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22. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine
- Author:
- Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
- Abstract:
- Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
- Topic:
- European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, and Ukraine
23. Allies Help Those Who Help Themselves: How Estonia and Japan Approach Deterrence
- Author:
- Yoko Iwama, Tetsuo Kotani, Sugio Takahashi, Tony Lawrence, and Henrik Praks
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Up until the blatant act of Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2022, the West had been gradually shifting its attention towards East Asia, with China seen as the primary challenge of the first half of the 21st century. The new context requires a thorough reassessment of international security architecture by all national stakeholders. This, in turn, offers Estonia and Japan the opportunity to enrich their security perspectives on common strategic threats, as well as on broader geopolitical shifts caused by Russia and China. This report introduces several aspects of these revolutionary developments, their background, and their potential implications, some of which have already been reflected in the updated strategic documents unveiled by US and Japanese defence communities. Taken together, these documents make a case for an enhanced partnership between Japan, the US, and Europe that would prepare like-minded allies to respond to any security crisis. In the eventuality of a crisis resulting in an actual military confrontation, the report compares China’s missile supremacy and Japan’s long-range standoff maritime firepower strategies by grounding this analysis in the theory of victory. Charting a more favourable course forward, the report assesses the current state of deterrence in the Baltics by detailing the key developments in regional defence posture and planning, with a clear shift towards forward defence. Centring on emerging cross-border risks posed by hybrid warfare and using Estonia as a case study for vulnerabilities, the report proposes ways to mitigate these risks by advancing the role of deterrence. The report’s recommendations are as follows: To establish a cooperative format between NATO and Indo-Pacific nations along the lines of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership and Cooperation Council and open NATO’s liaison office in Japan. To create the Baltic-Japan security and defence 1.5 Track dialogue forum. To develop ties between the defence intelligence services of Estonia and Japan in order to better understand the threats posed by Russia and China. To facilitate networking in the fields of concept development, capability planning, doctrine, and military education to address the challenges of multi-domain operations. To explore possibilities for closer defence industrial cooperation and technology sharing between Estonia and Japan in cyber security, artificial intelligence, sensorics, robotics, and electronic warfare. To engage Estonia’s knowledge and experience when adopting NATO’s standards and practices in Japan’s future capability development in pursuit of interoperability. To hold joint exercises in integrated air and missile defence, coastal defence, critical undersea infrastructure protection, etc. As Japan seeks to forge closer defence relations with Europe and European nations and enhance their defence ties with the democracies in the Indo-Pacific area, the need to understand better how cooperation between Estonia and Japan contributes to the emerging Euro-Pacific deterrence agenda will persist.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, and Estonia
24. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine
- Author:
- Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
- Publication Date:
- 04-2023
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
25. Addressing Cohesion Policy’s identity crisis in a changing European Union
- Author:
- Alison Hunter
- Publication Date:
- 02-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- European Policy Centre (EPC)
- Abstract:
- Since the late 1980s Cohesion Policy has been one of the cornerstone policies of the European Union. However, nowadays, a different, bolder Cohesion Policy debate is needed, reflecting a radically changed global environment. This Discussion Paper focuses on the upcoming review of the post-2027 Multi Annual Financial Framework and the debate concerning the future EU Cohesion Policy. It argues that Cohesion Policy’s purpose requires reinvention, not an incremental upgrade. Four overarching themes are analysed, reframing Cohesion Policy with a strategic, long-term investment perspective: EU resilience, security, strategic autonomy, and reforms. The author then proposes five recommendations which weave together these themes with the policy’s long-standing core features: Acknowledge the need to review the Cohesion Policy’s purpose. The EU should breathe new life into the Cohesion Policy debate. Revitalise Cohesion Policy’s long-term value by defending its pillars. The EU should re-confirm Cohesion Policy’s role as a structural policy. Position Cohesion Policy as the ‘guardian’ of EU place-based policymaking. Cohesion Policy should champion the “future-proofing” of regional resilience. Articulate Cohesion Policy’s role in the evolving EU governance and reform agenda. The EU should reach beyond the Recovery and Resilience Facility to reclaim Cohesion Policy’s role in structural reform. Improve Cohesion Policy’s convening power to catalyse deeper EU innovation cooperation. The future Cohesion Policy must deliver a more coordinated approach to the EU’s innovation agenda. The Paper concludes that the future Cohesion Policy should evolve in lockstep with citizens’ needs. This will not be easy. As discussions on the EU’s future have been sidelined in this crisis-prone area, the challenges ahead require strong leadership and coordination. The post-2027 EU Cohesion Policy will have much to contribute to rebuilding the EU’s future vision.
- Topic:
- Security, Governance, Reform, European Union, Regional Integration, Social Cohesion, Resilience, and Strategic Autonomy
- Political Geography:
- Europe
26. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: One Year On
- Author:
- LSE Ideas
- Publication Date:
- 09-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- LSE IDEAS
- Abstract:
- This Strategic Update summarises a roundtable discussion held at LSE IDEAS in July 2023. Contributors to the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Stuart Austin, Professor Gordon Barrass, Professor Christopher Coker, Tom McKane, Hugh Sandeman, Susan Scholefield, and Peter Watkins. None of the content of the Strategic Update is attributable to any one individual. One year on from NATO’s Madrid 2022 summit, this Strategic Update address the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and its implications for the future, especially regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. The paper addresses the misalignment between preparations for defence and the real state of its armed forces, the UK’s symbolic support for Ukraine versus its capability, the concepts of resilience and deterrence, and finally the future of NATO’s relationship with Russia.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America
27. Measuring economic resilience for the CEE and Black Sea countries in the framework of comprehensive defense
- Author:
- Maria Constantinescu
- Publication Date:
- 12-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Security and Defence Quarterly
- Institution:
- War Studies University
- Abstract:
- The main research objective of this paper is to identify key factors influencing economic resilience from the perspective of comprehensive defence. This involves developing a composite economic resilience index (Ericda) that outlines the relative economic resilience of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea regions, within the comprehensive defence framework. The paper employs qualitative research methods, focusing on an analysis of specialist literature pertaining to economic resilience. Quantitative methods are also used for developing the Economic Resilience Index from the Comprehensive Approach to Defence (Ericda) perspective. This includes using data on selected resilience indicators in Central and the Eastern European and Black Sea region countries to generate rankings. The results of the study reveal strong positive correlations between the economic resilience index and various factors, such as logistics and infrastructure, economic complexity, foreign trade vulnerabilities and dependence, economic stability and development, governance effectiveness, military, and human capital. Additionally, a negative correlation was observed with the resilience index. The research findings suggest that to ensure effective comprehensive defence, isolated measures targeting individual pillars are inadequate. Economic resilience requires a collaborative approach, extending beyond the purview of the finance ministry and involving a broader range of stakeholders.
- Topic:
- Economics, International Security, Resilience, Economic Security, and Military
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Black Sea
28. Shrinking Spaces in the Middle East and North Africa: Supporting Civil Society Resilience
- Author:
- Ilyas Saliba
- Publication Date:
- 01-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
- Abstract:
- Civil society organisations (CSOs) in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) face mounting challenges, especially in authoritarian states, where they encounter closures, persecution and smear campaigns. Consequently, their crucial work in advancing human rights, good governance and inclusive human development is increasingly stifled and criminalised. Activists and professionals linked to CSOs also endure surveillance and persecution. This should worry European policymakers since a vibrant and free civil society in MENA is in their interest, as it is key for human development. This policy brief proposes seven ways for development cooperation to protect CSOs in authoritarian regimes in the MENA and beyond. European foreign and development policies in the MENA region have led to governmental partnerships that often sustain authoritarian regimes at the expense of citizens’ rights, for instance on migration (Francavilla, 2023; Grimm & Roll, 2023). Although substantial humanitarian aid reaches conflict zones, one of the root causes of the continuing political violence and conflicts – absence of accountable democratic governments – remains inadequately addressed (Barakat & Fakih, 2021). To avoid further empowering authoritarian rule in the region, European policymakers should reassess their multi- and bilateral governmental cooperation. The prevalent assumption amongst many policymakers that the incumbent authoritarian regimes in MENA can provide political stability needs to be discarded. The stability paradigm guiding European relations with the Arab World should instead be replaced with a do-no-harm approach. Although “do no harm” is a core principle of European development cooperation policy, it often is ignored in practice or trumped by other interests (Leininger, 2023). Development cooperation benefitting citizens must prioritise inclusive human development through cooperation with a wide range of actors, including elected state bodies, independent media and watchdog CSOs (Rutzen, 2015). This policy brief develops seven recommendations for European policymakers in development cooperation. The first step is to overcome the prevalent stability-through-cooperation paradigm to prevent further negative effects on human rights, democracy and civil society. Therefore, it is important that European policymakers recognise these authoritarian regimes’ unwillingness to implement reforms that would reduce their control over political institutions. Second, it remains crucial that policymakers acknowledge the increasingly shrinking space for critical voices in civil society. Third, governments and regional organisations should give CSOs a voice at international summits and in international organisations to increase the visibility of their demands and show support for oppressed voices. Fourth, European development cooperation professionals should establish flexible crisis funding lines for at-risk CSOs and their staff. Fifth, at-risk journalists, activists or human rights defenders (HRDs) need access to fast-track visa programmes to ensure they can continue their work from abroad when the authorities want to silence them. Sixth, European development cooperation profession-als should continue to support marginalised voices and groups and push for more inclusive governance. Lastly, European governments should limit arms exports to authoritarian regimes.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Development, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Middle East, and North Africa
29. The Imperative of International Cooperation for EU Competitiveness and Resilience in Technology-Driven Industries
- Author:
- Matthias Bauer, Renata Zilli, and Dyuti Pandya
- Publication Date:
- 11-2023
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
- Abstract:
- The EU must embrace international cooperation and collaboration in technology-driven industries to ensure competitiveness and global relevance, while also considering the drawbacks of isolationist policies. The EU’s commitment to open markets and global cooperation has historically been its strength, and EU policymakers should continue to prioritise on these principles. Global markets, international R&D collaboration and global industry-led standards are crucial for innovation and efficiency in technology-intensive industries. Various sectors, including pharmaceuticals, ICT, aerospace, and defence, heavily rely on global partnerships to stay competitive and advance technologically. International cooperation in economic and security affairs, as exemplified by EU participation in global value chains of advanced semiconductors, the traditional EU approach to industry-led technology standardisation, and EU involvement in the international F-35 fighter development program, is critical for leveraging industry expertise, sharing technological advancements, and collectively addressing challenges in strategic sectors, thereby enhancing Europe’s economic resilience and security capabilities. Trust and legal certainty form the foundation for international partnerships in high-tech and defence sectors. Collaborations among like-minded partners enable secure information sharing, intellectual property protection, financial commitments, and compliance with regulations, while ensuring adherence to key EU values like human rights and the rule of law.
- Topic:
- International Cooperation, Science and Technology, European Union, Trade, Resilience, and Competition
- Political Geography:
- Europe
30. Defend. Resist. Repeat: Ukraine’s lessons for European defence
- Author:
- Hanna Shelest
- Publication Date:
- 11-2022
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
- Abstract:
- Ukraine’s response to Russian aggression in 2022 holds valuable lessons for the EU and its member states. Since 2014, Ukraine has transformed its armed forces, mobilised a network of reservists, and coordinated military and civilian defence agencies to prioritise cross-society resilience to crises. It has done so by adopting NATO best practices and through a unique movement of volunteers who help fund the war effort. The Ukrainian armed forces have also found innovative ways to use new technologies in mounting an asymmetric response to their much larger adversary. EU member states can learn from Ukraine’s experiences, but this should be a two-way street – with European countries continuing to supply weapons and provide training to Ukraine, and gaining real-world wartime insights in return.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Ukraine