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1. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:
Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

2. Using the financial system to enforce export controls

Author:
Benjamin Hilgenstock, Elina Ribakova, Guntram Wolff, and Anna Vlasyuk
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Russian imports of battlefield goods that are subject to export controls, including from Western producers, have surged since mid-2022 and reached levels close to those prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russia thus continues to be able to acquire critical foreign components that it needs for its military industry. These imports occur via mainland China, Hong Kong, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, while other countries including Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic have also seen massive increases in imports from the EU and other coalition countries that likely end up in Russia. The implementation and enforcement of export controls faces major challenges, which are multifaceted and centre around complex supply chains, lack of transparency in documentation and opaque financial structures. The issues are familiar from anti money laundering (AML) and countering financing of terrorism (CFT) frameworks, where much progress has been made in the last two decades. A similar approach could help in rendering export controls effective. We propose: First, financial institutions could be tasked to play a role in the monitoring of the trade in export-controlled goods and the blocking of illicit transactions, building on their experience with due diligence in financial transactions. Second, non-financial companies could learn from banks’ efforts in the AML/CFT sphere to implement proper due-diligence procedures and to ensure export controls compliance. Public-sector investigations and appropriate fines are critical to increase the incentives for firms to act. Technology sanctions are going to be part of the economic statecraft toolbox for the foreseeable future. The Russia case will test their effectiveness and credibility, or lack thereof.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Exports, Trade, Imports, Financial Systems, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

3. La evolución de Rusia tras la Guerra en Ucrania

Author:
Albert Priego Moreno
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
En febrero de 2022 las tropas rusas entraron en el territorio de Ucrania. Desde entonces Europa en general y Ucrania en particular vive sumida en una situación de gran incertidumbre. Son muchas las previsiones que se han hecho para tratar de encontrar certezas en un mundo que tiene más dudas que certidumbres. Buena parte del futuro de Europa pasa por Ucrania y sobre todo por como acabe la guerra con Rusia. Por ello este trabajo tratará de dibujar tres escenarios del futuro de Rusia partiendo de los siguientes cinco factores: la guerra en Ucrania, la situación de Putin, la economía rusa, las sanciones y la paz social en Rusia. Se utilizará una metodología prospectiva partiendo de un análisis previo de la participación de Rusia en las guerras en las que ha tomado partido. Estos escenarios servirán para ver las consecuencias que puede tener una derrota de Rusia en el frente ucraniano, consecuencias que no solo serían para Rusia y Ucrania sino también para el resto del mundo.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Vladimir Putin, Future, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

5. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

6. Turning Point or Dead End? Challenging the Kremlin’s Narrative of Stability in Wartime

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian government expects 2024 to be a turning point in the country’s war against Ukraine. For this expectation to become reality, the Kremlin is using means of reflexive control: It projects an image of a country that has weathered Western sanctions, ramped up its economic performance, and united a society behind its leader and his goals. This strategy was confirmed by personnel changes executed after Vladimir Putin’s inauguration for a fifth presidential term. The Kremlin’s message masks the costly trade-offs that the Kremlin has created by choosing to pursue a long and costly war with an economic and political system that operates in increasingly tight corners. The past months have seen several destabilizing domestic events in Russia, highlighting the risks of the widespread securitization of public politics, diversion of resources from domestic policy targets to the war, and passiveness of Russian society’s support for the Kremlin’s current policies. The ongoing restructuring of Russia’s domestic economy and economic elite, structural weaknesses created by a military-production based economic growth model, threat of the eventual need for social or military mobilization, and the authorities’ relentless tightening of the limits of public politics and acceptable public behavior represent growing risks for a governance whose sole organizing principle is the ongoing war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Elites, Russia-Ukraine War, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

7. Russian Company Elmak Procures “High Priority” Items for Russia’s War Efforts via China

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russian weapons, including bombs, missiles, and drones, depend on crucial electronic components, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, many of which cannot be made by Russia. In many cases, produced only by Western companies, these essential components are being sourced by Russian electronics importers and trading companies in large quantities from, foremost, China. The Russian trading company Elmak LLC, aka Kometa LLC, has imported over $5 million of Western electronic goods, almost entirely via China. Over 90 percent of the items fall under Tier 1 of the Bureau of Industry and Security and European Union List of Common High Priority Items banned for export to Russia and at heightened risk of being diverted to Russia illegally due to “their importance to Russia’s war efforts.” China’s lack of action to prevent these sales justifies NATO’s recent labeling China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” 1 adding weight to calls for the application of more sanctions against Chinese suppliers and enabling banks. But U.S. and other Western companies need to do more. They should not ship to China any electronics known to be used in weapons against Ukraine. U.S. companies should show greater due diligence on the final use and end users of their products and simplify supply chains to prevent unauthorized transfers of electronics with restricted Harmonized System (HS) codes. At the very least, companies should agree not to export the most important electronic items to China, which have been identified in Russian weapons downed in Ukraine. Otherwise, as the war continues, with more U.S and other Western manufacturers’ electronics found in Russian weapons in Ukraine after causing casualties and destruction, these manufacturers look increasingly insensitive and powerless against their own complicity in supporting Russia’s illegal war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Imports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

8. EU Needs Better Monitoring to Enforce Sanctions on Russian Disinformation Online

Author:
Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
EU sanctions partially restrict the activities of Russian-affiliated media in the Union, but a challenge remains to reduce the scale of sanctions circumvention online. All Member States could introduce internet monitoring for compliance with EU restrictions and mechanisms to remove sites duplicating banned content. The EU should adopt a new sanctions regime on Russian destabilisation activities globally as soon as possible.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Internet, Disinformation, and Monitoring
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

9. Human Rights, but with CPC Characteristics, Rising in China's Foreign Policy

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
For China, human rights in relation to a sovereignty is gaining importance in its cooperation with countries of the Global South. The Chinese authorities emphasise the right of governments to make their own decisions in this area, which is welcomed by many of these, mainly authoritarian, states. For the EU, it is important both to counter the Chinese narrative on such disparities in human rights standards and to apply sanctions against China in cases of violations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sovereignty, Sanctions, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Global South

10. Using Frozen Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine: Possibilities for the EU

Author:
Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The EU wants to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine, using for this purpose frozen Russian assets, among others. The European Commission proposes to improve the system of confiscation of private assets of sanctioned persons in case of criminal activity and to obtain income from the active management of immobilised Russian public assets. These solutions may yield limited results. To be more effective, the EU would have to reach an international agreement to confiscate the reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Sanctions, Reconstruction, European Union, Assets, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine