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151. Countering Authoritarian Propaganda: Perceived Expertise and Persuasiveness

Author:
Isabelle DeSisto, Laura Howells, Grigore Pop-Eleches, and Jacob Tucker
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
When do anti-regime messages persuade people living in authoritarian regimes to update their political attitudes? The literature on authoritarian politics has devoted considerable attention to understanding how pro-regime propaganda affects citizens’ attitudes, but far less to the converse: when and how anti-regime messaging is effective at bursting the regime’s information bubble. We argue that source credibility helps explain why some kinds of anti-regime messages influence opinions while others do not. To illustrate this argument, we draw on observational and experimental survey data collected in Russia after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We pair time-series data with three survey experiments, which together indicate that messages criticizing the regime and its policies are more persuasive when they come from people with subject-matter expertise.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Propaganda, Russia-Ukraine War, and Persuasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

152. Russia’s digital tech isolationism: Domestic innovation, digital fragmentation, and the Kremlin’s push to replace Western digital technology

Author:
Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Digital technology has long been a key component of the Russian government’s power, and for years following the collapse of the Soviet Union there was significant technology entanglement between Russia, the West, and other areas of the world. That changed in the late 2000s and early 2010s with heightened paranoia within the Kremlin about regime security and foreign subversion—and Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine has taken this to new levels. Due to combinations of intense securitization, Western sanctions, foreign businesses exiting Russia, tech “brain drain,” and other factors, digital technological isolationism is now both a reality and a desired goal for Moscow. This report examines the history of the modern Russian state’s approach to digital technology, the internet, and connection and interdependence with the West and foreign countries. It then analyzes the Kremlin’s late 2000s and early 2010s shift to a heavily securitized approach to the internet and its concerted push to develop domestic digital technology—both the successes and many failures. It then examines the 2022 Russian war on Ukraine, how the conflict and resulting events (such as sanctions and brain drain) have shifted Russia’s approach to domestic technology and digital isolation, and where different digital technology segments, such as hardware and software, stand.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Internet, Innovation, Isolationism, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

153. Inequality kills: on Russian combat ineff ectiveness in Ukraine and beyond

Author:
Pilster Ulrich and Olesya Vinhas de Souza
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
What would Russia’s military strategy be in a war with NATO? Before 2022, many analysts worried about the scenario in which Russia, leveraging a tactically profi cient and well-coordinated combined arms force, could swiftly overrun the Baltics in a matter of days. Drawing on a statistical analysis of historical battles and an examination of Russian force structure and equipment losses in Ukraine, we challenge this view. Endemic inequality within the Russian Armed Forces will continue to impede their adoption of the sophisticated tactics necessary for manoeuvre warfare. Therefore, we anticipate that a future potential Russian attack would resemble a war of attrition. Unable to quickly out-manoeuvre NATO forces, Moscow would aim to deploy overwhelming fi repower and manpower against Allied troops and civilian populations, with an aim to infl ict widespread and sustained destruction.
Topic:
NATO, Military Strategy, Inequality, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

154. Financing European air defence through European Union debt

Author:
Armin Steinbach and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Europe is vulnerable to air attacks by both state and non-state actors. Russia has substantially increased its production of hypersonic missiles, missiles and drones, while European air defence capacities remain patchy with little improvement in coverage in recent years. Air defence is a classic European public good. No individual nation alone can provide it comprehensively, while air defence provided individual European Union countries can offer significant benefits to Europe as a whole. Joint EU funding for the build-up of greater air defence capabilities would be thus justified and help ensure rapid and sufficient provisioning. Debt funding would be economically justified as air defence systems, such as Patriot and IRIS-T, involve large upfront costs – debt would allow the cost of the investment to be smoothed over longer periods. Issuing EU debt, similarly to what was done with the NextGenerationEU post-pandemic recovery instrument, would be justified given the level of the air-attack threat. EU debt funding of air defence system is legally possible. Debt funding for air defence would respect the EU’s limited competence in defence and such a scheme would maintain the exceptional character of debt funding, with EU countries responding to a security threat in an act of solidarity. Joint debt issuance would not imply changing the command structure of air defence as foreseen under NATO and the European Sky Shield Initiative, but it would impact procurement processes. Procurement could be organised in the framework of the EU’s existing Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) system. Additional EU debt would benefit the development of European industrial capacities in air defence, even if in the short term some funds were used to buy systems from the United States. Significant funds for research and the development of the domestic industrial base should be part of the initiative.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Debt, European Union, Finance, Macroeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

155. A European defence industrial strategy in a hostile world

Author:
Juan Mejino-López and Guntram B. Wolff
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has brought war back to Europe. Failing to stop Russia’s aggression would leave Europe at a critical disadvantage for decades, with a long-term threat to peace in the European Union. The EU can no longer rely on United States leadership in NATO and European countries therefore need to rapidly build-up their military capabilities. European countries have increased the amounts spent on defence considerably in recent years but the underinvestment of previous decades means that gaps still exist. While the EU as a whole fulfils the 2% NATO target, 7 EU NATO countries still fall short of reaching it. The European defence market remains fragmented. The lack of joint procurement and national preferences for defence spending translate into small markets with low production numbers. We provide evidence of the cost of no EU single market for selected defence products: Low production numbers are a major reason for relatively high costs per unit of production. European countries should work with the incoming EU defence commissioner to develop a cost-effective rearmament strategy. Countries pursuing goals individually would be ineffective. While EU defence industrial policy is constrained by institutional, political and practical problems, there are significant opportunities. A more integrated market for defence products would lead to greater economies of scale, resulting in lower prices and more defence readiness. Europe should aim at greater market integration for defence rather than at protecting smaller national markets. Addressing the current security concerns will require both EU and national large funding, easily €500 billion in the next five years, for which budget prioritisation as well as European and national debt will be needed. The European defence strategy should account for comparative advantages and disadvantages, which means that purchases of weapons from outside the EU are warranted and rational, especially when the security of supply and interoperability are guaranteed. Yet local purchases, i.e. some European preference, to boost industrial capabilities and innovation are critical to reinforce strategic autonomy and avoid falling behind on military technology.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

156. UK trade 2024

Author:
Jonathan Portes, Sarah Hall, and Stephen Hunsaker
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
UK trade has, since the 2016 referendum, become a hotly debated subject. Which is not to say that it is simply a Brexit story; the uncertainties currently shaping UK trade are far from unique to the UK. Supply chain disruption associated with international conflicts, and a geo-political environment that is generally less conducive to trade, are impacting trade globally. In the immediate years following Brexit, trade data was complicated by the Covid-19 pandemic and a significant rise in global energy prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. 2023 data released by the Office for National Statistics provides one of the first opportunities to assess the UK’s post-Brexit trade performance in detail. This report uses these data to set out the key recent trends in UK trade, outline where uncertainties lie and what the policy implications are.
Topic:
Brexit, Trade, COVID-19, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

157. Starr Forum: Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War

Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Ukraine and Russia One Year On: The Domestic Impact of the War
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

158. What is the Significance of Prigozhin's Revolt for Russian Security Policy?

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
On the night of 23-24 June, Yevgeny Prigozhin, the head of the Wagner Group private military company, which has been fighting in Ukraine and operating elsewhere, stood up to the Russian Ministry of Defence and began an armed march on Moscow. However, in the end he and his forces did not storm the capital, officially as a result of negotiations led by Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenka. Prigozhin’s actions will worsen the morale of Russian soldiers and mercenaries fighting in Ukraine but will not change Russia’s hostile actions towards NATO countries.
Topic:
NATO, Wagner Group, Russia-Ukraine War, Private Military Companies (PMCs), and Yevgeny Prigozhin
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

159. Using Frozen Russian Assets to Rebuild Ukraine: Possibilities for the EU

Author:
Elzbieta Kaca
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The EU wants to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine, using for this purpose frozen Russian assets, among others. The European Commission proposes to improve the system of confiscation of private assets of sanctioned persons in case of criminal activity and to obtain income from the active management of immobilised Russian public assets. These solutions may yield limited results. To be more effective, the EU would have to reach an international agreement to confiscate the reserves of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Sanctions, Reconstruction, European Union, Assets, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

160. South Africa-Russia Maintain Special Relations

Author:
Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Although South Africa declares it is neutral regarding the war in Ukraine and offers mediation, it remains a de facto ally of Russia. This is due to the strong sentiment among the ruling elites for the period of cooperation with the USSR, its successor Russia and its activity and influence in this country, and the perception that BRICS will help elevate South Africa’s international importance. If Vladimir Putin visits Johannesburg as scheduled in August, the authorities of the state, which is party to the Rome Statute, will not be willing to fulfil their obligation to arrest him or may even leave the International Criminal Court.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, BRICS, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and South Africa