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91. A Significant Change in Russian Doctrine on Nuclear Weapon Use

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Speaking to the Russian Presidential Security Council on Sept 25, 2024, Vladimir Putin asserted that “Aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state… supported by a nuclear power should be treated as their joint attack.” But what does this imply for the Ukraine war and more generally? Although the announcement reaffirms several long-standing provisions of Russian nuclear weapon doctrine, it does add something new and portentous. It asserts that Russia may reply to a massive aerial attack on the homeland while it is underway even if the attack is purely conventional. The perceived “massiveness” of the attack is held practically speaking to be equivalent to an existential attack. The new view may also imply that such an attack by Ukraine would be considered a joint UA-NATO attack and possibly warrant a similar response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

92. NATO’s “Back to the Future”: A Conversation with Dr. Benedetta Berti

Author:
Benedetta Berti
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
In 2022, the Concept was written right in the middle of Russia’s brutal war of aggression against Ukraine. All of those assumptions that we had in 2010 simply don’t work. The potential of conventional war cannot be dismissed. The notion that the Euro-Atlantic area is an area of stability and predictability—well, the reality is that those tools that provide for predictability and stability are all under tremendous pressure. So this Concept starts by saying: unfortunately, our security environment is the most complex that we’ve had for generations, and we need to act and prepare accordingly. One of the priorities is to rebuild the ability to ensure the territorial defense of Allies and to rebuild our deterrence and defense posture in a way that is credible for what is essentially a much more competitive world. So that’s a big change. It’s just beyond words. If you accept that assessment, it requires a significantly more robust investment in defense, in rebuilding our militaries, in investing in the right capabilities, and in rebuilding our defense industry. So, it is a generational shift.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Instability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

93. Alabuga’s Greatly Expanded Production Rate of Shahed 136 Drones

Author:
David Albright, Igor Anokhin, Sarah Burkhard, Victoria Cheng, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Over the last two years, Russia has launched thousands of Shahed 136 drones against Ukraine. Although most of these relatively noisy, slow-moving drones have been shot down, about 15 percent on average have gotten through, causing immense damage to Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. The Russian manufacturer of these drones, JSC Alabuga, contracted with Iran in early 2023 in a $1.75 billion dollar franchise deal to supply 6000 of the drones to the Russian Army by September 2025 in a three-stage arrangement, shown in Figure 1. While there were initial delays and skepticism about Alabuga being able to supply 6000 drones, data on Russian launches of Shahed drones collected by the Ukrainian military indicate that Alabuga is ahead in its production schedule and has already supplied approximately 4500 of the promised 6000 drones as of late April 2024. Based on these data, Alabuga has almost tripled its average production rate recently. It has, for the last several months produced Shahed drones at an average rate of about 20 drones per workday, equivalent to two shifts per day at the production facility, compared to a contract amount for 2023 of about 7 drones per workday followed by 10 drones per day. At this new rate, about 5200 drones per year, Alabuga could fulfill its commitment of supplying 6000 drones a year early, by mid-August 2024, and it could supply an additional 5400 drones by September 2025.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Production, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Ukraine

94. Russian Decoy Drones that Depend on Western Parts Pose a Great Challenge to Ukrainian Defenses

Author:
Igor Anokhin and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russia has developed and deployed several types of decoy drones to assist missile and drone strikes on Ukraine. This report discusses two of those decoy drones, the Gerbera (also known as Gerber) and the Parody (also known as Parodiya) UAVs that mimic the Shahed 136 and other drone systems. Both of these drones can be mass produced quickly and are built from simple materials like plywood, foam, and a few electronics, making them inexpensive compared to their more costly counterparts. Ukraine has become increasingly proficient at identifying, tracking, and intercepting Russian airborne platforms, like missiles and drones. To increase the effectiveness of Russian barrages, these decoy drones are launched in large numbers alongside missiles and attack drones, like the Shahed 136 and Lancet-3, to overwhelm and confuse Ukrainian defenses to draw anti-aircraft fire on the decoys, allowing other weapons to reach their targets. Ukrainian defenders can never be entirely certain that an incoming drone does not carry an explosive warhead, forcing them to expend valuable munitions intercepting these drones. Because Ukraine has limited stockpiles of interceptor missiles, anti-aircraft artillery ammunition, and hunter-killer-drones, deploying decoy drones is a viable strategy to wear down Ukrainian defenders. Using decoy drones can also help Russian forces identify where Ukraine has positioned anti-aircraft defenses, radar, and electronic warfare systems, and target those in subsequent attacks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Drones, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

95. Chinese Export of Restricted High Priority Battlefield Items to Russia

Author:
Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed more than 295,000 commercial import-export trade manifest records from May 2022 through the end of December 2023, detailing exports of restricted Tier One Harmonized System Codes (HS Codes) items on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL) being exported by Chinese companies to Russian importers. The BIS CHLP applies trade restrictions to Russia on the most sensitive and sought-after Western electronics and other commodities that Russia requires to build its war machine. Tier One covers key items that Russia cannot domestically produce and that have limited manufacturers and constitutes four HS Code chapter 84 codes (8542.31, 8542.32, 8542.33, and 8542.39) detailing the most important electronics which Russia needs to build drones, missiles, and other weapon systems. Russia depends on illicit import practices and networks to acquire these goods from overseas, mainly Western goods via China. Without these critical commodities, Russia would be crippled in its ability to produce the advanced missiles, drones, and other combat systems it needs to wage its war of aggression in Ukraine. More than $1.5 billion worth of restricted Tier One commodities were found being exported from China to Russia during the assessed period. The shipments contained electronics designed and produced by Western firms, but shipped by often obscure and little-known Chinese companies to Russian firms. Shipments containing Western brands found in the trade data include Texas Instruments, XILINX, Analog Devices, Intel, NVIDIA, ST Microelectronics, and other major sought-after designers and producers of electronics. Many of these companies’ products have been frequently found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine, especially in drone systems such as the Shahed 136 and the Lancet kamikaze drones, and Kometa anti-jamming equipment. For example, XILINX field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, all of which were found in the assessed trade data, are essential components in the Shahed 136, hundreds of which are being launched at Ukraine each month. 1 NVIDIA Jetson AI modules play a key role in how the Lancet—another drone launched by Russia at Ukraine in the thousands—autonomously identifies, tracks, and engages targets. 2 These amounts of drones, as well as other weapon systems like missiles and other drones, demand a huge quantity of Western Tier 1 goods to keep up production rates and meet the Russian military’s operational needs.
Topic:
Weapons, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

96. Russian Company Drake LLC’s Procurements for JSC Alabuga’s Military Drone Projects - JSC Alabuga’s Weaponization of Commercial Drones for Military Use in Ukraine

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
With the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, JSC Alabuga shifted from centering on hosting domestic and international civilian manufacturing facilities at its Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to direct military production of military drones, in particular the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone under a supply and franchise contract with Iran. This shift has necessitated the large-scale procurement of a variety of different types of goods abroad. One of JSC Alabuga’s important procurement arms has been Drake LLC, aka Dreik LLC, which contracts with Alabuga Development Company, JSC Alabuga’s main construction and production arm. Drake’s role in outfitting military industries was recognized on February 23, 2024, when it was sanctioned by the United States. However, its precise dealings which warranted this designation have received little public scrutiny. The case of Drake exposes a part of Alabuga’s drone production supply chain and its broader interest in military drones in addition to the Shahed 136 drone. This case study reveals how Alabuga Development Company purchased in early 2023 via Drake and a third party in Kazakhstan, DRONE.kz, up to 30 Dragonfish drones from Autel Robotics, a major Chinese drone manufacturer with a strong U.S. presence, for modification at Alabuga for military use in Ukraine. The planned changes included extending the drone’s range, strengthening its ability to defeat jamming from enemy electronic warfare systems, and/or attaching a universal delivery system for a variety of ordnance, such as grenades and video-guided rocket propelled grenades.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Manufacturing, Procurement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

97. Russian Company Elmak Procures “High Priority” Items for Russia’s War Efforts via China

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russian weapons, including bombs, missiles, and drones, depend on crucial electronic components, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, many of which cannot be made by Russia. In many cases, produced only by Western companies, these essential components are being sourced by Russian electronics importers and trading companies in large quantities from, foremost, China. The Russian trading company Elmak LLC, aka Kometa LLC, has imported over $5 million of Western electronic goods, almost entirely via China. Over 90 percent of the items fall under Tier 1 of the Bureau of Industry and Security and European Union List of Common High Priority Items banned for export to Russia and at heightened risk of being diverted to Russia illegally due to “their importance to Russia’s war efforts.” China’s lack of action to prevent these sales justifies NATO’s recent labeling China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” 1 adding weight to calls for the application of more sanctions against Chinese suppliers and enabling banks. But U.S. and other Western companies need to do more. They should not ship to China any electronics known to be used in weapons against Ukraine. U.S. companies should show greater due diligence on the final use and end users of their products and simplify supply chains to prevent unauthorized transfers of electronics with restricted Harmonized System (HS) codes. At the very least, companies should agree not to export the most important electronic items to China, which have been identified in Russian weapons downed in Ukraine. Otherwise, as the war continues, with more U.S and other Western manufacturers’ electronics found in Russian weapons in Ukraine after causing casualties and destruction, these manufacturers look increasingly insensitive and powerless against their own complicity in supporting Russia’s illegal war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Imports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

98. Iran/Russia Military Technology Axis: Russia Showcases to Iran New and Advanced Military Technology

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
A dangerous new weapons technology partnership between Iran and Russia is emerging with deadly consequences for the United States, Israel, and their allies. This axis, helped importantly by China, exchanges finished military hardware and the technology to replicate and produce it. With the advent of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the transfer of weapons technology from Iran to Russia has developed on a large scale. The Ukraine war has led Russia to seek goods from Iran, including prominently a $1.75 billion purchase of Shahed 136 kamikaze drones and their production know-how. As it produces the Shahed drones, known in Russia as the Geran 2 drone, Russia has improved it. Based on the extensive interactions in Iran and in Russia between Iranian experts and the drone manufacturer, JSC Alabuga, there are grounds to believe that Russian improvements in the drone’s design and production have filtered back to Iran. Additionally, Iran is interested more generally in Russian military technologies.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

99. 1,000 days of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine

Author:
Philip Breedlove, Iulia-sabina Joja, and Matthew Czekaj
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Wednesday, November 20, marks a somber anniversary for Ukraine: 1,000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion of the country. Though the Ukrainians continue to hold out with Western assistance against Russian attacks, the past two-and-a-half years have been devastating for the country and its people. Ukraine now faces another winter at war as momentum appears to be shifting in Russia’s favor. What can the US and its allies do to ensure hostilities end as favorably as possible to Ukraine and in line with American strategic national interests? MEI scholars General Philip M. Breedlove and Dr. Iulia-Sabina Joja join host Matthew Czekaj to discuss the state of the conflict and what’s at stake for the region and the global community.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Strategic Interests, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

100. 178th mBank-CASE Seminar Proceedings: Immigration and the Labour Market in Poland

Author:
Jan Bazyli Klakla and Maciej Duszczyk
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
Over the last dozen years Poland became an immigration country. The 178th mBank-CASE Seminar proceedings is devoted to this process – from various perspectives. The data speak for themselves. Immigration provides significant support for the Polish labour market. Poland is facing a rapid population decline. According to projections by the Ministry of Finance in 2022, by 2030 the population of Poland could decrease from the current 37.75 million to 36.6 million, and by 2050 to 34.1 million. The percentage of people of working age will decrease, while the elderly population will increase. Immigration may provide a solution to this problem. In 2022, around 100,000 people from Belarus arrived in Poland, most of them actively participating in the labour market. In addition, there are 1.2 million Ukrainians who stayed in Poland after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is therefore necessary to develop a long-term immigration, education and social policy to retain immigrants and integrate them into society and the labour market. This is what eminent experts who have been researching migration processes for years write about in the first two chapters of these Notebooks: Dr Maciej Duszczyk, as well as Dr Agata Górny and Dr Paweł Kaczmarczyk, from the Centre for Migration Research, operating within the University of Warsaw. The third chapter is devoted to the situation of female domestic workers.
Topic:
Immigration, Labor Market, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland