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271. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

272. Greenland obviously has its own defense policy

Author:
Sara Olsvig and Urik Pram Gad
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Historically, Danish decisions have not always put Greenlandic interests first. Although defense policy is formally under Danish jurisdiction, decisions only have the legitimacy necessary if Greenland participates in the decision-making processes. Because in Greenland, military activities and installations interfere intimately with civic society. Increased rivalry between the great powers in the Arctic produces challenging issues for the constitutional community consisting of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark. Denmark and Greenland must make the role they each want to play in the international community clear and rethink the responsibilities and coordination procedures of the community. Otherwise, Greenland and Denmark risk contributing to increased tension in the Arctic – and Greenland risks missing out on potential gains from the growing attention from the great powers.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Defense Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Denmark, and Greenland

273. Syria and Libya’s Contributions to the Evolution of the Turkish “Forward Defence” Doctrine

Author:
Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In the last decade, there have been considerable changes in Turkey’s regional policies, especially in terms of the increasing use of hard power. Such changes are largely in response to regional rivalry, refugee flow from Syria and the revival of Kurdish issues, as well as strained relations with Turkey’s traditional allies, such as the United States and the European Union, among other factors. In the first decade of its rule, the AKP government moved away from Turkey’s traditional approach to foreign policy by adopting soft power in its relations with the states in the Middle East region. However, following the Arab Spring, and especially 2016, the AKP government embraced a “forward defence” doctrine, reminiscent of the security policies of the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey reoriented its defence posture around a security-oriented approach due to its geostrategic location. This defence posture was based on the belief that Turkey has an unstable but strategically important location and hence needs powerful armed forces to employ hard power to protect its interests and security. Naturally, security threat perceptions reached their peak in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey came to the brink of using military force against several states such as Greece, Cyprus and Syria. Modernisation of armed forces and development of national defence industry were among the policies adopted during this era. The forward defence doctrine is key to Turkey’s policy in Syria and Libya. Given the dominant role played by Turkey in Syria, AKP has intensified its military activities beyond the Syrian border with the aim of preventing the expansion of the YPG and advance of the Syrian army into Idlib, which would trigger a large influx of refugees. Maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean intertwined with geopolitical tensions and rivalry between Turkey and its regional rivals such as France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. In response to its regional isolation and to block these developments, Turkey signed two Memoranda of Understanding, on maritime delimitation and on security cooperation, with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. The recent shift in Turkey’s security policy is in line with the basic principles of the AKP government’s grand strategy, which seeks to reposition Turkey as a central state in the international and regional system.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, and Syria

274. Global NATO: What Future for the Alliance's Out-of-area Efforts?

Author:
Antoine Got
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
While modest in scope, the efforts briefly discussed above illustrate a desire not to rescind NATO’s role in the promotion of international – as opposed to strictly regional – stability. Notwithstanding this, there is room for improvement. Above all, the non-kinetic nature of these initiatives signals that NATO is still hesitant to reattempt ambitious crisis-management endeavours involving large-scale troop deployments or combat operations abroad. This is coherent with previous policy, of course, considering that responsibility for security provision should remain regionally – if not locally – owned. This hesitancy is likely to endure as a consequence of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. As a result, the threshold for orchestrating military operations abroad will likely remain high. At the same time, NATO should not entirely forgo such endeavours. For while international support for SSR and capability-building are certainly vital to deliver long-term resilience, stability and the rule of law, these activities are not panaceas. Pre-crisis activities, including early preparation and prevention, are crucial in helping to reduce the known risks that can lead to or aggravate a crisis or conflict. But to conceive of prevention activities as alternatives to emergency response and management would be misguided. Crises are an unpredictable and unavoidable part of contemporary international relations, and an over- reliance on prevention activities can obfuscate the wider set of non- Article 5 instruments at NATO’s disposal to defend allied interests and protect foreign populations against violence. NATO can apply this holistic array of tools for the best possible outcome before, during and after conflict. NATO should also recognise that support for out-of-area crisis management does not necessarily require large-scale, high-risk and expensive foreign troop deployments, and that a middle ground exits between this and the political costs of inaction. With the ongoing sense of anti-interventionism in the West and the hybridisation of warfare, NATO can achieve considerable gains with low-cost, low-footprint forms of military intervention that rely on remote airpower, special operations, and the force-multiplying potential of local partners, which NATO can arm, train, and support logistically to fight against common enemies. Remote warfare and “over-the-horizon” counter-terrorism combined with local capacity-building can provide a middle ground between the costs of inaction and those of over-reaction, while constructively re-establishing the primacy of NATO as an international security provider.24 Most importantly, the alliance should not restrict the scope of its out- of-area activities because of fear that more engagement could lead to the organisation being unwillingly dragged into an Afghanistan-type conflict. NATO has drawn several lessons from this experience and is unlikely to repeat the mistakes of the past. To remain a prominent crisis- management actor, it must continue its efforts to engage proactively with the world.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

275. The EU’s Defense Ambitions: Understanding the Emergence of a European Defense Technological and Industrial Complex

Author:
Raluca Csernatoni
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Is the European Union (EU) about to rise as a defense technological actor on the world stage? According to conventional wisdom, attempts at greater European integration in security and defense were not likely to amount to much, given that such policy fields have long been considered the reserved domain of the EU member states or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This working paper goes beyond this traditional state-centered approach by looking at past and recent institutional efforts to consolidate European security and cooperation on defense industry and technology. Such efforts have continued despite the disruptions caused by the coronavirus pandemic, owing to the bloc’s willingness to become a stronger security and defense actor on the global stage. The timing of this shift was facilitated by a set of circumstances that triggered a new European defense momentum. Contributing factors include the geopolitical pressures of Brexit, an unreliable transatlantic partner in the United States, concerns within European defense industries regarding dwindling national defense budgets and fierce global technological competition in high technology areas, and the European Commission’s growing supranational role in security and defense. This impetus was also facilitated by the privileged relationship between various EU institutions, European defense industrial actors, transnational interest and lobby groups, and organized expert bodies. In this respect, the defense industry and high-level expert and interest groups have occupied a central position in shaping EU policy processes, funding priorities, and security and defense research programs. Such a rapprochement between EU institutional structures and the European defense industry has allowed for the emergence of a so-called European defense technological and industrial complex (EDTIC). This European defense industrial ecosystem encompasses a wider variety of transnational actors beyond the political, military, and industrial groups typically present in national military-industrial complexes. It presents a dense, multilevel network of EU institutions and agencies; security and industrial stakeholders; national public authorities; and interest and expert groups, all of which both compete and cooperate to shape and set policy agendas. However, this rapprochement is also characterized by the absence of strong democratic control mechanisms and little political and public accountability concerning the surge in and direction of the European defense technological and industrial integration process. These transformations have the potential to make the union a more capable and strategically autonomous global defense technological actor. At the same time, they challenge existing EU democratic governance structures and processes. The EU’s security and defense policies remain tough areas for parliamentary scrutiny and democratic oversight. The EU’s policymaking institutional machinery has been finely tuned to mediate power, keep things as technical and bureaucratic as possible, and to create package deals for certain defense industrial interests and member states’ political agendas. Yet, for real European integration in the field of security and defense, more political and democratic trust is needed across the continent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

276. Globalization and the Changing Concept of NATO

Author:
Umair Pervez Khan and Kashaf Sohail
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy International Relations
Institution:
Postgraduate Program in International Strategic Studies, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul
Abstract:
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been the most important and successful multilateral military cum political organization, pursuing the agenda of exporting democracy globally and ensuring the mutual defense of its allies. Historically, NATO was formed against the threat of communism emanating from USSR (Russia). The alliance did not use military option till the end of the cold war between the west and USSR, but post-cold war, it transformed and operated in Balkans, South Asia, Horn of Africa, and Middle East. The 9/11 incident further enhanced the military role of the organization and gave it ample reason to act internationally for ensuring the global security. America, being the leader of the alliance used it for fighting the so-called global war on terrorism and its adventures in Middle East. Nevertheless, in the last two decades the organization went through various changes and is now continuously in the state of transformation. The wave of populism which had influenced the very concept of globalization has posed serious challenges for the alliance. The Trump rhetoric of “America first”, BREXIT, challenges of migration, changing demography of Europe, assertion of Russia in global politics, confrontation between the NATO allies like Turkey and France, and rise of China are few factors which may affect the future of the so-called intergovernmental military alliance. This article concurrently discusses the new challenges for the NATO and sheds light on the possible options to the strategy of Biden administration to reverse the policies of its predecessor which have influenced the cooperation of different allies of NATO. In the end researcher has tried to put forth few recommendations which may help the policy makers to cope with the challenges NATO is facing. The study is qualitative and analytical in nature whereas primary as well as secondary sources are used for data collection.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Globalization, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

277. Collective Collapse or Resilience? European Defense Priorities in the Pandemic Era

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
To what extent has the COVID-19 pandemic affected defense priorities across Europe? When the pandemic reached its cities, Europe was already under severe internal and external stress. By throwing the continent and the world into an unprecedented economic crisis while security challenges abound, the pandemic has exposed Europe to a risk of irreversible loss of capacity for collective action, hampering its influence and control over its regional areas of interest. One year after, this report provides a comparative assessment of the impact of the pandemic on the foreign and defense policies and spending levels of ten different European countries. It not only aims at assessing the immediate impact of the pandemic on the defense posture of each country but more importantly at mapping in which areas the pandemic did or might prove disruptive for European defense priorities, whether directly or indirectly. Although uncertainty remains about the long-term effects of the current crisis, the different case studies highlight that, contrary to the most pessimistic scenarios, the pandemic has so far had a relatively modest impact on defense and security policies. Monitored European countries have so far shown resilience in their individual and collective responses to the crisis. If anything, changes brought by the pandemic are less striking than the continuity observed in most cases when it comes to foreign and defense policies, from stated levels of ambition to defense spending plans. It is, however, unclear how enduring this resilience can prove in the longer-term in the face of disruptive developments such as new variants of the virus, sweeping domestic political developments in Europe, radical changes in the US commitment to European security, or an intensified strategic competition in Europe’s neighborhood and beyond it.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

278. Complementarity or Competition? Franco-British Cooperation and the European Horizon of French Defense Policy

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
What does future hold for the Franco-British defense partnership after Brexit? France and the United Kingdom have, for long, enjoyed a close defense relationship, thanks in part to their analogous strategic cultures. The 2010 Lancaster House treaties built on this proximity to expand cooperation in the fields of nuclear weapons, force projection, interoperability and industrial integration. In spite of genuine progress in the first years following the treaties, the Franco-British strategic partnership has had to face two pitfalls: on the one hand, Brexit and its political consequences for the United Kingdom, and, on the other hand, President Macron’s attempt to revive European defense and Franco-German cooperation. The tenth anniversary of Lancaster House should offer the opportunity to rethink the convergence between bilateral cooperation and the resolutely European horizon of French defense policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, and Germany

279. A transatlantic agenda for homeland security and resilience beyond COVID-19

Author:
Anna Wieslander
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has disclosed the importance of resilient power – a society’s capability to absorb unexpected major shocks, handle and adapt to these, and then, most importantly, bounce back. As the pandemic still rages, endurance has become a major challenge for individuals, institutions, companies, and societies. It emphasizes another dimension of resilience: it is not only about how fast society is able to bounce back and recover at a certain moment, but also how it can withstand repeated shocks over time. The pandemic also brought the notion of solidarity to the forefront and exposed the connection between strong resilience and solidarity in open societies. Solidarity was repeatedly tested within and between nations, as well as between different parts of society. Fragmentation and competition flourished amid weak resilience and discouraged tendencies toward cooperation, despite potential gains. To successfully handle modern challenges to homeland security and resilience, such as climate change and pandemics, there is no way around efficient cooperation. For resilience to be strong, it must be developed not only among states but also in partnership with the private sector, as resilience must be ensured for individuals, communities, private businesses, and public institutions, and at all levels of authority. Furthermore, the pandemic has heightened other threats to modern societies, including disinformation, cyber operations, attacks on election systems, and social media manipulation. Ultimately, these threats are targeted to undermine democracy itself. They differ in character, magnitude, and scope, but are often non-military. This new report, “A Transatlantic Agenda for Homeland Security and Resilience Beyond COVID-19”, highlights some of these modern challenges, which could be possible focus areas for transatlantic cooperation, as well as ideas for building and enhancing capabilities. This report is the result of a half-day online workshop held on January 28, 2021. This report aims to help shape a transatlantic agenda on homeland security and resilience that encompasses everything from policy and capabilities to future science and technology in a time when the transatlantic relationship is ideally positioned to be revitalized and deepened.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Climate Change, Terrorism, Infrastructure, European Union, Crisis Management, Resilience, COVID-19, Disinformation, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

280. Responses to 9-11: The United States, Europe, and the Middle East

Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Video
Institution:
MIT Center for International Studies
Abstract:
Reflections on the One-Year Anniversary of 9/11
Topic:
Defense Policy, Terrorism, Military Strategy, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America