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1. A Bitter Adjustment for German Family Capitalism: Succession and a Changing Ownership Transfer Regime

Author:
Isabell Stamm and Allan Sandham
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Germany is known for its family-owned businesses that transfer ownership across generations. However, business owners in Germany increasingly envision selling their business beyond the family, which fundamentally changes the institutionalized way private ownership of businesses is transferred. In this paper, we analyze and explain this fundamental change in German family capitalism since the 1990s. Drawing on a sociology of ownership, we view family succession as a transfer regime and show how this regime has been problematized and gradually reframed. Based on analysis of a rich corpus of documents, archival materials, and twenty-seven expert interviews, we show how a new transfer regime – the exit regime – emerges, which coordinates ownership transfer among founders through matchmaking. Our study contributes to research on family capitalism and succession by demonstrating how family capital moves toward the financial sector without becoming financial capital as it loses the family and gains the founder as personalized points of reference.
Topic:
Regime Change, Capitalism, Family, Succession, and Ownership
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

2. A Bitter Adjustment for German Family Capitalism: Succession and a Changing Ownership Transfer Regime

Author:
Isabell Stamm and Allan Sandham
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
Germany is known for its family-owned businesses that transfer ownership across generations. However, business owners in Germany increasingly envision selling their business beyond the family, which fundamentally changes the institutionalized way private ownership of businesses is transferred. In this paper, we analyze and explain this fundamental change in German family capitalism since the 1990s. Drawing on a sociology of ownership, we view family succession as a transfer regime and show how this regime has been problematized and gradually reframed. Based on analysis of a rich corpus of documents, archival materials, and twenty-seven expert interviews, we show how a new transfer regime – the exit regime – emerges, which coordinates ownership transfer among founders through matchmaking. Our study contributes to research on family capitalism and succession by demonstrating how family capital moves toward the financial sector without becoming financial capital as it loses the family and gains the founder as personalized points of reference.
Topic:
Regime Change, Capitalism, Family, Succession, and Ownership
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

3. Who Are These Bond Vigilantes Anyway? The Political Economy of Sovereign Debt Ownership in the Eurozone

Author:
Tobias Arbogast
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
This paper examines the ownership structure of eurozone public debt and the distributional consequences thereof. Through both a comparative perspective and an explorative case study of Italy, this paper asks two research questions. Firstly, it asks who holds government debt in Spain, France, Germany, and Italy. I focus in on Italy to provide, to the author’s knowledge, the first highly disaggregated view of the holding structure of public debt. Secondly, for Italy I study distributional effects by examining who benefits from the interest received on government debt. This is accomplished through an investigation of the various stakeholders associated with public debt. Results indicate that most of the public debt is held by private and public financial institutions but rarely directly by households. Both direct and indirect beneficiaries of the interest received on government bonds in Italy turn out to be largely wealthy households, reflecting the unequal ownership of wealth more generally. However, prominent public financial institutions are also significant beneficiaries, which likely ameliorates a possible regressive distributional effect of the public debt holding structure. The paper discusses the results with an eye on inequality and contributes to further study of the political economy of public debt.
Topic:
European Union, Inequality, Public Debt, Bonds, Public Finance, and Ownership
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Governing Enterprises in Transition Economies: The Problem of Mixed Ownership in the Czech Republic

Author:
Raj M. Desai
Publication Date:
01-1995
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University
Abstract:
This paper examines how formerly state-owned enterprises are governed in a post-Communist economy. Privatization was intended to clarify ownership rights by making private property the basis for productive relations. Inreality, gov ernments still own substantial percentages of share capital in "privatized" enterprises. and the question of who controls the company often remains unclear. Two dimensions of emerging corporate-governance structures are examined for enterprises under joint public-private ownership: contract enforcement and the influence of the state-as shareholder. The main argument is that these structures are determined according to government-investor negotiations over how to relinquish control of firms and privatize their cash flows, and proceeds in two steps. First, state authori ties and prospective investors commit to the terms of privatization. Second, instruments of contract enforcement and state influence emerge from these commitments through bargaining. Evidence from two industry cases in the Czech Republic-steel and petrochemicals-shows that contract-enforcement is delegated to a third party when a govern ment cannot credibly commit to all the privatization terms desired ex ante by investors who prefer long-term, Jarge bloc equities; additionally, the state's fiduciary influence will be limited if ministries and property agencies are politically unified. Delegating contractual responsibility while limiting state discretion will make progress in estab lishing property rights. • An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chi cago. September 1995 .. The author is grateful for comments from Peter Hall. Joel Hellman. Grzegorz Ekiert, and the par ticipants of the Seminar on Post-Communist Institutions (Russian Research Center). and the Workshop on East European Politics (Center for European Studies). Harvard University.
Topic:
Governance, Industry, Ownership, Post-Communism, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Czech Republic