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1. The Joint Expeditionary Force in Northern Europe: Towards a more integrated security architecture?

Author:
Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The Joint Expeditionary Force – a UK-led defence cooperation format of ten European countries – has gained political momentum since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the late 2010s, the JEF has shifted its focus towards hybrid issues, increasingly in Northern Europe. While its role in the hybrid sphere is potentially fruitful, the JEF should be wary of taking on too wide a range of tasks. The JEF’s role as a “sub-threshold” actor could complement NATO’s collective defence efforts below Article 5. Hence, the JEF should be more coherently integrated into the Northern European security architecture. Obstacles to JEF-NATO integration have now been removed, as all JEF nations are also members of the alliance. A more explicit division of labour between the JEF and NATO would help Northern European countries to handle the current security environment comprehensively. Such a security architecture, covering all dimensions of the conflict spectrum, would be particularly beneficial for Finland, which shares a long common border with Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Security, Defense Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Finland, and Baltic States

2. Finland's partnerships as a NATO member: Prospects for defence cooperation in a multilateral framework

Author:
Iro Särkkä, Minna Ålander, Joel Linnainmäki, and Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Before joining NATO, Finland formed several bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation partnerships with its neighbouring countries and major NATO member states. After NATO accession, the role of smaller defence cooperation formats has changed in Finland’s security and defence policy. As a NATO ally, why should Finland continue to promote these forms of defence cooperation, and what will their significance be in the future? This report approaches defence cooperation from the perspective of individual NATO member states, aiming to enhance our understanding of the motives behind such cooperation in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Norway and Sweden. It studies defence cooperation through key strategic, military, economic and political factors, such as the perceived threat environment, military capabilities, strategic culture, and the role member states play in the multilateral security framework of NATO. The report compares these six countries with Finland and identifies factors impacting potential future cooperation. The report finds that regional defence cooperation can yield positive outcomes for NATO. Bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation can enhance intra-alliance policymaking and serve as a tool to build trust with key partners and allies, thus facilitating defence integration within NATO.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Partnerships, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, France, Germany, Estonia, and Sweden

3. The Newest Allies: Finland and Sweden in NATO

Author:
Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Jan Hyllander
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states. Although Finland had developed armed forces to cope independently with any military aggression, the brutality of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine led to a rapid and substantial shift in public opinion in favour of NATO membership, which was quickly embraced by the leadership. Public opinion shifted rapidly in Sweden too, but the debate there was also heavily influenced by Finland’s inescapable move towards the Alliance, which essentially undercut the logic of Sweden’s continued non-alignment. The two countries submitted their applications to join NATO on the same day in May 2022. As Allies, Finland and Sweden will bring great benefits to the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. Politically, their accession will strengthen NATO, including by creating a large bloc of states in northern Europe whose memberships of security organisations are (mostly) aligned and who demonstrate broadly similar security thinking. At the operational level, their accession will plug a large hole in NATO territory, reducing the isolation and vulnerability of the Baltic states and allowing military commanders many more options for preparing for and dealing with a possible conflict with Russia. At the tactical level, they add modern, capable armed forces to NATO’s inventory. Nonetheless, their accession is not without challenges and risks. The most difficult practical challenge for both countries will likely be developing deployable ground forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership. However, perhaps the more difficult challenges related to accession will be mental and cultural. For Finland, these relate to adjusting an independent, highly self-reliant defence model, held in great regard by both the leadership and population, to meet the needs of collective defence; and to the requirement to bolster Allied cohesion by speaking more openly about threats to the Allies’ common security interests, in particular, Russia. For Sweden, neutrality has been fostered not only as a defining element of its self-identity as a distinctive international actor, but also as a necessary vehicle for the development of a unique democracy and welfare state. These ideas are deep-seated and Sweden’s mental transition to Allied status may be difficult and lengthy. Among the risks is that the addition of two strong Allies will encourage other Allies or their publics to believe that deterrence and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region is complete, needing no further attention. A second is that the low-key approach Finland and Sweden expect to take to their membership, at least in the years immediately following accession, may mean that the benefits of their joining will be only partly realised. It would be a missed opportunity, for example, if Sweden declined to take a leadership role in the Nordic-Baltic region. There is also a risk that Finland and Sweden’s commitment to a strong Nordic regional identity, while useful for promoting practical security and defence cooperation, may be disadvantageous to Baltic security if its pull were to result in the diminished engagement of the two countries in the Baltic region. The tension between the two countries northern and Baltic identities has already been apparent in a discussion concerning their place in NATO’s operational-level command structure. Finally, there is a risk that imprecise talk about ‘strategic depth’ that has sometimes been part of the discussion about the benefits that Finland and Sweden bring to NATO may suggest that other parts of Allied territory are somehow less important. This would be unhelpful to coherent deterrence by denial on the north-east flank. While Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO greatly benefits the security and defence of the Baltic states, it is important that such risks and challenges are recognised, in order that they can be mitigated. We make several recommendations to Finland and Sweden as they continue their integration into the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Sweden, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

4. Finland: Integrating a new Ally

Author:
Iro Särkkä
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. One of the more surprising consequences of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine was Finland’s accession to NATO in April 2023 (and Sweden’s in March 2024). In the fourth brief of the series, Iro Särkkä looks at Finland’s integration into the Alliance. Over the past year, Finland has found that its initial resistance to changing any aspect of its fiercely independent defence model is not sustainable in the face of the needs of NATO’s collective defence. As it integrates more closely, it has an opportunity to carve out a role as a champion of Nordic-Baltic interests.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, Deterrence, Russia-Ukraine War, and Burden Sharing
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

5. The Joint Expeditionary Force: Baltic Interests

Author:
Tony Lawrence
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Elements of the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) will spend much of November 2024 in Latvia, taking part in a series of exercises known as Joint Protector 24.[1] Leaders of the JEF countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK will then meet in Tallinn on 16-17 December to discuss further cooperation in the framework.[2] What is the JEF, and what does it offer the Baltic region? Despite its name, the JEF is not a force. It is a flexible framework led by the UK, under which the UK itself and at least one other member (a ‘1 + 1’ format) can pool military capabilities for the purpose of conducting specific operations. The UK also provides the backbone of a permanent operational headquarters for the JEF—the Standing Joint Force Headquarters—although other command and control options are available depending on the scale and nature of a particular operation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Security Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Finland, Norway, Lithuania, Estonia, Denmark, Sweden, Latvia, Netherlands, Iceland, and Baltic States

6. Remote work in the Finnish Defence Forces: Employees’ experiences of changes in organisational culture

Author:
Tiina Kähkönen
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper investigated what changes took place in the organisational culture of the Finnish Defence Forces during the COVID-19 pandemic, and also afterwards when remote work has remained permanently available to staff. A total of 468 employees of the Finnish Defence Forces participated in the study by reporting their experiences of changes in organisational culture. In the analysis of qualitative data, the Gioia methodology, which classifies the data into categories and themes, was used. Remote work creates challenges for leadership, and more equality, changed management competence, and remote work management skills were expected from management. However, it would seem that the organisational culture in the Finnish Defence Forces has developed in such a way that trust within the organisation is even stronger than before. Remote work has developed the personnel’s skills in managing digital tools as well as the employer image of the Finnish Defence Forces in the eyes of their personnel. This is the first study to map employees’ experiences of remote work from the perspective of changes in organisational culture in the Finnish Defence Forces. The research provides novel information that can be utilised in developing the operations and management of organisations. The Finnish Defence Forces have taken significant steps towards a modern work community. There are still some challenges to be solved in terms of how to improve leadership of remote work. A particularly important resource in resilience to change is the trust that is manifested in the organisational culture of the Finnish Defence Forces.
Topic:
Defense Policy, COVID-19, Remote Work, and Organizational Culture
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

7. How allied Sweden and Finland can secure Northern Europe

Author:
Anna Wieslander, Eric Adamson, and Jesper Lehto
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO is approaching its ninth round of enlargement. The accession of Sweden and Finland—two solid democracies and defenders of the international-rules based order—into the Alliance will strengthen the core of the transatlantic community. Their NATO membership opens up new opportunities to bolster regional deterrence and defense in Northern Europe, increase transatlantic burden sharing, and secure the Alliance as a whole in ways not previously possible. This issue brief sets the stage by suggesting that the Alliance use the accession of Sweden and Finland to create an ambitious deterrence-by-denial “bubble” over Northern Europe. Such a strategy does not merely include military capabilities but must be underpinned by civil robustness and resilience that stretch across NATO territory. Operationally, allies in Northern Europe should prepare to assume greater responsibility as first responders in case of a severe security situation, below or at the level of Article 5. For this to succeed, political cooperation and agenda setting must intensify among Northern European allies.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Finland, Sweden, and Northern Europe

8. The role of space technologies in power politics: Mitigating strategic dependencies through space resilience

Author:
Markus Holmgren
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Space activity is experiencing a boom with the scope and importance of space technologies and services fuelling rapid growth upon growth. While the space boom is catalysing transferral of the ownership of previously public infrastructure and capabilities to corporate control, many space technologies have critically important military and civilian applications. As the importance of space sectors grows, both public and private cyberoperations targeting space infrastructure proliferate. This makes it more difficult to attribute the perpetrators of cyber operations. The United States’ lead in the space sector is increasing. Starlink, a satellite internet constellation operated by the US-based company SpaceX, will serve to bind many nations to one more US-controlled communication architecture. As a result of the implications of space technologies for comprehensive security, building space resilience is becoming paramount. States must diversify their supply of space-related services and tighten cooperation with like-minded states.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economic Policy, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and Finland

9. UK-Finland defence cooperation in the 2020s: A successful partnership requires continuous effort

Author:
Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The United Kingdom and Finland have conducted rather close defence cooperation in various forums for several years. Finnish NATO membership and the ongoing war in Ukraine also provide many incentives for deeper cooperation. Nevertheless, continued cooperation should not be taken for granted.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Finland

10. Questions Concerning Finnish Membership in NATO

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Admitting Finland into NATO constitutes a permanent defense commitment by the alliance. In the case of the United States, it also entails a further extension of its nuclear umbrella. Such moves warrant a fulsome public debate, not a rush to action. Consideration of the defensibility of Finland must take into account a revitalized, long-term Russian threat, not just the force currently mired in a grinding war in Ukraine. More thorough discussion is needed about Finland’s capacity to defend itself and the level of outside support it would require from NATO and, specifically, the U.S. military. Regardless of whether it admits Finland, NATO should support it in any future crises with Russia. But the nature of that support changes depending on whether Finland is an alliance member or not, with attendant implications for the level of risk NATO incurs. U.S. forces cannot be everywhere at once. New, permanent security commitments in northern Europe need to be examined relative to other U.S. global priorities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Finland, and Eastern Europe