Search

Begin New Search Topic Intelligence Political Geography Europe

1. Collaboration Between Intelligence Services in the Present-Day World: Challenges and Issues

Author:
Sergey Naryshkin
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations
Institution:
East View Information Services
Abstract:
Seeking to ensure their national interests, states have traditionally taken advantage of opportunities offered by what is known as intelli- gence diplomacy, involving official bilateral or multilateral collaboration between foreign intelligence services. Foreign intelligence services have accumulated considerable experi- ence in working together in various areas, and this applies not only to allied countries. this experience conclusively proves that partnership makes it possible to solve many problems – those related to intelligence and those outside the bounds of “classic” intelligence operations. the experience of Russia’s foreign intelligence service, which is cur- rently marking its 100th anniversary, is interesting and instructive. Created on December 20, 1920, the Foreign Department of the Cheka, the original predecessor of Russia’s foreign intelligence services (the Foreign Department-the First Main Directorate-the SVR), established first official contacts with several intelligence services of other countries. Fair partnership agreements at that time were signed on the initiative of other countries’ intelligence services. this clearly shows that right from the start Russia’s intelligence service had a reputation as a strong, useful and reliable partner.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, International Cooperation, and Spy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

2. Turbulence in arms control: Open Skies Treaty became a victim of the great power competition

Author:
Jyri Lavikainen
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Non-compliance and disputes between Russia and the US resulted in the US exiting the Open Skies Treaty. If Russia withdraws in response, European countries will lose an important source of intelligence.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Intelligence, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

3. Over the horizon: NATO joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in the Baltic Sea region

Author:
Mark E. Ferguson, Christopher Harper, and Richard D. Hooker
Publication Date:
11-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Since the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, NATO threat perceptions have significantly intensified, particularly with regard to the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that today face the most direct threat of any of NATO’s allies. To deter aggression in the Baltic region, NATO must deploy a credible and effective defense, grounded in a comprehensive understanding of adversary capabilities, actions and intent. A critical element of deterrence and defense is NATO Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance a networked system of sensors, collectors and analysts fielded by the Alliance and its member states to provide situational awareness, early warning and if necessary, decision support for combat operations. Put simply JISR is about getting the right information to the right person, at the right time in the right format. But if a crisis erupted in the Baltic Sea region, is NATO equipped to gather and process the information necessary to give commanders on the ground a clear operating picture? What improvements, if any, could be made to the way NATO and NATO allies collect and process intelligence? To answer these and other questions, the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security assembled a task force of leading regional security experts, led by co-chairs ADM Mark E. Ferguson, III, USN (Ret.) and AM Sir Christopher Harper, RAF (Ret.) and project director Dr. Richard D. Hooker, Jr, that examined NATO’s JISR posture in the Baltic Sea region and offers a series of recommendations to improve both collection and processing of vital intelligence so that NATO is ready to meet any challenge that may be waiting over the horizon.
Topic:
NATO, Intelligence, Drones, and Surveillance
Political Geography:
Europe, Northern Europe, and Baltic Sea

4. Approach to the Spanish External Image Applied to the Economic Intelligence / Aproximación a la imagen exterior española como herramienta de inteligencia económica

Author:
José Pablo Martínez Romera
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
The measurements of external image carried out in recent years to guide the "country-brand" strategies could have the potential to be used as economic intelligence tools. This way, public authorities would be able to foresee variations in those variables linked to the preferences of foreign citizens, such as investments, exports, tourism or immigration; helping them to design politics in these fields.
Topic:
Economics and Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe and Spain

5. The Use of Predictive Analysis Programs in Police Intelligence: A European Comparison / El uso de programas de análisis predictivo en la inteligencia policial: una comparativa europea

Author:
Virginia Cinelli and Alberto Manrique Gan
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on International Security Studies (RESI)
Institution:
International Security Studies Group (GESI) at the University of Granada
Abstract:
Nowadays, two main limitations persist in intelligence analysis: the intrinsic existence of a certain degree of uncertainty and the large volume of information available. In order to face these problems, since the end of the 90s, technology and statistics have been used in the field of security to tackle the analytical limitations of human beings, improving their performances. As a result, professionals in the crime prevention areas started using technology in investigation to calculate the probability that a (criminal) event might occur in the future. Such a phenomenon is also called predictive analysis. Today, Europe stands out both for the number and the type of predictive programs implemented in different national contexts. The main objective of this article is to analyze the phenomenon of predictive policing in the European context through a comparative analysis of 6 cases study in 5 different countries (Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) to, firstly, assess the implications in the improvement of the security context of the European Union, and secondly, to detect the innovative cases within this framework.
Topic:
Crime, Intelligence, Science and Technology, and European Union
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, Germany, Italy, and Netherlands

6. Transatlantic intelligence ties remain strong: Insulated against political turmoil

Author:
Christopher Kojm
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Headlines are rife with stories about political turmoil in transatlantic relations, and bitter disputes over trade and defence spending. Yet for the US Intelligence Community, ties with transatlantic partners have remained insulated against political differences. History shows that intelligence relationships follow their own logic.
Topic:
Intelligence, Regional Cooperation, Alliance, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and North America

7. Successfully Countering Russian Electoral Interference

Author:
Heather A Conley
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On Friday, May 5, 2017—just two days before the second and final round of the French presidential elections—gigabytes of data hacked from Emmanuel Macron’s presidential campaign team were released online. Months earlier an orchestrated disinformation campaign against the Macron presidential campaign had already begun. The so-called Macron Leaks—a combination of real emails and forgeries—could have been yet another example of a long list of attempts by Russia to interfere in a high-stakes transatlantic election. But the 2017 French presidential election may be the exception that proves the rule: it is the most clearly failed attempt. The Kremlin neither succeeded in interfering with the presidential election nor in dividing French society. As the United States prepares to hold nationwide elections on November 6, 2018, the director of national intelligence, Dan Coats, has already warned in February of this year that “We expect Russia to continue using propaganda, social media, false-flag personas, sympathetic spokespeople and other means of influence to try to exacerbate social and political fissures in the United States.” Calling Russian influence “pervasive,” Director Coats further noted that “The Russians have a strategy that goes well beyond what is happening in the United States,” he said. “While they have historically tried to do these types of things, clearly in 2016 they upped their game. They took advantage, a sophisticated advantage of social media. They are doing that not only in the United States but . . . throughout Europe and perhaps elsewhere.” Because the United States is not well prepared for future elections, it is necessary to study the past. This is why the 2017 French presidential election is a particularly important election to study and why we highlight French scholar Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer’s groundbreaking report on the Macron Leaks.1 Drawing in part upon the work of CSIS visiting fellow Boris Toucas,2 Vilmer’s forthcoming report will examine what happened during the French presidential election; who orchestrated the affair; how it was successfully countered; and what lessons can be learned. This Brief, which is part of the forthcoming CSIS comprehensive report, sums up the main lessons learned. Myriad structural factors, luck, as well as effective anticipation and reaction by the Macron campaign staff, government and civil society, and especially the mainstream media, combined to successfully resist Russian malign influence.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Elections, and Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and France

8. Guidelines for Intelligence Oversight for Parliamentary Committees in the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia

Author:
Teodora Fuior, Magdalena Lembovska, Wouter de Ridder, and Julian Richards
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Parliamentary oversight refers to the ongoing1 monitoring, review, evaluation and investigation of the activity of government and public agencies, including the implementation of policy, legislation and the expenditure of the state budget. Parliamentary oversight is one of the most important manifestations of the separations of powers in a democracy. Parliamentary oversight must extend to all areas of government, including intelligence and security services. Intelligence services work in secrecy and have the authority to make use of special powers that potentially are highly invasive of human rights. Communications interception and secret surveillance are only two of such powers. For these reasons, intelligence services are regarded by the public with suspicion and lack of confidence. Therefore, the need for legality, legitimacy and accountability is even higher for intelligence services than for other government agencies. As the lawmaker, parliament is responsible for enacting clear, accessible and comprehensive legislation establishing intelligence services, their organisation, special powers and limits. Parliamentary oversight activities review, evaluate and investigate how laws are implemented and how intelligence operations are in line with the constitution, national security policy and legislation. Parliament also approves the budget of intelligence services and can play a strong role in scrutinizing expenditure. Effective parliamentary oversight ensures a bridge between intelligence and the public and brings benefits to all: intelligence community, parliament itself and most importantly, the citizens.
Topic:
Security, Civil Society, Intelligence, Governance, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Geneva, Europe, Macedonia, and Albania

9. Britain Expels Russian Diplomats for Keeping Geopolitical Status

Author:
Wu Fei
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Rethinking Russia
Abstract:
UK has far-reaching strategic objectives to expel Russian diplomats for espionage. It has been aggressive to Russia for fear of a huge fall in its geopolitical status. Britain issued an ultimatum to the Russia after Skripal, the former Russian double agent, and his daughter Yulia were found poisoned and unconscious in Britain on 12 March. With no response from Russia, the Britain Prime Minister Theresa immediately announced that they will expel 23 Russian diplomats and command their departure in a week after report to Congress. Russia just indicates that they will take the same move as well.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Intelligence, Geopolitics, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, and France

10. November 2018 Issue

Author:
Ali Soufan, Paul Cruickshank, Nuno Tiago Pinto, Damon Mehl, and Michael Munoz
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
CTC Sentinel
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
In our cover article, Ali Soufan profiles Major General Qassem Soleimani, the long-serving head of Iran’s Quds Force who the U.S. government has accused, among other things, of support for terrorism and involvement in a 2011 plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States. Soufan outlines how Soleimani has masterminded Tehran’s efforts to project its power across the Middle East using a unique strategy of blending militant and state power, built in part on the model of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Soufan argues that with nationalist sentiment on the rise in Iran in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and the ongoing regional tussle with Saudi Arabia, Soleimani’s popularity would make him the natural front-runner if Iran chooses to adopt a military presidency. Our interview is with Patrick Skinner who during the decade after 9/11 worked in counterterrorism for the CIA in Afghanistan and Iraq. Last year, he began working as a police officer in his hometown of Savannah, Georgia, in an effort to make a difference closer to home. Skinner reflects on how lessons learned from his time as a CIA case officer and as a local police officer could apply to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy and tactics overseas. Drawing on thousands of pages of judicial documents and investigative files, Nuno Pinto outlines the alleged key role played by two Portugal-based extremists in a transnational Islamic State network whose alleged attack plans were thwarted by arrests in Strasbourg and Marseille in November 2016. The case raises concerns that European countries in which security services are less geared up to confront terrorist activity are being used as logistical hubs by jihadi terrorists. In the wake of the Islamic State’s deadly attack on Western tourists in Tajikistan in July 2018, Damon Mehl examines the threat the group poses to the country. With the Islamic State having lost almost all of its territory in Syria and Iraq, Michael Munoz looks at how the group’s propaganda efforts may evolve in the future.
Topic:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Counter-terrorism, Islamic State, Propaganda, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Tajikistan, France, and Portugal