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1. Exploring options for advancing Kosovo-NATO relations

Author:
Ramadan Iazi and Jeta Loshaj
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
NATO’s role in Kosovo has been vital since the 1999 intervention and KFOR remains integral for guaranteeing security and stability not only in Republic of Kosovo but also the wider Western Balkans. Public sentiment for full NATO membership is extremely high in Kosovo—over 90% support—reflecting Kosovars’ enduring trust in the NATP alliance. However this overwhelming public support can be affected if Kosovo’s aspirations for closer ties with NATO are not addressed. While, Kosovo’s formal progress toward full membership is politically constrained by the fact that four NATO member states have yet to recognize its independence, there are other options that NATO can pursue to advance relations with Kosovo. In this context, this paper explores options how can Kosovo and NATO advance relations and cooperation. The 1995 study provides core principles for options that are examined in this paper. These principles remain highly relevant for Kosovo. While formal membership is stalled by non-recognizing NATO member states, the paper argues that an inclusive, step-by-step approach can be adapted for a flexible, deeper engagement with Kosovo. A central recommendation is the creation of a “Kosovo Enhanced Cooperation Initiative,” a tailored version of NATO’s partnership mechanisms (e.g., Partnership for Peace, Planning and Review Process, and the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre). KECI would aim to strengthen Kosovo’s defense institutions, enhance interoperability, support civil emergency preparedness, and develop broader crisis-management capabilities. Crucially, it would not force any change in the political stance on recognition among NATO member states. The EU-facilitated normalization dialogue between Republic of Kosovo and Serbia is one of the essential elements especially for Kosovo to build the confidence of both skeptical NATO member states and international partners when it comes to Euro-Atlantic integration process of the country. Regular coordination with NATO and the EU, particularly concerning sensitive actions in the north, would affirm that Kosovo’s leaders prioritize strategic partnerships and diplomacy over moves that risks and undermine support for Kosovo. Nevertheless, without any concrete carrots such as anything close to a guarantee that Kosovo gains an open perspective for NATO’s PfP, it is rather difficult for Kosovo to be encouraged to deliver on either an agreement with Serbia or any other agreement.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Partnerships, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

2. Polish Presidency of the Council - A paradigm shift in Poland's European policy

Author:
Piotr Buras and Michał Matlak
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Poland is holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2025. After a controversial Hungarian presidency and political turbulence in France and Germany, European public opinion is looking to Poland, where an openly Eurosceptic government was ousted in the 2023 elections. This change has come at a time when the European Union is facing major existential challenges, in particular with the war in Ukraine, which are especially resonant in Poland. The hopes pinned on Poland are as much a reflection of the impression of a leadership vacuum in Europe that Warsaw - who else at the moment? - could fill, as well as the country's growing economic and geopolitical position after two decades of EU membership.
Topic:
Public Opinion, European Union, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland

3. The New Political Groups in the European Parliament: Ideological Identity and Cohesion

Author:
Antonis Papakostas and Spyros Blavoukos
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the outcome of the June 2024 European Parliament elections, focusing on the characteristics of national political formations that are represented in Strasbourg and the identity of the political groups in the European Parliament. This analysis is based on two axes of ideological and political nature: (1) the political spectrum (Left to Right), and (2) the disposition of the parties toward European integration. The paper makes use of data from the European Election Study 2024 (EES) exploring EP political groups’ (lack of) homogeneity and the varying degree of their internal cohesion.
Topic:
Ideology, European Parliament, Identity, Regional Politics, and Cohesion
Political Geography:
Europe

4. A Turning Point, or Not? Principles for a New European Order

Author:
Richard Youngs
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Despite repeated declarations of historic turning points, deep structural reforms to the European project remain elusive. While defense spending rises are welcome, EU governments must also pursue systemic changes to Europe’s political and security architecture.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Politics, Reform, European Union, Democracy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Navigating Geopolitical Realities: The EU’s Strategic Positioning in the South Caucasus and Central Asia

Author:
Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
This policy brief examines the strategic importance of the South Caucasus and its pivotal role in the European Union’s evolving engagement with Central Asia. The regional landscape, however, remains highly volatile. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has had direct and indirect repercussions for the South Caucasus. Against the backdrop of the war, Moscow continues its efforts to maintain the region within its sphere of influence – through military presence, disinformation, economic leverage, and political interference. Twenty percent of Georgia’s territory remains illegally occupied by Russian forces, while the fragile post-conflict environment following the Second Karabakh War continues to shape relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. While missions such as EUMM in Georgia and EUMA in Armenia reflect the EU’s growing political engagement, they remain limited in scope and capacity, constraining the Union’s ability to address the region’s evolving risks. The EU’s partnerships with South Caucasus countries are characterized by both strategic opportunity and persistent friction. Azerbaijan has become an important energy supplier to the EU, particularly via the Southern Gas Corridor, and is also involved in early-stage renewable initiatives such as the Black Sea Submarine Cable Project. However, the relationship remains complicated by enduring concerns related to governance, human rights, and democratic norms. Georgia, despite receiving EU candidate status in 2023, has prompted growing concern among EU institutions and member states over perceived democratic backsliding and increasing political polarization. The country remains a vital transit hub for the Middle Corridor and a central partner in EU connectivity efforts, but its internal developments have raised questions in Brussels about the sustainability of its European path. At the same time, Georgia continues to be a major target of Russia’s hybrid influence operations, which exploit internal divisions and erode trust in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Armenia, disillusioned with Russia’s security guarantees, is cautiously deepening its engagement with the West. However, the extent of this shift remains contingent on developments in Georgia – given Armenia’s geographic dependence – and on the prospects for a durable peace agreement with Azerbaijan. This policy brief assesses how the EU is managing the tensions between its strategic objectives and its normative commitments in a region increasingly shaped by Great Power rivalry. It concludes with policy recommendations aimed at strengthening the EU’s credibility and effectiveness in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia – advocating for a more coherent, proactive, and principled approach that aligns short-term geopolitical interests with long-term goals for regional stability and integration.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Interests, Regional Economy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, and South Caucasus

6. European Election: Red Alert!

Author:
Pascale Joannin
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Europeans are being called to the polls between 6 and 9 June 2024 — depending on the country — to renew the members of the European Parliament. These will be the tenth elections by direct universal suffrage since 1979.
Topic:
Elections, Geopolitics, Economic Growth, Crisis Management, COVID-19, Regional Politics, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe

7. 2024, a European political year - through the eyes of women

Author:
Stefanie Buzmaniuk
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
In 1906, Finland became the first country in Europe to grant women the right to vote, with the adoption of universal suffrage, at the same time as it won its autonomy from the Russian Empire. The following year, Finnish women were able to exercise this right in the general elections. Throughout the twentieth century, women in Europe and around the world fought long and hard to gain the right to vote without any additional conditions to those required of men. In some countries, only widows were allowed to vote as a first step towards electoral emancipation (in Belgium, for example, until 1921). In other countries, such as Bulgaria, the right to vote was initially reserved for mothers of legitimate children and exclusively for local elections. In Portugal, only women with a university degree were allowed to vote from 1931 on. In Spain it was not until post-Franco democratisation and the 1976 elections that Spanish women regained the right to vote, initially acquired in 1931 before the civil war. This year France is celebrating the 80th anniversary of women gaining the right to vote. Cypriot women won the right to vote at the same time as their male counterparts when the Republic was created in 1960. This can be explained quite simply by the fact that, at that time, such discrimination could no longer be justified. So, it took a good part of the twentieth century to get there... In European countries, legislation on the right to vote and stand for election now recognises equal access for women and men. However, their participation in political life is still marked by significant differences and major obstacles that we believe are unjustified. Women are still less represented on the political stage, even though they make up more than half of the population. In the European Union, there are ten million more women than men. This is a fact that deserves our attention in 2024, a year that is notable for its electoral importance, with the election of representatives to the European Parliament scheduled for 6 to 9 June. There will also be five presidential elections and six parliamentary elections in the Member States. This therefore provides a good opportunity to examine the position of women on the European political scene and the obstacles that still exist behind the scenes preventing them from participating fully in political life.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Elections, European Union, Women, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

8. The European Union enlarged from 27 to 36 members? Towards an "Agenda 2030"

Author:
Pierre Mirel
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The Western Balkans today still confirm Bronislaw Geremek’s premonition in 1990: "Three dangers lurk in the post-communist transition: populism, authoritarian temptation and nationalism.” These three tendencies are converging in ethno-nationalisms that are stalling the process of stabilisation and association of the six countries with the European Union. The pursuit of the rule of law is being made all the more difficult because the Balkans are growing poorer while the European Union is getting richer. In the east, association with Ukraine and Moldova has progressed, but the Russian occupation continues. Russia has shattered the international legal order with its aggression in Ukraine and is fighting against the values that Europe promotes and whose echoes resonate in the Balkans. The European Union has responded by reviving the accession process with the Balkans and by opening negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova, and perhaps in time it will do the same with Georgia. The complexity of this dual commitment, which would see the European Union grow from 27 to 36 members, requires that its many challenges be openly set out in an "Agenda 2030", with gradual integration forming the core of a renewed process.
Topic:
European Union, Regional Integration, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Overcome divisions and confront threats: Memo to the Presidents of the European Commission, Council and Parliament

Author:
Maria Demertzis, André Sapir, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
In the last five years, the European Union managed to find its way through a series of major shocks, including the pandemic and the 2022 surge in energy prices. The response was in many ways remarkable, including unprecedented EU borrowing to fund the NextGenerationEU economic recovery programme and a coordinated reduction in energy demand. However, these crises have left the EU in a bruised state. The pandemic recession and energy-support measures have squeezed fiscal space. Higher energy prices have persisted and EU industrial competitiveness has been eroded. The productivity and per-capita income gap with the United States has widened. Meanwhile, the world around the EU has become more threatening and fragmented. The military situation in Ukraine remains precarious. China has become both more authoritarian and more assertive. The US shift toward protectionism has become entrenched. There is less consensus for measures to combat climate change. In the face of all this, the challenges confronting you are substantial. In the next five years, you must continue to support Ukraine while implementing measures to reinvigorate EU growth, meet the 2030 climate targets and lay the ground for meeting the 2040 goals, and secure faster emissions reductions beyond the EU’s borders. Social cohesion needs to be restored to head off threats to the EU model. More needs to be done to improve EU external security. Promoting growth and enhancing cohesion will entail further deepening of the single market in areas with the highest growth impact, doing more to support innovation and defending competition, openness and multilateralism. Safeguarding the European Green Deal means boosting green industrialisation and fair burden-sharing, while scaling up international climate finance. Strengthening security requires continued support for Ukraine and the addressing of economic security risks. Underpinning all of this, a serious effort must be made to improve EU governance – and it must be done without creating further division.
Topic:
Security, European Union, European Parliament, European Commission, Energy, Regional Politics, Competition, European Council, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Europe

10. The Weimar Triangle's Path to Leadership Moments and Future Prospects

Author:
Nino Macharashvili
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In two separate speeches—one at the Sorbonne University in April and the other during his visit to Germany at the end of May—French President Emmanuel Macron said that Europe is “fighting to the death” (Macron 2024). Indeed, Europeans who are caught between Xi Jinping’s China, Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and the future possibility of Donald Trump’s USA, are the ones who most need unity at this point, but it is precisely because of this sense of insecurity that European unity is eroding. Macron’s last visit to Germany (Scally 2024) showed that Franco-German relations were only a facade manifestation of friendship and solidarity, and that the French and German governments are no longer able to independently decide on the geopolitical direction of Europe. Moreover, even if they can agree on a specific agenda, it is unlikely that it will be shared by the rest of the European Union. The solution to this dilemma is to strengthen the Franco-German union and add Poland as a third member. This makes sense, given that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reduced the differences in the three states’ perceptions of European security, and renewed the Weimar format for collaboration in the interest of peace and security in Europe. In our article, we will try to briefly answer the following questions: 1. What is the Weimar Triangle? 2. What political factors led to its activation? and 3. What changes might it undergo in the future?
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Weimar
Political Geography:
Europe