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102. Balkan Csárdás: Hungarian Foreign Policy Dance
- Author:
- Srđan Cvijić, Ivana Ranković, Luka Šterić, Maja Bjeloš, and Marko Drajic
- Publication Date:
- 05-2023
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
- Abstract:
- Since Orbán reassumed power in 2010, the Hungarian government has taken a more active role in the Western Balkans. In a short time period, it has increased its political and economic footprint. This paper is one of few all-encompassing efforts to explain Hungarian policy and involvement in the Western Balkans, and it attempts to do so by asking the following questions: What interests and strategic considerations drive Hungarian foreign and trade policy in the region? Who formulates foreign policy priorities in Hungary and what is the interplay between formal and informal actors? What economic interests shape Hungarian foreign policy in the region? How much has Hungarian foreign policy in the region changed as a result of the war in Ukraine? To answer these questions, this paper is divided into four main sections. The first focuses on Hungary’s foreign policy strategy in the region. The second, as a special case study, investigates the effects of Orbán’s minority politics in Serbia’s Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (Vajdaság in Hungarian). The third, researching the Hungarian media empire in the region, and finally the fourth focuses on the economic drivers of Hungary’s approach in the region. The paper builds upon numerous secondary sources and online and in-person interviews conducted with 19 government representatives, politicians, foreign policy experts, scholars, and journalists from Hungary, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Trade, Regional Economy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Western Balkans
103. Relations between Brazil and the European Union in a time of permanent crisis: Reflections and proposals for action
- Author:
- Kai Lehmann
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
- Abstract:
- The publication "Brazil-EU Relations in Times of Persistent Crisis" provides a comprehensive analysis of the complex relationship between Brazil and the European Union, highlighting the strategic importance of this partnership in a globally crisis-ridden context. The EU, Brazil's second-largest trading partner and the largest foreign investor in the country, plays a crucial role in Brazil's trade balance, while Brazil has emerged as a key supplier of agricultural products to the European bloc. However, the relationship faces significant challenges amid global crises. Difficulties in ratifying the EU-Mercosur Agreement and disagreements over the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022 exemplify the tensions that have developed in recent years. Despite this, cooperation between the two regions remains relevant, with substantial progress in deepening relations, as evidenced by the revitalization of diplomatic ties and the reactivation of the EU-CELAC summit in 2023. The publication explores four critical areas of this relationship—multilateralism, trade, environmental cooperation, and energy security—identifying barriers to fully realizing the potential of bilateral cooperation and proposing concrete actions to overcome them. It suggests rebuilding and revitalizing dialogue structures, strengthening civil society and academic participation, and focusing on practical, tangible outcomes that benefit both parties. Additionally, it emphasizes aligning political strategies around common goals, particularly in environmental and energy security issues, which are crucial for the stability and advancement of Brazil-EU relations. Based on a series of events organized by the Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI) and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) in Brazil, the document proposes a strategic path to strengthen this long-standing partnership, making it more resilient and adaptable to current and future global challenges.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Agriculture, European Union, Partnerships, Multilateralism, Trade, and Energy Security
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Brazil, and South America
104. Shared fortunes: Why Britain, the European Union, and Africa need one another
- Author:
- Nicholas Westcott
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Britain and Africa are deeply connected through their history and people as much as through trade, investment, aid, and culture. They can both benefit greatly from this relationship – especially in areas where their interests converge, including economic development, security, education, and climate. But political forces on both sides could push them apart – even as, increasingly, Britain needs Africa more than Africa needs Britain. The British government and the EU need to understand the relationship in its geostrategic context – the influence of China, Russia, Gulf states, and others affects African countries’ views on their place in the world. A closer and more responsive relationship between Britain, Africa, and the EU would have significant benefits for all sides – partly because each is weaker individually than they are together, and because Britain still has strengths that are most useful in cooperation with others. But this will only be possible if the British government significantly changes its approach to Europe as well as to Africa.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, European Union, Investment, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- Africa, United Kingdom, and Europe
105. Tough trade: The hidden costs of economic coercion
- Author:
- Jonathan Hackenbroich, Filip Medunic, and Pawel Zerka
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Chinese economic coercion against Europe is on a deeply worrying trajectory. Having moved from threats in 2020 to punishment of European companies in 2021, China is now interfering with the EU market as part of a diplomatic dispute with Lithuania. If Beijing pressures European companies to stop trading with Lithuania, businesses could face pressure to stop dealing with Taiwan, Slovenia, or other places when tensions rise. The threat of Russian energy coercion is real, too. The EU needs to develop an Anti-Coercion Instrument that acts as a powerful economic deterrent, but this alone will not sufficiently protect Europe against economic coercion. The EU also requires a comprehensive resilience architecture, including a strong agenda for improving economic strength and trade links, a Resilience Office, and a reformed Blocking Statute that can counter secondary sanctions with Chinese characteristics. A Resilience Office could provide strategic coordination of the EU’s response and evaluate the costs of economic coercion, while the Blocking Statute could allow for targeted countermeasures against companies based in third countries.
- Topic:
- Security, Economics, European Union, Trade, and Coercion
- Political Geography:
- Europe
106. EU-Georgia Relations at a Critical Juncture: A Case for European Strategic Autonomy
- Author:
- Ioannis N. Grigoriadis and Mariam Gugulashvili
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
- Abstract:
- Despite the substantial progress that Georgia has made in implementing the EU Association Agreement and related reforms, it has been experiencing democratic backsliding since 2018. The divergence of Georgia’s ruling party from a pro-European trajectory, as well as the political polarization that has been dominant in recent years, have contributed to the deterioration of ties between Georgia and the EU. Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Georgia, which was once seen as a “reform pioneer,” was not given candidate status in June 2022. Georgian public opinion has always supported membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions, with more than 80% of Georgians today being Euro-enthusiasts and overwhelmingly in favour of joining the EU. The EU is Georgia’s largest donor and trading partner. Georgia’s key strategic option boils down to Russia vs. the West. Georgia should foster closer relations with certain EU member states that could provide key support for its EU membership aspirations.
- Topic:
- Bilateral Relations, European Union, Trade, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Georgia
107. Post-Brexit imports, supply chains, and the effect on consumer prices
- Author:
- Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh de Lyon, Luisa Opitz, and Dilan Yang
- Publication Date:
- 04-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- This report documents the decrease in imports and shows how the patterns of imports vary across sectors following the UK’s departure from the Single Market and Customs Unit at the end of 2020. The authors, Jan David Bakker, Nikhil Datta, Josh De Lyon, Luisa Opitz, and Dilan Yang, focus on comparisons between imports from the EU and imports from non-EU countries. Some products, such as fats, oils, and waxes, experienced a sizeable decrease in trade volumes with EU countries compared to those of non-EU countries in January 2021. Other products, such as minerals, experienced minimal deviation in imports from the EU versus non-EU. We also document that the timing of import changes varies across products: in some cases, the deviation occurs pre-TCA, and there is some evidence of stockpiling; in other cases, the changes only occur post-TCA, and can be either short term or persistent. The fall in imports from the EU will affect the UK economy through its impact on supply chains. Two-thirds of international trade is in products used as inputs to production. We show that imports from the EU fell for products that are used as inputs to production in many industries in the UK. For some sectors such as agriculture, fishing, and car manufacturing, there is evidence that imported inputs began to be sourced from non-EU countries pre-TCA. For others, including vegetable oil, animal fats, prepared animal feeds, and pharmaceuticals, the adjustments occurred post-TCA. Evidence suggests that increased access to intermediate inputs can boost productivity, so a reversal is likely to cause a fall in productivity. Imports also provide cheaper goods to consumers, as well as a wider variety of choice. Focussing on food products, we show that the drop in imports after Brexit caused an increase in prices. Products that were more heavily reliant on imports from the EU increased in price following the election of Boris Johnson in 2019, pre-TCA and then increased further post-TCA. This report therefore shows that changes in imports of goods from the EU have affected UK firms’ supply chains. Part of this change is driven by the adjustment costs incurred as part of the new trading relationship and is likely to be short term, but another part is likely to reflect a long-term increase in the cost of inputs from the EU, which make up a sizable contribution of total imports. This could have a knock-on effect for consumers who will face higher prices, and for workers whose jobs will be affected by adjustments in the supply chain.
- Topic:
- European Union, Brexit, Trade, Imports, and Supply Chains
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
108. Manufacturing after Brexit
- Author:
- David Bailey and Ivan Rajic
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- In mid-2020, UK in a Changing Europe published its report on the effects of Brexit on UK manufacturing, and the likely effects after the end of the transition period. The present report is an updated view of where UK manufacturing stands after Brexit. The report finds: The Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) helped avoid tariff barriers. However, non-tariff barriers have returned, and the end of the transition period has brought adverse impacts for UK manufacturing. The TCA does not fully replace the frictionless trade and market integration that existed before it. The main adverse effects have been: administrative barriers to trade (e.g. customs formalities, proving rules-of-origin requirements) disruptions to labour flows, both affecting certain manufacturing sectors directly (e.g. food and drinks) and indirectly harming manufacturing by damaging service sectors (e.g. logistics) that support it. The adverse impacts are for now mainly showing through reduced exports and imports to and from the EU (around 15% less for both, as compared to a no-Brexit scenario), and through some production disruptions. The ongoing conflicts around Northern Ireland probably represent the biggest risk to UK-EU relations, with the potential to affect the entire TCA in case they escalate. Potential benefits from Brexit have yet to be felt: – There has been some redirection of exports towards non-EU countries, but this has not compensated for the reduction in trade with the EU. The UK has signed only two truly new trade agreements, with New Zealand and Australia, the former still only ‘in principle’. Both countries account for a small fraction of total UK trade, and the expected benefits of the trade agreements with them are minor. Trade negotiations with the US are currently stalled. Whether there is more progress on the trade front in the future remains to be seen. If there is more regulatory divergence from the EU going forward, it will become possible to see whether it will bring benefits or disruptions to UK manufacturers. Any benefits that may potentially arise out of Brexit will not happen automatically. The UK needs an active, integrated, and well-funded industrial policy, within a stronger devolution framework, if UK manufacturing is to benefit from future growth opportunities. This is especially the case in the context of net zero, industry 4.0 and levelling up. The impact of Brexit on manufacturing is likely to be most profound in regions in the north and midlands. That in turn will make levelling up more challenging.
- Topic:
- Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Economy, Brexit, Manufacturing, and Trade
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
109. Doing things differently? Policy after Brexit
- Author:
- UK in a Changing Europe
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
- Abstract:
- Brexit is done, but what does it mean? Doing things differently? Policy after Brexit brings together a number experts in their respective fields to investigate how policy and policymaking have changed in a range of sectors. We asked them to consider how changes so far compare to what was promised before Brexit, and to analyse what changes lie ahead and what their impact might be. Their contributions are divided into three sections: first, those policy areas (trade, immigration, agriculture, fisheries and subsidies) where Brexit compelled the UK to put in place alternative policies. Second, those retaining significant amounts of EU law where the government could think seriously about divergence (financial services, procurement, taxation, consumer protection, environmental policy, energy policy and aviation). A final section considers new or emergent sectors in which both the UK and EU are looking to dip their regulatory toes (climate change and net zero, data and digital, autonomous vehicles and bioscience).
- Topic:
- Agriculture, Immigration, European Union, Regulation, Brexit, Trade, Fishing, Subsidies, and Policymaking
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom and Europe
110. How Its War on Ukraine Killed Russia’s Hydrogen Ambitions
- Author:
- Aliaksei Patonia
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Hydrogen looks like the fuel that can facilitate global decarbonization because it can be used in diverse applications—such as heat and power generation, transport, and manufacturing—without any carbon emissions. But, while many countries (including in Europe) view renewables-based, zero-carbon hydrogen as the ultimate goal in transitioning to a hydrogen economy, today most hydrogen is produced from natural gas. Thus, it is unlikely that the hydrogen transition will happen without relying on this fossil fuel. Russia is the country with the world’s largest natural gas deposits, and it has been exploring ways to adjust its energy sector to the needs of the emerging global hydrogen one. In 2021, it announced the goal of capturing up to 20 percent of the world’s hydrogen market by 2030. This came after all the major importers of Russia’s energy products had developed their hydrogen strategies, and its key energy companies started to explore new opportunities. Having signed memoranda of understanding with some of the world’s major energy companies to jointly develop Russia’s hydrogen export potential, they focused on Europe as the key destination. Some of Asia’s hydrogen pioneers and most promising future importers, such as Japan and South Korea, were also included among Russia’s potential partners. These steps could have resulted in long-lasting and fruitful collaborations generating large profits for Russia, but its ambitions have been jeopardized by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This has led to Russia losing key political and economic partners in Europe and also in Asia, which—in combination with being the target the toughest sanctions in its history—is likely to cripple its nascent hydrogen sector. Having planned to convert its natural-gas pipelines to transport hydrogen to future buyers in Europe, Russia is unlikely to be able to use this infrastructure for this purpose anymore. The EU will be an unlikely buyer of Russian hydrogen for the foreseeable future. Turning to Japan and South Korea would not be a success either, since they have joined the sanctions regime against Russia and, like the EU, have been officially labeled as unfriendly by Moscow. This will make the transfer of the technologies critical for the production of low- and zero-carbon hydrogen from the world leaders to a technologically backward Russia very problematic. Europe will also feel long-lasting repercussions of Russia’s war in Ukraine in the energy and hydrogen sectors. With no steady supplies of cheap Russian gas or hydrogen, Europe’s decarbonization efforts and building up its hydrogen industry will be inhibited and require a lot more effort and money. Russia will have to seek alternative markets for its energy commodities and it will seek deals with China, the only country whose energy consumption can rival that of Europe. But, as one of the world’s largest producers of electrolysers and of conventionally manufactured hydrogen, China probably will not need to import Russia’s hydrogen to build up its own hydrogen sector. Possessing critical technologies of its own, it will instead increase imports of Russian primary energy sources (such as natural gas) that it can use for producing hydrogen. The influx of huge volumes of cheap Russian feedstock will speed up China’s transformation from a country with a nascent hydrogen sector into a dominant player on the global hydrogen market. If the EU or the United States—the only two actors comparable to China in economic, technological, and geopolitical strength—do not develop similarly strong hydrogen sectors, Beijing could end up dominating the global energy landscape. To avoid the geopolitical consequences of this and for global balance to be maintained, further cooperation between the EU and the United States will be needed to speed up the creation of strong hydrogen sectors for both.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, Business, Trade, Hydrogen, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine