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31. Wedged between East and West – The chances of an interest-based Hungarian foreign policy and the war in Ukraine

Author:
Andrea Schmidt
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Hungarian foreign policy has been in the international spotlight, raising doubts about its direction. The purpose of this article is to highlight the contradictions between an interest-based and a value-based foreign policy. A theoretical introduction is followed by a brief analysis of the elements of a pragmatic foreign policy. At the same time, the second part of the paper presents a short case study from the Western Balkans. The Hungarian position on two countries, Kosovo and Serbia, will be analysed, not forgetting that these two countries are examples of the changes that have taken place in the relations between Hungary and Serbia. Despite earlier nationalist tensions, Serbia has become Hungary's almost sole ally in the region, putting the minority issue in the background and adopting a pragmatic approach. In this essay, we will also try to identify the considerations that guided Hungarian diplomacy in its position towards the West. Finally, we will discuss the extent to which the original goal of "occupying Brussels" was realistic and the consequences of Hungary's pragmatic foreign policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Conflict, Pragmatism, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe, Hungary, and Western Balkans

32. Negotiating Uncertainty in UK-EU Relations: Past, Present, and Future

Author:
David Henig
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Ten key points to negotiating the UK-EU relationship: Europe has been weakened by difficult UK-EU relations at a time of international challenge. Eight years after the Brexit referendum a new UK government and European Commission provides a good opportunity to reset approaches and put obstructions aside. Too big for either side to ignore, this will always be an important, time-consuming, and slightly chaotic relationship – which thus needs a much firmer footing based on the following shared understanding: Probably the broadest, deepest bilateral relationship in the world, adding the world’s second largest trade flow to integrated neighbourhood challenges, meaning inevitable complexity and ongoing negotiation of many different topics. This has been insufficiently recognised, and should ideally be considered jointly, e.g. in terms of a shared vision, road map, scoping, implementation, otherwise even agreeing sequencing will always be problematic; Wide scope, with inevitable challenges and tensions, requiring regular senior-level contact, this should start with annual summits that develop mutual understanding, supported by regular meetings between UK Ministers and Commissioners, senior official meetings, and the sharing of information at expert level. There should not be a single undertaking negotiation; Divorce taking time to overcome, emotions on both sides are settling but still livelier than normal between nominal allies, with many involved who would simply like the unattainable return to the pre-2016 state, and others just as strongly opposed in various ways; EU needs to be less rigid given the UK will not neatly fit into existing models, there being too many mutual interests, from which will flow multiple arrangements and deals. Showing greater willing to a now more constructive counterpart means creativity in how to structure the relationship to deliver mutual interests as well as specific asks of both sides; Negotiations must informally include many actors, such as businesses, civil society, lower-level governments, academics, listening to whom should be the basis for the UK and EU shaping mutually acceptable deals. All of these stakeholders will equally have to learn to live with the uncertainty and difficulties of an ongoing relationship with multiple strands; UK previously a naïve negotiator failing to understand this collaborative yet still competitive, and increasingly public, nature of modern trade negotiations, or its new third country status. Positive signs of learning shown with the Windsor Framework should be developed – to include ‘Team UK’ negotiating, openly testing ideas with specialists, and understanding the EU, importance of trust in implementation, and limits of taking back control; Northern Ireland will always require special handling as a part of the UK whose peace process requires strong relations with the rest of the country and the EU. Ambiguity and flexibility will continue to be needed; There is no perfect model for future UK-EU relations, all potential options having drawbacks rendering them somewhat unstable, and no swift negotiating path to most of them. While the UK is not a member of the EU there will always be barriers to trade and movement of people which both sides with their priorities will aim to discuss, negotiate, and seek to ease; Public communications and understanding around the relationship must be improved, whether that is in terms of negotiating progress, realistic options for both sides, care with overly-simplistic messaging, or particular terminology with often multiple meanings; Despite uncertainty there will be a steady move towards deeper, more robust arrangements, since both UK and EU have strong interests in making these happen, but this will not be a quick or steady process, instead it will come from considerable engagement, flexibility, and patience, to create something that is tolerable if always slightly sub-optimal.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Regional Integration, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

33. The changing dynamics of the Western Balkans on the road to European Union membership: an update

Author:
Marek Dabrowski and Luca Léry Moffat
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The slow pace of European Union enlargement to the Western Balkans can be attributed to EU member countries losing their political appetite for further enlargement in the 2010s and early 2020s, and to the fact that Western Balkan countries have failed to make visible progress in meeting the criteria for EU accession The income per capita convergence of Western Balkan countries towards the German level (as a proxy for the EU) has been rather slow, with some acceleration in the second half of the 2010s and early 2020s. However, Western Balkan countries continue to suffer from several socio-economic vulnerabilities, including high unemployment rates (especially of young people) and low rates of participation of women in the workforce. After the beginning of the war in Ukraine in 2022, the EU gave higher political priority to further enlargement. It opened a new eastern front of potential enlargement (Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia) and activated the stalled accession process in the Western Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina obtained candidate status in December 2022 and was approved for accession negotiations in March 2024. Accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia were started in July 2022. With the new government in Montenegro from the end of 2023, the accession negotiation with this most advanced candidate country moved forward. Overcoming the legacy of the tragic conflicts in the 1990s is another key geopolitical challenge in the region. This involves the normalisation of Serbia-Kosovo relations and the reconciliation process inside Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the economic sphere, speeding up income per capita convergence with the EU requires further domestic economic reforms, accelerating intra-regional economic integration and creating new EU initiatives to support growth and social cohesion in the Western Balkans. Accelerating EU accession negotiations with indicative target dates, at least for frontrunners, can reduce the perception of geopolitical and economic uncertainty and stimulate foreign direct investment inflows.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Budget, European Union, Institutions, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Western Balkans

34. Triggering the Rule-of-Law Conditionality Mechanism against Hungary

Author:
Veronika Jóźwiak
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The mechanism that makes the payment of funds from the EU budget conditional on compliance with the principles of the rule of law is the newest instrument for protecting the Union’s financial and political interests. The tool allows the European Commission and the EU Council (Council) to exert influence on Member States that violate the fundamental principles of the Community. Triggering it against Hungary might result in a reduction of EU funds to the country as a consequence of rule-of-law violations for the first time in EU history. It is doubtful, however, that this will lead to systemic changes in Hungary.
Topic:
European Union, Rule of Law, European Commission, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Hungary

35. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:
David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

36. Russia’s 2023 foreign policy concept: war against Ukraine, confrontation with the west, and continuation of the tradition of imperialism

Author:
Medea Ivaniadze
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On March 31, 2023, the sixth Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation was published (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2023). The document was updated for the first time in six years, the main reason for which is the deteriorating international situation for Moscow amid the Russo-Ukrainian war. The text of the concept is highlighted by harsh and revanchist calls against the West and especially the USA. The document almost entirely refers to the Russo-Ukrainian war, at the same time, the concept shows that the current war is only one part of Russia’s confrontation with the Western world. The concept contains a number of statements inconsistent with the real policy of Russia and even lies, but despite the absurd, propagandistic content of the new document, it is important to find out how the new concept differs from its predecessor, and also what factors Russia relies on in the current difficult international situation? Based on the 2023 Concept of the Foreign Policy of Russia the impact of Russia’s imperialist worldview on its foreign policy in the light of full-scale military intervention in Ukraine, the changed attitude towards the West, the prospects of Russia-West relations, Russia’s attempt to strengthen ties with non-Western countries, and finally, threats from Russia to Georgia are discussed in this publication.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Georgia, and United States of America

37. Whose Zeitenwende? Germany Cannot Meet Everyone’s Expectations

Author:
Kristi Raik and Martin Quencez
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale of invasion of Ukraine pushed Germany to fundamentally revise its foreign and security policy, including its assumptions about European security, its relations with major powers, and its role as a mediator of intra-European disputes. The Zeitenwende’s level of ambition entails a profound reckoning of the failure of past policies, and has to be both European and global. Germany bears a special responsibility for strengthening European defense vis à vis Russia, reducing Europe’s vulnerabilities vis à vis China, maintaining a strong transatlantic alliance while also preparing Europe for a possible reduced US commitment in the future, and ensuring a coherent EU.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Germany

38. European energy solidarity: strengthening the EU’s crisibility

Author:
Aline Bartenstein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
By default, when the EU is hit by a crisis, member states tend to have a national sovereignty reflex. When Italy was hit hard by the Covid-19 pandemic, the first reaction was to close its borders and restrict the export of urgently needed medical equipment. National interest superseded the call for European solidarity. Although member states have repeatedly managed to unite and – in the face of the polycrisis – developed a certain crisibility, no one would have been surprised if member states had preferred to seek their own advantage when Russia started the war in Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Nearly one year later, member states are (still) united – some declaring this as never before – and a gas or electricity crisis has so far been averted. This unity, which certainly threatened to crumble in the face of Hungarian opposition, German hesitancy, and the different approaches to dealing with the war, leads us to the question of what is different this time? Certainly, the EU's identity has been profoundly challenged by the war since its peacekeeping credentials – the EU is even a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize – were perceived to be at risk. Was is this identity-threatening experience that united the member states? Or was it the recognition of Russia as a common foe that strengthened the bond between them?
Topic:
Sovereignty, European Union, Solidarity, Energy, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Italy

39. Can the EU still wrest the Balkans from their blighted history?

Author:
Jean Bizet and Fabrice Hugot
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
It is perhaps necessary, first of all, to recall why the name "Western Balkans" is still used to describe this peninsula in south-eastern Europe, why this imprecise geographical concept is preferred to any other name. To answer this question is to recognise from the outset the difficult fate suffered by this part of Europe: if we prefer to speak of the Balkans, it is quite simply because only geography is stable in this region.
Topic:
European Union, History, Geography, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Balkans

40. Geopolitical and Technocratic: EU International Actorness and Anne PINTSCH Russia’s War Against Ukraine

Author:
Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked the start of the largest and most brutal war at the heart of the European continent since World War II. It inevitably came as a “cold shower” for the EU and Member States’ politicians, demonstrating with absolute certainty the fragility of the international and European security order. The EU responded to the invasion with unprecedented sanctions against Russia and Belarus and multifaceted resolute support to Ukraine. The latter included the breaking of many previously existing taboos, such as the first ever use of the European Peace Facility to procure weapons for a third country at war or offering collective protection to about 8 million Ukrainian citizens and residents, fleeing the war
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Resilience, Technocracy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine