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1. Baltic and Nordic States Assess the Russian Military Threat

Author:
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The newest intelligence reports by the Baltic and Nordic states jointly warn about the aggressive intentions and reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. All of the documents assume the successful implementation of plans for larger Russian land and airborne forces till the end of 2026. However, these reports differ in the estimates of when the political moment and Russia’s conventional capabilities may permit it to initiate open conflict with NATO. Despite their informational and analytical contents, these reports may affect the Baltic region states’ capabilities development plans and their decisions about whether to increase defence spending.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

2. When sleepwalkers awake: German plea for a new European security architecture - a German point of view

Author:
Stéphane Beemelmans
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
For three years, a war has been raging on Europe's borders between two geographically connected states – a conflict that originated in Russia's occupation of Crimea and Donbass almost 11 years ago. Since then, every political and military decision-maker in our part of Europe should have realized that there is a (great) power on our continent that is ready at any time to put ‘war as a continuation of politics by other means’ (Clausewitz) into practice. The deterrent mechanism between the former blocs, which had been effective for almost 50 years and thus prevented war, has evidently given way to a ‘laissez-faire’ on the part of the European states, which has allowed Russia to attack and partially occupy Ukraine with complete impunity, using a crude mix of historical and political justifications that violate international law. What should not have happened could not be seen and therefore could not be addressed appropriately. Our and NATO's ‘laissez-faire’ was based on the for malistic argument that no NATO member country had been attacked and on the lack of strategic foresight disguised as ‘hope’, the expression of which under international law was the ‘Minsk Peace Agreement’ of 2015. The hope, namely, that this attack could be localized and thus geographically restricted or ‘frozen’.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

3. What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba

Author:
Dmytro Kuleba, Carol Saivetz, and Elizabeth Wood
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
What’s next for Ukraine and Europe? A conversation with Dmytro Kuleba, former foreign minister of Ukraine: Tuesday, April 8th, 2025. Speaker: Dmytro Kuleba is a senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and served as the foreign minister of Ukraine from March 2020-September 2024. Prior to that, he was deputy prime minister on matters of European relations from August 2019 to March 2020. He is internationally recognized as one of the most influential diplomats of his generation and a global champion for democracy, freedom, and resilience. Discussants: Carol Saivetz is a senior advisor in the MIT Security Studies Program at the Center for International Studies (CIS). She is the author and contributing co-editor of books and articles on Soviet and now Russian foreign policy issues. Elizabeth Wood is Ford International Professor of History at MIT. She is the author most recently of Roots of Russia’s War in Ukraine as well as articles on Vladimir Putin, the political cult of WWII, right-wing populism in Russia and Turkey, and US-Russian Partnerships in Science. She is director of the MIT-Ukraine Program at CIS.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Conflict, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. A New Security Order for Europe

Author:
Pierre Vimont
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Europe's security order has collapsed in the wake of the Ukrainian conflict. The very idea of rethinking this particular European framework raises doubts when faced with a Russian regime unable to admit the futility of its imperial dream. However, Europeans cannot afford not to think about the future of stability in Europe in response to the Russian question, which has been troubling our continent for too long[1]. Vladimir Putin's decision to invade Ukraine has put an end to the European security order as it was established in 1975 in Helsinki. By launching his "special military operation", the Russian President has gutted the whole edifice that had lasted as well as it could since its foundation.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

5. The Regional Security Complex Theory and Energy Triangle of EU-TurkeyRussia

Author:
Mehmet Ferhat Fırat
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
The Rest: Journal of Politics and Development
Institution:
Centre for Strategic Research and Analysis (CESRAN)
Abstract:
This study explores the application of the regional security complex theory (RCST) to the energy relations between the European Union (EU), Russia, and Turkey. It underscores the critical role of energy security in shaping international relations and highlights the mutual interdependence among these actors in the energy issue. The study sheds light on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on energy security and emphasizes the need for diversification of energy sources to reduce dependency on Russian natural gas. Turkey's active and neutral policy with Russia has formed a security complex in energy relations among these three actors. The claim that shared concerns or threat perceptions among actors assumed by the regional security complex theory constitutes a security complex has been used within the framework of this study to justify the existence of an energy security complex between Turkey, Russia, and the EU. Furthermore, given its strategic geographical position and energy infrastructure projects, this research outlines Turkey's potential as a critical isolator actor and energy hub in the region. Overall, this study offers valuable insights into the complex dynamics of energy relations and the evolving regional energy security landscape in the EU-Russia-Turkey triangle.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Security, Energy Security, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Turkey

6. The OSCE in Zeitenwende: How to keep the Organization on the radar screen?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
After a decade of turmoil in Ukraine, the OSCE faces a critical moment marked by internal deadlocks and external challenges. The absolute priority, on the way forward to the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, is to prevent the Organization from loosing its remaining visibility. A concerted effort to redefine the organization’s purpose is imperative, but this rests in the hands of the participating States, whose active support remains all too rare. Returning to “basics” and focusing on core competencies will be essential. The OSCE can still shape a renewed "Helsinki Plus" for European security, but we need to hurry before our leaders reinvent the wheel.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, OSCE, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe

7. The Joint Expeditionary Force in Northern Europe: Towards a more integrated security architecture?

Author:
Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The Joint Expeditionary Force – a UK-led defence cooperation format of ten European countries – has gained political momentum since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the late 2010s, the JEF has shifted its focus towards hybrid issues, increasingly in Northern Europe. While its role in the hybrid sphere is potentially fruitful, the JEF should be wary of taking on too wide a range of tasks. The JEF’s role as a “sub-threshold” actor could complement NATO’s collective defence efforts below Article 5. Hence, the JEF should be more coherently integrated into the Northern European security architecture. Obstacles to JEF-NATO integration have now been removed, as all JEF nations are also members of the alliance. A more explicit division of labour between the JEF and NATO would help Northern European countries to handle the current security environment comprehensively. Such a security architecture, covering all dimensions of the conflict spectrum, would be particularly beneficial for Finland, which shares a long common border with Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Security, Defense Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Finland, and Baltic States

8. NATO’s Regional Defence Plans

Author:
Nele Loorents
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
NATO heads of state and government will gather in Washington on 9-11 July to mark the Alliance’s 75th anniversary. While a third year of full-scale war rages in Europe, they will need to guard the tone of their celebrations. But it would be remiss of the Allies not to recognise the importance and success of their organisation. NATO remains the essential transatlantic forum. It has had huge positive impact on security in Europe and elsewhere, built shared understanding and purpose among a growing number of members, and successfully adapted to decades of changing circumstances. There is much to applaud. But there is also work to be done. The summit’s main business will concern Ukraine, defence and deterrence, and burden-sharing. While there are unlikely to be big announcements, the summit should play a significant role in ensuring that the decisions taken in Madrid in 2022, and Vilnius in 2023 are properly implemented. This series of briefs examines some of the key issues for the Washington Summit. In the fifth brief of the series, Nele Loorents examines progress in implementing NATO’s regional defence plans. These operational plans, adopted at the Vilnius Summit in 2023, are also intended to be a key driver of NATO’s capability planning process. NATO has revealed little about the implementation of the plans in the past year. But it is clear that serious capability gaps need to be addressed if the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture on the north-east flank and elsewhere is to be credible.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

9. A discussion of Kosovo- NATO relations and prospects for greater cooperation

Author:
Leureta Lumi
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Membership of Kosovo in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is regarded as a national interest across Kosovo’s political spectrum and receives substantial public support. According to the 2022 Security Barometer by the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS), an overwhelming 92 percent of all citizens in Kosovo are in favor of joining NATO. This support is even more pronounced among the Kosovo Albanians, where the approval rate soars to 99.5 percent. This is the only objective in Kosovo that enjoys this level of public backing. Kosovo’s Security Strategy 2022-2027 states ‘The irreplaceable aim of the Republic of Kosovo is NATO membership and integration as the mechanism that provides long-term strategic security’. NATO’s leading role in ending the 1999 war and averting a potential genocide in Kosovo is widely seen as a major reason behind the strong public support for the alliance. However, this sentiment has been reinforced by recent developments, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, intensifying Kosovo’s appreciation for NATO membership. The urgency for Kosovo to join NATO is further heightened by the unresolved bilateral disputes with Serbia and the increasingly adversarial positions of Serbian President Vucic towards, as shown by a recent statement from him, which implies that on Kosovo, Serbia should learn from Azerbaijan, adding that: “They waited 27 years for special geopolitical circumstances”. The Banjska terrorist attack in September 2023, which is believed to have been orchestrated with the support of Serbian security institutions and in cooperation with Russia, reinforces the perception that Serbia sees a military solution to the “Kosovo problem”. Although Kosovo benefits from NATO’s protection via the KFOR mission, NATO’s stance on Kosovo remains status-neutral, with no significant advancement in NATO-Kosovo political relations since 2016. This paper delves into these challenges and seeks to explore the obstacles Kosovo faces on its path to NATO membership. Accordingly, this paper includes an analysis of the current NATO-Kosovo relations, options for Kosovo to enhance these relations and overcome key challenges, including exploration of the Partnership for Peace and the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a review of NATO accession processes in Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia, and concluding remarks with recommendations.
Topic:
NATO, Public Opinion, Regional Security, and Security Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe and Kosovo

10. Europe's defence against Russia

Author:
Elina Valtonen
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The large-scale offensive launched by Russia against Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked a real turning point in the history of Europe. It radically altered the European security order, and there will probably be no turning back. The cooperative, treaty-based security order has been transformed into a system based on a balance of power, deterrence and containment[1]. By waging a brutal and illegal war against Ukraine, Russia's objectives have not changed. Its actions demonstrate total disdain for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent neighbouring state. This Russian aggression, in flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, demonstrates Russia's determination to undermine the foundations of the European security order. There is nothing to suggest that, in the area of our common security, Russia will resume respect for existing treaties and commitments. It is becoming increasingly isolated from the international community. Its recent hybrid operation to redirect foreign nationals to Finland's eastern border is further evidence of this trend. Russia is and will remain on the doorstep of the European Union. It is essential that, on the international stage, the European Union continues to act resolutely and in a spirit of unity to stem Russian aggression, that it prepares for the future and that it invests in defence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Deterrence, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe