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461. National Integrity System Assessment | Albania 2023

Author:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:
The National Integrity System Assessment, a tool developed by Transparency International, merges in-depth research with active stakeholder participation to evaluate the effectiveness of national anti-corruption mechanisms. This assessment aims to evaluate the institutional framework, assessing levels of good governance, transparency, and accountability. It examines the roles and governance structures of independent institutions, the executive, legislature, judiciary, media, political parties, civil society organizations, businesses, and state enterprises, organized into 15 distinct pillars. Authored by IDM’s research team, this report marks Albania’s first assessment of this kind since 2016.
Topic:
Governance, Transparency, and Integrity
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Albania

462. Strengthening Institutional Integrity: A Path to Combat Corruption in Public Administration

Author:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:
Strengthening institutional integrity is crucial for our efforts to combat corruption and enhance trust in public institutions. With this in mind, the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) conducted, for the first time, three social experiments with public administration employees aimed at measuring the culture of silence, tolerance, and reporting of corruption within the public administration. The social experiments involved approximately 70 employees from various public institutions, including the High Prosecutorial Council, the Commissioner for the Right to Information and the Protection of Personal Data, the Department of Public Administration, the General Directorate of Taxes, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, the Ministry of Justice, and the Institute for Public Health. The social experiments generated data for researching the culture of integrity in public administration. The findings will help inform the development of effective strategies for promoting ethical behavior and strengthening integrity within public institutions. Some of the findings from the experiments are: Public administration employees with in-depth knowledge of integrity rules tend to be better informed about suspected irregularities; Loyalty to the group within public administration influences the tolerance of corruption by its members; Public administration employees lack trust in the functioning of internal institutional mechanisms for reporting corrupt actions and unethical behavior; The main factors contributing to the lack of reporting of corrupt actions include employees’ fear of the impact of reporting on their work relationships and the possibility of retaliation. By focusing on the experiences of these three social experiments, we aim to contribute through innovative scientific research to the development of a new work culture oriented toward ethics, transparency, and accountability, thereby contributing to a more trustworthy and sustainable public administration.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Institutions, Identity, and Public Administration
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Albania

463. AI Policy in EU Illiberal Democracies: The Experience in Hungary and Poland

Author:
Filip Konopczyński
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
This paper examines the emergence of AI policies in Hungary and Poland under illiberal governments, and highlights their potential social and political consequences, particularly for democratic values and civil and fundamental rights. It focuses on the adoption of AI in the public sector, encompassing research and development, public administration, law enforcement, migration, and economic policy. In their AI policies, both countries’ governments have prioritized industry demands and subordination to the expectations of large foreign corporations (which is inconsistent with their digital sovereignty rhetoric). Meanwhile, they have neglected societal consultations and the needs of the scientific community. The AI policies implemented in Hungary and Poland by the Fidesz and Law and Justice (PiS) parties) have been characterized, respectively, by centralization and fragmentation, with varying outcomes. The AI systems deployed do not safeguard citizens’ rights as the political takeover of the justice system and partisan control of law enforcement have undermined redress mechanisms and limited legal protection from AI-related violations. The increasing use of AI in election campaigns, coupled with the lack of democratic oversight, increases the risk of mass disinformation campaigns and electoral manipulation in both countries. The cases of Hungary and Poland highlight some key implications for democracy and human rights in the EU where illiberal actors control AI policies and governance and disregard these values. The new EU AI Act may offer some protection for the rule of law and individual rights, but its potential loopholes could allow the unlawful deployment of AI systems in vital areas. AI policies in both countries have reflected their governments’ illiberal tendencies, expanding their control over citizens and curtailing democratic processes. The centralized governance raises concerns about the potential for mass surveillance and censorship, while the lack of transparency and inclusivity in AI policymaking could further marginalize minority groups and vulnerable populations. However, there are key steps that the EU can take to address these issues.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Domestic Politics, Artificial Intelligence, and Illiberal Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, and Hungary

464. Prospects for EU-Türkiye Foreign Policy Cooperation at a Time of Geopolitical Turbulence

Author:
Ian Lesser, Kadri Tastan, Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, and Paul T. Levin
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Over more than six decades, the relationship between Türkiye and the EU has undergone a profound transformation. Just 20 years ago, Türkiye had real aspirations to join the EU. Today, that prospect is a distant memory, and political relations between the two parties are at an all-time low. Despite the prevailing challenges and areas of divergent interests, Türkiye-EU relations continue to exert a significant influence on domestic and foreign policies across much of Europe, particularly with regard to trade, border management, and migration. While the United States may view ties with Türkiye as discretionary at times, for both Türkiye and the EU, engagement remains unavoidable. Furthermore, against a backdrop of geopolitical turmoil and regional instability, the imperative for robust dialogue and collaboration between the EU and Türkiye has never been more pressing. With Türkiye‘s accession process stalled and geopolitical tensions on the rise, the need to reinvigorate and strengthen diplomatic ties has become increasingly evident. From the enduring conflicts in Syria and Iraq to the evolving dynamics surrounding Russia‘s aggression towards Ukraine, the prevailing geopolitical context necessitates a coordinated approach between the two parties. This political report examines the potential for collaboration between Türkiye and the EU, defining the essential preconditions for such cooperation and elucidating its mutual benefits. It also assesses the obstacles that stand in the way of such cooperation and proposes a framework for foreign policy dialogue between Türkiye and the EU, incorporating the views of Türkiye, the EU, and the United States.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Middle East

465. Refugees and Return: Resolving Ukraine's Human Capital Crisis

Author:
Markus Ziener and Dariia Mykhailyshyna
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Ukraine is facing a human capital crisis of enormous proportions. Here, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presents the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees about their intentions to return to Ukraine or remain in their host countries. The report contains some recommendations for encouraging Ukrainians to return. Millions of its citizens fled the country after Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. To share best practices and generate possible solutions, the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), along with its partners—the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development and the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), hosted a conference titled “Toward a Skilled Workforce: Rebuilding Ukraine’s Human Capital” in Berlin on April 25–26, 2024. To set the stage, Dariia Mykhailyshyna of the Center for Economic Strategy in Kyiv presented the findings of three waves of surveys among Ukrainian refugees. Those findings, as well as some recommendations, are detailed in this report.
Topic:
Reconstruction, European Union, Refugees, and Human Capital
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

466. Rebuild, Decarbonize, and Integrate: Ukraine, the EU, and the Road to a Net-Zero Energy Sector

Author:
Jacob Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022. Reconstruction is already underway, but to meet EU accession requirements, Ukraine will have to rapidly decarbonize as it rebuilds. As the frontline situation points to a longer war than was projected early on, uncertainties about Ukraine’s long-term economic path and prospects have inevitably increased. At the same time, noticeable political progress has been made given the EU’s agreement to start negotiations for full Ukrainian membership. This step provides the fighting Ukrainian people with a long-term perspective and a destination point as a prosperous, democratic, European market economy. Anchoring Ukraine’s economic future in the EU will have transformative implications for the country’s economy, not least its energy sector. That sector, which is still exposed to Russian military attacks, is now compelled to assimilate into the rapidly decarbonizing EU. More than half of Ukraine’s power production capacity has been damaged by Russia since February 2022 or is situated on territory now controlled by Russia. The Net Zero World Initiative (2023) estimated that 43% of nuclear, 68% of coal-fired, and 33% of combined heat and power generation was lost to the war as of mid-2023. Despite continuing attacks, more than two gigawatts (GW) of electricity production capacity were restored during 2023. Reconstruction of the Ukrainian energy sector is already underway despite the war. With it, the country’s energy transformation has begun. Yet, in March 2024, Russia returned to large- scale saturation missile attacks against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, including its large hydropower plants and thermal power stations, inflicting further long-term damage. Putin seeks to exploit the apparent drop in Ukrainian air defense efficiency as Western supplies of air interceptor missiles have grown scarcer. Military risk consequently continues to cloud the outlook for Ukraine’s energy production. It also reduces the interest of foreign and domestic investors in committing resources to the sector. Uncertainty plagues the prospects for Western public support for Ukraine, too. Despite the recent passage of a funding package, future US funding will remain hostage to domestic politics. In Europe, various veto players—led by Hungary—as well as other internal divisions pose an ongoing political challenge to the EU’s financial support for Kyiv. The scarcity of public and private investment funding sources for Ukraine stands in stark contrast to the level of ambition for the energy- sector transition inherent in Ukraine’s EU accession process. One of the major energy- sector challenges facing Ukraine will be the expectation in Brussels that Ukraine will either enter fully into the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) or implement an ETS-aligned national carbon-pricing system of similar ambition. It will not be possible for the Ukrainian economy to be granted a prolonged transition period here, and—for instance—enjoy free carbon-emission credits for affected industries, when these same industries will have been partially or fully phased out in the rest of the EU at the time of Ukraine’s EU accession. While the EU ETS price is currently adjusting to the new post-2022 energy shock demand level (for example, prices have declined so far in 2024 to around €60–65/ton), the ETS auction price forward curve slopes upward. This indicates that carbon market participants continue to believe that EU carbon prices will rise during Ukraine’s EU accession process. Adapting the economy to the EU’s carbon price level will require urgent action on the part of the Ukrainian government as it prepares the long-term National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) that will lay out the country’s energy strategy for the rest of the 2020s. Certainly, Ukraine’s Environmental Protection Minister, Ruslan Strilets, displayed the necessary ambition when he spoke after the UN Climate Change Conference (COP28) in Dubai in late 2023. He reiterated earlier government statements from 2021 and committed Ukraine to launching a pilot emissions trading system in 2025 with a full launch in 2026. This would enable Ukraine’s entry into the ETS, and thus avoid negative effects of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) for Ukrainian exports. This is a timetable that necessitates immediate and sizable climate investments in Ukraine. Ukraine has further committed itself in recent months to a significant scaling up of its already large nuclear power-generation capacity. The Ukrainian government has signed memoranda of understanding aiming at the construction of up to nine new power units using Westinghouse AP1000 technology. Just as the accelerated introduction of carbon pricing in Ukraine will be costly, construction of new nuclear power units, even if located at one of Ukraine’s existing nuclear plant facilities, will require large sums of capital investment upfront. The issue of upfront costs will similarly weigh on the broader issue of reconstruction of Ukraine, as more energy- efficient buildings will only gradually earn back the higher building and materials costs through lower long-term energy consumption. Ukraine must be applauded for aiming to seize the opportunity to rebuild its energy sector and integrate it with the EU as quickly as possible. This follows the recommendations of several expert groups, including GMF’s earlier (2023) report on this issue, which called for rapid Ukrainian adoption of carbon pricing and highlighted the need to phase in EU-level building codes expeditiously. This paper will focus on the implications for both Ukraine and the EU of the Ukrainian government’s recent energy-sector choices. What do these plans require institutionally and financially to succeed, and how will they alter not only the Ukrainian but the entire EU energy sector in the process?
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Energy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Net Zero
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

467. Rethinking Industrial Policy for Central and Eastern Europe

Author:
Michal Hrubý
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) is increasingly important in the EU’s manufacturing landscape. The region’s export-oriented economies became an integral part of it through foreign direct investment—supported primarily by EU funding, including Cohesion Policy programs for regional and industrial development, and by national state spending. With its competitiveness at stake, the EU now focuses on industrial policy for cutting-edge technologies with high capital intensity. Many of its new regulations loosen state aid rules to allow generous support by governments to attract investors, which poses a problem for member states with less fiscal room to do so, including the CEE countries. This report discusses the opportunities and challenges for CEE countries to build manufacturing with potential to grow and to increase domestic value-added. It examines two case studies in the region: batteries and semiconductors, and their position in the value chains in Czechia and Hungary. Hungary has become one of the EU’s leading battery industry hubs and plays a key role in the drive toward self- sufficiency in this field. Its success came principally through government spending on investment promotion. Key issues have arisen regarding the environmental sustainability of new investments, the decision to attract cheap foreign labor without any appropriate long-term labor policy, and the lack of knowledge spillover from multinational companies to small and medium domestic ones to improve their value-chain position. New large investments announced by Chinese companies also raise geopolitical and security issues. With its broad innovation and R&D strategy and record low unemployment, Czechia did not make attracting large investments a priority before the COVID-19 pandemic. This has changed and its semiconductor industry is well- placed to draw in new investments in the micro- and nanoelectronics value chain. Czechia has started to support the industry through state aid for a handful of domestic and foreign companies, due to its strategic importance, its high value-added in production output, and the opportunity for stimulating R&D and high-skill employment. These case studies reveal key takeaways for Central and Eastern Europe. First, industrial policy based on state aid in small open economies are costly and will not generate long-term benefits if it is oriented solely at production tasks as in the past. Investment must bring innovation and R&D. Second, CEE countries should make financing innovation and R&D the priority, not subsidizing new manufacturing projects. They should rationalize their policy objectives and update and stick to their national strategies. Third, tight budgets and financial consolidation put pressure on selecting projects for state aid. Governments should not provide this aid without a solid cost-benefit analysis of the investments. Fourth, the CEE countries should consolidate the too broad innovation priorities within their national strategies and analyze their long-term growth potential. Fifth, industrial policy must be accompanied by appropriate labor and education policies to support the green and digital transition.
Topic:
Economics, Industrial Policy, Science and Technology, Innovation, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

468. Next-Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser, Joshua Stone, Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, and Francesca Ghiretti
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The papers in this compendium were written by 11 members of the 2024 Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) delegation: Alicja Bachulska, Viking Bohman, Francesca Ghiretti, Heather Hwalek, Leland Lazarus, Lauren Racusin, Friso Stevens, Joshua Stone, Brian Volsky, Theresa Winter, Adrienne Wu. Transatlantic attention to Taiwan has surged in recent years for several reasons. First, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has led to increased concern in the United States and Europe that Beijing’s growing military capabilities and declining confidence in its ability to achieve peaceful reunification will soon lead the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to attempt a takeover of Taiwan by force. The cost of such a war would carry a price tag of around $10 trillion, equal to about 10% of global GDP, according to Bloomberg Economics, far higher than the economic impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine. The devastating impact of a Taiwan Strait conflict has provided a wake-up call for leaders in Europe who now echo the Biden administration’s warnings to PRC leader Xi Jinping to refrain from using violence to change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In addition, Taiwan is now a regular agenda item in the US-EU Consultations on the Indo-Pacific and the US-EU Dialogue on China. Second, intensifying US-China strategic competition has increasingly focused on technology with chips at the center. Taiwan produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors and more than 90% of the most advanced ones. A single company, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), manufactures most of those chips. Recognition of Taiwan’s dominant role in the semiconductor supply chain has provided another reason to bolster deterrence. It has also sparked interest in “friendshoring” and “onshoring” semiconductor manufacturing. TSMC plans to start production at its first fab in Arizona in 2025 and will break ground on another in Dresden at the end of 2024 with an estimated completion date of 2027. Recognizing the rising geopolitical risks and their own strategic dependencies, the United States and the EU have made building resilient supply chains a priority, especially in semiconductors. In its 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy, Brussels explicitly committed the EU to engaging with Taiwan in creating resilient supply chains. Third, rising concern in the United States and Europe about election interference and disinformation have sparked interest in learning from Taiwan’s experience in combatting such threats. In the run-up to the January 13, 2024, presidential and legislative elections, PRC attempts to interfere in Taiwan’s politics surged to unprecedented levels through economic coercion, direct political meddling, displays of military force, and manipulation of social media. As the United States and many European countries prepare for their own national elections this year, they are engaging with experts from Taiwan to better understand PRC tactics and the tools that Taiwan successfully employed to counter PRC interference. Fourth, the United States and Europe increasingly recognize that Taiwan’s vibrant and successful democracy is under threat from an authoritarian regime. Taiwan has received high marks for protecting political rights and holding free and fair elections. Taiwan’s democratic achievements are even more impressive when set against the backdrop of a deterioration in freedom worldwide. Like other industrialized democracies, Taiwan faces a multitude of challenges that are especially difficult to address in the face of PRC efforts that prevent Taiwan’s government and its people from interacting with the world. Taiwan’s exclusion from international organizations also hampers the world’s ability to develop effective solutions to myriad problems. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals from the United States to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. In 2022, TUPP was expanded to include young professionals from Europe in support of GMF’s mission of promoting transatlantic cooperation. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, DC, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The 2024 TUPP cohort traveled to Taiwan in February for an intense week of meetings and activities. Each participant gained insights into Taiwan and its role in their respective fields. This year’s delegation comprised five Americans and five Europeans. Over time, TUPP seeks to create a body of global experts with firsthand knowledge of Taiwan who support sustaining and expanding its international ties. I am grateful to the Henry Luce Foundation, the Global Taiwan Institute, and the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy for their support of this goal. The contributions here, written by the entire 2024 TUPP delegation, underscore the importance of deeper study and understanding of Taiwan. I sincerely hope that they stimulate continued transatlantic and global interest in Taiwan and its future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Trade
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Taiwan, Asia, Poland, Germany, Latin America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

469. Time Is Almost Up

Author:
Martin Quencez and Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The transatlantic partnership has long neglected structural weaknesses. Unless corrected, they could soon doom it. Download PDF 2025 will open a new chapter for the transatlantic relationship. The outcome of the US presidential election will accelerate ongoing changes in the country’s approach to Europe, while a rapidly shifting security environment will compel the partners to reform their alliance. The next year presents an important opportunity to do this, especially as the terms of the European Commission and the US president coincidentally align. When Joe Biden was elected four years ago, many European leaders expressed the hope that, in the president’s words, “the US is back” in the transatlantic relationship. The change of administration in Washington could have constituted an opportunity for the transatlantic partners to “seize the Biden moment”, but critical reforms never took place. Instead, the Democrat’s election relieved many European governments, prompting a continued reliance on muddling through critical challenges rather than developing European responses to them. The US administration, for its part, did not sufficiently pressure Europeans to play a greater role in world affairs. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine forced Europeans and the EU to respond with costly and unprecedented measures, but these policies remain to this day largely disconnected from a broader political discourse of the war as an “existential” threat to the future of the European project. Europe’s avoidance of such big-picture issues has negative implications for its ties to the United States. The current transatlantic relationship suffers from four major challenges that, unless tackled in the next four years, could lead, at best, to its dysfunction and, at worst, to its implosion. These challenges are: security-related structural problems, intra-alliance competition and policy toward China, a European gamble on time, and a widening power gap between the United States and Europe. Transatlantic Security Reform: Ukraine Has Muted The Debate The swift, coordinated, and strong reaction of the United States and Europe to the war in Ukraine is undoubtedly the most significant moment of transatlantic unity in recent years. US military and strategic leadership, and Biden’s personal involvement in overcoming Congressional resistance to supporting Ukraine, will constitute the cornerstones of his legacy in Europe. The continent has also done its part, providing significant military and humanitarian support—at times even surpassing that from the United States. All this has brought the transatlantic partners closer together while bolstering public approval of NATO. Sustaining unity on Ukraine, although an outstanding diplomatic and political success, has, however, overshadowed a more complex picture of the transatlantic relationship. The war’s outbreak put American security guarantees for Europe in the spotlight, but more contentious policy issues have been neglected. Prioritizing Ukraine over other aspects of the transatlantic relationship was justified, but it prevented the allies from preparing for potential future crises. This is unsustainable and dangerous. Persistent security-related structural problems may seem paradoxical. After all, 23 of the 32 NATO allies finally invested, as pledged a decade earlier, at least 2% of GDP in defense in 2024. The EU has also stepped up its efforts in this area. Nevertheless, two underlying problems fester. First, Europe’s chronic capability shortage means the United States still contributes more than 65% of the NATO allies’ total defense spending and 38% of their military personnel. NATO’s so-called European pillar remains underdeveloped, and Europe cannot defend itself on its own. Second, European and transatlantic security suffers from a lack of imagination. The Biden administration has demonstrated that it can defend the European security order, and Europeans have unquestionably overcome many political taboos to support Ukraine, but policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have been unable, or unwilling, to develop a vision for a needed new security order. A post-Cold War approach to alliance management has led the Biden administration and many European allies to preserve a form of status quo while the world undergoes considerable change. At the same time, there remains in certain political circles a desire to recreate the prewar relationship with Moscow, especially as a chronic lack of political leadership in key Western capitals impedes the development of an ambitious strategic agenda. Transatlantic leaders have repeatedly and rightly stated that Ukrainians will decide when they stop fighting, but this stance hides the lack of transatlantic consensus on a postwar European order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Transatlantic Relations, and Presidential Elections
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

470. Is the G7 still relevant?

Author:
Raffaele Trombetta
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In the first of our new Expert Analysis series, former Italian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Raffaele Trombetta, draws on his career experience to answer the question of whether the G7 is still relevant in today’s international order. Detailing a narrative of the G7’s history, confronting its challenges, and addressing its common criticisms, this paper deals with the alternatives (G20 and BRICS), as well as where the G7’s interests should lie in future relations with China and the African nations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, G20, G7, BRICS, and International Order
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Europe, and Asia