Search

Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Political Geography Europe

111. The internal nature of the Alliance’s cohesion

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO Summits take stock of recent political and security developments, assess how they affect the Alliance’s posture and adaptation agenda, and decide on possible new directions. From the outside, a key feature of any Summit is also what it reveals about NATO’s political cohesion and relevance. The political cohesion of an international organization results from a general consensus among its key member states about its mandate, objectives and methods of operation. Relevance is about the extent to which an institution delivers on its mandate and therefore serves its purpose; relevance may be real or perceived, but is in any case essential to political cohesion. Cohesion and relevance can be undermined in at least three different ways. First, an institution’s cohesion and relevance are jeopardized whenever that institution proves unable to effectively deliver on the mandate it was established for. Second, cohesion and relevance are at stake when member states no longer agree on the objectives or methods of the institution, and as a consequence on the level of resources to allocate to it. Third, institutions’ cohesion and relevance may suffer from a lack of public buy-in for what they are and do. At all levels, the assessment results from a mix of rational analysis and a dose of manipulated subjectivity.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, North America, and Western Europe

112. The Berlin Pulse 2018 (full issue)

Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
Dear Readers, Welcome to the second edition of THE BERLIN PULSE! At times of turmoil, when the rules-based international order is put into question and traditional alliances become weaker, the majority of Germans still do not favour a more active stance in foreign policy: 55 percent of Germans prefer restraint rather than Germany engaging more strongly in international crises. Apparently, the demands by leading politicians and think tanks for Germany to take on greater international responsibility have not persuaded Germans to change their mind. THE BERLIN PULSE guides policy-makers and experts along the fine line between domestic constraints and international expectations. Political leaders such as the Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas and the President of Estonia Kersti Kaljulaid express their hopes and expectations for German foreign policy in 2019. Their perspectives meet the attitudes of the German public – sometimes they overlap, sometimes they clash. This year’s issue brings together data, analysis and different perspectives on the most pressing challenges for German foreign policy today and in the years to come – including some trends and outliers that may surprise you. With its new focus topic “The Value of Europe”, Körber Foundation is contributing to the debate on the past, present, and future of the European project and is paying special attention to the question of how a new split along the former “Iron Curtain” can be avoided. We are witnessing a growing internal division in the European Union: 77 percent of Germans believe the cohesion between EU member states has recently weakened. A striking 46 percent of Germans believe the EU’s Eastern enlargement in 2004 was not the right decision. At a time when the transatlantic relationship is going through turbulent times, three out of four Germans describe US-German relations as “somewhat bad” or “very bad” and favour a more independent foreign policy from the US. However, this alienation is not mirrored in the US: even if they consider Germany not a very important partner, 70 percent of Americans believe the relationship between the US and Germany is somewhat good or very good. We thank our transatlantic partners from the Pew Research Center for fielding joint questions on the transatlantic relationship in the US together with us. The results of the representative survey commissioned by Körber Foundation in September 2018 should enrich the conversation about German foreign policy during and beyond the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum, which we are proud to host together with the German Federal Foreign Office. “Talk to each other rather than about each other” – the motto of our founder Kurt A. Körber continues to guide Körber Foundation’s activities today. I hope you enjoy reading. Thomas Paulsen
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Military Affairs, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

113. Fostering a Defense-Industrial Base for Europe: The Impact of Brexit

Author:
Torben Schütz and Christian Mölling
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The European defence technological industrial base (DTIB) represents a core element of European defence and deterrence – it is a strategic asset. Strong defence industries multiply the deterrent effect of the armed forces. However, national industries in most countries cannot offer the full range of supplies needed by national armed forces. Despite the fragmentary nature of its industries, Europe collectively has most of the range of defence-industrial capabilities, enabling, at least notionally, security of supply for EU and NATO partners. The UK’s share of defence-related turnover among European companies is almost 40%. The UK also makes defence-industrial contributions to many multi- national projects. While Brexit does not remove the UK’s defence-industrial base from the wider European environment, it will complicate its involvement. The EU’s growing role in defence-industrial matters, through regulation and financial resources, is shaping the wider European DTIB. At the same time, the Union’s ambition as a security actor creates an obligation to ensure that European partners outside the EU can contribute as effectively as possible to European defence and deterrence. In order to do this: The UK, EU institutions and EU governments should work toward as close a common understanding as possible that safeguarding a sustainable, innovative and competitive European defence industry is in the strategic interests of all political partners in Europe. The UK and its EU partners should establish politically and structurally significant flagship armament projects. Such projects would support a shared objective, namely to consolidate the still fragmented European DTIB, and in the process make it more competitive. A European Defence Industrial Review should be launched to help identify key industrial branches and companies that are of structural relevance to the European DTIB, and therefore to European defence and deterrence. For future regulations related to the defence industry, the EU should take a ‘systemic view’, i.e. also take into account how a regulation affects European partners and contributors outside the EU.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and London

114. Opportunities for Defense-Industrial Collaboration after Brexit

Author:
Douglas Barrie
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The United Kingdom should seek to continue to support defence-technology cooperation with the European Union and partner states across all military domains. Avoiding, or at least minimising, the second-order effects of Brexit on wider defence cooperation with European partners will be easier if the UK is directly involved in the EU’s defence-technology initiatives. Specific opportunities present themselves across the military domains: Pursue cooperation in the air domain with regard to future combat- aircraft technology. While collaboration at the platform level is unlikely in the near term, exploring common R&D in key systems, such as radar, propulsion, avionics, sensors and weapons, is achievable. In the land domain, explore partnership with France and Germany on participating in the development of a next-generation main battle tank. Collaboration on applicable technologies at the component and sub- system levels should also be encouraged. This could include armour and armament R&D, and laser weapons. In the maritime domain, support cooperation in the air-defence arena, including the use of laser weapons for ship self-defence, and the use of naval vessels for ballistic-missile defence. In the space domain, examine potential cooperation on next-generation communication satellite requirements, and wider collaboration on geospatial intelligence.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, Brexit, Maritime, and Space
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, London, Germany, and Brussels

115. UK Participation in the EDA and the new EU defense package in the context of Brexit

Author:
Lucie béraud-Sudreau
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
To continue United Kingdom participation in European Union defence cooperation:  The UK, the European Commission and EU member states should strive to avoid near-term decisions that would shut out the UK from future participation in EU defence policies.  Pursue agreement on the nature of a ‘third-state’ position as applied to the UK, ensuring the goals of Brussels and London are met.  Identify ways for London to show its commitment to supporting the EU’s defence ambitions, signalling clearly a change from previous opposition.  Brussels and London need to agree the key preconditions that will under- pin any deal over the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).  The UK should aim to ensure a single point of entry through the European Defence Agency for defence cooperation with the EU, in the absence of a Commission directorate-general for security and defence. Reach agreement on an overarching financial contribution covering access to the EDA, the EDF and PESCO, while London also commits to contributing funding to specific projects it wishes to take part in.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, London, and Brussels

116. China’s pursuit of advanced dual-use technologies

Author:
Helena Legarda and Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In its quest to become a global ‘science and tech superpower’ and to build a strong military that can fight and win wars, China has embarked on a major process to achieve civil–military integration (CMI) and develop advanced dual-use technologies. Using various methods both to promote indigenous innovation and to access foreign technology and know-how, China’s goal is to leapfrog the United States and Europe and achieve dominance in these technologies, which will have major civilian and military implications in the future. The EU does not have strong, coordinated strategies to promote the development of indigenous dual-use technologies or to protect Europe’s indigenous innovation. As a result of this patchwork regime, China is either catching up to, or surpassing, European capabilities regarding most of these technologies through a ‘whole-of-government’ regulatory framework and financial investment, as well as by accessing European innovation and technology through a variety of means. For Europe, the incentive to keep up with China’s progress in these technologies, and to protect its own innovation in this field, is one with military, but also commercial and economic, imperatives. At a time when China is increasing its commitment to this process of developing advanced, dual-use technologies, it is high time for Europe to think strategically and take action to leverage its own competitive advantages.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United States, China, Europe, and Asia

117. European defence: what impact for NATO?

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The story of the EU’s efforts to acquire some kind of autonomy in the security domain has al- ways been told with reference to NATO. Back in Saint-Malo in 1998, French President Chirac and UK Prime Minister Blair framed the idea of a Eu- ropean Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), part- ly in response to NATO’s primacy in handling the Yugoslav conflicts. The objective at the time was for the Union to be given the “capacity for auton- omous action”,1 with “autonomous” referring to freedom from NATO and the United States. In this endeavour, the perception in NATO has always oscillated between indifference vis-à-vis a process that did not seem credible, and concern that an increased EU role in defence could under- mine NATO’s centrality and the transatlantic link. Over the last few years, the EU has embarked upon a process of beefing up its defence profile, raising anxieties in NATO circles. Most recently, references to the need for Europe to acquire stra- tegic autonomy or to move towards a European army, have added to the concerns. But are there reasons for NATO to worry about what the EU and its member states are doing? Is the EU aspira- tion in defence threatening the transatlantic link? Does the EU have the power to unsettle NATO?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and European Union
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, North Atlantic, France, and North America

118. Projecting Stability: Elixir or Snake Oil?

Author:
Ian Hope
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s internal security is intrinsically linked to external stability, and its quest for optimal security for its member states’ citizens therefore requires a presence at its periphery. This is what Projecting Stability is about. With this concept and activity, NATO takes stock of the indivisibility of security that is no longer composed of two distinct spaces. This is probably not new. After all, NATO’s crisis management and cooperative security efforts over the last 25 years have had a lot to do with handling the consequences of the internal-external security nexus. To a large extent therefore, NATO has been in the business of Projecting Stability since the end of the Cold War, just as Molière’s Mr Jourdain was speaking in prose without knowing it. Nonetheless, the Projecting Stability agenda was formalized at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, and is now being run in parallel with Deterrence and Defence as NATO’s main effort. This poses at least three sets of questions. First, beyond the above-mentioned internal-external security nexus, what is it that Projecting Stability is really about and aims to achieve? How does stability relate to security, and how can one “project” it? Does it contain a value-promotion agenda, or is the concept a retrenchment from the ambitious democratization goals of the past? Second, to what extent can Projecting Stability be prioritized, given the prominence of the Russian threat and therefore the necessity to “deter and defend”? Can NATO do both? And how much consensus is there among NATO member states on the need for Projecting Stability? Third, where is Projecting Stability supposed to happen, with what local buy-in and level of intrusiveness, and through what sets of instruments? Does the activity carry potential unintended consequences by which, in lieu of Projecting Stability, the Alliance’s presence would bring instability? Are there any past activities that attest to this risk, and about which lessons must be learned? Overall, is Projecting Stability an elixir, i.e. the appropriate response to a well- posed question, or is it rather some sort of snake oil, i.e. a false solution or a concept that is doomed to stumble against innumerable political and operational obstacles? These issues are what Ian Hope’s edited volume Projecting Stability – Elixir or XII Snake Oil? aims to explore. It does so through a collection of chapters, authored by a group of scholars and NATO officials, which offer an open analysis of the potential and challenges of Projecting Stability. This NDC Research Paper is the first issue of a new series created by the NATO Defense College. NDC Research Papers deal with NATO-related issues from a multiplicity of angles that can be historical, political, operational or prospective; they can have an obvious research – or, even more so, policy – angle; they are analytical in nature, and must be relevant to the understanding of NATO’s challenges and policy making. May this NDC Research Paper be the first of a long list of analytically sound, thought-provoking, and academically rigorous publications by the NDC Research Division.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

119. Supporting Political Stability by Strengthening Local Government: Decentralization in Ukraine

Author:
Lily Salloum Lindegaard and Neil Anthony Webster
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The government that followed the 2014 Maidan revolution in Ukraine has pushed a decentralisation agenda. After decades of Soviet style top-down governance, the status and role of local governments – hromadas – has been pushed to the fore. If implemented successfully, it could increase local development and political engagement, ultimately contributing to increased political stability in Ukraine and Europe. Yet the significance of decentralization reforms is often lost in the noise surrounding Crimea, the secessionist conflict in the east, and the political power struggles in Kiev. For legal reasons, the current decentralisation process is ‘voluntary’, with local communities having to agree to the changes. This has introduced unintended challenges, but also a bottom-up political dynamic to the process. At the same time, uncertainty and opposition to decentralisation reforms remain, perhaps understandable given a rapidly shifting political and legal landscape, the diverse political and personal interests involved, and the fear of political fragmentation that could benefit Russia. Denmark is one of several EU countries supporting the reform process. This DIIS Report focuses in on the processes unfolding in local communities and political arenas, affecting peoples’ lives, their hopes, and their relationship to the state from local to national level.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Development, Fragile States, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Denmark

120. Stepping up Synergies of the Danish Comprehensive Approach: The Peace and Stabilization Fund

Author:
Jessica Larsen and Christine Nissen
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies
Abstract:
The Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund is a prime example of how to combine civilian and military instruments to address conflicts in fragile states. However, there is still room for stepping up synergies of the military-civilian balance in Denmark’s comprehensive conflict management. Recommendations ■ Increase the frequency of formal feedback between the field and the strategic level of the PSF to avoid loss of knowledge. ■ Synergies between civilian and military instruments should take place through complimentary-but-separate interventions. ■ Take PSF instruments into account when planning Denmark’s broader engagement in conflicts to ensure a more comprehensive security policy effort.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Democratization, Development, Non State Actors, Fragile States, Violence, Peace, Police, and Justice
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark