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5661. EU and Ukraine: a turning point in 2004?

Author:
Taras Kuzio
Publication Date:
11-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
EU enlargement raises important questions: How much further can the EU enlarge? Should the EU encompass geographic 'Europe' or stop at the western border of the CIS? Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) clearly allows any geographically based European state to apply for membership. Is Ukraine then eligible? On 15 March 2001, the European Parliament supported Ukraine's future membership; in contrast, the EU continues to fudge any answer to this question. The difficulty in answering these questions lies with the criteria that should be used to formulate a response. Whatever the answer, with enlargement it has become a matter of urgency for the EU to engage strategically with its new neighbours in Eastern Europe. In particular, the EU must develop a realistic strategy for Ukraine, its largest new neighbour within Europe. Of these neighbours only two – Ukraine and Moldova – seek EU membership. One reason why Ukraine needs greater attention on the part of the EU is geopolitical. European Commission President Romano Prodi and Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson wrote: 'Any political instability, regressive economic development or fragmentary reform in these countries would threaten to create a new discontinuity in Europe – a political, economic and social divide – in the wake of EU enlargement.' 1 Ukraine borders three, and soon to be four, new EU members. All four of these are or will soon be NATO members. With enlargement, Ukraine's geostrategic importance becomes an issue that the EU must address. This Occasional Paper discusses critical issues in the EU-Ukrainian relationship and provides a number of policy recommendations that could contribute towards fashioning an EU strategy towards Ukraine. At the heart of the current stalemate in relations are virtual policies adopted by the EU and Ukraine towards each other. 2 The EU has never adopted a clear strategy towards Ukraine and other western CIS states that seek EU membership, and in general has paid far too little attention to the region. Ukraine straddles the Central and East European-Eurasian divide. This makes it all the more imperative that the EU devise a strategy that would support a potential shift within Ukraine towards a more Central and East European identity. This potential is more present in Ukraine than in other CIS states. The most effective manner to support Ukraine's 'European choice' may be by offering it an 'open-door' policy. The 2004 elections will have a decisive impact upon Ukraine's 'European choice'. If the front-runner in polls since 2000, Viktor Yushchenko, won the elections, the EU would be forced to change its 'closed-door' approach. Yushchenko would no longer continue a virtual 'European choice' strategy and the EU would be forced to drop its own virtual policy towards Ukraine. The policy proposals developed in this Occasional Paper outline a possible EU strategy towards Ukraine.
Topic:
International Relations and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

5662. EU-Russian security dimensions

Author:
Dov Lynch
Publication Date:
07-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
EU-Russian security cooperation remains nascent, but some important ground has been cleared since 2000. Yet, the dialogue is neither without ambiguity or problems. It is replete with both. This Occasional Paper examines three facets of EU-Russia security relations. The first chapter, by Hiski Haukkala, compares EU and Russian perceptions of the other in security terms. Haukkala traces the evolution of EU thinking on Russia throughout the 1990s, highlighting the obstacles that held up the development of a strategic vision of the 'partnership'. Following an analysis of how Russia views the EU, he concludes that both have different visions of the other which lie at the source of problems of perception and expectation. In the second chapter, Thomas Gomart concentrates on a single aspect of the EU's Common Strategy on Russia (1999), that of preventive diplomacy, examined through the cases of Belarus and Macedonia. Gomart notes the absence of coordination between the EU and Russia in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans, and stresses the need for greater effort. Gomart notes also the danger of blurring the lines between the 'preventive' and the 'pre-emptive', particularly with regard to counter-terrorism. Anaïs Marin concludes this Occasional Paper with an examination of the Northern Dimension. Marin notes the unique utility of the 'dimensionalist' approach to EU- Russian relations, which takes in a wide range of subjects and different types of actors within a flexible framework. In conclusion, she rejects calls for a greater institutionalisation of the Northern Dimension, arguing that flexibility and 'lightness' are its strength.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

5663. €uros for ESDP – financing EU operations

Author:
Antonio Missiroli
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The financing of EU-led crisis management operations is a somewhat neglected yet nevertheless crucial factor affecting the external effectiveness and internal consistency of the Union's foreign and security policy. Until recently, CFSP's operational acquis has been minimal, its legal underpinning limited and tortuous, its budgetary fundament ludicrous, and its administrative practice mostly contradictory and often fraught with inter-institutional turf battles between Council, Commission and Parliament. With the launch of the first ESDP operations proper (EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Concordia in FYROM) in 2003, the forthcoming Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo and the possible takeover of SFOR after 2004, it has become all the more important and urgent to devise more appropriate arrangements and incentives for common action. The European Convention and the ensuing Intergovernmental Conference represent additional opportunities to be seized. In this respect, the main issues to be addressed regard: a) the speed and readiness of budgetary allocations, on the one hand, and their long-term sustainability, on the other; b) the coherence of the relevant provisions, in both institutional and functional terms, and their consistency with the peculiarities of the EU as an international actor; and c) the degree of transparency, accountability and internal fairness compatible with the imperatives of crisis management. The experience of other international organisations operating in this field (NATO, OSCE, UN) can also be taken into consideration with a view to selecting rules and modalities that may be helpful in tackling the problems highlighted here. First and foremost, it is desirable that the current fragmentation of CFSP expenditure in separate EU budgetary lines be overcome. The appointment of an EU 'Minister for Foreign Affairs' (or whatever title is given to the new foreign policy supremo) is expected to help solve this problem and reduce some inter-institutional tensions and bottlenecks. For example, it is desirable for all expenditure related to civilian crisis management (with the possible exception of the salaries of seconded national personnel) to be borne by the EU bud- get in a more transparent fashion. To this end, the relevant procedures have to be made less tortuous and more flexible. Secondly, expenditure for operations 'having military or defence implications' — in so far as it will remain distinct and separate from the rest — should be pooled in a more systematic, sustainable and explicit manner. Neither the current 'ad hocery' (as exemplified by EUPM and Concordia ) nor the minimalist approach adopted by the Convention's Praesidium (with the proposal of a subsidiary 'start-up' fund) address the essential issues. In fact, if a subsidiary budget has to be set up, then it should be more ambitious and create a long- term basis for covering all the 'common costs' arising from military operations. Such an EU Operational Fund could usefully draw upon the precedent of the European Development Fund and adopt a distinct 'key' for national contributions. Such a 'key' should take into account e.g. the member states' ability to pay but also their ability to contribute in kin through the actual involvement of personnel and equipment in EU operations. It should also be periodically adjustable and help overcome potential 'burden-sharing' disputes inside the Union by setting agreed criteria against which to measure and assess national contributions without resorting to the crude GDP scale. At the same time, the Fund's financial cycle should be the same as that of the EU budget. And, in perspective, the “common costs” thus covered should include also accommodation and transportation costs, especially if the Union develops common capabilities in the fields of strategic lift and logistics. By doing so, the EU would eventually have two main modalities for common operational expenditure at its disposal: the EU budget for all non-military aspects, and the Operational Fund. Both would guarantee a reliable financial perspective. If the separation between civilian and military aspects were ever to be bridged, their merger would not represent a problem. Thirdly, the European Parliament could consider reimbursing those member states who participate in ESDP operations a fixed somme for faitaire to cover partially the per diems of their seconded personnel (civilian as well as military). Such reimbursement could be made through the EU budget annually, ex post facto, with no political conditions attached. On the one hand, it would prove that the EU budget covers not only internal benefits (agriculture and structural funds) but also external commitments. On the other, it would add transparency to ESDP in that the Parliament could organise hearings with experts and officials as well as plenary debates. For their part, the member states would gain an additional incentive – however modest – to provide adequate human resources for external operations. Finally, participating 'third' (and especially remaining and future candidate) countries could well be associated with all these arrangements, either case by case or more systematically. And none of the proposals outlined here necessarily require treaty change, although it would be preferable to insert some 'enabling' clauses in the Constitutional Treaty. All proposals, however, would require collaboration — rather than competition — between EU institutions.
Topic:
Economics, Government, and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Democratic Republic of the Congo

5664. The Galileo satellite system and its security implications

Author:
Gustav Lindström and Giovanni Gasparini
Publication Date:
04-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Aiming to reach operational status in 2008, the Galileo satellite system is planned to offer positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) services worldwide. It will join the ranks of the current GPS and GLONASS systems, allowing users to pinpoint their exact locations. While a civilian project, Galileo also has a security dimension. As a dual-use system, it will offer numerous applications in the security and defence field. PNT services give military planners and commanders means to manage assets, troops and munitions more effectively. Given its global coverage, Galileo will offer a large portion of these services to any interested party, thus opening the door for unintended users and uses. This has implications for the EU and its allies. Even if Galileo remains a civilian project, security issues will persist. With a growing number of users dependent on precise positioning services to carry out their daily functions, economic security would be negatively impacted should there be an intentional or accidental service shutdown. Thus, besides protecting the system from unauthorised use, it will be important to safeguard the system to ensure signal continuity at all times. Given the dual nature of the system, it is critical that European policy-makers consider the security dimensions of Galileo and take practical steps to limit its potential misuse. Among the required steps that need to be taken are: protecting the physical and electronic integrity of the system, establishing a permanent EU-US framework to handle outstanding security issues (such as the 'M-code overlay'), creating a clear chain of command for Galileo, expanding EU capacities to deal with space issues and limiting public regulated service signals (PRS) for security and defence-related purposes.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Europe

5665. Fighting proliferation—European perspectives

Author:
Gustav Lindstrom and Burkard Schmitt
Publication Date:
12-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is important to European policy-makers. This has been especially evident throughout 2003. On 6 June 2003, the European Union unveiled its basic principles for an 'EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD'. Among its first principles, the EU underscores that 'the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction (i.e. biological, chemical and nuclear weapons) and means of delivery such as ballistic missiles constitutes a threat to international peace and security'.
Topic:
Security and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Europe and Central Asia

5666. The South Caucasus: a challenge for the EU

Author:
Dov Lynch
Publication Date:
12-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The South Caucasus contains three states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Geographically, the region is populated by some fifteen million people, links the Caspian Sea basin to the Black Sea on an east-to-west axis, and is the juncture between the greater Middle East, Turkey and Iran, and the Russian Federation. This chapter will introduce a number of themes that run through this Chaillot Paper. The first part examines the nature of the 'transition' that the three South Caucasian states have undergone with a view to understanding the scale of their transformation. A second part discusses dimensions of state weakness across the region. Next, the chapter considers the impact of third parties on regional security/insecurity, and finally it outlines the structure of the volume.
Topic:
Security and International Organization
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, Central Asia, Turkey, Caucasus, Middle East, Soviet Union, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

5667. Partners and neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe

Author:
Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, and Judy Batt
Publication Date:
09-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
This Chaillot Paper is the product of collegial reflection by the EUISS research team. As the current enlargement process moves towards its culmination with the accession of ten new member states in May 2004, its effects are already making themselves felt not only on the internal but also the external policies of the widening Union. New borders and neighbours bring new challenges while reconfiguring old ones. This new reality requires more than just additions to already existing policies. The entire neighbourhood, or proximity, policy of the enlarged EU will have to be reassessed and reformulated.
Topic:
International Relations, International Cooperation, and Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

5668. The European Union and armaments Getting a bigger bang for the Euro

Author:
Burkard Schmitt
Publication Date:
08-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The proposals of the Convention on the Future of Europe and the recent European Commission Communication on a Defence Equipment Policy have revived the debate about the EU's possible involvement in armaments. There is indeed a chance today that a European Agency for Armaments, Research and Capabilities will be set up and anchored in the new EU Treaty. At the same time, there is a growing consensus that the EU Commission should have certain competencies in the field of security-related research, and even the establishment of a common defence equipment market is (again) under discussion.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:
Europe

5669. The European Union and the crisis in the Middle East

Author:
Martin Ortega
Publication Date:
07-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In summer 2000 the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians hosted by President Clinton at Camp David raised the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the most sensitive aspects of their controversy, after almost nine years of difficult but promising exchanges following on from the Madrid Conference of November 1991. Nevertheless, Yasser Arafat's refusal to accept the terms negotiated at Camp David and the outbreak of a second intifada on 28 September 2000 led to a spiral of violence that dashed hopes for peace, leading instead to low-intensity war. Nor did the election of Ariel Sharon as Prime Minister in February 2001 make a return to the negotiating table any easier. The two parties considered that they would have more to gain from acts of violence than from negotiations and agreements. Therefore, violence in the Middle East was the continuation of diplomacy by other means. The external actors did not want, or were unable, to break this vicious circle. The most bitter regional conflict since the Second World War was thus rekindled following a phase of pacification that had appeared to be permanent. The European Union and its member states, but also the European public, viewed this negative development with great concern, because the breakdown of the peace process symbolised the end of a decade of optimism that the international community could promote peace not only in the Middle East but also in many other regions, such as southern Africa, Central America, the Balkans or South-East Asia.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, South Africa, Balkans, Central America, and Southeast Asia

5670. EU cooperative threat reduction activities in Russia

Author:
Burkard Schmitt
Publication Date:
06-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
To strengthen the security structure of an erstwhile enemy, and a country that hard-nosed defence analysts and military planners - think of the last two US Nuclear Posture Reviews – still view as a potential threat, is quite an unorthodox and innovative way to address one's own security concerns. Yet cooperative threat reduction (CTR) has become part and parcel of Western security policy. A considerable number of NATO and European Union (EU) member states are involved in this sort of activity, as is the EU itself, including its most genuinely European actor, the European Commission (EC).
Topic:
International Cooperation and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Soviet Union