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101. Turning EU green energy diplomacy into reality

Author:
Louise Van Schaik, Akash Ramnath, and Giulia Cretti
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In Spring 2022, the European Commission will present its International Energy Engagement strategy, which will undoubtedly reflect that the European Green Deal nowadays tops the Brussels agenda. From being a traditional buyer of fossil fuels, the EU is adapting to become an exporter of green energy solutions and, to some degree, an importer of green energy. At a time when energy prices are historically high and EU climate policy is accelerating, this policy brief analyses what a more pro-active EU green energy diplomacy could look like. In light of this shift, a review is made of which instruments the EU could deploy to support green energy transitions and discourage third countries from continuing extraction and production of fossil fuels. It recommends the EU takes a firm stance on phasing out fossil fuel and enter dialogue with some of its current fossil fuel suppliers on the implications of its own transition. The EU will need to establish new partnerships on green energy provision, technology and critical raw materials needed for the transition.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Green Deal, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

102. Perspectives on a Hydrogen Strategy for the European Union

Author:
Cédric Philibert
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
There is now a wide understanding that larger use of clean hydrogen in future can be an important mean to achieve decarbonisation of the European economy. A robust, cost-effective European hydrogen strategy could become a pillar of an EU economic recovery plan which should, in line with the Green Deal, accelerate the decarbonization of European economies. The challenge for the upcoming EU strategy is to identify the most important future uses of cost-effective clean hydrogen, ensure sound scale-up through efficient public support schemes and system approaches driving significant cost reductions. Opportunities to maximise the economic benefits for the European economy in terms of jobs, value creation and competitiveness will also matter. And, of course, effective decarbonisation. The European hydrogen industry is now largely ripe for a progressive scale up that needs to be planned for the coming 20 years. While clean hydrogen will be indispensable, it comes with technical and economic challenges. There is an undisputed potential for decrease, but costs and availability of energy inputs, as well as transport and distribution systems, and an enabling policy environment, matter as much or more than simple scale-up. The EU will have to take stock of strategies developed by other countries. Japan and South Korea have robust industrial strategies that push carbon intensive hydrogen in the automotive, residential and power sectors with strong public support. Decarbonization is not always the primary objective. The current demand for hydrogen in fuel refineries and to produce ammonia and methanol for agriculture, mining and industry purposes figures at the top of the possible demand for clean hydrogen. Moreover, steel making in the industrial sub-sector is most likely to create considerable demand for clean hydrogen in complement to scrap recycling. In the transport sector, clean hydrogen could be primarily used for long-haul trucking and coaches. European products exist and deployment is already underway. Long-haul trucks and coaches may demand significant amounts of clean hydrogen, with some complements from other terrestrial transport means although the European carmakers prioritise battery electric cars and light duty vehicles. For hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and supporting infrastructures the challenge is of cost reduction through upscaling and mass production. Deep sea shipping is a sub-sector in which ammonia as a fuel is most likely to generate considerable additional demand for hydrogen. Aviation is a sub-sector that may call for large amounts of clean hydrogen in various forms unless offsetting emissions with verifiable carbon storage is available at scale and more competitive. Clean hydrogen may be used to achieve full decarbonisation of the power sector as an inter-seasonal option, via sector coupling with the gas infrastructure – but this will probably not be needed before 2035. Clean hydrogen can mainly be produced from electrolysis of water with low carbon electricity generation, from natural gas steam reforming with carbon capture and storage, and from natural gas pyrolysis. The clean hydrogen production comes with costs/challenges: hence why future demand must be carefully identified and prioritised. A sound hydrogen strategy for the EU should initially: Assess all available reference studies and international developments in terms of system benefits and costs, certainties and uncertainties, primary and secondary priorities, timelines as well as strengths and weaknesses of the European industry; Deploy progressively and cost-efficiently clean hydrogen for the applications where it has a potential proven advantage over competing solutions for decarbonisation to evaluate merit in terms of EUR/CO2 of each application under different assumptions; Support hydrogen clusters at city or territorial/ regional levels were production, demand and distribution can be effectively organized into systems that allow scale up, job creations, cost reductions and decarbonisation; Organize the scale up of demand and competition over supplies via regulation, IPCEIs in providing clarity over future needs/timelines; Develop roadmaps and demonstration projects for clean hydrogen-based solutions where the possibility of hydrogen proving a superior solution for decarbonisation is high enough; Protect EU hydrogen industry stakeholders at all levels and seizes from external takeovers; Ensure a level playing field for clean-hydrogen and hydrogen-rich fuels and feedstocks both within the EU and externally when there is a global market and competition, via regulatory tools and/or via a carbon border adjustment mechanism.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Hydrogen, Green Deal, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

103. Eastern Partnership policy beyond 2020

Author:
Michael Emerson, Steven Blockmans, Denis Cenusa, Tamara Kovziridze, and Veronika Movchan
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With the bold title EasternPartnership policy beyond 2020: Reinforcing Resilience – an Eastern Partnershipthat delivers for all, the recent EU Joint Communication offers a broad array of policy orientations but little operational specificity, find the authors of this commentary. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – each with EU Association Agreements, requested a ‘quadrilogue’ with the EU to deal with matters of common concern to them but not the other EaP states. The fact that this request was not granted is a glaring omission from the Communication, but one that could still be corrected at the EaP summit on June 18th. The summit should also agree the policy direction of the EU and the Eastern partner states beyond 2020, and include the many transnational issues worthy of quadrilateral consultations. Among these issues is how the revision of major EU policies, such as those on energy, climate and competition, may affect the associated states.
Topic:
Climate Change, Partnerships, Transnational Actors, Resilience, Energy, and Competition
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia

104. Eco-Innovation: Drivers, Barriers and Effects – A European Perspective

Author:
Sandra Leitner
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This paper determines the key drivers, barriers and effects of eco-innovation, in comparison to innovation in general. It further distinguishes between different types of eco-innovations to better capture their heterogeneous nature. It uses two different data sets: (1) the Community Innovation Survey 2014 (CIS-2014) for a large sample of EU Member States, further split up into three groups in accordance with their eco-innovation performance; (2) the German Mannheim Innovation Panel to address additional drivers the CIS-2014 is unable to capture. Results show that both R&D investments and complementary fixed capital investments are key drivers of eco-innovation, with differences across country groups. Results from the German sample further emphasise that expected future demand, rising costs for energy and other resources and the wish to improve one’s reputation and the need to meet industry standards help spur eco-innovation, while public policy is only of limited importance. In contrast, international market orientation turns out to be a barrier for eco-innovation. By and large, eco‑innovations also have a productivity-enhancing effect which is however lower as compared to innovations in general.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Public Policy, Demand, Energy, and Eco-Innovation
Political Geography:
Europe

105. The Impact of Energy Prices on Product Innovation: Evidence from the UK Refrigerator Market

Author:
François Cohen, Matthieu Glachant, and Marie Söderberg
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:
This paper uses product-level data from the UK refrigerator market to evaluate the impact of electricity prices on product innovation. Our best estimate is that a 10% increase in the electricity price reduces the average energy consumption of commercialized refrigerator models by 2%. A large share of this reduction is explained by a reduction of freezing space. We also show that the exit of energy-inefficient products contributes more to energy reduction than the launch of new energy-efficient models. These findings suggest that innovation – the development of better technologies embodied in new products – does not respond strongly to energy price variations.
Topic:
Innovation, Electricity, Efficiency, and Energy
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

106. New Energy Strategy of Ukraine Until 2020: Security, Energy Efficiency, Competition

Author:
Valeriya Klymenko and Hanna Pashkova
Publication Date:
01-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
The proposed “New Energy Strategy of Ukraine until 2020: Security, Energy Efficiency, Competition” (hereinafter referred to as NES 2020) is a comprehensive document for reforming the energy complex of Ukraine for the period until 2020. At the same time, NES 2020 defines, above all, the goals and algorithms for energy sector development, and thus will also remain relevant for creating further long-term strategies and sectoral programmes. Target figures mentioned in the document only demonstrate the general trajectory of energy resources demand and offer development. These figures are to have a more expanded and detailed presentation in the developed action plan of the CMU for implementation of NES 2020. Usually, a strategy, being a document that is the result of target-based programme planning and forecasting in a certain sphere of activity, covers a longer period of time – 10-20 years. However, serious challenges currently faced by Ukraine as a state, given the fact of external aggression and the burden of unresolved issues accumulated during the period of independence with reforming of the national energy complex, require a document with such status for a shorter period of time. The NES 2020 stipulates that by the end of its implementation term the restructuring of the energy complex of Ukraine will be complete, including its transition to modern market models of operation, and that the main safety and energy efficiency targets will be achieved. After 2020, Ukrainian energy sector will move on to a new level of its development – complete integration with the EU energy sector and innovative rebuilding. Thus, implementation of tasks in the energy sector after 2020, will require rather different approaches than those defined by NES 2020, which means – development of a new strategic document. During the development of NES 2020, proposals were considered regarding the content of the suggested document from such respected international organisations, as the International Energy Agency, Energy Community Secretariat, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, World Bank, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, etc. At the final stage of public consultations regarding NES 2020 draft, an expert discussion was organised, which involved representatives of leading scientific research institutions, companies working in the field, international organisations and NGOs, domestic and foreign experts, media, and based on results of which, the final draft of NES 2020 was created. This document was developed by the Razumkov Centre and other leading nongovernmental, public organisations and scientific research institutions of Ukraine, with support of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Committee on Fuel and Energy Complex, Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Safety. Therefore, the draft of NES 2020 can be rightfully viewed as a result of joint effort of Ukraine’s expert community and reputable international institutions.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Politics, Strategic Competition, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

107. Ukraine-Russia Relations in the Energy Sector: Status, Recent Development Trends, and Prospects

Author:
Yevhen Shulha
Publication Date:
01-2010
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
Separation of Ukraine-Russia bilateral relations in the energy sector is rather conventional, since they objectively fit into the relations of both countries with a third party – first of all, countries of Europe (in particular, the EU) as consumers of energy resources transported across the territory of Ukraine. Therefore, both from the viewpoint of the process chain (producer – transit state – consumer) and from the economy viewpoint (seller – provider of transportation services – buyer) those relations should be viewed in a trilateral format.1 More than that, it may be argued that problems stockpiled in that sector of relations between Ukraine and Russia and in Europe in general may be solved solely in such trilateral format.2 On the other hand, since early 2000s Russia has been insistently pursuing a policy translating relations with partners in the energy sector into a bilateral format where it is usually stronger and uses that advantage to defend and promote its interests and/or the interests of its state monopolies and separate financial-industrial groups. That is why there are grounds to view the Ukraine-Russia relations in the energy sector as bilateral, but with account of presence of a third party there, first of all, the EU, as Ukraine declares its integration in it and is now engaged in formulation of common norms and rules of the European energy markets. This section briefly outlines interim results and problems of the Ukraine-Russia relations in the oil, gas and nuclear sectors – more interrelated and interdependent than other domains of the energy sector.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Oil, Bilateral Relations, Nuclear Energy, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

108. Diversification projects in Ukraine’s energy sector: state, problems and ways of achievement

Author:
Yevhen Shulha
Publication Date:
01-2009
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
National Security and Defence
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
Ukraine, seeking to back future sustainable development of the national economy with energy resources, is interested in their reliable deliveries. Since large volumes of energy resources are imported from one country (or through the territory of one country) – Russia, Ukraine logically and reasonably tries to diversify their sources and in that way minimise risks for its energy security, including political ones. The plans to diversify sources of energy supply, first of all, to reduce energy dependence on the Russian Federation, for years have been declared in official documents of different levels (e.g., the Energy Strategy of Ukraine through 2030). Meanwhile, those questions caused most acute discussions in the Ukrainian political community and in society, which hindered implementation of diversification projects. The current stage of such projects’ development bears traits endangering their implementation. First, the global economic crisis that substantially complicated normal functioning of the Ukrainian economy also strongly affected operation of the national energy sector: in the conditions of foreign credits shortage and reduction of budget allocations on specific energy projects and the energy sector as a whole, investments in the energy sector go down, hindering its development. So, the global economic crisis adjusts plans that even before were not zealously implemented. Second, another “gas war” (January 2009) again complicated the uneasy relations of Ukraine with its strategic partner in the energy sector – Russia. And any economically unsound decisions may not only destabilise supply of energy resources but lead to their cut. Third, aggravation of home political confrontation on the eve of the presidential elections, unfortunately, extends to diversification projects in the energy sector. This greatly undermines the effectiveness of Ukraine’s international cooperation with foreign governments and transnational companies, since diversification projects are international, their implementation requires huge investments and import of advanced technologies. An economic choice of diversification projects should make that area of the energy sector reform the core of Ukraine’s energy strategy, concentrate funds on priority directions of development, cease excessive politicisation of that issue in society, making those projects nation-wide. At the same time, it is clear that irrespective of the diversification projects implementation time, Russia will remain the main partner for Ukraine in the energy sector in the long run. The pause in the “race” of international diversification projects caused by the global economic crisis enables Ukraine and its partners in implementation of said projects to defer for some time, without particular losses, passage of final decisions for all-round analysis of the goals they face and search of the most effective and acceptable for all actors ways of their attainment.
Topic:
Oil, Natural Resources, Gas, Diversification, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine