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841. Russia's Role in the Shifting World Oil Market

Author:
Lynne Kiesling and Joseph Becker
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Recent changes in Russia's domestic oil industry have had dramatic effects on world oil markets, including Russia's emergence as the number two exporter of oil after Saudi Arabia. These effects are occurring even though Russia is not close to fully exploiting its reserves. Russia's oil industry has large growth prospects, and this potential will allow Moscow to take a greater market share away from OPEC in the future. A number of factors will facilitate this trend. Russia's target oil price is lower than OPEC's, which gives it an incentive to continue exporting beyond OPEC's wishes. Also, Russia's oil industry is more privatized than the oil industries in Persian Gulf states, which allows it to be more entrepreneurial in attracting investment and joint ventures.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, and International Organization
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Middle East, Moscow, and Kabardino

842. Russia Watch No.7, March 2002

Author:
Duncan DeVille, Danielle Lussier, Melissa Carr, David Rekhviashvili, Annaliis Abrego, and John Grennan
Publication Date:
03-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Russian support for U.S. efforts in the war on terrorism has surprised many Western observers. But this was not the only recent surprise from Moscow — Western advocates for the rule of law in Russia also had much to celebrate in the closing months of 2001. Under strong prodding by President Vladimir Putin, the Duma passed several impressive pieces of reform legislation, including an entirely new Criminal Procedure Code, a potentially revolutionary land reform law, new shareholder protections in amendments to the Joint Stock Company Law, and the first post-Soviet Labor Code.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, Asia, and Moscow

843. The Prospects for Peace in Chechnya (Event summary)

Author:
Ilias Akhmadov
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Observers of the situation in Chechnya know that the "prospects for peace" that Akhmadov's title refers to are virtually nil, as Russian president Vladimir Putin and Chechen rebel leaders continue to lock horns on how to end the hostilities that broke out in war over two years ago. Akhmadov devoted considerable time in his discussion to the problems confronting Chechnya since the development of a Bush-Putin alliance to combat "Islamic fundamentalism." He also challenged Putin's insistence that the conflicts in Chechnya are domestic and therefore not subject to international monitoring or mediation. Akhmadov opened his talk with the assertion that the destruction he had discussed at the Davis Center in January 2000 had grown more serious, with levels of physical devastation and civilian casualties on the rise and the world community more supportive than ever of armed Russian intervention. To illustrate his point that the Russian Federation is unfairly using the international war on terror to justify actions in Chechnya, Akhmadov said that two days after FBI agents found diskettes containing flying instructions which had belonged to the terrorists responsible for the Sept. 11 terror attacks on the US, Russian FSB agents reported finding similar diskettes belonging to Chechen terrorists in the woods near a pilot-training school. Akhmadov considered the presence of such a school in those woods unlikely. He added that a high casualty rate among Chechen civilians is now officially connected to the search for members of Al Qaeda. Akhmadov reminded the audience of a speech made by Putin on September 24, 2001, in which the Russian president expressed support for the United States' war on terror and urged Chechen rebels to disarm and abandon their separatist fight. Akhmadov's response to that speech was that disarmament could not be a condition for starting peace talks. As for the November meeting between Viktor Kazantsev, Putin's envoy to Chechnya, and Akhmed Zakayev, a prominent representative of Chechnya's rebels, Akhmadov said it "left no room for illusions about their relations, or about the Russian government's position on Chechnya." The talk ended when Zakayev refused to comply with Kazanstev's request that the rebels disarm. Akhmadov addressed allegations of ties between the rebels and Osama bin Laden in the question-and-answer session, restricting himself during his talk to criticism of what he considers unwarranted BBC and CNN reports about the "thousands of Chechens fighting in Afghanistan." While Akhmadov allowed for the possibility that a few Chechens could be fighting for the Taliban, he stressed the unlikelihood that Chechens played a critical role in Taliban efforts and reported that nobody yet had been able to provide any "concrete facts to verify that Chechens are fighting for the Taliban." Putin's affirmations that Chechnya belongs to Russia apparently strike Akhmadov as oxymoronic, as indicated by his remark that "the Russian Federation wants to integrate the territory of Chechnya but not the people." To convey the extent of destruction wrought by the Chechen-Russian conflicts, Akhmadov cited data culled by Russians showing that before the first war in 1994, there were 1 million Chechens; 100,000 people were killed between 1994-6; that casualty figure has been greatly exceeded during the fighting that started in 1999. In addition, 400,000 Chechens have emigrated or become displaced persons. Akhmadov pointedly remarked that "we don't count as refugees, because that only happens during a war . . . What is happening in Chechnya is, according to Russia, 'a small, minor anti-terrorist operation.'"Finally, Akhmadov stated that impartial monitoring groups were needed to observe the conflict. He also asserted that a one-on-one dialogue with Russians was not a realistic solution and that intermediaries were needed to promote discussion between Russian and Chechen leaders. Following his prepared talk, Akhmadov replied to questions from the audience about issues including Chechen rebel fighting in Abkhazia, hostage-taking, and Russian bombing of civilian and industrial areas. In response to a question about Maskhadov's ability to rebuild the war-torn region, Akhmadov said that "neither Maskhadov nor any other Chechen can do anything with Chechnya's meager resources." He also said that the international community should aid Chechnya in future attempts to rebuild the war-torn republic and that visiting Ground Zero in New York had given him the "feeling that I had seen that [kind of devastation] somewhere before, only on a larger scale." Finally, Akhmadov answered an audience member's question about Russian and Chechen military strategy by saying that it was hard forhim to believe that "someone is sitting at a map plotting points . . . We're [Russians and Chechens] just killing each other . . . Russians see us, they kill us, and vice versa. It's a snowball effect."
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

844. Assessing Russian Democracy (Event Summary)

Author:
Grigory Yavlinsky
Publication Date:
02-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Mr Yavlinsky began by thanking the Belfer Center for the invitation and said that the main topic of his talk will be to explore the progress of Russian Democratization. According to Mr. Yavlinsky, the process of democratization involves not only creating some set of democratic procedures, like free elections or free press. It is necessary to look behind the formal democratic institutions to ask what people applying and using them have in mind. Only after analyzing such motivations is it possible to understand how essentially democratic and legitimate institutions produce results contrary to their nature. The value of freedom of speech is nonexistent, if people have nothing to say, the freedom of action is needless if people are only willing to march in military ranks. Hence democracy can only work if the society enacting it has some basic democratic values, education, beliefs or moral principles. The democratic institutions and procedures per se are merely tools, able to transform these ideas and beliefs into reality. That is why the benefits of mere democratic procedures are so limited. It is for this reason that the economic base of any democracy is one of its crucial elements, providing for independent individuals as its basic members. In Mr. Yavlinsky's opinion, these facts represent the main challenge for Russian democracy. Russia's small and middle business enterprises are important for its democracy. Mr. Yavlinsky called them a "conditio sine qua non" for any democratic society. Only if the economy of the country can ensure the independent economic behavior of its citizens and only if these citizens have a certain level of democratic education and democratic values, only in this case the democratic procedures can work for the common benefit. From Yavlinsky's point of view the main challenge for the Russian reforms is that the country has to perform an acrobatic act, similar to riding a bicycle, where it must accomplish two operations simultaneously: the Russians have to engage in actions preparing democracy and at the same time practice this democracy with no reference to any previous historic democratic record. After presenting these general thoughts Mr. Yavlinsky moved on to a deeper analysis of the present Russian situation. He assumed that the present political elite consists of people coming from the Soviet administrative system and still thinking in Soviet categories. To achieve their goals they use a democratic cover "quasi democracy," a somewhat modernized version of the famous "Potemkin villages." Just like Stalin's constitution, which was considered to be one the most progressive democratic constitutions, the present formally democratic institutions in Russia do not constitute real democracy. Yavlinsky described the present state of political life in Russia as a controlled or managed democracy. This is a state where the democratic tools are used to achieve any result desirable for the leader of the country. The most recent example of this type of manipulation was a recent proposal drawn up by the parties close to the Russian president. According to this proposal, elections should only be considered valid if voter participation was at least 50 percent and only if one of the candidates was able to achieve more then 50 percent of the votes. In the opinion of Mr. Yavlinsky such a regulation would easily lead to an election deadlock, which would benefit the president. Mr. Yavlinsky underscored the difference between this type of controlled democracy and a totalitarian rule. While the latter destroys all the democratic institutions directly and openly, the main strategy of controlled democracy is not to destroy, but to adjust the institutions to serve the goals of the ruling elite. If any adjustment of institutions is impossible, the government prefers to replace the people controlling these institutions (like replacing the owners of the free TV stations) or substitute these institutions with new, more easily manageable organizations (as happened in the case of the Media Union, which was created to weaken the influence of the Union of Journalists). Speculating on the future of the Russian democracy, Yavlinsky stressed the special and very important role of bureaucracy in implementing this new "vertical of power." However as any bureaucracy, it will lead to more corruption. In order to keep the corruption under control, the government will have to use intense enforcement mechanisms, which might go as far as creating a police state. Of the three core democratic elements — free press, free elections, and an independent judiciary — Mr. Yavlinsky specifically spoke about the press. Yavlinsky said that the situation with the press in today's Russia is certainly not comparable to the situation in the Soviet Union. Everyone can read anything in the press, even the most incredible and slanderous information about most prominent political figures. Restricted is any systematic explanation or critical analysis of the political events. For example, state television stations have a list of people who are not to be shown on the air. The same is true for the list of forbidden topics. Certainly there still are a some newspapers who still cover critical topics (e.g. Obschaya Gazeta and Novaya Gazeta). However, they unfold their activities in a kind of a glass box, their presence is not really essential, and is only useful for the government in order to demonstrate to foreign observers that free press exists. As a result of such media control, the Russian population is subject to the management and manipulation of human choice. According to Mr. Yavlinsky this ability to manipulate and control is actually one of the main results of the last 10 years: it is not hard to manipulate the choice of the Russian public. Just like one could convince it to vote for Yeltsin or vote for a totally unknown newcomer Putin, you can always manipulate the public opinion. In the question and answer section Yavlinsky addressed various issues. In speaking about the best way western countries could assist Russia on its way towards democracy, Yavlinsky rejected any form of financial credits or subsidies. He is convinced that the help must be conducted in a smart way and this means in the first place the west should give up any policy of double standards towards Russia and address Russia as an honest and valuable ally. Regarding Putin's intentions, Yavlinsky mentioned two of them: the intention to make Russia a strong state and to protect his own power. The question is not whether these goals are good or bad, but rather which instruments Putin is prepared to use to implement those goals.
Topic:
Security and Human Rights
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia

845. U.S.-Russian Relations Ten Months After September 11

Author:
Robert Legvold
Publication Date:
08-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
When American Airlines #11 exploded into the North Tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, in one respect, it was like the neutron Enrico Fermi sent smashing into the core of a uranium atom in 1934, changing the world, but in ways only half-perceived. True, the scientific community recognized that the split atom released “nuclear energy” more powerful than a million steam engines, and so their minds turned to imagining industrial technology in a world of limitless electricity. As late as 1938, the year Fermi received his Nobel prize, thoughts were more of what Mussolini had lost in losing Fermi by way of industrial advances than, as one newspaper of the day put it, “the admittedly far-fetched potential for so-called 'nuclear bombs.' "
Topic:
Security and Terrorism
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

846. NATO as a Factor of Security Community Building: Enlargement and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe

Author:
Corneliu Bjola
Publication Date:
04-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Wilson Center
Abstract:
This analysis is primarily concerned with examining the building blocks and mechanisms through which NATO extends its institutional and normative influence and contributes (or not) to reducing chances for military conflict and political tension in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by integrating the region into the Western security community. In terms of political stakes, the prospects of forming a CEE security community would be seriously undermined if NATO enlargement and partnership programs were perceived as facilitating the evolution of a regional arms race, driven by aggressive foreign policies and sponsored by widespread nationalism and regional mistrust. The formation of the CEE security community would be more likely if the institutional and normative adjustments induced by NATO's cooperative security arrangements were viewed as promoting the democratic development of the political-military structures driven by non-nationalist and region-wide, cooperative attitudes.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, and Democratization
Political Geography:
Europe

847. Migration, Population Change, and the Rural Environment

Author:
Richard E. Bilsborrow
Publication Date:
08-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Wilson Center
Abstract:
This article considers issues pertaining to the linkages between rural populations, migration from and to rural areas, and the environment—focusing on developing countries in the latter part of the 20th century. The article concentrates on internal migration, although it does briefly discuss the state of knowledge on the interplay between international migration and the environment. It addresses questions such as: What are the recent—and projected—patterns of rural population growth? How much internal migration in developing nations is towards rural environments? What kinds of rural environments are people moving into, in what countries, and what are the environmental consequences? Are there relationships in the other direction as well—that is, does environmental deterioration play an important role in out-migration from rural areas? And does out-migration from rural areas have environmental effects on the places of migratory origin? The article concludes with policy recommendations.
Topic:
Security, Environment, Migration, and Poverty
Political Geography:
Europe and Asia

848. U.S.-Russian Relations: Toward a New Strategic Framework

Author:
Eugene B. Rumer and Richard D. Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
In 2001, President Vladimir Putin made a strategic choice for Russia's integration with the West. Indicators of this decision include Putin's quest for better relations with the United States and Europe, his stated commitment to Russian membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), his pursuit of a new relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and his almost casual dismissal of the potential major irritants in the relationship with the United States and its allies—U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the likelihood of Baltic membership in NATO, sizeable U.S. military deployments to Central Asia, and a growing U.S. military presence in Georgia. Putin has unequivocally crossed these once-insurmountable red lines despite opposition from his closest advisers and the unease of the Russian public over the American presence in Russia's backyard.
Topic:
Security and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Georgia

849. Europe's New Security Vocation

Author:
Michael Brenner
Publication Date:
03-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
The idea of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) has been a feature of the transatlantic security dialogue for a decade. The 1991 Maastricht Treaty foresaw an eventual incorporation of the Western European Union (WEU) as the defense arm of the European Union (EU). Endowing the Union with military capability was a logical extension of the commitment to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as stipulated in the treaty. Both ideas, promoted by France and Germany, expressed the general desire of member states to play a more active role in securing the peace and stability of postcommunist Europe. Extending the principle of integration into the foreign policy field served two purposes. It was a means to tighten community bonds in the new, unsettled strategic environment by providing reassurance against the renationalization of defense policies. At the same time, it laid the basis for a collective effort to influence continental affairs consonant with the European venture in an orderly transition to democracy and market economies. The perceived need to add a security building block to the project of "constructing Europe" also reflected apprehension about a possible retreat of the United States from a Europe now free of the Soviet military threat. That possibility added further reason for West Europeans to make contingency plans for an uncertain future.
Topic:
Security and NATO
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, France, Soviet Union, and Germany

850. Between Efficiency and Legitimacy: Democratic Accountability of the Military in the US, France, Sweden and Switzerland

Author:
Hans Born
Publication Date:
11-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
During situations of national emergencies, natural disasters, conflict and war, state institutions have to act quickly and decisively in order to divert dangers. Every state and its society need to have a competent political leadership and government agencies that are able to act efficiently. From a democratic governance point of view, however, it is equally important that the decision-making process and the resulting outcome is both accepted and valued by the people. In other words, it is essential that the processes and outcomes of the state institutions are legitimate within a democracy.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, and Government
Political Geography:
Europe