Despite the recession, the United States and Europe remain each other's most important foreign commercial markets. No other commercial artery in the world is as integrated and fused as the transatlantic economy. We estimate that the transatlantic economy continues to generate close to $4.28 trillion in total commercial sales a year and employs up to 14 million workers in mutually “onshored” jobs on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Bilateral Relations
The international financial institutions dramatically increased their lending in 2008–09 to help developing countries cope with the global financial crisis and support economic recovery. Today, these organizations are seeking billions of dollars in new funding. The IMF, which only a few years ago was losing clients and shedding staff, expanded by $750 billion last year. The World Bank and the four regional development banks for Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America are asking to increase their capital base by 30 to 200 percent. A general capital increase (GCI) for these development banks is an unusual request. A simultaneous GCI request is a once-in-a-generation occurrence.
Topic:
International Relations, International Monetary Fund, Financial Crisis, and World Bank
During the height of the Cold War, the Arctic region was considered a geostrategic and geopolitical playground for the United States and the Soviet Union, as strategic bombers and nuclear submarines crossed over and raced below the polar cap. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Arctic region significantly diminished in strategic importance to the United States. Twenty years later, senior U.S. military and diplomatic officials have turned their attention once again to the Arctic region but in a far different way than during the Cold War.
Topic:
Cold War
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Soviet Union
In the summer of 2009, the head of a prominent public relations consulting firm in Brussels told me that he had once tried to work with Bulgaria in the 1990s. After two years, however, the leadership of the firm concluded that Bulgaria was not yet ready to seriously engage with Europe, and they abandoned their attempts to work with the country. Since that time, Bulgaria has gained European Union membership while the same public relations head has gone on to successfully represent governmentlevel interests of other Eastern European states that are not EU members to this day. I was curious about this disconnect. Was this a function of the time that had passed and the progress that Bulgaria had made since the 1990s? Had this firm simply failed to read the tea leaves properly on Bulgaria? As I looked more deeply into the issue, however, it became clear that the story of Bulgaria in the late 20th and early 21st centuries is not so straightforward. Transitioning politically, geographically prone to conflict, new to capitalism and rife with corruption and organized crime, post-communist Bulgaria seemed to be a new Wild West – with all the same risk, but perhaps the same rewards, too.
It is my thesis that the national security risk posed by Russian energy policies are only tangentially related to Europe's dependency on Russian energy imports. The primary energy risk to Europe, and especially to the newer EU members, stems from the corrosive effect this dependency has on governance and on transatlantic cooperation. Moscow's divide-and-conquer tactics have successfully prevented greater inter-European cooperation on both economic and security issues. As we shall see, these factors have added to already existing strains in the U.S.-Europe relationship. Further NATO enlargement has been stopped, in part, due to Moscow's energy ties with the wealthier Western European states. It is in the U.S. interest to assist those Eastern and Central European (ECE) states that are highly dependent on Russian energy imports and are most susceptible to imported corruption. Kremlin officials, supported by 60 percent of Russian public opinion, favor reestablishing Soviet-era control or influence over ECE countries. The threat to the sovereignty of these new democracies cannot be dismissed.
Despite a growing interest in African political parties, no comparative analyses of political ideology in Africa have been undertaken to date. This study addresses this shortcoming by applying the Manifesto Research Group's (MRG) coding scheme to a complete set of African party manifestos in three African countries. The study's main aim is to determine whether a research tool that has been seminal in the study of Western politics can be used to study political parties in nonindustrialized societies. In a first step the study examines the extent to which African manifestos advance programmatic ideas. Although most parties fail to do so, results indicate drastic differences between parties. The study subsequently investigates how African parties position themselves on a right–left spectrum. Most parties show a bias towards the political Left. Finally, the study examines the stance of individual parties on specific policy issues such as democracy and human rights, education, corruption, youth and women, and intercommunal relations. The study argues that although the MRG scheme has been designed against the historical background of European politics, it can be applied to advance the study of African parties.
The Balkans face more trouble in Kosovo as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina unless the United States and European Union take dramatic steps to get both back on track towards EU membership. In Bosnia, the international community needs to reconstitute itself as well as support an effort to reform the country's constitution. In Kosovo, Pristina and Belgrade need to break through the barriers to direct communication and begin discussions on a wide range of issues. This brief proposes specific diplomatic measures to meet these needs.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Relations, Diplomacy, and Ethnic Conflict
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, and Balkans
EU policy towards the southern Mediterranean remains painfully fragmented across different lines: member state initiatives vs. EU initiatives; bilateral EU policies vs. multilateral frameworks. Underpinning these tensions is an ongoing 'securitization' of the Mediterranean debate which centres on threats emanating from the South, including Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and immigration–or on challenges such as energy. On the other hand, the stated European goal in the region remains the advancement of EU norms and values–to be attained primarily through governance reforms aimed at improving the rule of law. This article will exemplify these discourses by focusing on the case of Italy's Mediterranean policy. In conclusion it sets out two competing scenarios for the future development of Euro-Mediterranean discourse: one based in normative logic termed 'making democracy work'; the other rooted in security logic and termed 'good enough governance'.
In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, it is important to review the present arrangements for the institutional representation of the European Union in international organisations, and more broadly, in the processes of international negotiations and the way the EU acts as contracting party to conventions of international law.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, and Governance