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1. Untangling the Transatlantic Knot: Germany, France, and the United States

Author:
Gesine Weber and Jacob Ross
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
France’s and Germany’s reactions to Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine reveal their significantly different relationships with the United States. Their interpretations regarding the European security architecture are almost diametrically opposed. While Berlin concluded that European security must be constructed transatlantically, Paris saw confirmation of its interpretation that Europeans must be able to address security challenges independently of Washington. Donald Trump’s reelection constitutes a challenge for the two countries because both need to fundamentally rethink their respective relationships with the United States and Europe-US relations more generally. The scope of the US withdrawal from European security remains to be seen, but it will be similarly challenging for Paris and Berlin.
Topic:
NATO, Geopolitics, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, France, Germany, North America, and United States of America

2. China: From Systemic Rival to Systemic Threat

Author:
Andrew Small and Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
For the United States and Europe, dealing with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now a challenge of such wide-ranging nature that it will cut across almost the entire transatlantic agenda of the incoming Trump administration. From addressing Beijing’s role as the “decisive enabler” for Russia’s war of aggression to rethinking the way that US-EU trade and technology ties need to be organized, China policy no longer occupies a separate silo but conditions every element of the security and economic landscape. Under the Biden administration, Europe and the United States undertook an unprecedented effort not only to coordinate their approaches to the PRC itself, but also to advance on other fronts where the China challenge was the main motivating factor, such as EU-US efforts to negotiate agreements on steel, aluminum, and critical minerals. The two sides’ analysis has grown much closer, and in some areas, this translated into tangible results—whether conveying common red lines to Beijing on the delivery of lethal aid to Moscow and the use of force against Taiwan or tightening controls on advanced semiconductor equipment exports. Overall, however, progress still fell short of the high stakes. Some EU member states treated the Biden administration’s partner-friendly approach as a holiday from difficult strategic choices on China rather than an optimal window in which to make them. EU-level efforts to build more effective approaches on economic security, trade defense, and cyber security were often slow-rolled or undercut by major capitals. There were also areas in which the Biden administration allowed domestic political considerations to undermine efforts to build a common strategic economic approach among US partners—particularly the use of national security tools against US allies, whether the blocking of Nippon’s takeover of US Steel or the initial retention (and suspension rather than lifting) of Section 232 tariffs against the EU. While the two sides are certainly more closely aligned and better coordinated, moving in the right direction is no longer enough. If Europe and the United States are unable to achieve results in several critical areas in the next few years, it will come at a growing cost to their security and economic interests, as well as to the broader transatlantic relationship. Success, on the other hand, would put a new set of foundations under it. Three issues are likely to loom over the agenda for the incoming Trump administration: the threat of the “Second China Shock” to US and European industry; Beijing’s deepening coordination with Russia and other authoritarian states; and intensifying PRC pressure on Taiwan.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

3. The Joint Expeditionary Force in Northern Europe: Towards a more integrated security architecture?

Author:
Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The Joint Expeditionary Force – a UK-led defence cooperation format of ten European countries – has gained political momentum since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Since the late 2010s, the JEF has shifted its focus towards hybrid issues, increasingly in Northern Europe. While its role in the hybrid sphere is potentially fruitful, the JEF should be wary of taking on too wide a range of tasks. The JEF’s role as a “sub-threshold” actor could complement NATO’s collective defence efforts below Article 5. Hence, the JEF should be more coherently integrated into the Northern European security architecture. Obstacles to JEF-NATO integration have now been removed, as all JEF nations are also members of the alliance. A more explicit division of labour between the JEF and NATO would help Northern European countries to handle the current security environment comprehensively. Such a security architecture, covering all dimensions of the conflict spectrum, would be particularly beneficial for Finland, which shares a long common border with Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Security, Defense Cooperation, and Joint Expeditionary Force
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Finland, and Baltic States

4. Defense Cooperation Agreements in northern Europe: Strengthening the United States’ global position, transatlantic relations, and regional deterrence and defense

Author:
Charly Salonius-Pasternak
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The US has concluded or updated bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) with all Nordic states. These DCAs enhance regional deterrence, enable operational and tactical cooperation from day one in the event of war, and provide broader regional and global benefits.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Deterrence, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Nordic Nations, and United States of America

5. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

6. Future-proofing EU security and defence cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Dylan Macchiarini Crosson, Stefania Benaglia, and Linus Vermeulen
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has led policymakers to re-prioritise the European security architecture and the EU’s neighbourhood, including a positive reassessment of NATO’s role as a reliable security provider. As the transatlantic relationship and the Indo-Pacific are inherently intertwined, this once again highlights the imperative of the EU making the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority. This presents the EU with an opportunity to project its values, interests and power, though hampered at present by political infighting and the mushrooming of conflicts in and around Europe. Still, the time has come for the EU to assess how it should adjust its approach to Indo-Pacific security. How can the EU effectively strike a balance in security and defence cooperation with partners to uphold key principles of international law and order without endorsing the idea that ‘might makes right’ in the Indo-Pacific?
Topic:
Security, NATO, International Cooperation, International Law, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe and Indo-Pacific

7. UK-Finland defence cooperation in the 2020s: A successful partnership requires continuous effort

Author:
Antti Pihlajamaa
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
The United Kingdom and Finland have conducted rather close defence cooperation in various forums for several years. Finnish NATO membership and the ongoing war in Ukraine also provide many incentives for deeper cooperation. Nevertheless, continued cooperation should not be taken for granted.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Finland

8. NATO and Societal Resilience: All Hands on Deck in an Age of War

Author:
Edward Hunter Christie and Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Prior to 2022, NATO and the European Union were already moving toward more comprehensive approaches to resilience. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine heightens the need for such work, with a sharper focus on scenarios of armed attack. In view of decisions taken at NATO’s recent Madrid summit and the evolution of EU legislation, all alliance members will benefit from close liaison work and reciprocal briefings between relevant NATO and European Commission officials as well as through the NATO Resilience Committee and the European Critical Entities Resilience Group. Three new functions should be added to the NATO baseline requirements: payment systems, psychological defense, and continuity of data and infrastructure software. The forthcoming membership of Finland and Sweden will provide NATO with particularly valuable national best practices, notably in terms of coherence, robustness, quality of cooperation across government and society, and engagement with the population.
Topic:
NATO, Resilience, Society, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

9. NATO and Russia after the Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Liana Fix and Steven Keil
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the culmination of its increasingly militarized foreign policy centered around a small cast of decision-makers primarily in the military and security services close to the president. Its approach is aggressive, risk-tolerant, and deeply revisionist, spanning domains and leaning heavily on brutal tactics to achieve victory. NATO is now forced to return to its original mission—to defend Europe against an aggressive and highly militarized Russian foreign policy. NATO-Russia relations relatively normalized in the immediate post-Cold War context, resulting in waning European investments in defense capabilities. NATO only began reversing this trajectory in 2014, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, and must now significantly speed up its efforts. Key priorities include transitioning from forward deterrence to forward defense, augmenting NATO’s capabilities in Europe and creating a greater role for Europe, strengthening regional partnerships, reestablishing risk-reduction mechanisms to manage a potential escalation between NATO and Russia, and considering long-term stabilization scenarios.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. A Modern Marshall Plan for Ukraine

Author:
Heather Conley
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Can one of the most successful US foreign policy initiatives in the 20th century—the Marshall Plan—be replicated in the 21st century—a modern Marshall Plan for Ukraine? The unequivocal answer to this question is “yes,” but it is essential to draw upon historical and inspirational lessons from the Marshall Plan to ensure the reconstruction and long-term economic recovery of Ukraine succeeds.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Recovery, Post-Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, Defense Cooperation, and Marshall Plan
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine