Search

Begin New Search Topic Gas Political Geography Europe

61. Petrol and Natural Gas Market of the Visegrád Group Countries 1993–2016: Current State and Prospects

Author:
Robert Klaczynski
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
The paper addresses problems related to energy policies pursued by Central Eu- ropean countries. It identifies the amounts of energy resources in individual countries in the Visegrád Group as well as the transmission infrastructures they use for natural gas and crude oil. The author discusses projects aimed at diversifying energy supplies which are of key importance to V4 countries. The article also presents relations between those countries in both within the group and bilaterally. When outlining prospects of a V4 energy strategy, the account is taken of such vital aspects as relations with the Russian Federation and the contribution made by Visegrád countries to EU actions designed to develop a single energy market.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Regional Cooperation, Infrastructure, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Europe, and Visegrad

62. Snubbing Matteo Salvini Makes No Sense

Author:
Emmanuel Navon
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Despite the fascist roots of Matteo Salvini’s “Liga” party, upgrading relations with the current Italian government serves the national interest because it shall help Israel export it’s natural gas to Europe as well as break the European consensus on Iran and on Jerusalem’s status.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Gas, Political Parties, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, and Israel

63. Egypt, a future gas supplier to the European Union?

Author:
Jan Mazač and Lukáš Tichý
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute of International Relations Prague
Abstract:
The main objective of the external dimension of the EU energy policy in line with the Energy Union strategy is primarily to ensure energy security by diversifying external energy supplies, transport routes and suppliers, mainly in the gas domain. Egypt’s recent offshore and onshore gas discoveries increased its natural gas reserves estimate. Its natural gas production is thus expected to double in 2020 and transform the country back into a gas supplier in the eastern Mediterranean region. The European Union (EU) should thus strengthen its relations with Egypt to allow its gas production to reach European markets.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Markets, Oil, European Union, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, North America, and Egypt

64. Advancing Natural Gas Reform in Ukraine

Author:
Sagatom Saha and Ilya Zaslavskiy
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
A prerequisite for Ukraine’s economic and political success is reform of its energy sector. Enduring corruption and mismanagement in the energy sector have generated pernicious budget deficits, eroded sovereignty, jeopardized energy security, and limited economic potential. Although all post-Soviet states have encountered obstacles in transitioning to market economies, Ukraine has been remarkably slow to introduce market reforms, and its sclerotic energy sector is at the center of its economic dys- function. Even after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Orange Revolution, and nine International Mon- etary Fund (IMF) loans conditional on reform, Ukraine’s energy sector remains a drain on taxpayers, a playground for corrupt oligarchs, and an unattractive destination for international investment. However, Ukraine now has a small but important window of opportunity. The 2014 Euromaidan Revolution—the series of pro-European demonstrations that culminated in Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s removal—provided a mandate and framework for energy reform. Beginning in 2015, Ukraine moved to cut implicit subsidies on natural gas, adopted laws to restructure the state-owned oil and gas company Naftogaz, and halted imports of Russian gas. These advances are welcome news not only for Ukraine, but also for the United States. A prosper- ous and energy-secure Ukraine, capable of standing up to Russian interventionism, would advance U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region. Recognizing this, Washington already provides technical, financial, and military assistance to Kiev.1 The United States has focused particularly on encouraging Ukraine’s energy-sector reforms, last year tasking the State Department with promoting the country’s energy security with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. Unfortunately, Ukraine’s energy-sector reforms to date do not go far enough. To achieve lasting reform, Ukraine must curtail its population-wide subsidies, reinforce the independence of its energy regulator, and dismantle the monopolies that exist in every segment of the natural gas sector. The benefits that would result from these steps are manifold. End consumers would enjoy better energy services and lower prices; the domestic energy sector would create high-skilled jobs and boost eco- nomic output; and the government would secure new revenue streams that could bolster national priorities such as defense and social services. Further reforms in Ukraine’s energy sector could mean the difference between economic growth at the current sluggish rate of 2 percent and reaching 6 percent or more, which some experts suggest is possible.2 Ultimately, Ukraine will be the arbiter of its own success in energy-sector reform. But the United States can and should do more to help it achieve politically and technically complex reforms. Apply- ing greater diplomatic pressure, providing technical assistance, and offering targeted financial in- centives—and disincentives—could speed the pace of Ukraine’s reform efforts. The Donald J. Trump administration, which has not yet articulated a clear strategy toward the country, should place energy-sector reform at the center of its relationship with Ukraine. Doing so would constitute a low-risk, high-reward strategy for Washington to counter Moscow’s influence at the North Atlan- tic Treaty Organization (NATO) border without overcommitting to military options and antagoniz- ing Russia. Moreover, by helping Ukraine reform its energy sector, the Trump administration may create opportunities for trade in energy equipment and services, advancing its strategy of U.S. en- ergy dominance.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Reform, and Gas
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

65. The Impact of US LNG on Russian Natural Gas Export Policy

Author:
Tatianna Mitrova and Tim Boersma
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The United States and Russia have long been the world’s largest natural gas producers, but they traditionally have not faced off in direct competition in that market. The United States was expected to become a net importer of natural gas, while Russia’s state-owned Gazprom took a prominent position in the European market. The boom in US shale-gas production changed that. While the United States had been trading gas regionally by pipeline for decades, the shale boom allowed for the export of US liquefied natural gas, putting the two gas giants in competition. Even before the first molecule of US LNG shipped, rising US production had diverted LNG destined for the United States into the European Union. Facing increased competition pushed Russia toward a more market-oriented strategy, with Gazprom adjusting its long-term oil-linked contracts that had previously been the backbone of Russian sales to European customers to use more hybrid formulae. This was just the beginning. After a slow start, the competition brought on by US gas is to a large extent shaping the Russian natural gas strategy in Europe and beyond. For Europe, rising gas competition from new suppliers has both economic and energy security implications. Globally, it is also raising questions about how Gazprom will compete in Asia, where demand is growing and gas suppliers are looking to place future production, as well as in other markets. Understanding how Gazprom will react to US gas is thus a critical economic and geopolitical question for LNG importers and exporters worldwide. In this paper the authors examine how Gazprom will maneuver in global markets under specific circumstances. It opens with a discussion of how the US and Russian gas sectors developed and interacted in the period before shale gas. The paper then examines how Gazprom’s gas trade has been impacted by new US production and what changes may be coming as US exports continue to increase. It finds that the advent of US LNG has already reduced Russian gas revenue, undermined its oil-linked pricing model, forced contract renegotiations and accelerated domestic gas market liberalization and LNG development. The authors argue that Russia is in a good position to defend its market share in Europe and looks at some of the strategies that could be pursued under various market scenarios, including the following: High Asian demand and low oil prices: If oil-linked gas prices were pushed below spot prices, Gazprom would not need to further adjust its pricing policy (as was the case in 2015–2017). In certain situations Gazprom might even limit supplies to drive prices up and increase its rent, becoming the price maker. Such a strategy would be utilized cautiously to avoid demand destruction and prompting new FIDs for new (US) liquefaction capacity. High Asian demand and high oil prices: In this scenario Gazprom’s position would be well served in the short to medium term by strong revenues. In the longer term, however, high prices will attract more competitors to the markets (and prompt new FIDs), so it is important for Gazprom to keep its own prices competitive and to keep the margin of the aggregators, which are supplying the European market, below their margin in Asia. There are already almost no “pure” oil-linked contracts left, and Gazprom in Europe mainly has hybrid pricing, but this scenario will require a more fundamental shift in the pricing, with the share of spot-indexed prices becoming dominant. Low Asian demand and low oil prices: Gazprom may be forced to keep prices for its long-term contracts below short-run marginal costs of US LNG. Gazprom might voluntarily move to completely spot-indexed prices, simultaneously trying not only to find new markets for its gas (both in Asia and in Europe) but also to stimulate new demand. The company would need more flexible and creative marketing, and it would seek to improve the efficiency of its operations, both internationally and domestically. Should Gazprom start to see its market share decline, Moscow could decide to liberalize the pipeline export monopoly, a decision that would make Novatek and Rosneft more powerful players. Low Asian demand and high oil prices: Russia would feel competitive pressure not only from the United States but also from all existing low-cost LNG suppliers like Qatar, which may have to switch to Europe and keep gas prices at a low level. Gazprom would have to engage in this price competition as well, flooding the market using spare capacities and driving the prices down to the level of its short-run marginal costs, which will disincentive US LNG aggregators to offtake their LNG. Gazprom has considerable underutilized upstream capacities and huge spare transportation capacities, allowing it to drive down European prices below the level acceptable for US LNG suppliers. This scenario hurts everyone on the supply side, and it is warranted to ask how long it could be upheld. The study finds that even in scenarios where Gazprom sees gas revenues driven down to 2009 or 2016 levels, this should not prove catastrophic for Russia. For Moscow, facing more competition in Europe is a new situation that Gazprom and decisions makers in the Kremlin will have to deal with. Under normal circumstances, competition between various sources of supply can result in net benefits for the end consumer. In addition, this paper demonstrates that the changes in the global gas market have forced Gazprom to adjust its business practices. However, the increased politization of natural gas in the United States carries a risk of inflamed tensions between Moscow and Washington.
Topic:
Globalization, Natural Resources, European Union, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

66. Russia’s National Oil Champion Goes Global

Author:
Edward C. Chow and Andrew J. Stanley
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
After the Soviet Union collapsed and Russia was roiled by political and economic chaos, many state-owned assets were privatized based on political connections and corrupt practices. The oil sector was a particularly attractive, but by no means the only, target for these privatizations. By the end of the 1990s, almost all of Russia’s oil production was privately owned. In spite of continued nontransparency, the oil sector began to resemble a competitive market with private investors introducing Western technology, financial accounting, and operating and management practices. It also started to attract major foreign investments. The remaining state oil assets were managed by a sleepy state enterprise named Rosneft that, in spite of its name (Russian Oil), produced less than 5 percent of Russia’s oil. Today, majority state-owned Rosneft produces almost half of Russia’s oil. Its daily oil production of 4.6 million barrels, according to its last reported quarterly results, is double that of the world’s largest oil company by market capitalization, ExxonMobil, which last reported daily liquids production of 2.3 million barrels. Rosneft’s rapid rise coincided with the rule of Vladimir Putin, who first became president of Russia in 2000. Its production increases were built largely on the backs of controversial acquisitions of assets previously held by private companies such as Yukos, TNK-BP, and Bashneft. Rosneft’s acquisition spree accelerated after Putin’s close associate and Russia’s then-deputy prime minister Igor Sechin became chairman of its board of directors in 2004. Sechin left government in 2012 to take over as Rosneft’s chief executive officer. Rosneft’s board of directors is now chaired by former German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. Rosneft’s transformation as Russia’s national oil champion is consistent with Putin’s policy of regaining state control over the commanding heights of the Russian economy, which is more reliant on oil income today than the Soviet Union ever was. Rosneft is Russia’s largest taxpayer and contributed a quarter of government revenue in 2014. Until recently, Rosneft concentrated mainly on consolidating its dominance over the domestic oil patch. It is also Russia’s leading refiner and is increasing natural gas production for direct sales to domestic gas users, producing 67 billion cubic meters in 2016. In 2014, Russia was hit by the twin shocks of a global oil price collapse and Western economic sanctions enacted after its aggression against Ukraine in the Donbas region and annexation of Crimea. These developments affected Rosneft severely since it involved the value of the commodity it produces and sells and restricted Rosneft’s access to international financing when it was heavily indebted from the aforementioned acquisitions. A normal company might hunker down, repair its balance sheet, and wait for external conditions to improve. Instead Rosneft has done the exact opposite and expanded its international business aggressively. As part of the 2014 U.S.-led sanction efforts, Igor Sechin, as the leading figure of Russia’s largest petroleum company and his having “shown utter loyalty to Vladimir Putin,” was directly sanctioned. Further Russian sanctions enacted by Congress in 2017 called on the U.S. Department of the Treasury to submit a detailed report on senior political figures, oligarchs, and parastatal entities as determined by their “closeness to the Russian regime and their net worth.” While the unclassified version of the report released to Congress on January 29 included Igor Sechin, the report was poorly received and largely regarded as nothing more than a “rich list” by Russian experts. However, the report also contains classified annexes, including a list of parastatal entities and supporting analysis, which by definition would have included Rosneft. Although Rosneft’s rapid international expansion is too recent to assess definitely, this paper describes some of Rosneft’s overseas ventures and explores possible motivations, economic and political, behind them.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Foreign Direct Investment, Sanctions, Gas, Transparency, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Eastern Europe

67. Who’s Afraid of Russian Gas? Bridging the Transatlantic Divide

Author:
Nikos Tsafos
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
The Issue Russian energy has divided the transatlantic alliance for over 60 years. Tensions normally just simmer, but they flare up when a new project is proposed, especially after a political crisis. In the 1960s, it was the prospect of increased Soviet oil exports following the Cuban missile crisis. In the 1980s, it was more Soviet gas for Western Europe after the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan and martial law had been declared in Poland. Today, it is the proposed Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its war against Ukraine (among other actions). Disagreements are natural in a broad alliance with diverse interests and perspectives. But it is now almost impossible to discuss Russian gas with any sense of calm (increasingly true for all things related to Russia). Russian initiatives are infused with perceptions and fears that range from the simple and legitimate to the obscure and far-fetched. In reality, arguments about Russian gas are rarely about Russian gas; they are about history, strategy, and geopolitics. Gas is just the spark. The end result is confusion and discord at a time when the transatlantic alliance has enough problems—without needing to add gas to the fire. It is time to separate Russian gas from the broader Russia agenda. Doing so will boost energy security, protect and strengthen the transatlantic alliance, and allow us to focus where the West can resist Russian power more meaningfully. This argument rests on three propositions. First, that energy does not give Russia as much power as we usually assume; second, that an antagonistic strategy is unlikely to be sustained or succeed in bringing about change, whether in energy or geopolitics; and third, that the best response to Russian gas is a set of policies that Europe should pursue anyway and that are unrelated to Russia. In short, we need to radically rethink Russian gas; how much it matters; and what the United States and Europe should do about it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Gas, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America

68. How International Oil Companies Could Assist the Republic of Cyprus to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals: A Conversation Starter

Author:
Andrea Tornaritis and Perrine Toledano
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
This policy paper is addressed to International Oil Companies (IOCs), public officials and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) involved in the natural gas industry in Cyprus. There is currently no conversation happening in Cyprus on how the oil and gas industry could help Cyprus achieve their Sustainable Development Goals. Therefore, this paper hopes to initiate a debate and conversation around this topic. It provides an overview of the ways in which IOCs operating in Cyprus could contribute towards the sustainable development of the natural gas industry and assist the Republic of Cyprus to achieve a number of their 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, Sustainable Development Goals, and NGOs
Political Geography:
Europe, Cyprus, and Mediterranean

69. The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas by Agnia Grigas

Author:
Andrew C. Hess and Agnia Grigas
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Fletcher Security Review
Institution:
The Fletcher School, Tufts University
Abstract:
It is encouraging to find a highly competent scholar willing to take on the complexities of a global energy revolution. Agnia Grigas’ book is not just about the political control of oil and gas reservoirs. Rather, it addresses the consequences of a new era in natural gas production that is capable of transforming structural relations in the energy world. Grigas’ geographical and historical context for examining the new politics of natural gas are appropriate: the geography being the northern and eastern parts of Eurasia, while the historical dimension is the emergence of a large pipeline structure connecting the Soviet Union to Europe after 1960, and the challenges it posed after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. ​ Long before Nikita Khushchev (d. 1971), Soviet geologists had discovered large reserves of oil and gas in Central Eurasia. After the end of World War II, the Soviet State proceeded to construct a huge pipeline network to distribute energy within the Soviet Union as well as to Europe. This created an energy management system that favored long pipelines, long-term contracts, fixed prices, and a decision-making environment in which political power often determined the outcome of disputes over prices and costs. Post 1991, with the Russian Union trying to protect its market for gas in Europe on one hand, and emergence of new nation states on the other, severe disputes arose over the price of gas...
Topic:
Energy Policy, Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Gas, and Book Review
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

70. Nord Stream 2: A Boon or a Threat to European Energy Security?

Author:
David Koranyi
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:
There has been much controversy around Nord Stream 2, a planned extension of the undersea gas pipeline stretching from Russia to Germany. By lying down two extra pipes in addition to the two already in operation since 2011-2012, the second phase would see the doubling of the capacity of the route, from 55 to 110 billion cubic meters (bcm) and commence operations in 2019 at a cost of 9.5 billion euros. This would mean that over 70% of Russian gas exports could be channeled through a single pipeline through Germany. Nord Stream 2, coupled with constructing the �irst two lines of Turkish Stream (with a capacity of 31.5 bcm) would also allow for the complete circumvention of the Ukrainian transit route.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, and Germany