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772. Supporting Ukraine’s Security Sector Reform: Mapping Security Sector Assistance Programmes
- Author:
- Richard Steyne and Priajina Khudaverdyan
- Publication Date:
- 09-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Razumkov Centre
- Abstract:
- Mapping Study seeks to support international engagement on security sector reform in Ukraine by identifying the extent and scope of current rule of law, security sector governance (SSG) and democratic oversight programming. By covering international and regional organisations’ initiatives, as well as national projects, the Study seeks to comprehensively map programmes assisting Ukraine’s democratic institutions, executive, government, independent oversight institutions, civil society, media and the security sector itself.
- Topic:
- Security, Civil Society, Corruption, Migration, Reform, Disarmament, Borders, and Human Trafficking
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
773. Legal Framing of Parliamentary Oversight of Defence Industrial Complex (Conference Proceedings)
- Author:
- Razumkov Center
- Publication Date:
- 03-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Razumkov Centre
- Abstract:
- This publication presents proceedings and recommendations from the conference jointly held by DCAF, the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) Institute for Legislation of Ukraine and the CACDS. The Conference focused on the legal framing of parliamentary oversight of the defence industrial complex (production, exportation, procurement) of Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Governance, and Legislation
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine
774. Russia’s hybrid warfare in the form of its energy manoeuvers against Europe: how the EU and NATO can respond together?
- Author:
- Vira Ratsiborynksa
- Publication Date:
- 06-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- NATO continues evolving and adapting to new security challenges and threats coming from the East and the South. At the NATO Summit in Warsaw in July 2016 the member states of the Alliance reaffi rmed their commitments on the core purposes of the Alliance: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. Th e Warsaw Summit marked a shift from reassurance to deterrence posture sending a signal that the Alliance is ready and is able to meet the challenge of hybrid threats. Th e changing security landscape in the Eastern fl ank reinforces NATO’s need to strengthen its core ‘hard power’ principles as well as update its ‘soft power’ infl uence on issues such as energy security.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Energy Policy, and Regional Cooperation
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North Atlantic, and North America
775. Supporting Political Stability by Strengthening Local Government: Decentralization in Ukraine
- Author:
- Lily Salloum Lindegaard and Neil Anthony Webster
- Publication Date:
- 11-2018
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The government that followed the 2014 Maidan revolution in Ukraine has pushed a decentralisation agenda. After decades of Soviet style top-down governance, the status and role of local governments – hromadas – has been pushed to the fore. If implemented successfully, it could increase local development and political engagement, ultimately contributing to increased political stability in Ukraine and Europe. Yet the significance of decentralization reforms is often lost in the noise surrounding Crimea, the secessionist conflict in the east, and the political power struggles in Kiev. For legal reasons, the current decentralisation process is ‘voluntary’, with local communities having to agree to the changes. This has introduced unintended challenges, but also a bottom-up political dynamic to the process. At the same time, uncertainty and opposition to decentralisation reforms remain, perhaps understandable given a rapidly shifting political and legal landscape, the diverse political and personal interests involved, and the fear of political fragmentation that could benefit Russia. Denmark is one of several EU countries supporting the reform process. This DIIS Report focuses in on the processes unfolding in local communities and political arenas, affecting peoples’ lives, their hopes, and their relationship to the state from local to national level.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Development, Fragile States, and Peace
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Denmark
776. Stepping up Synergies of the Danish Comprehensive Approach: The Peace and Stabilization Fund
- Author:
- Jessica Larsen and Christine Nissen
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
- Abstract:
- The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund is a prime example of how to combine civilian and military instruments to address conflicts in fragile states. However, there is still room for stepping up synergies of the military-civilian balance in Denmark’s comprehensive conflict management. Recommendations ■ Increase the frequency of formal feedback between the field and the strategic level of the PSF to avoid loss of knowledge. ■ Synergies between civilian and military instruments should take place through complimentary-but-separate interventions. ■ Take PSF instruments into account when planning Denmark’s broader engagement in conflicts to ensure a more comprehensive security policy effort.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Democratization, Development, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Denmark
777. Possible Impacts: Implications of Building A Unified European Army on Regional Security
- Author:
- FARAS
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
- Abstract:
- French President Emmanuel Macron’s call to create a unified European army, independent of NATO, to defend the European continent in the face of major powers such as Russia, China and even the US, has sparked a political firestorm. The most notable of these reactions came from US President Donald Trump, who tweeted rejecting the proposal and criticizing the French President, heightening tensions between the two sides. At the official level, the US State Department commented on the idea of the European Union forming an independent army of member states, stating that the US opposes any actions that could contribute to weakening NATO. “That’s been a sustained entity that the United States government and many others supported for many years, and so we would not want the weakening of NATO”, US State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert said on November 14, 2018.
- Topic:
- Security, Regional Cooperation, Armed Forces, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Eurasia, France, and United States of America
778. Britain’s Post-Colonial Foreign Policy Towards the Persian Gulf Security (1971-1991): An Alternative Approach
- Author:
- Esra Cavusoglu
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Turkish Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
- Institution:
- Sakarya University (SAU)
- Abstract:
- British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, started a new era in the region with new political order and new security map. Iran and Saudi Arabia emerged as the guardians of the status quo to be filling the power vacuum left by the British in behalf of the West. Britain adopted a new post-imperial role in the region along with new post-colonial foreign policy in the post-withdrawal context. British policy towards the regional security is analysed in this article with central focus on the shift emerged in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in the British policy. After 1979, Iran, no longer a Western ally, has been defined as the major internal threat for the regional security following the major external threat of the Soviet expansion in the British foreign policy. This paper argues that the shift in the British policy came along with a sectarianist approach towards the region. The sectarianization emerged with the securitization of the Gulf based on “Iran threat” within the determinants of the Anglo-American alliance on the regional security. The sectarianist discourse adopted by the British foreign policy was employed as an effective tool of the securitization of the Gulf that was deepened during the regional conflicts, the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Sectarianism
- Political Geography:
- United Kingdom, Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Persian Gulf
779. Prisons and Radicalization: Breaking the Cycle through Rehabilitation
- Author:
- Francesca Capano
- Publication Date:
- 12-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Istituto Affari Internazionali
- Abstract:
- Concerns over migration, economic growth and the rise of populism seemed to overshadow the threat of terrorism in many European countries during 2018. While the number of attacks and alleged plots in Europe have declined considerably compared to previous years, experts have long warned that measuring the terrorism threat on the basis of successful attacks was a “mistake”.
- Topic:
- Security, Terrorism, Prisons/Penal Systems, and Radicalization
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Italy
780. The Return of Political Warfare
- Author:
- Seth G. Jones
- Publication Date:
- 02-2018
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
- Abstract:
- The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy outline a U.S. shift from counterterrorism to inter-state competition with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. However, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for much of this competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs of conventional and nuclear war would likely be catastrophic. U.S. strategy is evolving from a post-9/11 focus on counterterrorism against groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State to competition between state adversaries. As the National Defense Strategy notes, “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.”1 This shift has significant implications for the U.S. military, since it indicates a need to improve U.S. capabilities to fight—and win—possible wars against China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea if deterrence fails. Though it is prudent to prepare for conventional—and even nuclear—war, the risks of conflict are likely to be staggering. Numerous war games and analyses of U.S. conflicts with Russia in the Baltics, China in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, and North Korea on the Korean peninsula suggest the possibility of at least tens of thousands of dead and billions of dollars in economic damages. In addition, these conflicts could escalate to nuclear war, which might raise the number of dead to hundreds of thousands or even millions. According to one analysis, for example, a U.S. war with China could reduce China’s gross domestic product (GDP) by between 25 and 35 percent and the United States’ GDP by between 5 and 10 percent. The study also assessed that both countries could suffer substantial military losses to bases, air forces, surface naval forces, and submarines; significant political upheaval at home and abroad; and huge numbers of civilian deaths.2 These costs and risks will likely give Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and even Pyongyang pause, raising several questions. Will these high costs deter the possibility of conventional and nuclear war? If so, what are the implications for the United States as it plans for a rise in inter-state competition? The Cold War offers a useful historical lens. NATO planners prepared for a possible Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe. The U.S. military, for example, deployed forces to the Fulda Gap, roughly 60 miles outside of Frankfurt, Germany, as one of several possible invasion routes by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces. NATO also planned for nuclear war. The United States built up its nuclear arsenal and adopted strategies like mutually assured destruction (MAD). The concept of MAD assumed that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by two or more opposing sides would cause the annihilation of both the attacker and the defender. The threat of such heavy costs deterred conflict, despite some close calls. During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the two superpowers nearly went to war after a U.S. U-2 aircraft took pictures of Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) under construction in Cuba. But Washington and Moscow ultimately assessed that direct conflict was too costly. Deterrence held. Instead, the United States and Soviet Union engaged in intense security competition at the unconventional level across Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Both countries backed substate groups and states to expand their power and influence. Under the Reagan Doctrine, for example, the United States provided overt and covert assistance to anticommunist governments and resistance movements to roll back communist supporters. The Soviets did the same and supported states and substate actors across the globe. In addition, the Soviets adopted an aggressive, unconventional approach best captured in the phrase “active measures” or aktivnyye meropriatia. As used by the KGB, active measures included a wide range of activities designed to influence populations across the globe. The KGB established front groups, covertly broadcast radio and other programs, orchestrated disinformation campaigns, and conducted targeted assassinations. The Soviets used active measures as an offensive instrument of Soviet foreign policy to extend Moscow’s influence and power throughout the world, including in Europe. Unlike the Cold War, the United States confronts multiple state adversaries today—not one. As the National Defense Strategy argues, the United States is situated in “a security environment more complex and volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory” where “the central challenges to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.” But based on the likely costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war with China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, much of the competition will likely be unconventional—and include what former U.S. State Department diplomat George Kennan referred to as “political warfare.” The term political warfare refers to the employment of military, intelligence, diplomatic, financial, and other means—short of conventional war—to achieve national objectives. It can include overt operations like public broadcasting and covert operations like psychological warfare and support to underground resistance groups.3 The United States’ adversaries today are already engaged in political warfare. Russia, for instance, utilizes a range of means to pursue its interests, such as technologically sophisticated offensive cyber programs, covert action, and psychological operations. Moscow has conducted overt operations like the use of RT and Sputnik, as well as semitransparent and covert efforts. It has also become increasingly active in supporting state and substate actors in countries like Ukraine, Syria, Afghanistan, and Libya to expand its influence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and even North Africa. Finally, Russia is attempting to exploit European and transatlantic fissures and support populist movements to undermine European Union and NATO cohesion, thwart economic sanctions, justify or obscure Russian actions, and weaken the attraction of Western institutions for countries on Russia’s periphery. Iran is using political warfare tools like propaganda, cyber attacks, and aid to substate proxies to support its security priorities, influence events and foreign perceptions, and counter threats. Tehran is also assisting state and substate actors in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Bahrain, and Afghanistan. Iran supports Shia militia groups in Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, and Houthi rebels in Yemen. In the South China Sea, China is pouring millions of tons of sand and concrete onto reefs, creating artificial islands. It is also conducting a sophisticated propaganda campaign, utilizing economic coercion, and using fleets of fishing vessels to solidify its assertion of territorial and resource rights throughout the Pacific. Finally, Beijing is targeting the U.S. government, its allies, and U.S. companies as part of a cyber-espionage campaign. With political warfare already alive and well with the United States’ state adversaries, there are several implications for U.S. defense strategy. First, U.S. policymakers need to be prepared for significant inter-state competition to occur at the unconventional level, since the costs and risks of conventional and nuclear war may be prohibitively high. This should involve thinking through trade-offs regarding force posture, procurement, acquisition, and modernization. A U.S. military that predominantly focuses on preparing for conventional or nuclear war with state competitors—by modernizing the nuclear triad, building more resilient space capabilities, acquiring more effective counter-space systems, equipping U.S. forces with high-technology weapons, and emphasizing professional military education (PME) to fight conventional wars—may undermine U.S. unconventional readiness and capabilities. Second, even organizations that already engage in some types of political warfare—such as U.S. Special Operations Command and the U.S. intelligence community—will need to continue shifting some of their focus from counterterrorism to political warfare against state adversaries. This might include, for example, providing more aid to the Baltic States to conduct an effective resistance campaign against unconventional action by Moscow. Or it might involve aiding proxies in countries like Syria and Yemen to counter Iranian-backed organizations. It could also include improving the border security capabilities and effectiveness of Ukrainian military and police units against Russian-backed rebels. Third, the United States should invest in resources and capabilities that allow the military and other U.S. government agencies to more effectively engage in political warfare—and to provide agencies with sufficient authorities to conduct political warfare. One example is improving capabilities to conduct aggressive, offensive cyber operations. Other examples might include advanced electronic attack capabilities, psychological warfare units, security force assistance brigades, and precision munitions. Recognizing that other powers routinely conduct political warfare, George Kennan encouraged U.S. leaders to disabuse themselves of the “handicap” of the “concept of a basic difference between peace and war” and to wake up to “the realities of international relations—the perpetual rhythm of struggle, in and out of war.” Kennan’s advice may be even more relevant today in such a competitive world.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea