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61. Brothers in arms: The value of coalitions in sanctions regimes

Author:
Sonali Chowdhry, Julian Hinz, Katrin Kamin, and Joschka Wanner
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
Abstract:
This paper examines the impact of coalitions on the economic costs of the 2012 Iran and 2014 Russia sanctions. By estimating and simulating a quantitative general equilibrium trade model under different coalition set-ups, we (i) dissect welfare losses for sanction-senders and target; (ii) compare prospective coalition partners and; (iii) provide bounds for the sanctions potential — the maximum welfare change attainable — when sanctions are scaled vertically, i.e. across sectors up to an embargo, or horizontally, i.e. across countries up to a global regime. To gauge the significance of simulation outcomes, we implement a Bayesian bootstrap procedure that generates confidence bands. We find that the implemented measures against Iran and Russia inflicted considerable economic harm, yielding 32 – 37% of the vertical sanctions potential. Our key finding is that coalitions lower the average welfare loss incurred from sanctions relative to unilateral implementation. They also increase the welfare loss imposed on Iran and Russia. Adding China to the coalition further amplifies the welfare loss by 79% for Iran and 22% for Russia. Finally, we quantify transfers that would equalize losses across coalition members. These hypothetical transfers can be seen as a sanctions-equivalent of NATO spending goals and provide a measure of the relative burden borne by coalition countries.
Topic:
Globalization, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Sanctions, Alliance, and Embargo
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

62. The EU and China: Sanctions, Signals, and Interests

Author:
Sven Biscop
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Sanctions are much easier to use against your allies than against your enemies. A friend will want to stay in your good books, and is much more likely to modify his behaviour than an adversary, who will probably just harden his resolve to outdo you. The Trump administration liberally used sanctions against allies in Europe and Asia, who did not exactly cave in but did not want things to escalate either.1 The US trade war with China, on the other hand, cost both sides dearly, without resolving anything. In a coordinated move with the US, the UK, and Canada, the EU has adopted sanctions against four Chinese officials and one entity for violating the human rights of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province.2 That is fully legitimate: as a union of democracies, the EU has a moral duty to speak up for human rights everywhere. But are sanctions the most effective way of doing so?
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Sanctions, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

63. The impact of EU sanctions on Belarus will be limited

Author:
Izabela Surwillo
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The current Belarusian crisis was set off by a disputed presidential election on 9 August 2020, which gave Alexander Lukashenko his sixth term in office. Once again, the EU’s capacity for leadership was put to the test. When faced with the escalating post-election crisis in Belarus, the EU acted relatively fast, and after at­tempts to establish a dialogue failed, first sanctions followed in October 2020. The sanctions policy sent a signal to the Belarusian regime that EU member states can reach a common agreement. However, according to regional experts, the sanctions should have been broader and implemented earlier to show support for Belarusian society. Tougher sanctions were introduced when a Ryanair flight was forced to land in Minsk in May 2021. The extended sanctions package that followed increased the targeting of financial assets and state companies that are important contributors to the Belarusian state’s budget. Broader personal and sectoral sanctions hit Belarusian national industry and Alexander Lukas­henko’s immediate political circles. In response, he has engineered a migration crisis on the EU’s external border in Poland, Lithuania and Latvia that is destabili­sing the security situation in the region. The effectiveness of the new sanctions remains limited, as even those high state officials who have been targeted generally do not travel extensively or hold assets abroad. Moreover, while some of the sectoral sanctions are particularly aggravating to, for example, Belarusian transportation and logistics sectors (e.g., banning air carriers such as Belavia), they have sometimes targeted companies that do not have very strong trading links with the West, but that cooperate extensively with Russia (e.g., the production of ma­chines for exports to the east). There are also nume­rous loopholes in the sanction’s regime (e.g., exceptions made for imports of potash fertilizers) that undermine its effectiveness and have been blamed on certain lobby groups in Europe connected to businesses that trade with the Belarusian regime. Furthermore, loopholes seem to have been left in place intentionally to leave room for future dialogue with Belarus.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Belarus

64. Biden and Belarus: A strategy for the new administration

Author:
Anders Åslund, Melinda Haring, John Herbst, and Alexander Vershbow
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
United States President Joseph R. Biden Jr. has an historic opportunity to bring Europe together and reverse the tide of dictatorship by building an international coalition to support democracy in Belarus. In 2020, Belarusians unexpectedly called Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s legitimacy into question in the country’s August presidential election. Lukashenka brazenly rigged the results, claiming that he took 80 percent of the vote, but neither the United States nor the European Union (EU) recognizes his victory. A months-long protest movement has coalesced that demands new elections under the supervision of the international community. Recent years have seen no better chance for US leadership to facilitate lasting positive change in Europe than the crisis in Belarus. But how to secure democratic change in Belarus is not simple given internal resistance and Moscow’s determination to prevent another “color revolution.” Lukashenka is likely finished, unable to restore any authority or legitimacy. But he is seeking to hang on despite Moscow’s efforts to arrange a pliable replacement who would preserve Minsk’s pro-Russian orientation. Managing Moscow’s efforts to prevent an aroused citizenry from choosing their own leader is no easy task. Russia remains the key geopolitical player in Belarus, often plays the long game, and may be willing to countenance military options that the United States cannot. Perhaps the key fact is that Belarusians have made it amply clear that they want accountable leaders that they can choose and dismiss for themselves. More than thirty thousand peaceful protesters have been detained since August, more than three hundred and fifty police officers have defected, and ordinary Belarusians are no longer afraid to voice their opposition to the regime. Kremlin support for the ongoing repression risks turning the Belarusian people—historically friendly toward Russia—in a pro-European direction. These changes in Belarus are something that Moscow cannot ignore, and the United States and its allies must nourish and strengthen them in consistent ways that avoid and deter a Kremlin overreaction. Biden, with his long experience promoting US values and interests and his determination to strengthen transatlantic relations, is ideally situated to promote clear support for the people of Belarus that does not directly challenge Moscow’s security interests.
Topic:
Economics, Human Rights, Sanctions, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

65. Transatlantic tools: Harmonizing US and EU approaches to China

Author:
David Barkin and Agatha Kratz
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Close cooperation between the United States and the European Union is essential if advanced economies are to develop effective responses to the array of challenges presented by China. Washington and Brussels share concerns regarding competitive distortions arising through the state’s role in the Chinese economy, the use of advanced technologies to repress ethnic minorities and fuel its military, and the spread of authoritarian influence through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, there has been a lack of coordination and cooperation in recent years between the US and EU when it comes to responding to China’s policies and behaviors. Washington’s focus on risks to US economic and national security contrasts with an emphasis in Brussels on ensuring reciprocity and leveling the economic playing field. But, with the transatlantic relationship back on a better footing under the Biden administration, new structures for transatlantic dialogue being put in place, and a greater focus on the Indo-Pacific in both Washington and Brussels, this paper argues there is now an opportunity for the United States and Europe to learn from each other and harmonize some of their China-related efforts.
Topic:
Human Rights, Markets, Sanctions, European Union, Regulation, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

66. Europe’s last chance: How the EU can (and should) become the indispensable actor in Venezuela’s democratic restoration

Author:
Ryan C. Berg and Jorge González-Gallarza
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research
Abstract:
The EU’s current policy approach toward Venezuela is insufficient to contribute meaningfully to a political transition in the country and protect human rights. Oftentimes, the EU’s policy has been at odds with the US, having permitted unrelated disagreements to cloud its recognition of its strategic interest in a free, prosperous, and democratic Venezuela. The Nicolas Maduro regime’s illicit investment schemes have found fertile ground in the EU at large, with a particular hotspot in Spain. A torrent of investments and acquisitions has allowed corrupt cronies in Maduro’s entourage to engage in unfathomable kleptocracy and stash their ill-gotten gains in the eurozone, vitiating the rule of law in the process. The EU consistently underappreciates the Maduro regime’s multi-faceted security threat, which intersects with and compounds many of the EU’s greatest geostrategic challenges in the post-COVID-19 landscape. China, Cuba, Iran, and Russia are all at once strategic rivals of the EU and enablers of the Maduro regime’s threat to its security. The Joe Biden administration’s commitment to multilateral engagement in Venezuela offers the EU a chance to reclaim transatlantic cooperation and present a common vision for political transition in the country. Beefing up sanctions and developing a coordination mechanism, as well as drumming up humanitarian aid, would constitute serious progress and potentially thrust the EU into the role of indispensable actor in Venezuela’s democratic restoration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Sanctions, European Union, Democracy, Multilateralism, and Hugo Chavez
Political Geography:
Europe, Latin America, Spain, and Venezuela

67. Sanctions, a privileged instrument of European Foreign Policy

Author:
Ramona Bloj
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The value of sanctions does not only lie in their effectiveness. Sanctions are often a means of sending a clear signal of disapproval, a foreign policy stance, more moderate than an embargo, less dangerous than military retaliation. It is thus halfway between inaction and violent overreaction. In this respect, it is not surprising that the European Union has made it a privileged instrument of its foreign policy
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

68. The EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime: Prospects and Challenges

Author:
Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The European “Magnitsky Act” adopted by the EU is a political signal that the Union wants to protect human rights in the world more effectively. It fixes the scope of sanctions application in this field, but it does not fundamentally change existing EU practices. Still, the challenges lie in the adoption of sanctions listings by a unanimous decision of the Member States and their subsequent effective implementation. The new system will be used for the first time to impose restrictions on those responsible for the detention of Alexei Navalny in Russia. It may also be used in cases of human rights violations in China or on the territory of conflict areas in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Sanctions, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe

69. Germany-Turkey Relations: It could be worse

Author:
Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Germany at the end of 2020 finds itself in an awkward position. It is hailed by President Erdogan as one of the “reasonable countries within the EU” and by Ibrahim Kalin as having “played a remarkably positive role.” Germany has “gained” this esteem because of its mediation efforts between Greece and Turkey concerning the tensions in the East Med and for avoiding harsher EU sanctions. However, concerning the clash between France and Turkey over Islam(ism) and freedom of expression, Germany cannot mediate. Similar confrontations will also occupy Germany for the years to come and the German-Turks, now almost 3 million, will be right in the centre of this confrontation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Germany, and Mediterranean

70. Society max: How Europe can help Syrians survive Assad and coronavirus

Author:
Julien Barnes-Dacey
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
After nine years of conflict, the US is mounting a ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Syria, seeking the regime’s demise. But, with Assad having effectively won the war, he is unlikely to succumb to US economic pressure. Assad bears responsibility for the country’s freefall but this strategy will further accelerate societal collapse, especially as coronavirus looms, and will not deliver a transition. European governments should pivot to a longer-term strategy focused on protecting those societal forces that are still standing and that can help salvage a better future aligned with European interests. This should include increased – and cautious – support to them within government-controlled Syria. The unpredictability of the Trump administration means persuading the US down this track is not impossible – Europeans should seek to influence Washington to widen space for societal support.
Topic:
Sanctions, Conflict, Syrian War, Coronavirus, COVID-19, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and Syria