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Begin New Search Topic Coercion Political Geography Europe

1. Instruments of economic security

Author:
Conor McCaffrey and Niclas Poitiers
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Geopolitical and economic developments, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and trade disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic, have raised concerns about the European Union’s exposure to hostile countries. The challenge of improving European economic security (which we narrowly treat here as exposure to foreign trade or production shocks) has grown in importance, with various relevant policy measures introduced at EU level. Focusing in particular on the threat posed by economic coercion, this paper begins by assessing the nature of this threat, before outlining two lessons that can be drawn from two recent instances of this coercion in action: China’s actions against Lithuania and Australia respectively. First, while much of the policy debate has focused on imports, the threat to EU exporters should not be ignored. Second, while coercion may not cause any macroeconomically significant harm, this may mask severe impacts on the targeted industries, which should be considered in any policy responses. The EU has significantly added to its policy tools in this area, though some of the instruments introduced under the umbrella of economic security go beyond the definition we consider. An effective response should be built around: building a deeper understanding of the risks facing the EU; improving diversification of both exports and imports; using targeted industrial policy in the limited sectors where the risks warrant intervention; and managing and limiting the fallout of any shocks using ex-post instruments.
Topic:
European Union, Economic Policy, Economic Security, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Tough trade: The hidden costs of economic coercion

Author:
Jonathan Hackenbroich, Filip Medunic, and Pawel Zerka
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Chinese economic coercion against Europe is on a deeply worrying trajectory. Having moved from threats in 2020 to punishment of European companies in 2021, China is now interfering with the EU market as part of a diplomatic dispute with Lithuania. If Beijing pressures European companies to stop trading with Lithuania, businesses could face pressure to stop dealing with Taiwan, Slovenia, or other places when tensions rise. The threat of Russian energy coercion is real, too. The EU needs to develop an Anti-Coercion Instrument that acts as a powerful economic deterrent, but this alone will not sufficiently protect Europe against economic coercion. The EU also requires a comprehensive resilience architecture, including a strong agenda for improving economic strength and trade links, a Resilience Office, and a reformed Blocking Statute that can counter secondary sanctions with Chinese characteristics. A Resilience Office could provide strategic coordination of the EU’s response and evaluate the costs of economic coercion, while the Blocking Statute could allow for targeted countermeasures against companies based in third countries.
Topic:
Security, Economics, European Union, Trade, and Coercion
Political Geography:
Europe

3. Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The United States and its allies in the West have been unable to use the threat of military force to coerce Russia into stopping its war in Ukraine. In part, this is because the West is more concerned about escalation than Russia. Further analysis using Alexander L. George’s framework of coercive diplomacy, however, suggests the problem is more complex and deep-rooted: Few of the historical conditions or factors that favor coercive diplomacy are present in Ukraine. This analysis reveals three things the United States and its allies should do to revive the prospects of ending the war in Ukraine through coercive diplomacy. First, they should take smaller, more achievable steps which are less likely to inspire Russia to double-down. Second, they should exploit Russia’s deteriorating position through a mixture of carrots and sticks. Finally, the West should seek to minimize the intensity of its wider confrontation with Russia and focus on strategic stability as an end in itself. This will be challenging because of the gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. But it may help end the war through coercive diplomacy, and avoid a serious miscalculation with Russia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Coercion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Realising the EU Hybrid Toolbox: opportunities and pitfalls

Author:
Kenneth Lasoen
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In recent years European and other nations have been increasingly targeted by different manipulation or coercion tactics that remain under the threshold of violence, and are commonly referred to as hybrid threats.For the debate on defining hybrid threats, see Dick Zandee, Sico van der Meer and Adája Stoetman, Countering hybrid threats: steps for improving EU-NATO cooperation, Clingendael Report, October 2021, p. 2-5; Georgios Giannopoulos, Hanna Smith and Marianthi Theocharidou, The landscape of Hybrid Threats: A conceptual model, Publications Office of the European Union, February 2021. For instance, in 2016 the elections in the United States were manipulated by a foreign state actor through targeted propaganda and the leaking of hacked material that compromised one of the presidential candidates. In the same year the British referendum on remaining in the European Union was also targeted by sophisticated propaganda efforts.United States Senate, Putin’s Asymmetric Assault on Democracy in Russia and Europe: Implications for U.S. National Security, Committee on Foreign Relations, 115th Congress, 2018, p. 116-118. The need to counter these threats and deal with them comprehensively has therefore been acknowledged in the EU Strategic Compass. It provides for the development of a toolbox to put at the disposal of member states a wide range of measures to respond to hybrid campaigns, should they choose to invoke the assistance of the EU. This EU Hybrid Toolbox (EUHT) intends to gather all civilian and military instruments that can be employed to counter hybrid campaigns. Operationalisation was intended by the end of 2022 but this no longer seems attainable. However, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the importance of having a coordinated reaction capability to counter hybrid campaigns and is likely to provide the momentum to bring the development of the EUHT to fruition. This policy brief examines the most recent progress on operationalising the EUHT. First, the rationale for the EUHT is explained. Next, the state of play in the operationalization process is analysed. The subsequent section focusses on the difficulties stemming from differences of opinion between the member states, followed by an assessment of the issues surrounding decision-making. After suggestions for increasing the effectiveness of the EUHT are given, the policy brief ends with conclusions and a listing of opportunities and pitfalls.The methodology used for this policy brief consists of a combination of literature scanning and a limited number of interviews. The author would like to thank the interviewees for their valuable input that was given under the application of the Chatham House Rule.
Topic:
European Union, Hybrid Threats, Coercion, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Designing a Geo-Economic Policy for Europe

Author:
Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Geo-economic policies have become an increasingly important feature of international politics – and not just since the war in Ukraine. The EU has proposed an economic anti-coercion tool to deter third-party coercion. This policy brief analyses the risks and benefits as well as the challenges related to the EU’s proposed deterrence policy based on a review of the academic literature on coercion and the effectiveness of economic sanctions.
Topic:
Sanctions, Coercion, Geoeconomics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Germany

6. The myths and realities of China's economic coercion

Author:
Luke Patey
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Despite the significance of the world’s second largest economy increasingly using its trade and connectivity as a weapon to advance its foreignand security-policy aims, separating the myths from the realities of Chinese coercion is crucial in shaping appropriate policy responses and deterring China and others from such assertive behaviour.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Denmark

7. Lithuania, China and EU lawfare to counter economic coercion

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Without any formal notification, China recently declined customs clearances for shipments from Lithuanian firms in the pharmaceutical, electronics, and food sectors, and warned multinationals of secondary sanctions if they did not sever their ties with Lithuania. These covert actions were taken in response to Lithuania’s invitation to Taiwan, which the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claims as its own territory, to open a ‘representative office’ in Vilnius. No other country has ever found itself at the receiving end of such intense and politically motivated Chinese economic pressure. These actions on the part of the PRC are politically explosive because it raises serious questions about the international conduct of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). If it can simply wipe a country off its trade book, a state belonging to the EU’s customs territory no less, then what does it mean to be a member of the WTO, or a signatory to any other number of international agreements? And, given the lamentable state the WTO is in: could the European Commission’s newly proposed anti-coercion instrument bring any solace to Lithuania and the EU?
Topic:
Law, European Union, Economy, Trade, and Coercion
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Lithuania