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791. The Role of the EU in Peace-Building in the Mediterranean

Author:
Fred Tanner
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The disappearance of the overwhelming threat of Cold War confrontation has left the Europeans more sensitive to challenges, risks and threats from their southern periphery. The wars in the Persian Gulf and in the Balkans, the bloody civil war in Algeria, the recurrence of deadly violence between Israelis and Palestinians, the spread of religious extremism and the increasing migratory pressures from the South have obliged Europe and NATO to pay greater attention to their near abroad in the South. Given the region's root causes of conflict such as poverty, economic cleavages and uncontrolled population growth, the North's balancing strategy of the Cold War days was replaced by policies of engagements, politico-economic partnerships and dialogue initiatives. The EU, recalling its Euro-Arab special relations of the 1970s, lobbied to get its share in the post-Gulf War peace process, that brought together for the first time Arab states with Israel and Western "sponsors" in the multilateral setting of Madrid. Short-cut by the Arab-Israeli bilateral tracks under US patronage after Oslo, the EU changed gears in 1995 and founded in Barcelona a Euro-Med partnership with all Mediterranean states, including those of North Africa (with the exception of Libya), the Near East and the Palestinian Authority. This Partnership includes a political, economic and social dimension. The founders of the Partnership hoped that it would turn into the Mediterranean equivalent of NAFTA on the one hand and provide a support structure for the Middle East process on the other. The "Political and Security Chapter" of the Euro-Med Partnership was not only reminiscent of the Helsinki Process of the Cold War period, it also created a political platform of North-South co-operation in the Mediterranean that kept the Americans out and the Israelis in. The exclusion of the US from Barcelona (even as observer) was certainly one of the reasons why NATO enhanced its own security co-operation with some Southern Mediterranean states. Today, the Barcelona process finds itself in more or less direct competition with NATO with regards to soft security projection towards the South. This paper examines future scenarios of Euro-Med relations as well as of Atlantic relations over Mediterranean issues - under the assumption that Europe would become an international security actor. It will suggest that - in the long term - a successful Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) would strengthen the EU security and crisis management capabilities in the Mediterranean region. The CESDP would entitle the EU to enter the domain of security-cooperation in the fields of peacekeeping, defence training and education and the use of military assets for humanitarian operations. But two obstacles will have to be overcome: First, the relations to NATO dialogue programmes in the region will have to be sorted out and second, the Southern partner states need to be assured that the EU headline force projection capabilities will not make Europe more interventionist in the region.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

792. Russian Perception of European Security

Author:
Yuri Nazarkin
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Historically, Russia was always threatened from three sides: from the West it was threatened and invaded at different periods of its history by Poland, Sweden, France and Germany; from the South, its traditional rival and enemy was the Ottoman empire; from the East, China and Japan. Throughout its history Russia had to be on the alert along all its borders. Though at present there are no direct military threats from any of the three directions, the current Russian security planning takes into account all the three directions. However, the problem of European security is the highest priority in Russian foreign and security policy. There are a number of reasons for this.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Europe, and Asia

793. Recoiling from Russia

Author:
André Liebich
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
The above manifesto, entitled "A Horror is Haunting Europe," was published on the front page of one of Europe's premier newspapers in the thick of this year's presidential campaign in Russia. It was signed by some two hundred intellectuals and public figures, the French being the most strongly represented but including signatories from fifteen other European countries and a number of Americans. Among the recognisable names are those of media and cultural personalities such as Costas Gavras, Jean-Luc Godard, John Le Carré, Bernardo Bertolucci, Jane Birkin, Vanessa Redgrave and Barbara Hendricks. Many of the others are widely known academics, such as Umberto Eco and Noam Chomsky, as well as a minor galaxy of familiar Parisian personalities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, America, and Europe

794. Russia's Eurasian Security Policy

Author:
Roland Dannreuther
Publication Date:
08-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
Ever since Catherine the Great pronounced that 'Russia is a European country', Russia has been an inescapable part of the European balance of power. Russia's European credentials are indisputable. The larger majority of the Russian population, and most of the major economic centres, are located in the European part of Russia. Russians are Christian, if of the eastern orthodox faith, and Russian poets, novelists, artists and composers have made an extraordinary contribution to European culture. Russians perceive themselves as part of European civilisation, not least when confronted with other ancient civilisations, such as Iran, India and China. Moreover, other European actors have recognised Russia as an intrinsic part of the European order, even if at times this recognition has been mixed with strong doses of suspicion and fear. But, Russia is not only in Europe. Geographically, the larger part of Russia's territory, however inhospitable and poorly populated, lies in Asia. Culturally, Russia has periodically been hermetically sealed from mainstream developments in Europe. During the medieval period, Russia lay under Tartar rule; during the Soviet period, the borders were, in Stalin's words, under 'lock and key' and Western influences were rigorously excluded. The consequent backwardness of Russia, which has been a consequence of these intermittent linkages with the more developed West, has diluted Russia's European credentials. Russia's Asian destiny was also a deliberate act of state policy with Russia's borders being continually expanded into Asian territory. Russia had a similar experience to the United States with a continental expansion to the Pacific, which was driven, as in America, by entrepreneurial colonists who subsequently decimated the local populations. Towards the South, Russia followed European imperial practice and engaged in a mission civilisatrice to bring European-style rule over purportedly backward peoples. The Russian imperial experience differed from the British and French examples in one critical element: no division was made between the metropolitan centre and empire and thus no clearly demarcated border existed between the Russian state and its imperial appendages. The Tsarist military historian, Mikhail Vernukov, argued that this absence of a separation involved a different imperial practice when compared with 'Englishmen in India who do their utmost to avoid mingling with the natives . . . Our strength lies in the fact that . . . we have assimilated subject races, mingling affably with them'. For these and other reasons, Russia's European credentials have been questioned, not only by other Europeans but by Russians themselves. For west Europeans, the vast geographical expanse, the relative backwardness and large population, the heady mix of despotism and mysticism, has made Russia an alien entity, the 'other' from which the enlightened rational West can be contrasted. The well-known French proverb - 'Grattez le Russe, et vous trouverez le Tartare' - illustrates this European scepticism well. Russians themselves have often been drawn to emphasising the exceptionalism of Russia, not as in America because Russia represents the 'new' rather than the 'old' world, but because Russia's unique position between Europe and Asia makes it belong to neither and the fusion of East and West preserves the benefits of Western civilisation but without its decadent rationalism and materialism. The notion of Moscow as the Third Rome has been a continual source of attraction to the more mystical members of Russian society. This complex set of historical experiences, mutual perceptions and attitudes have contributed to the frequent shifts in Russia's policy towards the rest of Europe. At times, Russia has fully embraced the West so as to 'catch up' and modernise; at other times, Moscow has retreated into its citadels so as to preserve its uniqueness and the universality of its message. In terms of security policy, Russian leaders have been consistent in promoting as fluid and weak a set of alliance structures in Europe as possible. Alexander I, at the Congress of Vienna, was arguably the first to conceive of the notion of collective security and this legacy has been followed in more recent times with Gorbachev's promotion of a 'common European home' and the Soviet and post-Soviet predilection for defining the CSCE/OSCE as the overarching framework for the European security order. These collective security proposals, which have consistently baffled and irritated other Europeans powers, have had a strong realpolitik dimension, alongside the requisite dose of mysticism. Such schemes are designed to exclude a concentration of power in Europe, which might be directed against Russia, and to prevent the type of direct aggression which Russia suffered through the Napoleonic and Nazi invasions. Such flexible arrangements are also the most favourable mechanism for promoting Russian influence in Europe and to securing Russia's consistent desire, even obsession, to be treated as an equal with the other European great powers. It is clear that the West's rejection of the proposed collective security arrangement for the post-Cold War European order, and the corresponding expansion of NATO, has been viewed in Moscow as a humiliating geopolitical defeat. The sense of betrayal, of promises made by the West and then reneged upon, has been profoundly felt. With the perception of a Europe excluding and marginalising Russia, there has been a turn towards the East in the search for alternative avenues for projecting Russia's power and influence. Again, there are historical parallels with the nineteenth century when the concerted European effort to block Russian expansion into the Balkans, with its ultimate pan-Orthodox goal of capturing Constantinople, led to Russian energies being re-directed towards expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In a similar vein, in March 1997, the Russian Presidential Spokesman, Sergei Yastrzhembskii, stated at the Russian-USA Helsinki summit: 'If NATO expansion is going to continue . . . Russia will be confronted with a need to reconsider its foreign-policy priorities. Our relations with China, India . . . and Iran are developing well'. The objective of this paper is to assess the nature, complexities and the relative success and failure of Russia's purported 'turn' to the East. Three areas will be briefly surveyed: recent Russian policy towards the Middle East, to Central Asia and to China.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and NATO
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Europe

795. EU Security Towards the Mediterranean - The Role of Southern Europe

Author:
Roberto Aliboni
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Istituto Affari Internazionali
Abstract:
In the last two years, the EU has begun to strengthen its security and defence integration with a view to acquiring new capabilities in crisis management at both the European and Atlantic level. To that end, it is in the process of reinvigorating its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and developing the newly-born Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP).
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and North Africa

796. EU Finalises Military Tasks: Much Left To Do

Author:
Catriona Gourlay, Sibylle Bauer, Sharon Riggle, Thomas Sköld, and Jensen Frederik
Publication Date:
12-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Security Information Service
Abstract:
At the Nice Summit on 8 December, EU member states agreed that it is time for the EU to 'play...its role fully on the international stage' by cementing a new military dimension to its structures. The 60-page 'Presidency Report' (doc#14056), attached at the end of the Presidency Conclusions, exhaustively describes the modalities of the new common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and describes how the new structures will enable the EU to carry out the so-called Petersberg Tasks. [This article includes excerpts from a longer paper, available soon at www.cesd.org].
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

797. Military secrecy in the EU Council provokes legal challenges

Author:
Catriona Gourlay, Sibylle Bauer, and Jensen Frederik
Publication Date:
10-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Security Information Service
Abstract:
On 26 July 2000 EU Ambassadors voted to introduce new rules denying the public access to classified, secret or top-secret documents containing information on military or non-military crisis management. The decision was adopted in August without further consultation of other EU institutions or any parliamentary or public debate. The Council has since been accused by some member states and the European Parliament (EP) of bringing secrecy into the EU by bypassing normal decision-making procedures and excluding an entire category of documents from the public — challenges which will ultimately be resolved in the European Court of Justice.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

798. The EU Rapid Reaction Facility: A quick fix or fudge?

Author:
Catriona Gourlay, Sibylle Bauer, Christopher Bollinghaus, Hiroko Kosaka, and Russell Pickard
Publication Date:
07-2000
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Security Information Service
Abstract:
One of the shortcomings of European Union (EU) crisis management is the inability, as a direct result of the rigidities imposed by the pillar structure, to mobilise resources to support properly co-ordinated, coherent and timely nonmilitary interventions. The report on Non-Military Crisis Management of the EU, prepared for the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, called for the establishment of a Rapid Reaction Facility (RRF) to overcome these structural obstacles. The Commission has since developed a proposal for a Council Regulation to establish such a Facility but outstanding questions about its legal basis and its sources of funding may delay its adoption.
Topic:
Security and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe

799. "One China" and Relations Across the Taiwan Strait

Author:
James J. Przystup, Ronald N. Montaperto, and Gerald W. Faber
Publication Date:
09-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
Relations across the Taiwan Strait have reached an apparent impasse. Both China and Taiwan have, in a sense, painted themselves into corners. Yet, aware of the considerable costs that will inevitably be incurred by new and higher levels of tension or conflict, both President Jiang Zemin of China and Chen Shui-bian, the newly elected President of Taiwan, share a vital interest in finding a face-saving way out of their respective dilemmas without compromising their longer term objectives. In the process, each is being influenced and constrained by a number of factors related to politics, economics, and broad strategic interests. Overall, these factors will provide incentives to seek a reduction of tensions, at least in the short term. At the same time, years of mutual mistrust and the stark and growing differences between their respective political and social cultures will continue to affect the prospects for a mutually acceptable resolution of the issues separating China and Taiwan.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Government
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Taiwan

800. Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe

Author:
Jeffrey Simon
Publication Date:
06-2000
Content Type:
Working Paper
Abstract:
As Central and East European (CEE) armed forces are reduced and restructured over the next decade, human and financial resources will be stretched and stressed, in some cases beyond capacity. CEE governments and societies will likely experience civil-military tension. Due to resource shortages, CEE Membership Action Plan (MAP) partners, who aspire to NATO membership, will be tempted to exaggerate defense planning and enlarge forces to accommodate their political objective of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, and Government
Political Geography:
Europe