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21. How Would Europe Defend Itself?

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Achieving greater European defensive autonomy is unlikely to be quick or easy. While there are alternatives, adapting NATO to this end is arguably the most realistic path. Pointing out the significant challenges to European defensive autonomy should not be construed as an endorsement of the status quo. Contending demands for limited U.S. military resources in Asia and elsewhere augur a reduced U.S. role in NATO regardless of Europe’s capacity to defend itself. Given current deficiencies with European capabilities and the failure of many NATO members to meet basic funding obligations, significant spending increases are likely needed to actualize greater independent European military capabilities. Smaller coalitions within NATO could achieve more effective solutions at the regional level, as opposed to trying to achieve full defensive autonomy among all 29 European members. In particular, defense of the Nordic-Baltic region could be an important test case. Nuclear issues will be particularly difficult to navigate. Reliance on either British or French nuclear forces as NATO’s primary deterrent comes with important challenges. Likewise, retaining the U.S. nuclear umbrella absent U.S. ground forces in Europe could prove unworkable. Russia’s capacity to rebound long term and pose a more robust threat to Europe should not be discounted. This underscores the importance of working through the difficult issues associated with European defensive autonomy in the current strategic window of Russian weakness.1
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Deterrence, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

22. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat

Author:
Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden

23. Between Emotions and Realism: Two Faces of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans

Author:
Srdan Hercigonja and Vuk Vuksanović
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
Turkey’s more assertive posture towards the Balkans is neglected compared to the commentariat that deals with Russia and China. To fill this policy gap, the research team of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) has conducted research based on the analysis of secondary source material and, even more importantly, on fieldwork interviews that involved 16 sources, academics and think tank researchers based in Istanbul and Ankara. Although the consulted sources have different backgrounds and political sympathies, the research established a presence of common themes. Namely, Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans has two aspects. The first is based on emotions. Turkish foreign policy towards the region is framed by Turkey’s special ties with the region based on shared history, social connections, identity factors and the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan country most frequently mentioned in the context of special ties with Turkey is Bosnia and Herzegovina, in light of socio-cultural ties and the fact that it is a country in which the Ottoman legacy is felt most strongly. The second approach is rooted in traditional foreign policy realism derived from an objective and calculated assessment of the regional balance of power and one’s own interests. Within this approach, Turkey is trying, for security and strategic reasons, to act pragmatically and be effective in the Balkans without entangling itself in crises that could impede its regional influence. This approach leads Turkey towards engaging Serbia, the region’s strategically consequential country because Ankara is deeply convinced that if it wishes to be effective in the Balkans, it needs to have a partnership with Belgrade. In doing so, it must strike a balance between emotions and realism. It needs to walk the fine line between nurturing ties with communities with cultural and religious ties, like Bosniaks and Albanians, while avoiding alienating countries whose partnership Ankara needs to succeed in the Balkans, such as Serbia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Emotions, Realism, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Asia, and Balkans

24. Realising the EU Hybrid Toolbox: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:
Kenneth Lasoen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In recent years European and other nations have been increasingly targeted by different manipulation or coercion tactics that remain under the threshold of violence, and are commonly referred to as hybrid threats.For the debate on defining hybrid threats, see Dick Zandee, Sico van der Meer and Adája Stoetman, Countering hybrid threats: steps for improving EU-NATO cooperation, Clingendael Report, October 2021, p. 2-5; Georgios Giannopoulos, Hanna Smith and Marianthi Theocharidou, The landscape of Hybrid Threats: A conceptual model, Publications Office of the European Union, February 2021. For instance, in 2016 the elections in the United States were manipulated by a foreign state actor through targeted propaganda and the leaking of hacked material that compromised one of the presidential candidates. In the same year the British referendum on remaining in the European Union was also targeted by sophisticated propaganda efforts.United States Senate, Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security, Committee on Foreign Relations, 115th Congress, 2018, p. 116-118. The need to counter these threats and deal with them comprehensively has therefore been acknowledged in the EU Strategic Compass. It provides for the development of a toolbox to put at the disposal of member states a wide range of measures to respond to hybrid campaigns, should they choose to invoke the assistance of the EU. This EU Hybrid Toolbox (EUHT) intends to gather all civilian and military instruments that can be employed to counter hybrid campaigns. Operationalisation was intended by the end of 2022 but this no longer seems attainable. However, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of having a coordinated reaction capability to counter hybrid campaigns and is likely to provide the momentum to bring the development of the EUHT to fruition. This policy brief examines the most recent progress on operationalising the EUHT. First, the rationale for the EUHT is explained. Next, the state of play in the operationalization process is analysed. The subsequent section focusses on the difficulties stemming from differences of opinion between the member states, followed by an assessment of the issues surrounding decision-making. After suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the EUHT are given, the policy brief ends with conclusions and a listing of opportunities and pitfalls.The methodology used for this policy brief consists of a combination of literature scanning and a limited number of interviews. The author would like to thank the interviewees for their valuable input that was given under the application of the Chatham House Rule.
Topic:
European Union, Hybrid Threats, Coercion, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

25. European Union common security and defence policy and Latvian involvement in EU battlegroups

Author:
Valerijs Bodnieks
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
In this article, the author analyses types of Europeanisation: top-down, bottom-up, horizontal, circular, and looks at Latvian involvement in the EU CSDP capability project - EU Battlegroups. Additionally, the author analyses the EU CSDP strategies in 2003 and 2016 with emphasis on key threats and key directions of action for the security of the EU. If it is necessary, EU Battlegroups can become involved to secure the EU. In the article, the author examines Latvian involvement in EU Battlegroups and changes in political planning documents and legal acts regarding EU Battlegroups. The author shows that for the future, it is necessary to involve an EU Battlegroup in real action in the area of operations, and that it is necessary to initiate discussions on a possible review and evaluation of the format of the EU Battlegroup.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe and Latvia

26. RETHINKING REASSURANCE

Author:
Brian Blankenship and Erik Lin-Greenberg
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Political Violence @ A Glance
Abstract:
If Poland’s president gets his way, the Pentagon might soon start building Fort Trump on Polish soil. Permanently posting thousands of American troops in Poland, however, isn’t the best way to convince NATO allies that America will defend them from Russian aggression. American boots on the ground in allied territory have long been the standard signal of Washington’s commitment to its allies. New circumstances, however, demand a new means of reassurance: substituting advanced unmanned weapons and off-shore military capabilities for vulnerable ground forces. In an era where the White House spurns investing blood and treasure to defend its allies, weapons that counter Russian capabilities but pose little risk to US personnel—like drones and ship-based air defense systems—can more credibly signal Washington’s commitment to its allies. While a US base remains the gold standard of reassurance measures, the Pentagon has relied on small, rotational deployments of ground and aviation units to the NATO states most threatened by a resurgent Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

27. Security policy of the Baltic states and its determining factors

Author:
Sławomir Piotrowski
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
The history of the nations living in today’s Baltic States is marked by fighting against stronger neighbours: Russia, Poland, Sweden, Denmark and the German settlers in their territories. Unlike Lithuanians, Estonians and Latvians failed to create their own statehood before the 20 th century. The Lithuanians created their own state, a powerful one, which then became a part of an even wider state organism – the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. As a result, the security policy of Lithuania was identical to that of the First Republic of Poland. Although there were tribes living within the area of current Estonia and Latvia for many centuries up to the outbreak of World War I, the lands of Latvia and Estonia had been changing owners and had been under the rule of almost all neighbouring countries. As a result of the positive outcome of the First World War, but also thanks to their efforts, the Baltic States regained independence in order to lose it after only 20 years, as a consequence of another war. After restoring independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States realised that even acting together they were unable to defend themselves against a potential aggressor. As a result, they decided to follow in the footsteps of other countries of the former Eastern Bloc (e.g. Poland and Slovakia) and to integrate with Western European structures such as NATO and the EU. Following NATO inclusion, the security strategies of the Baltic States have been revised in line with the changes in their surrounding geopolitical environment.
Topic:
Security, History, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe and Baltic States

28. Destination NATO: Kosovo’s Alternatives towards NATO Membership

Author:
Plator Avdiu
Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The report addresses key challenges and existing complex relations between the Kosovo institutions and NATO. KCSS’ research has highlighted that the membership process of Kosovo towards NATO is challenged by external and internal impediments. Kosovo is the only country in the region of the Western Balkans left out of the NATO enlargement process. Furthermore, the country has not established any official or contractual cooperation and relations with NATO. This is due to non-recognition of Kosovo by four NATO member countries, NATO’s neutral stance towards the state of Kosovo since its Declaration of Independence on 17 February 2008 as well as NATO’s commitment that its peacekeeping mission in Kosovo (KFOR) to operate within the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. On the other hand, until recently neither the Kosovo institutions have not demonstrated readiness and practical commitment with respect to NATO integration. From 2008 to 2014, Kosovo has not indicated a firm political will that demands the commencement of official cooperation with NATO. The Kosovo policymakers have shown only declarative commitments as to Euro-Atlantic integration, whereas membership of Kosovo in NATO only became a priority for the Kosovo institutions in 2014. Additionally, Kosovo should undertake the necessary reforms related to establishing better cooperation and coordination of all institutions involved in NATO’s integration process.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Treaties and Agreements, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

29. Kosovo’s Membership and Representation in Regional Security Initiatives

Author:
Donika Emini
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
In particular, the challenges are present with respect to Kosovo’s access to defense related regional initiatives. While Kosovo’s recent membership in the RCC is expected to open the doors for representation and access to other regional security initiatives, the findings in this paper show that the progress is limited and accompanied by a wide variety of challenges. By not being fully-fledged member, Kosovo is constrained in benefiting from joint operations and activities in the field of rule of law, justice and security. Consequently, the political agreements reached in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia and the concept of introducing regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, are seriously challenged.
Topic:
Security, Treaties and Agreements, Rule of Law, Representation, Justice, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

30. Creating a Disaster: NATO’s Open Door Policy

Author:
Robert J. Art
Publication Date:
09-1998
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Political Science Quarterly
Institution:
Academy of Political Science
Abstract:
ROBERT J. ART argues that an open door membership policy will destroy NATO and that there is a better alternative to create a security structure for Europe.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Alliance, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America