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31. The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Crafting A Disinformation Framework

Author:
James Pamment
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
EU officials must coordinate better to mount an effective collective response to disinformation campaigns and influence operations throughout Europe. For the European Union (EU) to mount an effective defense against the various threats it faces in the information space, the various institutions that compose it must work better in concert. To do so, the EU and its many affiliated bodies should adopt commonly held terms for discussing the challenges they face, clearly delineate institutional responsibilities based on each body’s comparative strengths, and formulate countermeasures that more fully leverage those advantages.
Topic:
European Union, Institutions, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Europe

32. The EU’s Role in the Fight Against Disinformation: Developing Policy Interventions for the 2020s

Author:
James Pamment
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The EU needs a disinformation strategy that is adaptable and built to last. The European Union (EU) needs a well-conceived and forward-looking policy for countering threats in the information space, especially those posed by disinformation, influence operations, and foreign interference. Because of the amorphous and ever-changing nature of the threat, EU officials and their counterparts in EU member states would do well to craft an approach that draws on a variety of effective tools, including strategies for altering adversaries’ behavior, nonregulatory principles and norms to foster a well-functioning digital public sphere, and regulatory interventions when necessary to ensure that digital platforms uphold suitable norms, principles, and best practices.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Disinformation, Non-Traditional Threats, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

33. The EU’s Role in Fighting Disinformation: Taking Back the Initiative

Author:
James Pamment
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Amid the coronavirus pandemic, Europe and the West are grappling with a host of thorny dilemmas posed by disinformation and foreign influence operations. Amid the coronavirus pandemic, Europe and the West are grappling with a host of thorny dilemmas posed by disinformation and foreign influence operations. While these problems predate the viral outbreak, the public health crisis has certainly exacerbated them. Brussels has taken some steps to meet this set of challenges, some of which are already paying dividends. But there is more that Europe can do to make its response more effective. Specifically, the EU should formulate shared terminology for combating disinformation, assertively deter adversaries who are spreading disinformation and conducting influence operations, craft sensible nonregulatory interventions to protect online users, and establish an independent, transparent auditing regimen for certain online platform functions.
Topic:
European Union, COVID-19, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Europe

34. Disinformation from China and Russia during the COVID-19 Pandemic

Author:
Agnieszka Legucka and Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has become another opportunity for China and Russia to conduct disinformation campaigns. Activities include overt and covert propaganda directed at the EU, NATO and the United States. Both countries are seeking to strengthen their international position, primarily in relations with the EU and the United States. The disinformation activities of Russia and China also result from the desire to disrupt European cooperation, which is a challenge for Poland.
Topic:
NATO, European Union, COVID-19, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Poland, and United States of America

35. Information Warfare Between Russia and Ukraine: A Cause of War for the West?

Author:
Kazimierz Pierzchala
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Experts on information competition between Russia and Western countries are convinced that president Vladimir Putin plans a war against the West as a long-term opera- tion. It is directed on two fronts: internal and the more effective external one. Both can be developed in every country of the World; the opponent may be a compatriot but the ally may be a foreigner. Fortunately, in the West the effectiveness of these operations is lower. Confrontation with the West the Kremlin has many advantages: parental and controlled informational space, technical implements, huge experience based on expert knowledge, likewise a longstanding practice in conducting informational operations. Those actions are strongly concentrated and there are widely used digital platforms and also, they popularise the contents in harmony with Russian Federation politics. Their aim is not only forming in- ternal and external public opinion properly and in line with the Kremlin’s interests, because as the annexation of Crimea has demonstrated that their aim is construction of a new reality of the world. Paradoxically, in the Russian Federation’s policy, media freedom and political pluralism are considered as a weakness of the West. Many communities which have different benefits are sensitive to the Kremlin’ s propaganda.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Information Age, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

36. US foreign policy tools in the era of disinformation: Deficiencies prevent effective response to malign information operations

Author:
Deborah A. McCarthy
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Russia, China, Iran and ISIS use information operations to undermine the national security objectives of the United States and its allies. However, the US’s international response has been weak. Internal constraints have limited more effective counter-measures. In particular, the lack of a coordinated White House-level strategy, dispersed authorities and little cooperation with private social media companies can be identified as causal factors. Additional steps by the Trump Administration to counter foreign disinformation will aim to protect the 2020 presidential elections rather than to push back on efforts to undermine US leadership abroad.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, ISIS, Social Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, Europe, Iran, Middle East, Asia, and North America

37. Avoiding the Band-Aid Effect in Institutional Responses to Disinformation and Hybrid Threats

Author:
Nina Jankowicz
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Since 2014, a variety of initiatives have been created in response to the rise of Russian interference in democracies. Some of the organizations, while created as answers to a real and increasingly exigent danger, began their work without a clear mandate or political will behind them. As a result, their work has not always been fully effective, falling subject to “Band-Aid Effect” in which the creation of new bodies to address the complex problem of foreign interference in democracies is viewed—whether by the convening institution, the media, or the public—in itself as a panacea. Through a study of six key unilateral and multilateral efforts in Europe to counter disinformation and hybrid threats, this paper identifies best practices and pitfalls in establishing such bodies. It assesses the extent to which they are integrated into meaningful policy- and decision-making processes, the extent to which they coordinate across government and with each other, and the extent to which they are meeting public-facing program objectives. The six efforts profiled in this paper are diverse in form and approaches, and they have achieved success in building awareness about the problem among the public and policymakers. They have also faced a variety of obstacles. Attempts to set up similar efforts can extrapolate from their experience the following best practices so as to avoid “The Band-Aid Effect” in building up new institutions.
Topic:
Democracy, Disinformation, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

38. Kremlin Propaganda and Disinformation in Georgia: Tools, Channels, Narratives

Author:
Małgorzata Zawadzka
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The aim of this paper is to present the Kremlin’s propaganda and disinforma- tion mechanism based on a case study of Georgia. The importance of information security has been present in Russian strategic documents since the very beginning of the Russian Federa- tion, however the role of information as a weapon, not as a goal, was developed and publicly voiced much later. Although geopolitical goals in Georgia have remained the same, the switch to non-military means changed the targets, objectives and tools used to achieve them. This paper, following the research and media monitoring conducted between September 2016 and September 2017, analyses Kremlin channels, tools and narratives in the Georgian information sphere and evaluates its effectiveness.
Topic:
Media, Propaganda, Disinformation, and State Media
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Caucasus, and Georgia

39. Online Information Laundering: The Role of Social Media

Author:
Kirill Meleshevich and Bret Schafer
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia’s ability to successfully conduct hybrid warfare is predicated on the creation of a fog of ambiguity between the Kremlin’s actions and the Kremlin itself. By conducting operations through an ad hoc network of proxies, carve-outs, and cutouts — whose connection to the Kremlin is difficult to definitively establish — the Russian government is able to maintain plausible deniability and thus lower the diplomatic and military costs of its actions. It is a strategy with deep roots: maskirovka — a Soviet-era military doctrine that translates as “mask” or “masquerade” — established operational deceit as a core tenet of both conventional and irregular warfare. While modern maskirovka is most commonly associated with the use of “little green men” to occupy Crimea, it is a tactic that is also deeply ingrained in the Kremlin’s ongoing disinformation campaign against the United States and Europe. This presents an obvious challenge: How can the West respond to an adversary who denies even being present on the battlefield? One answer may lie in understanding the operational resemblance between the spread of disinformation and the laundering of illicit funds. Just as ill-gotten money needs to be moved from an illegitimate source into an established financial institution, disinformation is most powerful when a façade of legitimacy is created through “information laundering.” Anti-money laundering practitioners describe the need for financial criminals to place, layer, and integrate illicit funds, meaning that money obtained through criminal means needs to find an entry point into the financial system, then move between banks or financial products to hide the identity of the owner, and finally be woven into an asset from which seemingly legitimate funds can be drawn. Russian disinformation follows a similar pattern; only here, the currency is information and the reward is influence. This piece will examine these similarities and explore the policy measures that could be taken in light of these findings.
Topic:
Internet, Social Media, Disinformation, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

40. Countering Russian Information Operations in the Age of Social Media

Author:
Keir Giles
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Council on Foreign Relations
Abstract:
As investigations into attempts to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election continue, more aspects of Russia’s approach to information warfare are coming to light. A steady stream of new disclosures is revealing a complex blend of hacking, public disclosures of private emails, and use of bots, trolls, and targeted advertising on social media designed to interfere in political processes and heighten societal tensions. Moscow’s hostile actions are driven by the belief that Russia is already in a state of conflict with the West, led by the United States, and that the internet is a domain for waging this conflict. From the earliest stages of the internet’s development, Russia has held a starkly different view from the West of its benefits and its potential. Russia’s national security establishment immediately saw connectivity as a threat and a potential weapon—and eventually as one that could help achieve regime change and deprive a country of its sovereignty—rather than as an enabler of economic development. The organization of Russia’s information-warfare capabilities, which include cyber operators, media outlets, and false flag entities, is shrouded in secrecy. In the West, generally only the intelligence community has a clear picture of how Russian capabilities are directed. Barring the sudden appearance of a Russian counterpart to Edward Snowden, the only view into Russia’s information toolbox is provided by cybersecurity companies and criminal prosecutions. The picture is further muddied because the Russian government keeps many of its cyberwarfare actors at arm’s length by employing contractors and former criminals through middlemen, giving Moscow a degree of deniability if caught. Nevertheless, both Western governments and private industry can take steps to mitigate Russian influence operations. Western governments should swiftly and decisively denounce Russian information activities as soon as they are identified, and their counterintelligence agencies should identify quantitative means to measure the effectiveness of Russia’s methods. Social media companies should more aggressively police their platforms for malicious state-sponsored content, and they should work with news organizations to promote verified and fact-checked content on their platforms.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Political stability, Disinformation, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and North America