Savage Century: Back to Barbarism By Thérèse Delpech, Translated By George Holoch Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 211 pages, $21.24 Reviewed by William J. Peterson Jr.
Bunton: Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, 1917-1936 Reviewed by Michael R. Fischbach Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 38, no. 9 (Winter 2009), p. 96 Recent Books Colonial Land Policies in Palestine, 1917-1936, by Martin Bunton. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Oxford Historical Monographs. x + 204 pages. Select Bibliography top. 214. Index top. 217. $110.00 cloth.
In this age of globalization, nations rise and fall in the world markets day and night. Europe, Germany in particular, may at first have indulged in a certain amount of schadenfreude to observe the abrupt fall from grace of the U.S. financial system. But not for long. As of November 2008, the euro zone is officially in a recession that continues to deepen. Germany's government was compelled to enact a 50 billion euro fiscal stimulus package. The Japanese economy, though perhaps among the least susceptible to the vagaries of the European and U.S. economies, followed soon after, with analysts fearing that the downturn could prove deeper and longer than originally anticipated. The U.S.—Europe—Japan triad, representing the world's three largest economies, is in simultaneous recession for the first time in the post-World War II era. China, meanwhile, is suddenly seeing its 30-year economic dynamism lose steam, with its mighty export machine not just stalling but actually slipping into reverse.
In the latter half of the 1990s, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was preparing to expand its membership for the first time since the admission of Spain in 1982, Russian officials claimed that the entry of former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO would violate a solemn ''pledge'' made by the governments of West Germany and the United States in 1990 not to bring any former Communist states into the alliance. Anatolii Adamishin, who was Soviet deputy foreign minister in 1990, claimed in 1997 that ''we were told during the German reunification process that NATO would not expand.'' Other former Soviet officials, including Mikhail Gorbachev, made similar assertions in 1996—1997. Some Western analysts and former officials, including Jack F. Matlock, who was the U.S. ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990, endorsed this view, arguing that Gorbachev received a ''clear commitment that if Germany united, and stayed in NATO, the borders of NATO would not move eastward.'' Pointing to comments recorded by the journalists Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, former U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara averred that ''the United States pledged never to expand NATO eastward if Moscow would agree to the unification of Germany.'' According to this view, ''the Clinton administration reneged on that commitment . . . when it decided to expand NATO to Eastern Europe.''
Topic:
NATO and Government
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, North Atlantic, Moscow, Germany, and Spain
The purpose of the present quantitative study is to explain the international terrorism activities in Western Europe. The data set contains information on terrorismrelated events in West European countries (data has been collected for the period from 1968-2008) and includes information about tactical, political or geographical criteria. International terrorism has been an important part of the Contemporary European History, the trend is not going to disappear and we need foresight tools to know the threat.
In reflecting on the extensive literature and research on intelligence failures and particularly that which ensued in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, Indonesia and those in Europe, this analysis concludes that intelligence, and particularly Western intelligence, cannot be completely at fault for the failure to identify appropriately and forewarn about the occurrence of historical discontinuity events. Western policymakers, economic advisers, as well as socio-economic elites' performance throughout the 1980s and 1990s reveals flaws in long-term policy planning and decision-making with serious repercussions for strategic intelligence analysis. The inability to forecast historical discontinuity events is a key element of intelligence and policy which needs further revision.
Turkey and Armenia are close to settling a dispute that has long roiled Caucasus politics, isolated Armenia and cast a shadow over Turkey's European Union (EU) ambition. For a decade and a half, relations have been poisoned by disagreement about issues including how to address a common past and compensate for crimes, territorial disputes, distrust bred in Soviet times and Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani land. But recently, progressively intense official engagement, civil society interaction and public opinion change have transformed the relationship, bringing both sides to the brink of an historic agreement to open borders, establish diplomatic ties and begin joint work on reconciliation. They should seize this opportunity to normalise. The politicised debate whether to recognise as genocide the destruction of much of the Ottoman Armenian population and the stalemated Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh should not halt momentum. The U.S., EU, Russia and others should maintain support for reconciliation and avoid harming it with statements about history at a critical and promising time.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, Genocide, Regional Cooperation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Turkey, Caucasus, Asia, Soviet Union, Armenia, and Azerbaijan