Search

Begin New Search Topic Security Political Geography France

11. What Strategic Posture Should France Adopt in the Middle East?

Author:
Héloïse Fayet
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
France has a historical presence in the Middle East, where it has many interests to defend: the fight against terrorism, the promotion of the arms industry, the dissemination of humanitarian values, etc. To this end, it has a number of resources at its disposal, notably military: French forces are deployed in Iraq, Syria and Jordan as part of Operation Chammal, in Lebanon for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in the United Arab Emirates. This strategic posture, inherited from the history and "Arab policy" of the 20th century, is now being called into question by the geopolitical upheavals in the region. The resizing of the American presence in the Middle East, initiated by the withdrawal from Afghanistan, is accompanied by a growing assumption of responsibility for their own security by local actors. This evolution is embodied, for example, in the signing of the Abraham Accords, which redefine the place of Israel. The American pulling out also allows extra-regional powers such as China and Russia to become progressively involved in the area. These transformations require an adaptation of the French posture in order to position itself as a credible actor in the strategic competition. It is therefore necessary to move away from the sole focus on counterterrorism, which no longer gathers partners, and more broadly to redefine the partnership strategy and the mechanism deployed on the ground. A strengthened interministerial, or even European, dynamic also seems essential in order to mobilize all the levers available to France.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, France, and Syria

12. Building Bridges over the Blue Pacific: Beyond Marine Protected Areas – A Europe-Oceania Cooperation

Author:
Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The “new scramble for the Pacific” is characterized by a race for the control of maritime space and resources, oscillating between ocean grabbing and ocean commoning. Building Bridges over the Blue Pacific. Beyond Marine Protected Areas – A Europe-Oceania Cooperation Download 0.96 Mo This tendency can be seen in the endemic nature of Illegal Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing (estimated in 2016 as 10% of the overall catch in the Pacific Islands Countries – PICs), but also in the multiplication of large Marine Protected Areas (MPAs): delimited areas in which certain human activities such as fishing are restricted to conserve resources (the Pacific hosts the majority of the world’s MPAs). The European Union (EU), as the biggest importer of fish (which imports half of its tuna from the Pacific) and a leader in biodiversity protection, has a key stake in ensuring a sustainable management of these resources. Moreover, Europe has territories in the Pacific (French New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis & Futuna) with large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) that are difficult to monitor and protect in the face of diverse challenges: foreign intrusions, IUU fishing, narcotrafficking and interstate tensions. Hence, ocean governance is one of the seven priority areas of the EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. MPAs have been the favorite scheme to manage the maritime space and protect biodiversity & marine resources. Large or small, they can offer minimal or total protection by limiting certain human practices. A loosely defined framework, MPAs allow for a greater control over a designated territory. As such, it is a truly geopolitical object, and is not immune to controversy. This said, MPAs are a key tool for biodiversity conservation, and a vital scheme to achieve the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity’s call to protect at least 30% of the planet – land and sea – by 2030 (the 30x30 initiative). To be useful and successful, MPAs or other protection schemes need to be considered efficient and fair – hence legitimate. This requires adequate access to scientific data to ensure the process is knowledge-driven and to gauge the effectiveness of the protection measures. Local communities, their economic needs and their traditional knowledge of the ocean, should be taken into account at each stage. Moreover, surveillance should be ensured to deter illegal activities and enforce protection measures. This briefing argues that building two-way bridges between experts, decision-makers and populations in Europe and the Pacific Islands will be extremely beneficial to ensure the effectiveness and fairness of ocean governance schemes. The Pacific needs scientific data that Europe can offer. Europe can greatly benefit from understanding the Pacific Islanders’ needs and learn from local customary practices to protect resources in a more relevant and democratic manner. This participatory, multi-scaled approach would provide new paths towards more efficient resource protection schemes in Europe, too, taking into consideration tools that may not have conservation as an objective, but are effectively sustaining biodiversity. This briefing is based on discussions that took place during the webinar “Are Marine Protected Areas a relevant tool for the Pacific?” organized by Ifri’s Pacific Islands Program on June 21, 2022. Contributions from panelists will therefore be highlighted.
Topic:
Security, Natural Resources, Governance, European Union, Maritime, Oceans and Seas, and Biodiversity
Political Geography:
France, Pacific Ocean, and Oceania

13. France and AUKUS: Bouncing Back to Live Up to Pacific Challenges

Author:
Jérémy Bachelier and Celine Pajon
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Back in September 2021, the announcement of AUKUS – the defense partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) was a shock to Paris. Not only it meant the brutal conclusion of a submarine deal signed in 2016, but it also provoked a major breach of confidence in France’s relations with its three key partners – shedding crude light on the divergences of approaches regarding the best way to salvage the rules-based order and address the China challenge. This initiative, intended to be a coordinated response to the Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific, called into question France’s strategic positioning in the region. One year after, however, AUKUS does not seem to have marked a major turning point regarding the French strategy in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the Pacific. After an immediate aftershock, France's bilateral relations with Washington, Canberra and to an extent London gradually recovered. Political and strategic discussions at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2022, the recent visits of the Australian Prime minister and minister of Defense in France and numerous bilateral calls at the end of Summer between French and Australian political and military leaders have pointed to a positive dynamic for an improved strategic cooperation in the region. Rather than prompting a radical change in the France's Indo-Pacific strategy, AUKUS highlighted a fault line between the strategic/political rhetoric level and the operational level of defense cooperation regarding the French engagement in this region. The multiple maritime security and climate change challenges in the Pacific Islands region require France to cooperate closely with its regional partners, starting with Australia, and continue to promote effective multilateralism. In addition, the growing risks of high-intensity conflicts in the vicinity of the Pacific Islands region, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and/or in the South China Sea, require for France to speed up the strengthening of its interoperability with its regional allies in the coming years and probably to decide on the role it would like to - and be able to - concretely support its own interest and allies.
Topic:
Security, Maritime, AUKUS, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, France, Australia, United States of America, Pacific Ocean, and Pacific Islands

14. Indo–French Defence Cooperation in the Light of Regional Security Balance in South Asia

Author:
Mukesh Shankar Bharti
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The article aims to describe the regional security challenges to India in South Asia. Since the partition of India in 1947, the country has continuously been under external threat as a form of proxy warfare and terrorism. For this purpose, the article highlighted the core hotspots where India has major border issues with China in the Himalayan terrain. India has been facing a bigger security challenge from China and Pakistan in the South Asia region. This article analyses the defence ties between India and France in the context of security. India's neorealist approaches expand its strategic partnership in global politics. Therefore, India has been getting strategic support from the French side whenever India seeks support in a critical situation. The article uses the methods of case study and discourse analysis to answer the question and find out the study's relevance. As a result of severe security threats, India had to negotiate the purchase of defence equipment from France. India had to buy Rafael fighter jet, submarine and other heavy military weapons. Indo-French relations are stronger than in the past and will develop as friendly relations in the future.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Regionalism
Political Geography:
South Asia, Indonesia, Asia, and France

15. The African-France Summit and an Overview of its Recommendations Since 1973

Author:
Fabien Sundjo
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
France’s earliest profit-making involvement in Africa in the business of buying and transporting slaves started in the 17th century when the local Indian population proved unable to work in plantations in America compared to black Africans. France’s interest in Africa reached its zenith in the 19th and early 20th centuries when France acquired a gigantic African empire. Though several reasons could explain the scramble for Africa by France, we present herein the three most important. First, the defeat of France in the 1870 Prussian war in which she lost influence and a reduction in her international ego. Second, the anxiety to implement Colbert’s mercantilist philosophy emphasized that any rising industrial power required to have both the source of raw materials and market extension under her control. Third and finally, as Europeans scrambled for Africa, France feared their traditional enemies could annex a remarkable share of the territory. Hence, from the outset, it was not the financial gains that many thoughts motivated France’s involvement in Africa but politics and national ego. It will only be later that France saw Africa as a cheap source of military manpower that could help balance demographic stagnation in France. This perception will later be reinforced by her experience in the two World wars. In this light, Iliffe (2007) holds that French colonial policy was characterized by the exploitation of rich resources from Africa. In the midst of all these benefits from colonization in Africa, Charles de Gaulle‘s decision to retain influence in Africa after decolonization in 1960 was driven by the need to persist with these benefits under neo-colonization. According to Abdurrahim (2014), in Africa, France uses a realist foreign policy in which states shape their foreign policies based on their national interests. To facilitate the implementation of this realist foreign policy, France will design the Franco-African summit that will cement France’s influence in her former colonies to date. Were France’s policies put in place through the Franco-African summits shaped to benefit France solely? This paper aims to present the Franco-African Summit and carry out a stocktake of France’s commitments through recommendations from the Franco-African Summit.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and France

16. A Crash Test: EU Strategic Autonomy in the Foreign Policy of France

Author:
Łukasz Maślanka
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
France uses the idea of EU strategic autonomy as a tool in its own foreign policy. France’s aim is to redefine the Union’s partnership with the U.S. and NATO. Hence, the activity of President Emmanuel Macron in emphasising the differences between the positions of the U.S. and the EU, especially in relations with China and Russia. Macron’s rhetoric worries other European countries and hides the real problems in EU security policy, such as insufficient financing of the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the lack of a clear definition of strategic autonomy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, France, and United States of America

17. Disorder from Chaos: Why Europeans fail to promote stability in the Sahel

Author:
Andrew Lebovich
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
France, Germany, and Sahel countries launched the Sahel Alliance in 2017 with the aim of bringing together major international donors to better coordinate development assistance and other financing efforts for the region. The Alliance aimed to integrate security, development, and governance perspectives but has struggled to find coherence and effectiveness – although it has adopted some novel approaches. The worsening security situation in the Sahel led international actors to then set up new initiatives, including the Partnership for Security and Stability in the Sahel and, more recently, the Coalition for the Sahel. However, the relationship between these initiatives remains largely theoretical, with the practicalities of cooperation and burden sharing yet to be fully defined. These new initiatives risk privileging security solutions to complex problems, meaning that necessary governance reforms may fall by the wayside. This is despite widespread acknowledgement, including from senior French officials, that there is no purely military solution to the varied conflicts and challenges in the Sahel.
Topic:
Security, Development, Diplomacy, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North Africa, and Sahel

18. How Germany and France Could Play a Leading Role in International Donor Coordination

Author:
Lennart Kaplan
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
In the framework of the Agenda 2030 for sustainable development, France and Germany face common challenges, ranging from security to global health. Against this background, this paper discusses opportunities and barriers for a French-German leadership in international donor coordination.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, International Cooperation, Trade, and Donors
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

19. A Paris Reset on Hezbollah? Implications for French Interests and Regional Security

Author:
Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
In this study, counterterrorism expert Matthew Levitt explores the history and current status of Hezbollah operations against French interests, and details how a change in Paris's longstanding opposition to designating the group could bolster French efforts to stabilize Lebanon. Lebanon’s corrupt political system needs major reforms, but Hezbollah has indicated, unsurprisingly, that it will reject any changes that diminish its political status. Specifically, the group insisted in late September that it maintain control of key ministries in any future government. This demand cut against the work of French authorities seeking to help stabilize the country following the devastating port blast in early August. In his response, President Emmanuel Macron signaled a break from typical French passivity toward Hezbollah. He denounced the group’s attempts to pose as a legitimate political party while engaging in militant activity independent of the Lebanese state. In this Policy Note, counterterrorism expert Matthew Levitt shares the little-known story of Hezbollah’s targeting of French interests, dating to the early 1980s. He then shows how the group poses a unique and growing set of challenges to France, both at home and abroad, and argues that Paris should reconsider its longtime opposition to designating Hezbollah in its entirety as a terrorist organization. Such a policy change, he contends, would bolster Macron’s efforts to stabilize Lebanon while mitigating threats within French territory.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Counter-terrorism, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, France, and Lebanon

20. The Normandy Negotiations Renewed: Divisions at Home and Opportunity Abroad

Author:
David Carment
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
After three years of limited discussion, the leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine renewed their peace talks to resolve the separatist conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbas). Efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Donbas began five years ago with the meeting of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine. This framework, developed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), attempted to facilitate a dialogue between Russia and Ukraine through the mediation of an impartial actor, and it culminated in the Minsk I (September 2014) and then Minsk II (February 2015) agreements. The Minsk II agreements comprised a 13-point peace plan, chief among which is an arrangement specifying support for the restoration of the Ukrainian-Russian border. While the implementation of the military portions of the Minsk II agreements were finalized within three months of signing, the political and security portions remained unresolved. Though President Vladimir Putin has declared his intent to protect the Russian-speaking peoples of the region, he has also stated he has no interest in reclaiming Eastern Ukraine. Not surprisingly, since Russia’s ultimate goal is undeclared, the conflict has proved very difficult to resolve.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Territorial Disputes, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, France, Germany, and United States of America