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71. EU MONITOR: Czechs and the Post-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework

Author:
Vít Havelka
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
In his latest EU monitor, Vít Havelka examines the attitude of the general Czech public towards the new EU Multiannual Financial Framework. At the beginning of May 2018, the European Commission introduced its proposal of the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-27. Since then, the EU member states as well as the European Parliament have been intensively negotiating about each aspect of the Commission´s draft without being able to reach an agreement. Consequently, the talks will slip into 2020, probably being finalized no earlier than summer 2020 during the German presidency of the European Council. The following article is therefore meant to provide the reader with an understanding of what ordinary Czechs think of the MFF negotiations and what should the EU budget finance. The text is predominantly based on standard public opinion poll conducted by STEM Agency in cooperation with EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in October 2019. The sample consisted of 1002 respondents, combining PAPI and CAPI questioning. The quantitative research was supplemented with qualitative questioning in form of focus groups conducted at the beginning of November 2019.
Topic:
Public Opinion, European Union, and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe and Czech Republic

72. Czechs and the EU Brand: How do Czechs feel about the EU and what could change their mind?

Author:
Vít Havelka
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
This study is mainly based on a series of 12 brief surveys by Behavio research agency and on longitudinal research by STEM Institute for Empirical Research. The expert’s inputs were provided by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy. The Czech Republic could serve as a kind of laboratory for investigating anti-EU sentiments. Czechs’ perception of the EU membership is the poorest of all the EU citizens, (mere 33 % view it as a good thing). Not even half of the adult Czech population (47 %) would vote to stay in the EU, despite having a booming economy and bearing almost no impact of the migration crisis. Moreover, the Czech economy is strongly export-oriented and benefits from the EU budget. Thus these negative sentiments seem to be very much about emotions and image. Czechs’ feelings toward the EU are similar to other Visegrad (V4) countries in many ways, but these similarities are less prominent than one would expect – especially in the case of Slovakia, where attitudes towards NATO and the EU are reversed. In many aspects, Czech Eurosceptics have been more influenced by British and Italian politicians than by their counterparts in Slovakia, Hungary or Poland. The popularity of the EU in the Czech Republic has been very volatile over the past 15 years. It was even modest at the beginning and the first disillusion came soon after the country’s accession, but was quickly countered by the Czech presidency of EU in 2009. EU’s image dropped again during the global economic downturn and the Eurozone crisis, which played a relatively strong role in the 2010 national election campaign. The migration crisis worsened negative sentiments even further, despite having little direct effect on the country. The recently observed increase in popularity can be mostly attributed to the country’s economic growth.
Topic:
Public Opinion, European Union, and Survey
Political Geography:
Europe and Czech Republic

73. The Berlin Pulse 2020 Special Edition: German Foreign Policy in Times of COVID-19

Author:
Pascal Lamy, Feng Zhongping, and Karen Donfried
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
“Uncertainty is the only certainty” – these words are credited to the Roman philosopher Pliny the Elder, who died in the wake of an eruption of Mount Vesuvius in the year AD 79 which buried the city of Pompeii under volcanic ash. Whether or not the corona pandemic will be remembered 2,000 years from now, the virus reminds us of Pliny’s words: We may not yet know how SARS-CoV-2 will affect our societies, but affect them it will. Given this momentous event, like other organizations, we at Körber-Stiftung have had to respond with flexibility and a willingness to do things a little differently – one of the results is this special issue, juxtaposing German public opinion with international perspectives on the policy choices facing Berlin. This pandemic is occurring at a time of profound political change. Experts and policy-makers have pointed out for the better part of two decades now that whatever happens in China is likely to affect us. The absence of US leadership, a divided Europe, the increasing prevalence of international mistrust – like a focal lens, the coronavirus has shown us in all too much detail how these dynamics might play out over the next few decades. Germany has long struggled to adapt to these new realities. Germans have been told that their country will need to take on “more responsibility”, and that we will need to “take our fate into our own hands”. One example of how Berlin has tried to do so is through a renewed emphasis on multilateralism as a pillar of its foreign policy, not least by crafting the Alliance for Multilateralism. But how do these dynamics, and the spotlight they have cast on Berlin’s role in international affairs, square with public opinion? To answer this question remains the mission and idea of The Berlin Pulse.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Multilateralism, Crisis Management, Transparency, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Europe, and Germany

74. The Berlin Pulse 2020/21 (full issue)

Author:
Gro Harlem Brundtland, Paolo Gentiloni, Peter Altmaier, and H.R. McMaster
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
In last year’s edition, we called 2020 an ‘eventful year’ with Germany’s presidency of the European Council and the US presidential election. But no one would have thought that a pandemic might be added to the list of major events affecting German foreign policy and political priorities around the globe. One year – and a COVID-19 special edition of The Berlin Pulse in between – later, international policy-making is slowly adjusting to the new level of uncertainty the pandemic brought into our lives. Despite these uncertain times, German public opinion on involvement or restraint in international crises remains solid as a rock: 44 percent of respondents say that Germany should get more strongly involved while 49 percent still prefer restraint. Since Körber-Stiftung posed this question for the first time in 2014, the public’s perspective has barely changed. In spite of this continuity, the present issue is also full of surprises and novelties. The idea of The Berlin Pulse is to identify potential gaps between German public opinion and expectations of international policy-makers. In 2020, another gap becomes an eye-catcher – the one between German and US public perceptions of the transatlantic partnership. A wide majority of US respondents considers Germany as a partner when tackling issues, such as protecting human rights and democracy (75 percent) or the environment (76 percent). By contrast, German respondents hardly reciprocate this feeling. With the US presidential election just behind us, an increasing US-Chinese rivalry in which Europe risks becoming – as Pauline Neville-Jones puts it – ‘the pig in the middle’ and crises beyond COVID-19 on the horizon, the present issue dedicates one chapter to each of these three developments to which German foreign policy needs to respond.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Public Opinion, European Union, Multilateralism, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and WTO
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, India, Germany, Syria, and United States of America

75. Many Faces of Serbian Foreign Policy Public Opinion and Geopolitical Balancing

Author:
Maja Bjelos, Vuk Vuksanovic, and Luka Steric
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
According to a public opinion survey Serbian citizens identify Russia and China as their greatest friends. As the country's most important foreign policy priorities, citizens recognize preserving Kosovo as part of Serbia, strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries and strengthening cooperation with Russia. More than half of the citizens do not support Serbia's membership in the EU. Most respondents (40%) perceive Russia as Serbia’s best friend, and 72% believe that Russia’s influence in the country is positive, which is an increase of 11% compared to the results of the survey from 2017. Only two percent of people believe that Russia’s attitude towards Serbia is hostile. After Russia, second place on the list of friends is reserved for China (16 percent of respondents). The growth of positive attitudes towards China is especially visible after the beginning of the pandemic, which is proved by the fact that 75% of respondents believe that China provided the most assistance to Serbia in the fight against the pandemic, although there are no official data on the amount of Chinese aid. According to available data, the largest donor was the European Union (EU), and only 3% of Serbian citizens recognize that. In addition, almost 90% of respondents believe that the Chinese influence in the country is positive, which is an increase of over 30 percent compared to the survey from 2017. Although EU membership has been a strategic goal of Serbia since 2005, only 9% of respondents believe that it is the main foreign policy priority of Serbia. Citizens recognize the preservation of Kosovo as part of Serbia, strengthening cooperation with neighboring countries and strengthening cooperation with Russia as the three most important foreign policy priorities. Although Serbia is a candidate for EU membership, only 20% of respondents believe that the state should harmonize its foreign policy with Brussels. The results of the survey show that the majority of 51% do not support Serbia’s membership in the EU, compared to 46% of respondents who would opt for membership. This result indicates that the number of opponents of European integration has increased since 2017, when only 35% of citizens voted against EU membership. The number of respondents who believe that Serbia is surrounded by mostly friends in the region has almost doubled compared to 2017 and now is over 40%, but there is a slight increase in the opinion that Serbia has more enemies in the neighborhood, which now think a little less than 50% of citizens. When asked who Serbia’s biggest enemy is, 30% of respondents identified Croatia, 20% Albania and 13% the United States. Slightly more than 70% of the respondents believe that there will be no outbreak of armed conflict in the Balkans in the next five years, which is an increase of 20 percent compared to 2017. The powerful emotional pull of the Kosovo dispute is also demonstrated by the fact that 52% of respondents believe that Serbia should intervene militarily in Kosovo in the case of a conflict and 47% of respondents would personally join their compatriots in the case of conflict. In contrast, 69% of respondents said that Serbia should not intervene if the same situation occurred in Montenegro, and 58% if the conflict broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the majority of citizens would not get involved in those conflicts. It is encouraging that two thirds of those interviewed believe that lasting peace between Serbs and Albanians is possible, and half of all respondents think that it is possible to achieve this only in the case of a peaceful settlement of the dispute over the status of Kosovo. Public opinion survey was conducted by CeSID for the needs of the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in the period from September 15 to October 5, 2020, on a representative sample of 1,200 citizens of Serbia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, Public Opinion, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

76. Boosting Armament to Fight Demographic Decline, Crime and Corruption – Public Opinion on Security

Author:
Marija Pavlovic
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
The main finding of this study is that the Serbian public have conflicting views on national and personal security and their relationship with the country’s institutions. On the one hand, people instinctively recognise that the main security threats are internal and are related to poor governance – such as organised crime and corruption and low levels of trust in institutions that serve the interests of politicians – which is why they rely on themselves and their own good conduct, from which they derive a sense of personal security. On the other hand, under the influence of media messaging and dominant narratives about threats to national security, presenting a maelstrom of great power rivalry and adversarial actors in the region, they continue to believe that hard power is the best response to security issues. Therefore, they see solutions mainly in the continued strengthening of the country and investment in the security sector. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that public opinion is diametrically opposed to the threats and risks defined by the official National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy adopted last year. Both documents place (the relatively unlikely events of) armed aggression and separatist tendencies within the country in first place on the list of threats to Serbia’s security – threats that only appear in the lower half on the list of priorities in the eyes of the public, who see human security issues as the priority problems. This discord between public perception and the strategic documents is a consequence of the almost complete lack of public debate during the adoption process of these documents. At the same time, it is testimony to the wrongheaded priorities of Serbia’s security policy, which is clearly at odds with the needs of the public, even though the National Security Strategy cites their subjective feelings in defining national security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Corruption, Crime, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

77. Serbia in the Jaws of the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Srdan Hercigonja
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP)
Abstract:
The public opinion poll conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in October 2020 shows that the society is divided, both when it comes to measures taken in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic and regarding the reaction of the competent institutions to the health crisis. Although no less than a third of the Serbian citizens do not believe in or have serious doubts about the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the vast majority of them are of the opinion that the health crisis will have serious economic consequences, while a third are convinced that it has affected the level of democracy in Serbia. Most people see the pandemic as a threat to human and national security, but they are divided over how this crisis has affected their everyday lives. Polarisation was identified in relation to the level of trust in state institutions. Citizens trust the health care system the most, which is not surprising since the health care system commonly occupies a very high position in general surveys conducted to measure trust in all institutions. The reason for the high level of trust in the health system is the fact that it is the entire health system – not just the specialised COVID departments – that is bearing the brunt of the pandemic. As for other institutions, the percentage of trust in the President of the Republic and the Crisis Task Force for the Protection of the Population from the Infectious Disease COVID-19 stands at almost fifty-fifty, which again reflects the broader picture of citizens’ (dis)trust in these permanent and temporary institutions. One of the reasons for the division in the perception of disease as a threat to the personal safety of citizens is poor informing and reporting on the course and consequences of the pandemic (frequent contradictory messages provided by the Crisis Task Force and the authorities), which has been identified in the survey as one of the biggest problems of pandemic management. An enormous number of citizens perceive China as the largest financial and humanitarian donor during the period of the pandemic, which also influences – in the general survey – positive opinions about foreign countries, where China ranks first. Despite the fact that it was in fact the European Union that helped Serbia the most in the fight against the Coronavirus, in both financial and humanitarian terms, in the eyes of the citizens China still convincingly holds the first place.
Topic:
Security, Public Opinion, Health Care Policy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe and Serbia

78. Is the Euro up for Grabs? Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Author:
Lucio Baccaro, Bjorn Bremer, and Erik Neimanns
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic may lead to a resurgence of the euro crisis. In this context, Italy seems particularly vulnerable: support for the euro is lower than in most other eurozone countries, and a possible exit could have serious consequences for the common currency. Based on a novel survey experiment, this paper shows that the pro-euro coalition is fragile in Italy and preferences are malleable. They are heavily dependent on the perceived costs of continued membership, as a majority of Italians would opt for Italexit rather than accepting a bailout plan requiring the implementation of austerity policies. Individuals who feel they have not benefited from the euro are most likely to support exit when faced with the prospect of austerity. This suggests that, differently from Greece, where voters were determined to remain in the euro at all costs, the pro-euro coalition may crumble if Italy is exposed to harsh conditionality.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Crisis Management, Voting, Survey, COVID-19, and Euro
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy

79. To Stay or to Go? How European Right-wing Populist Parties are Adjusting to the Post-Brexit Era Public Opinion

Author:
David Fernández Marcos
Publication Date:
05-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
Since the 1990s a great deal of literature has been written predicting the behaviour of right-wing populists explaining their policies and ideology. Until Brexit, there had been no such clear victory for right-wing populist policies. Drawing from the current state of the art, data from the national and European electoral party manifestos as well as Eurobarometer survey data from France, Germany, Italy and Sweden, this dissertation employs Strom’s rational choice-based party behaviour model to explore how the internal structure and each country’s political and institutional environments have mediated the right-wing populist parties’ reaction to the upswing of positive opinions about the European Union among European public opinion since Brexit. They have done so in two directions: by either continuing their promise to leave the EU or by dropping the promise and instead advocating institutional reform, in those cases where the parties seek to govern.
Topic:
Public Opinion, European Union, Brexit, Populism, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Europe

80. Causas del antimilitarismo y anti belicismo de la ciudadanía española: La incidencia del servicio militar (1808-2001)

Author:
Fernando Puell
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Revista UNISCI/UNISCI Journal
Institution:
Unidad de investigación sobre seguridad y cooperación (UNISCI)
Abstract:
El artículo plantea la tesis de que la oposición de grandes capas de población a prestar el servicio militar fue la principal causa del sentimiento antimilitarista y antibelicista que caracteriza a la sociedad española incluso en la actualidad. A tal efecto, se hará un recorrido de las manifestaciones de dicho rechazo a partir de la Guerra de la Independencia, momento en que aparecieron los primeros síntomas de este fenómeno. Después se contemplará la incidencia de la redención en metálico y la sustitución durante el periodo liberal, la de las guerras de Santo Domingo, Cuba y Filipinas en el último tercio del siglo XIX y de la de Marruecos en el primero del XX. El artículo finalizará con un análisis sobre la repercusión que la objeción de conciencia y la insumisión tuvieron en la suspensión del servicio militar en el año 2000. Para ello se utilizará un amplio espectro de fuentes testimoniales, legislativas y sociológicas, así como la abundante bibliografía disponible sobre el tema.
Topic:
History, Public Opinion, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain