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131. Capacity Losses, Reconstruction and Unfinished Modernization: The Chemical Industry in the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SBZ)/GDR 1945-1965

Author:
Rainer Karlsch
Publication Date:
03-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
Between the two World Wars, central Germany (the later GDR) was a preferred region for the foundation of new chemical plants. But after World War II, Soviet occupying troops dismantled 116 chemical plants in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. After the division of Germany became apparent, the Soviet Zone began a policy of self-sufficiency, but the chemical industry of the GDR dropped behind the West German chemical industry in the first postwar decade. After the "Sputnik shock" in 1957 and Khruschev's proclamation of an "economic race," the chemical industry in the Eastern Bloc moved into the center of the economic policy. In November 1958, the GDR enacted, as did the Soviet Union, a special chemical program. The main points of the program were the doubling of the chemical production within seven years, and an even greater increase in production of synthetic fibers and plastic. But the program failed. Decisive for the backsliding of the GDR's chemical industry was the uncoupling from the international division of labor and the integration into the East European economic zone. The GDR's Chemical Industry could find no real equivalent partner in Eastern Europe, and cooperation with the West was restricted for political reasons. The "opting for oil" of the Ulbricht-era became in the Honecker-era a policy of moving "back to coal." The maintaining of carbide chemistry finally ended in an energy crisis and an ecological fiasco.
Topic:
Cold War, Industrial Policy, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

132. Dominance through Cooperation - The Japan Strategy of I.G. Farben

Author:
Akira Kudo
Publication Date:
03-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the Japan strategy of I.G. Farben in the inter-war period. It deals with export strategy as well as the licensing of technologies. It concludes that I.G. Farben suffered from a variety of difficulties in its Japan business, especially in the area of direct investment, and that, in spite of this, it succeeded in developing active business operations in Japan, especially in its exports of dyestuffs and nitrogenous fertilizer and in its licensing of the Haber-Bosch process for synthetic ammonia.
Topic:
Industrial Policy and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Japan, Europe, Israel, and East Asia

133. Electoral Institutions, Cabinet Negotiations, and Budget Deficits within the European Union

Author:
Mark Hallenberg and Jürgen. von Hagen
Publication Date:
02-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
Large government budget deficits are a concern in most industrialized countries. Two literatures in political economy argue that differences in political institutions explain much of the variation in the success of counties in their efforts to run small deficits. One group of authors considers how differences among electoral systems affect the size of budget deficits, while the second group concentrates on the governmental institutions which structure the formation of the yearly budget. Among the "electoral institutionalists", a consensus is beginning to emerge which treats proportional representation systems as a cause of high levels of public debt. In contrast, "fiscal institutionalists" argue that the presence of certain institutions in the decision-making process at the cabinet level, such as a strong finance minister or negotiated spending targets, lead to smaller deficits than in cases where such institutions are missing. We indicate that these two literatures complement one another. Electoral institutions matter because they restrict the type of budgetary institution at the governmental phase which a state has at its disposal. A strong finance minister is feasible in states where one-party governments are the norm, and such states usually have plurality electoral systems, while negotiated targets provide an alternative in multi-party governments. In multi-party governments, which are common in states with proportional representation, the coalition members are not willing to delegate to one actor the ability to monitor and punish the others for "defections" on the budget. The empirical section of the paper indicates a strong relationship between one-party governments and strong finance minister solutions within the European Union states on the one hand and multi-party or minority governments and targets on the other. Pooled time series regression results also support our contention that it is the presence or absence of one of these budgetary institutions, rather than the plurality/proportional representation dishotomy, which has the greatest impact on debt levels.
Topic:
International Organization and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

134. A Strategy for Launching the Euro

Author:
Maurice Obstfeld
Publication Date:
02-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
This paper studies the constraints placed by the Maastricht Treaty on the rates at which member currencies will exchange against the Euro at the start of stage 3 of economic and monetary union (EMU). The paper shows that the stage 3 bilateral conversion factors for EMU member currencies must correspond to closing market exchange rates as of December 31, 1998; furthermore, currency conversion rates into the Euro cannot be determined until that date. Moreover, official announcements about intended conversion factors will carry no credibility with markets, as market rates must be chosen over any prennounced rates according to the Treaty. Unless there is heavy official intervention in the runup to stage 3, EMU members' bilateral market rates will exhibit excessive volatility and may induce beggar-thy-neighbor policy behavior. On the other, hand, exchange-rate targeting may open the door to speculative currency crises. The only feasible solution appears a widely-publicized institutional reform to subjugate national central banks' policies entirely to the goal of intra-EMU exchange stability in the final months of stage 2.
Topic:
International Political Economy and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe

135. Balancing Positive and Negative Integration: The Regulatory Options for Europe

Author:
Fritz W. Scharpf
Publication Date:
11-1997
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies
Abstract:
During the golden years from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, the industrial nations of Western Europe had the chance to develop specifically national versions of the capitalist welfare state - and their choices were in fact remarkably different (Esping-Andersen 1990). In spite of the considerable differences between the "Social-Democratic", "Corporatist" or "Liberal" versions, however, all were remarkably successful in maintaining full employment and promoting economic growth, while also controlling, in different ways and to different degrees, the destructive tendencies of unfettered capitalism in the interest of specific social, cultural, and/or ecological values (Scharpf 1991a; Merkel 1993). It was not fully realized at the time, however, how much the success of market-correcting policies did in fact depend on the capacity of the territorial state to control its economic boundaries. Once this capacity is lost, countries are forced into a competition for locational advantage which has all the characteristics of a Prisoner's Dilemma game (Sinn 1994). It reduces the freedom of national governments and unions to raise the regulatory and wage costs of national firms above the level prevailing in competing locations. Moreover, and if nothing else changes, the "competition of regulatory systems" that is generally welcomed by neoliberal economists (Streit/Mussler 1995) and politicians may well turn into a downward spiral of competitive deregulation and tax cuts in which all competing countries will find themselves reduced to a level of protection that is in fact lower than that preferred by any of them.
Topic:
Economics, Government, International Organization, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

136. From Free Trade to Supranational Polity: The European Court and Integration

Author:
Alec Stone Sweet and James A. Caporaso
Publication Date:
11-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In this paper, we propose a dynamic theory of legal integration, test the model quantitatively, and then cross-check it by way of process tracing. We show that transnational exchange, litigation, and the production of Euro-rules have evolved interdependently, and argue that this interdependence provokes and reinforces the spillover effects that partly drive the construction of supranational governance. In case studies of the impact of the legal system on outcomes in two areas, the free movement of goods and European social provisions, we show that our model outperforms the dominant framework for understanding how the EC legal system operates - intergovernmentalism. In each of these areas, the data show that the legal system functions to reduce member-state government control over policy outcomes, and to enhance the influence of supranational institutions, national judges, and private actors.
Topic:
Government, International Law, International Organization, and International Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

137. Emergence of a Supranational Telecommunications Regime

Author:
Wayne Sandholtz
Publication Date:
11-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The patchwork of national telecommunications monopolies in the EU was incapable of meeting a rapidly growing need on the part of societal actors for efficient, technologically advanced, cross-border telecommunications. The Commission mobilized various transnational actors -- equipment manufacturers, business users, providers of new services, suppliers of alternative infrastructures -- to support its plans for EU-level liberalization and harmonization. Whereas in a first phase the Commission acted as a source of initiatives and models for states whose policies were in flux, the second phase saw a dramatic shift in the nature of governance. Employing its powers under Article 90 of the Treaty (which does not require Council approval), the Commission set out to abolish national monopolies in telecoms equipment, services, and, finally, infrastructures. The telecoms case thus supports three of the project's central propositions: that societal transactions drive movement toward supranational governance; that changes in EU rules, organizations, and transnational society are interlinked; and that member states do not always control these processes of institutionalization.
Topic:
Government, International Political Economy, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Europe

138. Economic Structure and the Decision to Adopt a Common Currency

Author:
Jeffrey A. Frankel and Andrew K. Rose
Publication Date:
08-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
Everyone studing EMU cites the theory of Optimum Currency Areas: whether a country like Sweden should join the currency union depends on such parameters as the extent of Swedish trade with other EU members and the correlation of Sweden's income with that of other members. Few economists have focused on what we consider one of the most interesting aspects of this issue. Trade patterns and income correlation are endogenous. Sweden could fail the OCA criterion for membership today, and yet, if it goes ahead and joins anyway, could, as the result of joining, pass the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) criterion in the future. (Further, even if Sweden does not enter EMU quickly, it will be more likely to satisfy the OCA criteria in the future as a result of its recent accession to the EU.) The few economists who have identified the importance of the endogeneity of trade patterns and income correlation are divided on the nature of the relationship between the two. This is an important empirical question, which may hold the key to the answer regarding whether it is in Sweden's income interest to join EMU. We review the OCA theory, highlighting the role of trade links and income links. Then we discuss and analyze the endogeneity of these parameters. We present econometric evidence suggesting strongly that if trade links between Sweden and the rest of Europe strengthen in the future, then Sweden's income will become more highly correlated with European income in the future (not less correlated, as some have claimed). This has important implications for the OCA criterion. It means that a naïve examination of historical data gives a biased picture of the effects of EMU entry on Sweden. It also means that EMU membership is more likely to make sense for Sweden in the future than it does today.
Topic:
International Political Economy and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Europe and Sweden

139. The European Commission's Ability to Act under European Competition Law: The Example of Telecommunications and Electricity Policy

Author:
Susanne K. Schmidt
Publication Date:
08-1996
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of European Studies
Abstract:
European competition law allocates far-reaching competences to the European Commission. The paper asks for the conditions under which the Commission may use these rights against the member states, focusing on the most powerful provision - the right of the Commission under Article 90 to issue directives by itself in those cases where member-state governments have allocated specific rights to undertakings that conflict with the Treaty's rules. In addition the Commission may pursue Treaty violations on a case-by-case basis. In European telecommunications policy the Commission has used its powers rather successfully, with all liberalization decisions being based on Article 90. But for European electricity policy the Commission has shrunk away from using these powers in favor of initiating council legislation. The paper analyzes the conditions of the Commission's ability to act under European competition law in a multi-level framework, drawing among others on a principal-agent approach.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Government, International Law, International Political Economy, and Science and Technology
Political Geography:
Europe