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71. EU sanctions and Brexit: Losing the hard edge of European foreign policy?

Author:
Juha Jokela and Ilari Aula
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The EU needs to assume more responsibility in defending its interests and security. Brexit will constitute an additional challenge for the EU in this respect, and has led to calls to strengthen the efficiency of the the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including EU sanctions, which currently form one of the toughest and most increasingly used tools in the EU’s foreign policy toolbox. The UK has been the most active and influential member state in formulating the EU’s sanctions policy. The EU could largely replace the technical expertise provided by the UK, yet the level of ambition of the EU’s sanctions policy is likely to decrease. Even though the UK has taken measures to maintain the sanctions regimes it agreed to as an EU member state, an independent UK sanctions policy could result in divergence. The envisaged coordination mechanisms between EU and UK sanctions policies can mitigate some of the negative implications of Brexit, but they cannot replace the UK’s EU membership.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

72. Sharpening EU sanctions policy for a geopolitical era

Author:
Niklas Helwig
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) increasingly uses sanctions in order to respond to breaches of international norms and adverse security developments in its neighbourhood and beyond. This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the current state of EU sanctions and discusses options on how to maintain them as an effective tool. The study identifies the withdrawal of the UK as one of main architects of the instrument and an increasingly unilateral and unpredictable US sanctions policy as key challenges. In addition, the EU’s machinery for planning, deciding, implementing and enforcing sanctions exposes vulnerabilities in an increasingly geopolitical environment. The current shifts in international relations constitute an opportunity to clarify the strategic nature of EU sanctions and to fine-tune the sanctions machinery. EU unity and a joint diplomatic approach to international crises are vital for the success of the policy tool. Consequently, the efforts to improve the instrument need to ensure member states’ ownership of EU sanctions policy. Our economic analysis of Russia sanctions and countermeasures reveals rather minor macroeconomic repercussions for the EU and Finnish economy. The efforts to sharpen EU sanctions policy is important for Finland as one of the smaller and export oriented countries in the EU given the increasingly turbulent world marked by geopolitical competition. This publication is final report of a research project conducted by FIIA and ETLA entitled “Development of EU’s Sanctions Policy: Political and economic implications for Finland”. The project is part of the implementation of the Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research for 2019
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Sanctions, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

73. Shifts in Global Sanctions Policy, and What They Mean for the Future

Author:
Richard Nephew
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The last four years have borne witness to a range of new sanctions, policies, and approaches around the world. Some of these were predicted in November 2016, as Donald Trump took to sanctions far more than his predecessors, using them to tackle virtually every foreign policy problem he encountered. In fact, Trump’s use of sanctions transcended their typical usage in both form and content, as he employed tariffs and other more traditional “trade” tools to try to manage a bevy of nontrade problems. The long-term effects of this decision have yet to be felt or properly understood. It may be that Trump was ahead of the curve in seeing the fracturing of the global liberal economic order and employed the US economy for strategic advantage while it was still ahead. It may also be that Trump undermined the US position in the global economy through his policies, if not actually hastened the demise of this system of managing global economics. Time and the evolution of policy in other global power centers will eventually tell. The shifting approach to sanctions policy by a variety of other states is a manifestation of the potential effects of Trump’s policy choices in using US economic power. From the EU to Russia to China, other countries have changed long-standing policy approaches as they relate to sanctions, either to respond to or perhaps to take advantage of the new paths forged by the United States. The actions that they have taken are not “unprecedented” per se, as each of these countries or organizations has—at times—embraced policies that are consistent with some of these current actions. But, in aggregate, they describe an overall shift in how the world treats sanctions and trade policy, particularly that as practiced by the United States.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, and Sanctions
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

74. The Impact of Sanctions Imposed by the European Union against Iran on their Bilateral Trade: General versus Targeted Sanctions

Author:
Mahdi Ghodsi and Hüseyin Karamelikli
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Economic sanctions are intensively used by international institutions to enforce political objectives. Since 2006 the EU has been implementing general sanctions against the whole economy of Iran, affecting their trade relations. Since 2007, and following the imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council, the EU has also implemented smart sanctions targeting Iranian entities and natural persons associated with its military activities. In a non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL), this paper investigates the impact of general and targeted EU sanctions against Iran on quarterly bilateral trade values between the 19 members of the euro area (EA19) and Iran between the first quarter of 1999 and the fourth quarter of 2018. The results indicate that general sanctions have strongly hampered trade flows between the two trading partners. The impact of general sanctions on the total imports of the EA19 from Iran is more than four times stronger than on the total exports of the EA19 to Iran. Moreover, the EU’s general sanctions have hampered trade in almost all sectors, except for the primary sectors. Furthermore, our study finds that the impact of smart sanctions targeting Iranian entities and natural persons is much smaller than the impact of general sanctions on total trade values and the trade values of many sectors. Smart sanctions affect the exports of most sectors from the EA19 to Iran, while they are statistically insignificant for the imports of many sectors from Iran. Thus, this paper provides evidence on the motivations behind smart sanctions, which target specific individuals and entities rather than the whole economy, unlike general sanctions, which have a negative impact on ordinary people.
Topic:
United Nations, Sanctions, Trade, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, United Nations, and European Union

75. FDI another day: Russian reliance on European investment

Author:
Marta Dominguez-Jimenez and Niclas Poitiers
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Most foreign direct investment into Russia originates in the European Union: European investors own between 55 percent and 75 percent of Russian FDI stock. This points to a Russian dependence on European investment, making the EU paramount for Russian medium-term growth. Even if we consider ‘phantom’ FDI that transits through Europe, the EU remains the primary investor in Russia. Most phantom FDI into Russia is believed to originate from Russia itself and thus is by construction not foreign.
Topic:
Economics, Energy Policy, Foreign Direct Investment, Governance, Sanctions, European Union, and Global Political Economy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

76. Between God and the Sugar Dates: Lessons for a "Geopolitical" EU from the US–Iran Crisis

Author:
Tommaso Emiliani
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
The killing of top Iranian General Qasem Soleimani by a US drone strike on 3 January 2020, followed by the Iranian retaliation on US military bases in Iraq, left many Europeans wondering how – if at all – the European Union can foster de-escalation in the Middle East. The EU is presently stuck between a deepening strategic rift with its US ally and its inability to advance its independent interests and policies vis-à-vis Iran. It is now clear that Europe cannot protect its relations with Washington while also salvaging the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iranian nuclear deal. Borrowing from an old Persian proverb, Europe cannot have both God and the sugar dates.
Topic:
Sanctions, Military Affairs, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and Coronavirus
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, United States of America, European Union, and Gulf Nations

77. A Blacklist is (Almost) Born: Building a resilient EU human rights sanctions regime

Author:
Clara Portela
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In December 2018, the Council of the European Union initiated discussions about the creation of a new sanctions regime designed to address gross human rights violations, following a proposal from the Netherlands. So far, the EU only operates three thematic sanctions regimes: those targeting terrorism, cyberattacks and chemical weapons attacks. Unlike classical sanctions packages addressing crises in specific countries, such as Guinea or Venezuela, horizontal sanctions regimes apply to individuals and entities considered to have committed severe human rights abuses. Once approved, the planned blacklist is set to become the EU’s fourth horizontal sanctions regime, enlarging its vast body of autonomous sanctions regimes, i.e. restrictions adopted in the absence of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate. Over a year after the initial Dutch proposal was tabled, the sanctions regime is still under discussion, which contrasts with the rapid adoption of previous thematic regimes. On first inspection, the slow pace of preparations is puzzling: the vast majority of EU sanctions regimes were traditionally imposed in response to human rights breaches.3 Most EU autonomous sanctions regimes currently in force cite human rights violations as the rationale for their adoption. Indeed, the emphasis on human rights as a key motivation for the imposition of sanctions sets EU autonomous sanctions apart from the practice of other international sanctions senders like the United Nations (UN).4 Given that the promotion of human rights is a centrepiece of EU foreign policy, consensus among member states in support of such a regime should be forthcoming. If human rights breaches constitute the dominant motivation for the imposition of EU autonomous sanctions, what is holding up the approval of the prospective regime? Designing a horizontal sanctions regime in the EU is a much harder task than meets the eye. The present Brief aims to unravel the challenges that make it difficult for this regime to take shape, and suggests ways in which the obstacles identified may be surmounted or, at the very least, mitigated.
Topic:
Human Rights, Sanctions, European Union, and Transnational Actors
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

78. Price of Aggression: The Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy

Author:
Kazimier Dadak
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
In late February of 2014, president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych, a staunch ally of Russia, lost power. This event sent into motion a sequence of events that pitched Rus- sia against its neighbour and the West. Faced with the loss of influence, if not control, over Ukraine, Vladimir Putin immediately took steps that, in his mind, were to secure the interests of his country. First, in March 2014, Russia seized and annexed Crimea; soon af- terwards a Russian-inspired rebellion engulfed eastern Ukraine. These measures drastically increased Putin’s popularity at home, but made him a pa- riah abroad. Initially, the West, including the European Union, imposed diplomatic sanc- tions1. They had no effect on Russian behaviour and, in July, the West expanded punitive measures to the economy2. President Putin did not budge, and in September, the United States and the European Union increased the pressure by imposing additional sanctions on the financial sector3. As a result, Russian companies, including large banks, were effec- tively cut off from western financial markets. Past experience, such as the U.S. led sanc- tions on Iran, shows that this type of punishment is very effective and this paper illustrates that they exacted a price on the Russian economy as well.
Topic:
Economics, Sanctions, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

79. Coming out and breaking out: The US, Iran and Europe go nuclear

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
On the eve of the US elections, the nuclear deal (JCPOA) stands on the edge of the precipice. The US strategy of ‘maximum pressure’ has not (yet) achieved its implicit objective of 'regime change' but tanked Iran’s economy, caused its government to dig in and increased regional instability. The geopolitical consequences of US sanctions, EU prevarication and Iran’s deep presence throughout the Middle East have been equally profound. At the global level, they include nudging Iran towards China/Russia, the US alienating its European ‘partners’ and encouraging them to develop greater strategic autonomy. At the regional level, US sanctions risk creating an alternative economic regional order, ensuring Yemen remains a protracted war and making a regional security initiative more necessary, but less likely. It is not yet too late to turn the tide. The focus should now be on reducing regional tensions and especially the stress that sanctions have put on Iran’s population and government. Radical action looks more inviting when one stands against the wall, but the Middle East does not need more conflict than it already has. To do so, the EU should first support Iran with a large-scale Covid-19 humanitarian economy recovery package. As such measures are already sanctions-exempt, they will create few new tensions. An economic initiative should follow that grants preferential access to the EU’s internal market for industrial and agricultural goods from the entire Middle East (for Iran via an upgraded INSTEX). Such interventions will not resolve existing security dilemmas but can show there is an alternative to confrontation.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Elections, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Yemen, and United States of America

80. Meeting the challenge of secondary sanctions

Author:
Ellie Geranmayeh and Manuel Lafont Rapnouil
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Secondary sanctions have become a critical challenge for Europe, due to the Trump administration’s maximalist policy on Iran and its aggressive economic statecraft. Europe’s vulnerabilities mostly result from asymmetric interdependence with the US economy, due to the size of US markets and the global role of the US dollar. In future, states will likely weaponise economic interdependence with the EU to target countries that are more important to the European economy than Iran, such as China and Russia. European countries should demonstrate that, despite their economic interdependence with the US, they control EU foreign policy. The EU and its member states should strengthen their sanctions policy, begin to build up their deterrence and resilience against secondary sanctions, and prepare to adopt asymmetric countermeasures against any country that harms European interests through secondary sanctions. They should also attempt to bolster the global role of the euro and lead a robust international dialogue on the role of sanctions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, European Union, Economy, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Iran, North America, and United States of America