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1. Together or Alone? Policy Brief The need for increased Albanian-Dutch cooperation to fight transnational organised crime

Author:
Alban Dafa and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In recent years the Netherlands has voiced security-related concerns about the involvement of Albanians nationals in organised crime in the Netherlands. These concerns culminated in a request to the European Commission to suspend visa-free travel for Albanians to the EU. This policy brief argues that the current Dutch approach does not provide the best means to address issues of organised crime, such as drug trafficking, related to Albanian nationals. It identifies several inadequacies in the crime data used to substantiate the Dutch position and the way Dutch authorities publicly communicate them. It posits that greater bilateral cooperation beyond the EU accession framework could improve efforts to fight transnational organised crime effectively. The opening of EU accession negotiations with Albania may offer a window of opportunity to formulate a constructive agenda of cooperation beyond the formal EU enlargement framework. This policy brief was written by Alban Dafa from the Institute for Democracy and Mediation and Wouter Zweers (the Clingendael Institute).
Topic:
Security, Law Enforcement, Transnational Actors, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Europe, Albania, and Netherlands

2. A Blacklist is (Almost) Born: Building a resilient EU human rights sanctions regime

Author:
Clara Portela
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In December 2018, the Council of the European Union initiated discussions about the creation of a new sanctions regime designed to address gross human rights violations, following a proposal from the Netherlands. So far, the EU only operates three thematic sanctions regimes: those targeting terrorism, cyberattacks and chemical weapons attacks. Unlike classical sanctions packages addressing crises in specific countries, such as Guinea or Venezuela, horizontal sanctions regimes apply to individuals and entities considered to have committed severe human rights abuses. Once approved, the planned blacklist is set to become the EU’s fourth horizontal sanctions regime, enlarging its vast body of autonomous sanctions regimes, i.e. restrictions adopted in the absence of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate. Over a year after the initial Dutch proposal was tabled, the sanctions regime is still under discussion, which contrasts with the rapid adoption of previous thematic regimes. On first inspection, the slow pace of preparations is puzzling: the vast majority of EU sanctions regimes were traditionally imposed in response to human rights breaches.3 Most EU autonomous sanctions regimes currently in force cite human rights violations as the rationale for their adoption. Indeed, the emphasis on human rights as a key motivation for the imposition of sanctions sets EU autonomous sanctions apart from the practice of other international sanctions senders like the United Nations (UN).4 Given that the promotion of human rights is a centrepiece of EU foreign policy, consensus among member states in support of such a regime should be forthcoming. If human rights breaches constitute the dominant motivation for the imposition of EU autonomous sanctions, what is holding up the approval of the prospective regime? Designing a horizontal sanctions regime in the EU is a much harder task than meets the eye. The present Brief aims to unravel the challenges that make it difficult for this regime to take shape, and suggests ways in which the obstacles identified may be surmounted or, at the very least, mitigated.
Topic:
Human Rights, Sanctions, European Union, and Transnational Actors
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

3. Cyber Conflict Uncoded: The EU and conflict prevention in cyberspace

Author:
Patryk Pawlak, Eneken Tikk, and Mika Kerttunen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
When the Supreme Leader of Iran promised revenge in response to the killing of General Suleimani in January 2020, the possibility of offensive cyber operations against US targets was suggested. Eventually, Iran resorted to a more conventional response, launching missiles against US military bases in Iraq. However, this episode points to a shift in our understanding of what conflict means. In January 2019, the French Minister of Armed Forces, Florence Parly, stated that “cyber warfare has begun and France must be ready to fight it” as she announced the new French Military Cyber Strategy. In a similar vein, the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, announced in September 2019 that Britain is “at war every day” due to constant cyber-attacks from Russia and elsewhere and warned that with the evolving character of warfare, the distinction between peace and war no longer exists in the modern world. The proliferation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), both the expansion of usage and the increased availability of harmful means, has brought about new ways of power projection. Political and economic contestation between states now involves targeted cyber-attacks against other countries’ utilities, financial networks, election infrastructure and governance systems. Cyber-attacks – a deliberate use of malicious software for exploiting or altering computer code, data or logic to cause harm – offer new methods to target internet infrastructure, telecommunications networks, information systems, as well as computers and computer systems. Such activities might have the objective of destroying or affecting the proper functioning of these systems with adverse effects for their users – whether states, companies, public service providers or individuals. As a result, power projection does not have to involve tanks or missiles; nor does it have to result in direct death and destruction comparable to armed conflict. Confrontation is, however, a constant in states’ ambitions, attitudes and capabilities, blurring the line between war and peace. This Conflict Series Brief examines the current practices and future possibilities of preventive action in relation to conflict in cyberspace. When categorising state uses of ICTs as a form of conflict, attention should be paid to three considerations. First, hostile uses of ICTs rarely occur outside of a pre-existing or broader politico-military dispute. Second, a malicious state use of ICTs can lead to an escalation in pre-existing adversarial relations. Third, the use of cyber capabilities in a conflict situation often includes the targeting of civilian infrastructure and therefore has wide-ranging implications for the proper functioning of societies. Against this background, this Brief argues that the use of malicious cyber tools for power projection can and must be prevented.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Transnational Actors, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Technology and the Future of Work

Author:
Ian Goldin
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
Recent decades have seen rapid increases in the use of robots and rapid advances in artificial intelligence, driven particularly by improvements in machine learning. From games like chess and Go to speech recognition and image recognition, machines have come to outperform humans in an expanding range of activities. This development has motivated many attempts to gauge the impact on the future of work for humans. Frey and Osborne estimate that 47% of total US employment is in jobs at high risk of automation within the next decade or two. Arntz, Gregory, and Zierahn in turn estimate the figure is 9% in the USA and 10% in UK, while PwC estimate 38% in the USA, 35% in Germany, 30% in the UK, and 21% in Japan are at risk. This policy paper reviews the relationships between automation, artifical intelligence, and jobs, a retrospective look at technological upheavel throughout history, and what the future of work looks like by country and sector. Additionally, the paper considers the transformation, redistribution, and recognition of what work looks like globally as a byproduct of new technologies, as well as the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on the future of work. Case studies from India and the Philippines provides prominent success stories of developing countries creating tradeable services industries, while two examples from Nordic countries and Estonia highlight novel policies in developed countries to ensure the benefits of new technologies are widely shared. Finally, Goldin provides recommendations for governments, international agencies, and other partners to to support employment and inclusive growth in the face of technological change.
Topic:
Science and Technology, International Security, Transnational Actors, Artificial Intelligence, and Workforce
Political Geography:
Europe, South Asia, India, East Asia, and United States of America

5. Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020

Author:
Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Denis Cenusa, Tamara Kovziridze, and Veronika Movchan
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With the bold title EasternPartnership policy beyond 2020: Reinforcing Resilience – an Eastern Partnershipthat delivers for all, the recent EU Joint Communication offers a broad array of policy orientations but little operational specificity, find the authors of this commentary. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – each with EU Association Agreements, requested a ‘quadrilogue’ with the EU to deal with matters of common concern to them but not the other EaP states. The fact that this request was not granted is a glaring omission from the Communication, but one that could still be corrected at the EaP summit on June 18th. The summit should also agree the policy direction of the EU and the Eastern partner states beyond 2020, and include the many transnational issues worthy of quadrilateral consultations. Among these issues is how the revision of major EU policies, such as those on energy, climate and competition, may affect the associated states.
Topic:
Climate Change, Partnerships, Transnational Actors, Resilience, Energy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia