Europe' reactions to its recently-constituted Muslim communities reflect its implicit self-image of cultural homogeneity, despite a long tradition of endless cultural adaption. This, in turn, is a facet of the persistance of an Orientalist vision which stimulates its opposed mirror-image, Occidentalism or Orientalism-in-reverse, as those communities react with a sense of profound alienation. The two interact to generate the cultural and political confrontation that typifies inter-communal relations today, constructing a new inter-communal socio-political boundary that could harden into a permanent divide of mutual hostility. It is this, far more than globalised salafi-jihadism, that explains the political extremism confronting European states today.
Application of the federal principle of shared sovereignty to external security policies directed against foreign states can easily give rise to a situation in which the federation ceases to be an indivisible subject in an international setting. This can in turn lead to conflicts between the two levels. A comparison of three instances of sanctions adopted by federated states - the sanction policies of Massachusetts in support of the democratisation of Myanmar/Burma (1996-2000), the divestment policies of Illinois in opposition to the governmental policies of Sudan (2006- ), and the participation by Flanders in Belgian and European sanctions in protest against the Freedom Party's participation in the Austrian government (2000) - confirms this thesis.
New Democracy's victory in the March 2004 Greek elections immediately raised questions about the continued development of the process of rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, which had started five years earlier in 1999. However, concerns were misplaced. The incoming administration made it clear that it intended to maintain the policy of détente. Like the previous PASOK government, it sought to minimise the role of Cyprus as a factor in bilateral relations and continued to support Turkey's membership of the European Union. Where differences did arise between New Democracy and PASOK, they appeared to be more a result of the differing styles of George Papandreou and Petros Molyviatis, the two foreign ministers, than as a result of any significant disparity in basic foreign policy principles.
The European Union's difficulty in functioning is a result in large measure of its decision-making mechanisms, which expose any measure to a veto by a scant minority or even a single state. The flexible model of Europe, and that is of differentiated integration, attempts to overcome this deadlock. The flexible model is based on the simple and reasonable idea that a member state which dissents is not obligated to associate itself with a certain initiative, but cannot block the others from carrying it out. In certain "virtuous" conditions, flexibility does not imply a risk of breaking up the Union. On the contrary, it offers a dynamic instrument to reconcile the requirements of unity and diversity and promote the process of European integration.
While attributing the main tasks relating to CFSP to various institutions, the EU Treaty mirrors the traditional EU structure, which does not appear to be able to provide the coherence and efficiency needed in the foreign policy field. The Constitutional Treaty attempted to achieve coherence by introducing important changes, including an EU Minister for Foreign Affairs (the "double-hatting" solution). After the CT ratification failures, however, thinking must be directed at finding steps that lead towards the CT solutions but are at the same time compatible with the TEU. While double-hatting is difficult to reconcile with some of the TEU's provisions, other measures and devices could to some extent anticipate the CT's perspective without contravening the treaties in force.
The prospect of transatlantic cooperation in the field of defence systems depends on reaching an acceptable point of equilibrium. Without it, Europe would find the strategic, political, economic, and industrial risks of total American predominance in this field (with the consequent loss of technical and production expertise) unacceptable. The reduction of the gap between Europe and the United States depends on the integration of the European defence market. This must not be seen as a risk for transatlantic collaboration, but as an opportunity. Building up a transatlantic market could also improve the efficiency of the American market by increasing competition. This collaboration, based not on bilateral, national, or multilateral agreements, but instead on bi-continental cooperation, is the challenge that Europe and the United States must face and meet together.
In its European Security Strategy, the European Union defined the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a strategic partner and envisaged comprehensive cooperation with it, including in the security sector. China and the EU often use the same terms, but the connotation of these terms differs due to fundamentally different security concerns. This article critically assesses the possibilities, prospects and difficulties from a European point of view of pursuing Sino-European cooperation in security matters. It concludes that given basic differences in perception, cooperation is likely to be successful in such fields as environmental disasters and pandemics, but will remain limited in such areas as non-proliferation, the fight against terrorism and energy security.
The Chinese arms embargo issue has gone beyond Sino-European bilateral relations to become a matter of significance - and concern - for East Asian and US policymakers. Thus, an eventual solution depends not only on the interplay between EU and Chinese policymakers' interests and considerations, but is now interconnected with China's domestic developments and regional posture, the security concerns of China's neighbours (especially Japan and Taiwan), the evolution of US-China relations and transatlantic relations.