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131. Are Global Value Chains for Sale? On Business-State Relations in the MENA Region

Author:
Nora Aboushady and Chahir Zaki
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) for six MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). In addition to political connections, we construct several measures of “political influence” based on available data on lobbying and grand corruption. We also explore whether political connections help firms overcome barriers to trade and investment and increase their participation in GVCs at the extensive and intensive margins. Our findings suggest that political connections do matter for firms’ GVC participation. The impact is more pronounced for firms that combine political connections with informal payments to influence policymaking. Our findings on the significance of trade and investment barriers for GVC participation for different categories of firms’ political influence are – however – inconclusive.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Politics, World Bank, Business, Investment, Trade, and Global Value Chains
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, North Africa, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and West Bank

132. REPORT LAUNCH: Presumptively Antisemitic: Islamophobic Tropes in the Palestine-Israel Discourse

Author:
Sahar Aziz, Mitchell Plitnick, and Jonathan Matz
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
Join Sahar Aziz, Mitchell Plitnick, and Jonathan Matz for an insightful discussion during the launch of our pivotal report, 'Presumptively Antisemitic: Islamophobic Tropes in the Palestine-Israel Discourse'. This critical session delves into the escalating issue of antisemitism accusations in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, particularly amidst the recent calls for a ceasefire and human rights advocacy in Gaza. Our panelists will explore the complex dynamics at play, shedding light on how the weaponization of antisemitism accusations often results in perpetuating Islamophobic stereotypes, infringes on the free speech rights of Muslims and Arabs, and ultimately hinders genuine efforts to combat antisemitism. This discussion is crucial for anyone interested in Middle East politics, human rights advocacy, and the broader implications of political discourse.
Topic:
Human Rights, Politics, Islamophobia, Anti-Semitism, and Discourse
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

133. Teach-In on Gaza

Author:
Race and Rights (CSRR) Center for Security
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Center for Security, Race and Rights (CSRR), Rutgers University School of Law
Abstract:
Teach-In on Gaza
Topic:
Human Rights, History, Hamas, Armed Conflict, Palestinians, and Blockade
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

134. Starr Forum: The Israel-Hamas conflict: Expert perspectives on the ongoing crisis

Author:
Marsin Alshamary, David Kirkpatrick, Peter Krause, Steven Simon, and Evan Lieberman
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Speakers: Marsin Alshamary on the regional impact. Alshamary, MIT PhD '20, is an assistant professor at Boston College, and an expert on religion, civil society and social movements in the Shi’a Middle East. David Kirkpatrick on Hamas’s strategy. Kirkpatrick is a staff writer for The New Yorker and has worked for more than two decades as a reporter for the New York Times. Peter Krause on the historical context and Israeli strategy. Krause, MIT PhD '11, is an associate professor of political science at Boston College, and an expert on international security, Middle East politics, terrorism and political violence, nationalism, and rebels and revolution. Steven Simon on US policy. Simon, a former Robert E Wilhelm Fellow at CIS, served as the National Security Council (NSC) senior director for the Middle East and North Africa during the Obama Administration and as the NSC senior director for counterterrorism in the Clinton White House. Moderator: Evan Lieberman is the Total Professor of Political Science and Contemporary Africa at MIT and the director of the Center for International Studies (CIS).
Topic:
Security, Human Rights, Hamas, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

135. The Case for Sending a Multinational Force to Gaza

Author:
Nir Arielli, Jacob Stoil, and Mary Elizabeth Walters
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
While the current Israeli military operation seeks to degrade the military capabilities of Hamas, the Israeli government has not put forward a coherent plan for what should happen to the Gaza Strip once the operation is over. The United States, the European Union and other key allies of Israel have stated their objection to an Israeli re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. Instead, the US administration and several other key actors have indicated their preference for the Palestinian Authority to govern Gaza. However, the President of the Palestinian Authority, Mahmud Abbas, and other prominent Palestinian figures have made it clear that they do not wish to take over the running of Gaza immediately after Israel’s military operation with no political horizon in sight. In the longer run, they expect to see the Gaza Strip incorporated into an independent Palestinian state. Importantly, the Palestinian Authority currently does not have the capacity to take over and govern the Gaza Strip. An interim solution that could assist in the governance of the Gaza Strip, while providing security and preventing further attacks on Israel, is deploying a large multinational peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and robust rules of engagement. In terms of its mission, size, mandate, and rules of engagement, such a multinational force would need to resemble KFOR in Kosovo and INTERFET in East Timor much more than the ineffective UNIFIL mission in southern Lebanon, which proved incapable of keeping Hezbollah forces away from Israel’s border. An effective peacekeeping mission in Gaza would have to fulfil three interlinked tasks. Security: It is still unclear how the present military operation in the Gaza Strip will end. If Israeli forces withdraw while there are still militant groups with the capacity for violence within Gaza, the multinational force may have to engage in peace enforcement. Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, peacekeepers can be authorised to target particular actors, demobilize warring parties and decommission their weapons, and to support the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-state armed groups to legitimate authorities. The multinational force could assume gradual responsibility over parts of the Gaza Strip as part of a phased Israeli withdrawal. Careful coordination between the IDF and the peacekeeping mission will be crucial. Governance: The multinational force must prevent a vacuum in governance in Gaza. Part of its mission should be to ensure that basic civil authorities and essential services return to work and continue to function, and that internally displaced refugees can be temporarily accommodated and eventually return to their homes. An internationally-appointed High Representative should lead the mission’s civilian efforts, paving the way for a phased handover to Palestinian control. Reconstruction: The Gaza Strip is currently experiencing unprecedented levels of destruction. The multinational force can play a key role in initial reconstruction efforts, ensuring the supply of electricity and water returns quickly, and minimizing any hazard caused by unexploded ordnance, Hamas tunnels, and sewage spillages. Deploying multinational forces in Gaza will send a very clear message to Palestinians, Israelis and the rest of the region that there will not be a return to the status quo ante of “managing the conflict”. A peacekeeping mission in Gaza will be an interim phase and must be part of a broader diplomatic settlement that will include Israelis, Palestinians, key regional actors, and the international community. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper represent the personal views of the authors and are not necessarily the views of the US Department of Defense, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Army, Army University, US Military Academy, or the US Air University.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Reconstruction, Peacekeeping, Armed Conflict, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

136. A Roadmap for Economic-Political Stability in Gaza, within A Wider Framework

Author:
Yitzhak Gal
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
As with many major crises, the catastrophic Oct. 7 Hamas onslaught on Israel and ensuing war in Gaza offer an opportunity for change. This policy paper proposes guidelines for a post-war roadmap to long-term economic, security, and political stability in Gaza. The approach proposed in this paper combines an “economic leap” plan with a political arrangement within the framework of regional economic cooperation, according to the following principles: (1) ending the war in Gaza with the collapse of the Hamas regime and its replacement with a stable governmental system that combines the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority and deep international and regional involvement, (2) a comprehensive two-stage economic plan for Gaza, consisting of an “immediate response and reconstruction plan” and concurrently, implementing an “economic leap” plan that will place the Gaza Strip on a path of rapid and stable long-term economic growth, (3) the Gaza Strip’s economic boost plan will form part of a broader blueprint for the Palestinian Authority’s economic boost. The economic plan will integrate and support the political arrangement and stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian system. Jumpstarting Gaza’s economy, and the Palestinian economy in general, will be achieved through a combination of several elements, chief among them: (1) a series of “game-changing” projects in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, (2) continue the deep ties of Gaza with the Israeli economy and West Bank, (3) develop economic ties with the Gulf bloc as another strong economic partner, along with Israel, (4) integrate Gaza and the West Bank into the economic cooperation processes taking place in the region and into major regional projects, (5) The elements mentioned above would be reflected in a quantum leap in the scope of investments in the Palestinian economy. An economic boost is vital to ensure the success of the the political goals, and vice versa. Ending the war without implementing the guidelines proposed here would abandon Gaza again to radical Palestinian forces and take Gaza and Israel back to where they were on the eve of Oct. 7. Namely, instability in Gaza and an Israeli policy of “managing” the conflict at varying levels of violence. The terrible cost of this policy is tragically clear. * This document is part of a series of policy papers which is a product of a joint project by the Mitvim Institute and the Berl Katzenelson Foundation to reflect on the post-war era with the support of the new Israel Fund.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Political stability, Hamas, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

137. Israel’s policy on Qatar after the October 7 attack

Author:
Moran Zaga, Ariel Admoni, and Maryann Bisharat
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Israel lacks a clear, consistent and established strategy for its relations with Qatar, despite profound Qatari influence in the region. Since the 1990s, Israeli decision-makers have faced the dilemma of balancing between Qatar’s regional and global importance and its close ties with enemies of Israel. Qatar’s dominance has increased since the October 7 attack, as it has become an effective mediator on which Hamas and Israel have no choice but to depend. At the same time, its negative impact has also grown clearer, generated public debate in Israel. The question is: how do we proceed? This policy paper examines the policy options available to Israel on Qatar, both during the war and in the long run. We provide a systemic review of Israel’s constraints and opportunities regarding Qatar’s role in the region, taking into account various approaches to its involvement in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the geopolitical reality. Our basic assumption is that eliminating Qatari influence on the Palestinian issue altogether would be costly, complicated and likely to fail. Given its geopolitical and economic power, coupled with its foreign policy, Qatar will remain an active player on the Palestinian issue regardless of Israel’s preferences. Adopting a confrontational approach could do more harm than good. Israel is better off diverting Qatar’s influence in directions that serve its interests – i.e., weakening Hamas, responding to war challenges and helping restoring Gaza. At the same time, Israel should work to ensure Qatar is not the only regional power holding sway over Gaza and the West Bank. We propose several strategies for managing Israel’s relations with Qatar. One is to maintain constant tension between incentives and pressure points. Qatar’s major weak points are security threats (such as targeted assassinations in its territory or removing security cooperation) and damage to its diplomatic relations with global powers, especially the United States. Israel must therefore involve its international partners in shaping its policy toward Qatar. Another method is appointing a broad state-security framework (preferably the National Security Council) to manage the relationship with Qatar, bringing in external experts to add knowledge and fresh perspectives. Mossad, which currently handles the relationship, cannot formulate policy. Therefore, it should remain the operative arm and manage covert channels. To serve Israel’s immediate interests during the war, we recommend leveraging all of Qatar’s influence on Hamas in Gaza, despite the urge to cut ties over its support of terrorism. Qatar can be crucial to achieving Israel’s two war goals: freeing the captives and toppling the Hamas regime. Israel must continue to use Qatar as a mediator in captive release negotiations, given its unique position. As the war progresses, Hamas’ reliance on Qatar can be used as a lever. Israel should push Qatar to cut practical ties with Hamas, in a gradual manner only while the negotiations are underway, in order to directly weaken Hamas. As motivation, Israel can propose an alternative that retains Qatar’s influence over Palestinian politics, while ensuring conditions that are better for Israel. We believe that without such motivation, Qatar will cling to its hold over Hamas. Israel should also use Qatar’s abilities to assist in other war needs, such as communication, administrative coordination and aid to civilians, using existing Qatari infrastructure in Gaza. At the same time, Israel should draw clear red lines regarding Qatar’s support for terrorism and publicly hold it responsible for strengthening Hamas. This call for accountability may actually help diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis Qatar. In the long run, we submit that a policy of diversifying external influences in the Palestinian sphere will reduce Israel’s binding dependence on Qatar. When the postwar arrangements of governance in Gaza and the West Bank are clearer, Israel should actively work to bring moderate Arab states into the emerging order. Multi-state systems tend to be more moderate, enabling different channels of communication and maneuvering between the various actors. When the reconstruction of Gaza begins, economic projects should only be considered if they are based on broad partnerships. The UAE will play a particularly important role, having demonstrated its economic and diplomatic contribution to the Palestinians, as well as to the normalization with Israel. In the long run, we believe that cutting all ties with Qatar may hurt Israel. Qatar can play a constructive role in shaping the post-war political order in Gaza, as long as its influence is balanced by other regional partners. Our analysis includes input from 11 in-depth interviews with Israeli position-holders currently or previously involved in ties with Qatar, including high-ranking officials in the security establishment and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, academics and policy researchers. The first section examines the public debate in Israel over Qatar, emphasizing the need to build up a knowledge base to assess Israel’s policy options. The second section outlines Qatar’s global assets, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian context. This section analyzes Qatar’s regional influence and whether it can be changed. The third section recommends a wartime policy on Qatar covering five issues: releasing captives, toppling Hamas, administrative coordination, Al Jazeera’s influence, and holding Qatar accountable for supporting terrorism. The fourth section lays out three long-term policy options: conditional acceptance, diversification and cutting ties. The options represent different public opinions and offer creative solutions to avoid repeating past failures. For everyone, we detail steps for implementation, potential implications, opportunities and possible difficulties. Finally, we present the necessary strategy, including the incentives and pressure points available to Israel vis- à-vis Qatar.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Hamas, Mediation, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and Qatar

138. Securing Critical Infrastructure in Gaza is a Necessity for Israeli National Security

Author:
Mitvim
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
Ensuring the functioning of life-sustaining infrastructure in the Gaza Strip is critical for advancing the two main Israeli goals of the war in Gaza – the return of the hostages and the defeat of the Hamas regime. Providing clean drinking water and treatment of wastewater, along with the supply of food, shelter, and medicine, are critical security considerations for the following reasons: ● Granting legitimacy to the military action- Ensuring a humanitarian situation that is in line with international humanitarian law in the Gaza Strip is a key condition for mobilizing internal, international, and regional legitimacy for military action. ● Ensuring the safety of Palestinian civilians, Israeli hostages, and soldiers in Gaza – An outbreak of infectious diseases will directly endanger civilians, kidnapped Israeli citizens, and IDF soldiers in the Strip. In addition, there is concern that an outbreak of epidemics would likely spread into Israel and Egypt. ● Preventing long-term pollution that damages natural resources – A humanitarian disaster in Gaza will lead to long-term pollution damaging natural water sources such as the coastal aquifer and the many wells both in Gaza and in Israel. ●Conserving financial resources by preventing a humanitarian disaster – Prevention is always less costly. ● Maintaining Israel’s values and upholding its moral standing. Given Israel’s interests as detailed above, to prevent a humanitarian disaster occurring in Gaza, Israel must take concrete actions to improve the immediate humanitarian situation in the southern Gaza Strip. This requires that Israel: – Allow the entry or provision of sufficient basic water supply for the civilian population, while protecting water/wastewater infrastructure and the operation of desalination facilities, supply of chlorine into the water systems, and maintenance equipment needed. – Facilitate maximum sewage treatment by providing fuel for sewage pumping systems, and, as much as possible, operating treatment plants in cooperation with the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) professional bodies. – Permit sufficient energy supply for water and sewage treatment needs by considering to re-activate parts of the power lines in the south of Gaza, (monitoring the transmission of electricity), supplying fuel under the Gaza Reconstruction Mechanism (GRM), and renewable energy systems that are disconnected from the grid. – Open the Kerem Shalom crossing for the transfer of essential humanitarian aid – water, fuel, food, shelter, and medicine – in order to overcome the backlog at Raffa Crossing in the provision of humanitarian aid. – Promote a framework that connects relevant factors in Israel to their counterparts in the UN in order to create a comprehensive mapping and status report of needs, locations, bottlenecks, contributions, assistance funding, and the like. – Promotion of a vaccination program and health monitoring – support for monitoring disease in Gaza and promotion of a vaccination program under the auspices of an international organization in accordance with health developments in the Gaza Strip.
Topic:
National Security, Humanitarian Crisis, Critical Infrastructure, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

139. Feature Article: In Search of Hope: Gaza’s Youth Face Death and Row the Boat in Uncertain Waters

Author:
Pal-Think for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the scorching summer of 2023, hundreds of Gaza youths driven by depression and despair queued to submit their applications to obtain Turkish visas. In search of a better life, those youths have made the tough decision to travel to Turkey. However, the story does not end at this point. After landing at Turkey, many will attempt illegal migration to Europe using dangerous boats. Since 2007, local reports have confirmed that over 250,000 youths migrated from the Gaza Strip in pursuit of a thriving life in Europe. In August 2023, alone, there were over 16,700 Turkish visa applications submitted by young adults living in the Gaza Strip’s five governates. Interviews with applicants revealed that the most travelled destination is Turkey through which they can migrate to Europe. Young citizens, aged 18 to 30, emphasised that the already deteriorating economic environment in Gaza has created a space for higher immigration rates. Migration from the Gaza Strip has been increasing in recent years. As a result of stagnating economic situation, prospective migrant youth have highlighted that migration is not a voluntary choice but a consequence of prolonged economic hardships. Several research papers have shown that there are no accurate statistics on the people’s number who left Gaza, however, in May 2019 it was cited that more than 40,000 emigrants left Gaza as of the same time in 2018. While the United Nations estimated about 20,000 people left and according to human rights experts in Gaza, 70,000 people left from the period of 2014 until 2020. Although this is just an approximate estimate, these numbers suggest a high percentage of youth migrating from Gaza. According to UNHCR data, close to 150,000 people made their way into the EU this way in 2022 alone.
Topic:
Push Factor, Economic Crisis, and Irregular Migration
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Mediterranean

140. Palestinian Democracy: Examining Barriers to Democratic Transition and How to Overcome Them

Author:
Pal-Think for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The paper examines the obstacles to democracy in Palestine, most notably the Israeli occupation, which has distorted the structures of Palestinian society and its desired state and impeded the elections. In addition, the Palestinian division has also led to the absence of national consensus on the time and manner of holding the elections. The paper also presented internal and external factors obstructing the conduct of democratic transitions in Palestine. The paper concluded with a set of policy proposals to address these obstacles, such as holding local and general elections, turning to the international community to help the Palestinians build their democracy and hold elections, and consolidating the values of democracy through a social and political upbringing in the emerging Palestinian generation.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, Democracy, Occupation, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza