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1. Factsheet: Alice Weidel

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Alice Weidel is the co-chairwoman of the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), a far-right political party in Germany and the first far-right nationalist party to enter the German parliament since World War II. Under the leadership of Weidel, the party has become the second strongest force following the national elections in February 2025. Weidel has a long history of anti-Muslim statements and support for discriminatory policies targeting Muslims. She argues that Islam is incompatible with the German constitution and European values, and is also connected to several anti-Muslim actors.
Topic:
Islamophobia, Far Right, Alternative for Germany (AfD), and Alice Weidel
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

2. Factsheet: Tomio Okamura

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Tomio Okamura is a far-right Czech politician who founded the anti-elitist and anti-Muslim party, Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD). He has made comments that promote anti-Muslim tropes and demonize Muslims and actively advocates for the Czech Republic to exit from the European Union. Following the 2024 European Parliament elections, Okamura joined the right-wing group, Europe of Sovereign Nations, which includes several political parties that support discriminatory policies targeting Muslims.
Topic:
Discrimination, Islamophobia, Far Right, Political Parties, and Tomio Okamura
Political Geography:
Europe and Czech Republic

3. Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy

Author:
Rosa Balfour and Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The political landscape in the European Union (EU) is changing rapidly. For decades, the traditional mainstream parties of the center right and center left have been losing ground, while antiestablishment parties have been gaining support. According to research by the University of Amsterdam, 32 percent of voters opted for antiestablishment parties in 2021, up from 12 percent in the early 1990s.1 Radical-right parties make up about half of this share, and their support has risen faster than that of any other group. Many of the fourteen parties examined in this study have achieved vote shares of 20 percent or more. The radical right is now in government, or supports the government, in Finland, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden. In the Netherlands, it is likely that Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV) will be part of a governing coalition. In other countries, these parties have become the leading opposition groups. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) has been carefully preparing to win the 2027 presidential election. Setbacks for the radical right in Poland and Spain in the second half of 2023 have shown that the relentless rise of these parties is not a foregone conclusion. However, current polling for several national elections and the June 2024 European Parliament elections indicates a strong likelihood of their continuing electoral success.2 Chega (Enough), a recently established party that shot to 18 percent of the vote in Portugal’s March 2024 election, ended the country’s exceptionalism as one of the few European nations without a right-wing populist party.3 The June 2024 Belgian federal election may see the Flemish nationalist party Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest), which so far has been strong in Flanders but kept out of national politics, break through at the federal level. Polling for Austria’s September 2024 parliamentary election suggests a surge in support for the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).4 In contrast with populism, which has a thin ideology focused mainly on fomenting the anger of the so-called pure people against corrupt elites and which has risen on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, the radical-right parties of the 2020s have a more distinct ideological profile.5 All have national specificities, such as rural origins in Northern Europe or ethnonationalism in Central Europe. Several parties are rooted in postwar fascism, such as the FPÖ, RN, Brothers of Italy (FdI), the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), and the Sweden Democrats (SD). For some groups, strong connections with society and well-developed party structures compensated for their marginal impact in national politics. Before its landslide victory in Italy’s 2022 parliamentary election, support for FdI hovered at around 5 percent, as it did for the party’s predecessor throughout the period since World War II.6 Other parties, such as Hungary’s Fidesz, gained ground as classic populist or even mainstream parties and benefited from an aura of respectability even as they shifted toward ethnonationalist or nativist positions. Since the 1990s, liberal-democratic parties have started to adopt some of the ideas of the radical right while keeping the parties themselves out of government. In the 2000s, the radical right became normalized, in some countries becoming part of the political mainstream. During this process, as political scientists Cas Mudde and Jan-Werner Müller have argued, liberal-democratic parties have shifted toward the radical right in the hope—mostly in vain—of keeping their traditional electorates. Yet, in practice, this approach has led voters to prefer the real radical right to its imitators. In other words, the tactic of chasing the radical right has not paid off electorally. Voters have moved toward the radical right as a consequence, not as a cause, of liberal-democratic parties’ attempts to contain it.7 Today, the far right is dominated by the radical right, which, unlike the extreme right, accepts the essence of democracy but rejects its liberal elements: minority rights, the rule of law, and the separation of powers.8 The radical-right parties selected for this study all share deep antimigration sentiments, often determined by race or religion; a nationalism that makes these parties Euroskeptic and opposed to what they see as a Brussels-based dictatorship; and skepticism of climate change policies. Many of these parties also espouse deeply conservative family values that go against women’s and LGBTQ rights. Foreign policy is usually not the strong suit of these parties, apart from their keen interest in the external dimension of migration policy. These parties pay close attention to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine but are sharply divided on this issue, with positions ranging from deep mistrust of Russia to close alignment with the Kremlin’s arguments. A future Donald Trump administration could lead to new divisions in the EU, as some member states are likely to align with the United States under any circumstances. This would mean that many of the EU’s current foreign policy positions, such as support for Ukraine, would come to an end. As radical-right parties rise to prominence at the national and the EU level, they are developing views on a range of foreign policy issues, building increasingly influential international networks and think tanks, and learning from each other’s successful tactics in solidifying their control of the state and propagating their values.9 For some radical-right parties that have been established in government, such as Fidesz and, until October 2023, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party, the upgrading of foreign policy on their political agendas can be inferred by the fact that all diplomatic postings in the EU are political appointments. Hungary’s foreign policy machinery is under the direct control of the prime minister.10 Diplomatic colleagues of the Hungarian representatives in Brussels know that the country’s negotiating positions are micromanaged in Budapest.11 Other countries, such as Italy and Finland, have chosen to rely on the credibility of career diplomats to navigate the Brussels machinery, preferring compromise over confrontation and isolation. For a long time, European politicians and EU institutions have assumed the radical right could be contained. Now, the challenge of the radical right needs to be addressed more seriously. Just as this phenomenon has eroded democracy and the rule of law in some EU member states, so foreign policy may become affected at a time when collective action is most needed to address international issues. As the radical right challenges the EU’s attempts to navigate a dangerous world, European politics can no longer afford complacency.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Germany

4. Europe’s Democracy Catch-22

Author:
Richard Youngs
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
East Asia Institute (EAI)
Abstract:
The dominant, epoch-making European storyline is now clear: the rise of the far right threatens the European Union (EU)’s future and democracy. This standard view is expressed in countless opinion pieces and political speeches and is now reshaping both national and EU-level politics. Even if the far right did not surge quite as dramatically as widely predicted in either the European Parliament or French parliamentary elections, its growing popularity clearly represents a pressing challenge both at the EU level and in national politics (Ash 2024). However, the continent’s predicament might be more accurately described as a more subtle and complex conundrum: in the immediate short term, what is good for the EU integration project might not be good for democracy, and vice versa. The EU and national governments have been struggling with this democracy catch-22 for several years now, and the election results make it an even sharper challenge. The postelection context has been dominated by the debate over whether to engage or isolate the far right—a debate that has been exhaustively covered and unfolding for many years. Yet, the empirical record suggests that neither engaging with the far right nor ostracizing it has worked especially well. Instead, a third approach might help map a way out of the democracy catch-22: a European democracy pact.
Topic:
Elections, European Union, Democracy, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Navigating Extremism: Safeguarding Europe’s Religious Sites amidst Shifting Political Landscapes

Author:
Annika Scharnagl and Daniela Pisoiu
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
This report highlights the increase in violence against religious institutions in Europe, particularly affecting Jewish and Muslim communities following conflicts such as the Israel-Hamas war. The report also notes a correlation with the rise of right-wing factions, indicating a concerning trend towards discriminatory beliefs in society. It is concluded that urgent scholarly and policy interventions are necessary to address these challenges. This emphasises the need for comprehensive interfaith dialogues and educational initiatives to mitigate emerging threats and uphold the values of religious freedom and social cohesion in contemporary European societies.
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Far Right, Social Cohesion, Protection, Muslims, and Jews
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Analyzing How the Tools of the British Far-Right Have Evolved

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Since July 30, 2024, several British cities and towns have been gripped by a wave of far-right violence described as the worst since World War II. This outbreak followed the killing of three girls in a knife attack at a children's party in Southport, northwest Britain. The violence involved a series of criminal and inflammatory actions in what appear to be coordinated efforts to thwart immigration and intimidate minorities in Britain. This reflects the British far-right's ability to utilize and even evolve its traditional tools to adapt to the current context and available resources.
Topic:
Immigration, Violence, Far Right, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Britain, United Kingdom, and Europe

7. The rise of the far right in the European Union: Gaining power not through a sweeping victory, but through creeping normalisation

Author:
Nils Fabian Müller
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
In the 2024 EU elections, far-right parties are expected to win more seats in the European Parliament than ever before. At the national level, too, far-right parties are entering more and more EU governments. Despite these gains, the centre-right European People’s Party, rather than the far right, is likely to play the central role in the EU institutions in the next legislature. The EU’s consensus-based system is a safeguard against the sudden seizure of power by far-right parties. But once they have achieved a certain position, the same system makes it difficult for others to form majorities without them. The EU is therefore facing not a sweeping but a creeping gain in far-right power, as centrist political parties become more open to cooperation, and far-right positions are slowly normalised in political discourse. Paradoxically, the very mechanisms that are supposed to protect national sovereignty (such as unanimity requirements in the Council) are the ones most likely to allow far-right parties to influence EU policy, even if they represent only a minority of EU citizens.
Topic:
Elections, European Union, Far Right, and European Parliament
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Factsheet: Walter Rosenkranz

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Walter Rosenkranz is a long-standing politician of the far-right FPÖ. In 2024, he was elected First President of the National Council, which is the second most powerful office in Austria. Rosenkranz has a long history of making Islamophobic statements and policy proposals, and has transnational links with anti-Muslim actors.
Topic:
Politics, Islamophobia, Far Right, Walter Rosenkranz, and Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)
Political Geography:
Europe and Austria

9. Factsheet: Herbert Kickl

Author:
Bridge Initiative Team
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Bridge Initiative, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Herbert Kickl is the current leader of the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), one of Austria’s major political parties that has shared power in various coalitions over the past three decades. It regained power, especially after mobilizing against immigrants and Muslims and is one of the main factors in the institutionalization of Islamophobia in Austria with many links to far-right anti-Muslim actors around the globe. Kickl invented the most successful anti-Muslim political campaigns of his party with slogans such as “Home, not Islam” (Daham statt Islam). Together with Viktor Orbán, Kickl established the Patriots for Europe (PfE or Patriots), the new far-right political group in the European Parliament, which has become the third-largest group ahead of the tenth European Parliament (2024-2029).
Topic:
Immigrants, Islamophobia, Far Right, Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), and Herbert Kickl
Political Geography:
Europe and Austria

10. The Recent Rise of the Far Right and Voters’ Anti-Refugee Attitudes in Europe

Author:
Yoonjung Kim and Nam Seok Kim
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
This paper explores the connection between individuals’ barrier preference toward immigration and refugee policy and how they are linked to voting behavior. We use three different datasets to tackle these two questions. We utilize multi-country survey data with abundant information regarding voters’ subjective attitudes toward immigrants to study the determinants of far-right voting in Europe. Notably, even after controlling for education, income level, or current employment status, which represents the human capital endow-ment of natives, industry-level comparative advantage and disadvantage, and political scale from left to right, we still find that a preference for immigration barriers has strong explanatory power for far-right voting behavior. We find that educational attainment and income level are important in explaining vot-ers’ anti-immigration attitudes, as the Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts. On average, voters with higher education and higher income are relatively more open to immigration and aware of their role in the economy. In addition to the cross-country election studies that allow us to study the anti-immigration attitude, we also use election surveys conducted in the Neth-erlands and France to add more details on the role of individual immigration and refugee policy preference in the voting behavior. The election survey on the parliamentary election of the Netherlands provides a special identification approach that is not available in cross-country election surveys. The panel structure of the Dutch survey allows us to observe the voting history of re-spondents in 2012, 2017, 2019, and 2021 parliamentary elections. Using this information, this paper clarifies the characteristics of voters who newly join supporting right-wing populism. In other words, we study determinants of ‘switching’ voting behavior from non-populist parties to right-wing populist parties focusing on the refugee barrier preference. We explore whether atti-tudes towards refugees affect this switching behavior in the politics of the Netherlands. The election survey on French voters covers the most recent presidential election in France. We elaborate on how immigration policy pref-erences of French voters are related with the popularity of right-wing popu-list presidential candidates in France. Considering that non-economic factors contribute to explaining the far-right voting behavior, utilizing other non-economic variables such as individ-uals’ sentiments towards various entities (including the government, legal sys-tem, and the European Parliament), and subjective evaluation of their own health and happiness can also add explanatory power, as numerous previous findings imply. For systematic consideration of these abundant variables in the ESS data, we use LASSO for variable selection. For this exercise, we con-sider two approaches in selecting the optimal penalty term, namely cross-validation (CV) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC). It is worth high-lighting that almost all of the immigration barrier preference variables are se-lected when using both CV and BIC for variable selection criteria.
Topic:
Political Economy, Refugees, Far Right, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
Europe