Search

Begin New Search Topic Monetary Policy Political Geography Europe

61. Towards a Deeper EMU: An assessment of political divisions within the EU

Author:
Juha Jokela
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Policymakers, observers and the media have referred to a vast number of divisions in crisis-torn Europe. The EU is divided between north and south or creditors and debtors. Some have emphasised the emerged division between anti-EU and pro- EU forces. Significantly, these divisions are also manifested within the eurozone, in the form of the current differences between the French and German views, and the increasing role of the populist movements in many euro countries. Yet others have highlighted the boundary between the eurozone and the rest of the EU, and suggested that the euro countries now form the core of the Union. Relatedly, some of the non-euro members are distancing themselves from the EU – most notably the UK – while many others aim to secure their influence in the Union, even if euro membership may have been put on the back burner.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Germany

62. What Germany should fear most is its own fear: An analysis of Target2 and current account imbalances

Author:
Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies
Abstract:
This paper analyzes two claims that have been made about the Target2 payment system. The first one is that this system has been used to support unsustainable current account deficits of Southern European countries. The second one is that the large accumulation of Target2 claims by the Bundesbank represents an unacceptable risk for Germany if the eurozone were to break up. We argue that these claims are unfounded. They also lead to unnecessary fears in Germany that make a solution of the eurozone crisis more difficult. Ultimately, this fear increases the risk of a break-up of the eurozone. Or to paraphrase Franklin Roosevelt, what Germany should fear most is simply its own fear.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Cooperation, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

63. Moral Hazard in an Economic Union: Politics, Economics, and Fiscal Gimmickry in Europe

Author:
James Alt, David Dreyer Lassen, and Joachim Wehner
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
This paper examines empirically how transparency of the budget process affects fiscal rules and incentives for fiscal gimmickry or creative accounting in the European Union. Using stock-flow adjustment data for EU countries from 1990-2007, we show that pressure from a deficit limit rule as in the Stability and Growth Pact creates incentives for fiscal gimmicks, as does political pressure from the electoral cycle and economic pressure from negative shocks in the business cycle. However, we show that where institutional transparency is higher, these incentives are damped and largely disappear. We infer that fiscal rules do not work well when institutional transparency is low.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

64. The Consolidation of the Anglo-Saxon/European Consensus on Price Stability. From International Coordination to a Rule-Based Monetary Regime

Author:
Arie Krampf
Publication Date:
10-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG)
Abstract:
During the 1990s, a consensus consolidated among policy makers and economists worldwide regarding the desirability of very low inflation targeting. So far, this process has been explained on the basis of a domestic- functional thesis, according to which commitment to very low inflation provides local economic gains with no costs. In this paper, I present an alternative explanation, according to which the global norm of very low inflation targeting was consolidated as a political solution to the problem of exchange rate misalignment and volatility. I argue that policy makers in Germany and the US believed that convergence of monetary policies and inflation rates, in addition to liberalization of financial markets, will stabilize exchange rates without the need for direct coordination. The paper employs the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism as a benchmark to explain the choice of the European and the G-5/7 countries to establish a low-inflation rule-based international monetary regime. The paper concludes that the regime of very low inflation targeting was consolidated as a politically viable solution to a political problem rather than as an economic best practice. Furthermore, it concludes that the norm of very low inflation targeting was a “corer solution” that neglected the problem of exchange rate stability.
Topic:
Economics, Markets, Political Economy, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
United States and Europe

65. Key Issues on European Banking Union: Trade-Offs and Some Recommendations

Author:
Douglas J. Elliott
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Brookings Institution
Abstract:
European leaders have committed to moving toward a banking union, in which bank regulation and supervision, deposit guarantees, and the handling of troubled banks will be integrated across at least the euro area and possibly across the wider European Union. This is quite positive for two reasons. Most immediately, it will help solve the euro crisis by weakening the link between debt-burdened governments and troubled banks, where each side has added to the woes of the other. In the longer run, it will make the “single market” in European banking substantially more effective.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe

66. Updated Estimates of Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rates

Author:
William R. Cline and John Williamson
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
In 2008 we introduced a semiannual series providing estimates of fundamental equilibrium exchange rates, or FEERs (Cline and Williamson 2008a). The economic concept of FEERs was first set forth by Williamson (1983). An operational method for arriving at multilaterally consistent estimates of FEERs was developed by Cline (2008) and has been applied over the past five years in this series of estimates. This issue marks the valedictory round of the series for Williamson, who is retiring.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
Europe and Lisbon

67. Hyperinflations Are Rare, but a Breakup of the Euro Area Could Prompt One

Author:
Anders Åslund
Publication Date:
11-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Hyperinflation is one of the most misused words in the English language. Two years ago, I heard a prominent American investor say that we were about to get hyperinflation, “not 15 percent a year as under Jimmy Carter but perhaps 5 percent a year.” Hyperinflation is usually 1,000 percent or more a year. The standard definition by Philip Cagan (1956) is that hyperinflation starts when inflation reaches 50 percent a month, and then the economy is in hyperinflation for one year until monthly inflation falls and stays below 50 percent.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, Regional Cooperation, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

68. Why a Breakup of the Euro Area Must Be Avoided: Lessons from Previous Breakups

Author:
Anders Åslund
Publication Date:
08-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
One of the big questions of our time is whether the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) will survive. Too often, analysts discuss a possible departure of one or several countries from the euro area as little more than a devaluation, but I argue that any country's exit from the euro area would be a far greater event with potentially odious consequences. Exit from the EMU cannot be selective: It is either none or all.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

69. Combating Widespread Currency Manipulation

Author:
Joseph E. Gagnon Gagnon
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Widespread currency manipulation, mainly in developing and newly industrialized economies, is the most important development of the past decade in international financial markets. In an attempt to hold down the values of their currencies, governments are distorting capital flows by around $1.5 trillion per year. The result is a net drain on aggregate demand in the United States and the euro area by an amount roughly equal to the large output gaps in the United States and the euro area. In other words, millions more Americans and Europeans would be employed if other countries did not manipulate their currencies and instead achieved sustainable growth through higher domestic demand.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Markets, and Monetary Policy
Political Geography:
United States, America, and Europe

70. The Coming Resolution of the European Crisis: An Update

Author:
C. Fred Bergsten and Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
06-2012
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics
Abstract:
Getting the diagnosis right is a prerequisite for understanding the euro area predicament and evaluating key decisions taken since early 2010. As we laid out in Bergsten and Kirkegaard (2012), while the euro area faces multiple overlapping and mutually reinforcing elements of fiscal (Greece), banking (Ireland/Spain), and competitiveness (Southern periphery) crises, it is first and foremost facing a crisis of institutional design. The common currency as designed in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 is a half-built house without the critical components of banking and fiscal union necessary to sustain it through the type of crushing economic and financial down- turn witnessed since October 2008.
Topic:
Economics, International Trade and Finance, Monetary Policy, and Financial Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe