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391. Blowback from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Sarah Cliffe, Leah Zamore, and James Traub
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation (CIC)
Abstract:
While the Ukrainian army and people continue to resist, the costs of Russia's invasion in human terms are mounting. As of March 15, the United Nations (UN) had verified 1,900 civilian casualties, including 726 deaths (fifty of them children), as Russia intensifies its assault on civilian targets, seizes the Zaporizhzhia nuclear site, lays siege to Mariupol which is without food, energy, or water in freezing temperatures, continues to threaten Kyiv, begins a push on Odesa and assaults Kharkiv with heavy and indiscriminate shelling.
Topic:
Security, War Crimes, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

392. Agenda OTAN 2030 y Concepto Estratégico 2022

Author:
Carmen Romero
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
El momento crítico que atraviesa la seguridad europea tras la agresión de Rusia contra Ucrania ha alterado el entorno estratégico y obliga a la Alianza Atlántica a repensar su posición. Sunuevo concepto estratégico a aprobar en 2022 está marcado por este hecho histórico. Si bien, esta nueva estrategia está guiada a su vez por la Agenda OTAN 2030, adoptada en 2019, que establece una serie de principios como guía: unidad, defensa colectiva, resiliencia, salvaguarda de las infraestructuras y superioridad tecnológica. Así, este ensayo estratégico quiere reflexionar sobre este proceso para que la Alianza y la OTAN sean claves en la defensa del orden de seguridad internacional. Con este fin,analiza las claves de dicho entorno y cómo la organización pretende responder a esos desafíos, lo que tiene evidentes y potenciales implicaciones para España.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

393. OTAN, España y el FrenteSur. Análisis geopolítico tras cuarenta años de experiencia compartida

Author:
Emily E. Arnold-Fernández
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Cuatro décadas es tiempo suficiente para realizar un balance de la relación de España con la OTAN, como miembro de pleno derecho.Balance de particular interés en este periodo en el que hemos asistido a tantos cambios en el contexto internacional; cambios que han afectado a nuestra percepción de amenazas y a los modos de hacerles frente.Este trabajo analizará desde dos enfoques la experiencia española como miembro de la Alianza y los distintos estados de la relación, tanto con la Organización, como con su principal socio. El primero tomará en consideración los condicionantes domésticos de cada una de las partes. El segundo, atenderá a los condicionantessistémicos que tanto han variado desde la época de la guerra fría. Particular atención merecerá el siempre mejorable enfoque del denominado “flanco Sur”, con la vista puesta en la elaboración del nuevo concepto estratégico de la OTAN. Al respecto, se atenderá a las distintas sensibilidades dentro de la Alianza y la reivindicación de un trato análogo al recibido por el tradicional “flanco Este”. El contenido del documento de reflexión para la elaboración del nuevo concepto estratégico OTAN respecto a la proyección sur, puede implicar un cambio en la naturaleza de la relación con esta zona de operaciones. La metodología de investigación de basará en una serie de entrevistas sobre la base de una encuesta previa a oficiales españoles con experiencia práctica en la OTAN, tanto en operaciones como en diversos puestos directivos. Se incluirán también elementos de la consideración norteamericana respecto a la participación española. Combinados los resultados con el apoyo científico de académicos, foros de defensa y contribuciones de think tanks, se extraerán las conclusiones y recomendaciones para una mayor y mejor comprensión en los próximos cuarenta años.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Budget, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain

394. ¿Puede la OSCE (todavía) contribuir a la seguridad europea?

Author:
Fernando Arlettaz
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
La Conferencia sobre la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa (convertida luego en la Organización para la Seguridad y la Cooperación en Europa) nació con el objetivo de constituir un foro de diálogo entre actores con opciones políticas y concepciones de laseguridad radicalmente diferentes. Luego del final de la Guerra Fría, el discurso de la Organización se orientó hacia la promoción de un ideal democrático robusto. Sin embargo, los hechos mostraron los límites del optimismo inicial. El rol efectivo de la Organización siguió vinculado a un concepto tradicional de seguridad como seguridad interestatal, con cierta atención a la dimensión de los derechos humanos, pero también con una alta tolerancia a los regímenes no democráticos que persistían en su seno. Esta geometría variableentre los componentes del concepto de seguridad se relaciona con la naturaleza misma de la Organización: ella nació como forma de garantizar un modus vivendientre Estados con intereses e ideologías enfrentados y mantiene en buena medida este carácter, aunque la oposición no sea hoy entre dos modelos económicos diferentes sino entre Estados con grados variables de democratización.
Topic:
Security, Democratization, Regional Cooperation, and OSCE
Political Geography:
Europe

395. The crisis of European security: What Europeans think about the war in Ukraine

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine could mark a watershed for European security. There has been much talk that European governments are divided over the conflict, but European citizens seem remarkably united around three key ideas. Firstly, they believe it is likely that there will be another Russian invasion of Ukraine. Secondly, they see this as a problem not only for Ukraine but for European security generally. Thirdly, they want Europe to respond to the crisis, with majorities supporting a response from NATO and the EU in particular. Europeans disagree on which are the most pressing threats linked to the crisis and on the price their countries should pay to defend Ukraine: people in Poland, Romania, and Sweden are much more willing to make sacrifices than those in France and Germany. The crisis will likely test Europeans’ readiness to defend the European security order.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Public Opinion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

396. Children of War: The Ukrainian Case

Author:
Isabella Martin
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has imposed considerable physical, mental, and emotional damage on children. It is critical to provide mental health and psychosocial support (MPHSS), as well as to reinforce psychological and social infrastructure—in Ukraine and countries hosting refugees—to help them cope with the immediate trauma of war and promote resilience for future reconstruction efforts. Severe damage to civilian infrastructure has left many children without access to schools, healthcare resources, and support networks within care facilities, while those who have fled Ukraine risk falling victim to human trafficking and exploitation. Moreover, children are targets of the Kremlin’s efforts to erase the Ukrainian identity, brutally executed through oppressive policies such as forced school curriculum in the occupied territories and atrocious practice of ’filtration’, with children separated, abducted, and then put up for adoption in Russia. Inside and outside of the country, Ukraine’s youth are left extremely vulnerable to abuse, with the consequences to their mental health to last for generations—and to affect the nation’s post-war recovery—if not taken care of already today. Without developing proper coping mechanisms in children and adolescents now, the trauma imposed on the young generation will hinder rebuilding efforts and undermine societal institutions. It is thus imperative to support MHPSS initiatives and contribute to a resilient society in post-war Ukraine.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Education, Health, War, Children, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

397. The old is dying and the new cannot be born: A power audit of EU-Russia relations

Author:
Kadri Liik
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Policymakers across the EU agree Russia poses a multifaceted threat to their security. Europeans have responded quickly to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, but they lack a ‘theory of victory’. They have no shared view about how the conflict is likely to end. No single EU member state is guiding Russia policy; a ‘leaderless unity’ has emerged. This could provide the bloc with a form of dispersed strength – but a change in US leadership could expose the weakness of this situation. EU policymakers do not believe that Europeans have the means to bring about regime change in Russia; at the same time, they are unable to foresee a stable future relationship with a Putin-led Russia. Policymakers are uncertain how Russia’s war on Ukraine will affect their interaction with other parts of the world, including China and the global south. This could prevent Europeans from mounting a more effective global response. Europeans should re-examine the support they give to Russians fleeing the regime – emigrés represent an important connection to Russian society, which will be valuable whoever occupies the Kremlin.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

398. Ukraine–Russia Conflict: India’s Energy Security

Author:
Shebonti Ray Dadwal
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
Any major upheaval or crisis in any part of the world, particularly one that involves an energy-producing country, has an immediate impact on the energy markets. But, barring the first ‘oil shock’ in 1973, which caused an initial spike in prices, the markets have settled down, particularly once it is established that the energy supplies will not be affected. However, since February 2022, following the onset of the Russian–Ukraine conflict, energy security has returned to the forefront of national security concerns. Oil and other energy prices are climbing to record levels, hovering around US$100 a barrel. In a recent report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that the Ukraine war will severely set back global economic recovery from the COVID–19 pandemic, increase inflation, cause grave risks to the financial system, and even potentially fragment the world economy into geopolitical blocs (Gourinchas, 2022: 10–11). What makes the current conflict different from earlier crises? After all, the canvas of the conflict is essentially restricted to the European theatre and should, therefore, have limited fallout. Even when Russia attacked and annexed Crimea in 2014, the energy markets did not witness the kind of reaction and response the current Russia–Ukraine conflict is experiencing.
Topic:
Security, Markets, Oil, Crisis Management, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, South Asia, Ukraine, and India

399. Finland and Sweden in NATO: the potential of new security providers

Author:
Hanna Ojanen
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO is occurring at an accelerated pace. In January 2022, neither government was considering NATO membership; in May 2022, they moved decisively into the application process. In response, NATO member states have rush processed their membership, with most NATO countries ratifying Accession Protocols. In November 2022, they are a mere two ratifications short of membership. Both Finland and Sweden are sending a strong message to Allies and Russia by joining NATO without preconditions as already active contributors and security providers within the Alliance. For its part, NATO would not only gain two new member states but also a new regional subgroup of Nordic countries that have their own perspectives and strategic cultures. Moreover, Finland and Sweden will bring a model for bilateral defence cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Finland, and Sweden

400. China, the West, and the Future Global Order By Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri

Author:
Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
PRISM
Institution:
Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), National Defense University
Abstract:
The primary purpose of this article is to respectfully communicate to a Chinese audience a Western view of the future world order. China needs the West as much as the West needs China. However, the West has awakened geopolitically to the toxic power politics that Russia is imposing on Ukraine and China’s support for it. China is thus faced with a profound choice: alliance with a declining and weak Russia or cooperation with a powerful bloc of global democracies that Russia’s incompetent and illegal aggression is helping to forge. The West is steadily morphing into a new global Community of Democracies with states such as those in the G7, Quads, and Quints taking on increasing importance as centers of decisionmaking.2 All three groupings reflect an emerging implicit structure with the United States at their core, European democracies on one American geopolitical flank, with Australia, Japan, South Korea, and other democracies in the Indo-Pacific region on the other American geopolitical flank. The force that is forging such a community is China as it morphs into a superpower. Specifically, China is choosing to be an aggressive putative superpower. President Xi Jinping’s aggressive worldview is of a China defined by its opposition to the United States and, by extension, America’s democratic allies and partners. A new world is being forged from within the increasingly hot cauldron of U.S.-Chinese strategic competition. However, does that mean this new world is inevitably now set on a crash course to conflict, something akin to a re-run of the collapse of pre–World War I Europe into systemic war? Or is it not too late for both sides to forge a pragmatic peace—a peace forged from respect, rather than destructive and disrespectful confrontation? On the face of it, President Xi seems to have made his choice, but in some very important respects siding with Russia in geopolitical conflict with the community of democracies seems counterintuitive when we look at China from a Western perspective (as this article does). This perspective also implies China’s “choice” might not be as firm as some would have it—a profound but essentially simple choice between siding with Vladimir Putin and confrontation with the West or continued growth, wealth, and power through collaboration with the West? The facts speak for themselves. Using the most favorable economic statistics for the combined Chinese and Russian economies—purchasing power parity—their combined economies are worth some $27 trillion in 2022. Using the same data for G7 countries, the core of the emerging Community, the total is $39 trillion.3 Add Australia and South Korea to the aggregate and the figure is $42 trillion. If nominal gross domestic product (GPD) is compared, the contrast is even more striking with the combined GDPs of China and Russia in 2022 totaling $20.2 trillion, while the combined GDPs of the G7 countries amount to $45.2 trillion, which when Australia and South Korea are added increases to $48.8 trillion.4 Critically, China’s trade with the democracies is over 10 times greater than that with Russia,5 while in 2020, China’s merchandise trade surplus with the rest of the world totaled $535 billion, with much of that figure due to surpluses with both the United States and Europe.6
Topic:
Security, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Superpower
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America