pragmatism has been misunderstood. The paper also explains the rationale behind Saudi Arabia’s willingness to normalize relations with Israel, and that Saudi-Israeli normalization is treated as a gateway to a larger game-changing strategic treaty with the United States, rather than a keenness to cooperate with Israel itself. In addition, the paper argues that while the Saudi ruling elite are willing to play financial and security roles in “reconstructing” Gaza, it is unforeseeable that this will ensue without a credible peace process that can justify these efforts, especially against the backdrop of Saudi Arabia’s restructuring of its own economy. The paper then explains the ways in which Saudi Arabia, Gulf Arab states, and European states can help cooperate in areas such as building a Palestinian economic horizon that can strengthen the Palestinian-Israeli political framework; developing Palestinian-Israeli green cooperation; and developing an Arab-Israeli network of academics, experts, and journalists that can be an intersection of top-down and bottom-up projects that aim to reach a two-state solution.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Normalization, 2023 Gaza War, and Peace Process
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Saudi Arabia

73. April 2024 Issue

Author:
Michael Knights, Sean Morrow, Asher Spain, Kevin Jackson, and Paul D. Williams
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In this month’s feature article, Michael Knights provides a highly detailed assessment of the six-month Houthi war effort that has seen the Tehran-backed group launch missiles at Israel and attack shipping off the coasts of Yemen. He assesses that: “The Houthis have used the Gaza crisis to vault into the front ranks of the Iran-led ‘Axis of Resistance,’ arguably as the only axis partner to truly globalize the conflict through their anti-shipping attacks on the approaches to the Suez Canal. The movement has demonstrated boldness—as the first axis member to fire ballistic missiles at Israel—and resilience in the face of U.S.-U.K. airstrikes. The Houthis are likely to emerge from the war as a more confident, ambitious, and aggressive terrorist army, with a taste for provocative and eye-catching acts of defiance against Israel and the United States.” Our interview is with Colonel (Ret.) Miri Eisin, the director of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University who previously served in a variety of senior intelligence roles in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). She stresses the need to learn lessons from the intelligence failures that preceded the Hamas-led October 7 attack so that Israel is not surprised again, for example with regard to the kind of threat Hezbollah could pose in the coming months. “All of us made wrong assumptions, and the combination of all of them brought about a colossal failure,” she says. “We collectively were wrong about the capability. We were wrong about the intentions. We were wrong about the ferocity.” Kévin Jackson assesses the current state of al-Qa`ida Central. He writes that “while the challenges facing the group are real, it should not be written off, as it has proved time and again more resilient than expected.” He adds that “in the wake of the Gaza war, al-Qa`ida likely feels emboldened by what it perceives as a uniquely auspicious geopolitical context to further its global ambitions.” The African Union is set to withdraw the remainder of its forces from Somalia by December 31, 2024. Paul Williams evaluates whether the Somali National Army (SNA) or al-Shabaab would be stronger militarily if this happens. He writes that “the SNA would retain an advantage in terms of size, material resources, and external support but performs poorly on non-material dimensions and would remain dependent upon external finance and security assistance. Overall, however, al-Shabaab would be slightly militarily stronger because of its significant advantages across the non-material dimensions related to force employment, cohesion, and psychological operations, as well as the sustainability of its forces.”
Topic:
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Al Qaeda, Houthis, African Union, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Somalia

74. The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza

Author:
Nir Arielli, Jacob Stoil, and Mary Elizabeth Walters
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
While the current Israeli military operation seeks to degrade the military capabilities of Hamas, the Israeli government has not put forward a coherent plan for what should happen to the Gaza Strip once the operation is over. The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip. An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border. An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks. Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial. Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control. Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages. Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reconstruction, Peacekeeping, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

75. A Roadmap for Economic-Political Stability in Gaza, within A Wider Framework

Author:
Yitzhak Gal
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
As with many major crises, the catastrophic Oct. 7 Hamas onslaught on Israel and ensuing war in Gaza offer an opportunity for change. This policy paper proposes guidelines for a post-war roadmap to long-term economic, security, and political stability in Gaza. The approach proposed in this paper combines an “economic leap” plan with a political arrangement within the framework of regional economic cooperation, according to the following principles: (1) ending the war in Gaza with the collapse of the Hamas regime and its replacement with a stable governmental system that combines the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and deep international and regional involvement, (2) a comprehensive two-stage economic plan for Gaza, consisting of an “immediate response and reconstruction plan” and concurrently, implementing an “economic leap” plan that will place the Gaza Strip on a path of rapid and stable long-term economic growth, (3) the Gaza Strip’s economic boost plan will form part of a broader blueprint for the Palestinian Authority’s economic boost. The economic plan will integrate and support the political arrangement and stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian system. Jumpstarting Gaza’s economy, and the Palestinian economy in general, will be achieved through a combination of several elements, chief among them: (1) a series of “game-changing” projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, (2) continue the deep ties of Gaza with the Israeli economy and West Bank, (3) develop economic ties with the Gulf bloc as another strong economic partner, along with Israel, (4) integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the economic cooperation processes taking place in the region and into major regional projects, (5) The elements mentioned above would be reflected in a quantum leap in the scope of investments in the Palestinian economy. An economic boost is vital to ensure the success of the the political goals, and vice versa. Ending the war without implementing the guidelines proposed here would abandon Gaza again to radical Palestinian forces and take Gaza and Israel back to where they were on the eve of Oct. 7. Namely, instability in Gaza and an Israeli policy of “managing” the conflict at varying levels of violence. The terrible cost of this policy is tragically clear. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Political stability, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

76. Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack

Author:
Moran Zaga, Ariel Admoni, and Maryann Bisharat
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Israel lacks a clear, consistent and established strategy for its relations with Qatar, despite profound Qatari influence in the region. Since the 1990s, Israeli decision-makers have faced the dilemma of balancing between Qatar’s regional and global importance and its close ties with enemies of Israel. Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed? This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality. Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank. We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels. To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas. As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar. In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners. Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Hamas, Mediation, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Qatar

77. Securing Critical Infrastructure in Gaza is a Necessity for Israeli National Security

Author:
Mitvim
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Ensuring the functioning of life-sustaining infrastructure in the Gaza Strip is critical for advancing the two main Israeli goals of the war in Gaza – the return of the hostages and the defeat of the Hamas regime. Providing clean drinking water and treatment of wastewater, along with the supply of food, shelter, and medicine, are critical security considerations for the following reasons: ● Granting legitimacy to the military action- Ensuring a humanitarian situation that is in line with international humanitarian law in the Gaza Strip is a key condition for mobilizing internal, international, and regional legitimacy for military action. ● Ensuring the safety of Palestinian civilians, Israeli hostages, and soldiers in Gaza – An outbreak of infectious diseases will directly endanger civilians, kidnapped Israeli citizens, and IDF soldiers in the Strip. In addition, there is concern that an outbreak of epidemics would likely spread into Israel and Egypt. ● Preventing long-term pollution that damages natural resources – A humanitarian disaster in Gaza will lead to long-term pollution damaging natural water sources such as the coastal aquifer and the many wells both in Gaza and in Israel. ●Conserving financial resources by preventing a humanitarian disaster – Prevention is always less costly. ● Maintaining Israel’s values and upholding its moral standing. Given Israel’s interests as detailed above, to prevent a humanitarian disaster occurring in Gaza, Israel must take concrete actions to improve the immediate humanitarian situation in the southern Gaza Strip. This requires that Israel: – Allow the entry or provision of sufficient basic water supply for the civilian population, while protecting water/wastewater infrastructure and the operation of desalination facilities, supply of chlorine into the water systems, and maintenance equipment needed. – Facilitate maximum sewage treatment by providing fuel for sewage pumping systems, and, as much as possible, operating treatment plants in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) professional bodies. – Permit sufficient energy supply for water and sewage treatment needs by considering to re-activate parts of the power lines in the south of Gaza, (monitoring the transmission of electricity), supplying fuel under the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), and renewable energy systems that are disconnected from the grid. – Open the Kerem Shalom crossing for the transfer of essential humanitarian aid – water, fuel, food, shelter, and medicine – in order to overcome the backlog at Raffa Crossing in the provision of humanitarian aid. – Promote a framework that connects relevant factors in Israel to their counterparts in the UN in order to create a comprehensive mapping and status report of needs, locations, bottlenecks, contributions, assistance funding, and the like. – Promotion of a vaccination program and health monitoring – support for monitoring disease in Gaza and promotion of a vaccination program under the auspices of an international organization in accordance with health developments in the Gaza Strip.
Topic:
National Security, Humanitarian Crisis, Critical Infrastructure, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

78. In the Israel-Hamas war, Russia takes the ridge road

Author:
Laetitia Spetschinsky
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
The article explores Russia’s response to the Israel-Hamas conflict, revealing a distinct stance from the US, Europe and many other partners. Moscow refuses to condemn Hamas, advocating instead a path to peace that downplays the US and raises the emerging powers’ profile – especially Russia’s. Examining historical ties, economic connections, and internal dynamics, the article analyses Russia’s role as a mediator. It highlights significant elements in the complex relationships between Russia and strategic regional players such as Iran, China, India, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, as well as Moscow’s ambitions in the UN. The conclusion discusses potential implications for Europe, emphasizing the EU’s vulnerabilities and the role of key member states.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Affairs, European Union, Geopolitics, UN Security Council, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

79. Analyzing the implications of the Gaza war for Israeli-Turkish ties

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
The ramifications of the war in Gaza have led to a significant downturn in the ties bеtwееn Turkey and Israel. President Rеcеp Tayyip Erdogan's remarks, in a spееch to his AK Party’s lawmakers in parliament on November 16, 2023, branding Israel as a "terrorist state'' and accusing it of perpetrating atrocities against Palestinians have bееn pivotal in escalating tensions between both countries. He further stated that all those supporting Israel’s war on Palestinians were complicit in all Israeli massacres.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Atrocities, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

80. Turkey’s regional policy in the shadow of the Gaza War

Author:
Michael Sarlis
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
Abstract:
In our November-December issue of Turkeyscope, Michalis Saris discusses Turkey's reaction to the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel and the subsequent Gaza War. He notes that Turkey foreign policy has undergone a rapid shift and its relationship with Iran has improved as a result.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Iran, Turkey, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza