Search

Begin New Search Topic COVID-19 Political Geography Europe

211. The Spread of the Novel Coronavirus Infection in Russia and the Government's Countermeasures

Author:
Hironori Fushita
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) infection in Russia has been slower than in other European countries, but the number of infected people has surged since late March, especially in Moscow, and has exploded since April. As of April 14, the number of people infected with the novel coronavirus in Russia was 201,122 (up 2,774 from the previous day), with 1,694 recovering and 170 dead1. The following article will provide an overview of the spread of the novel coronavirus infection in Russia and the government's countermeasures, as well as the impact of this infection on the future of Russian politics
Topic:
Government, Politics, Governance, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

212. Financing the European Union: New Context, New Responses

Author:
Clemens Fuest and Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Roughly two thirds of the European Union’s budget is financed out of member states’ national tax revenues. These resources, based on gross national incomes, are transparent, fair and in line with the principle of subsidiarity but they lead to political debates that emphasise the cost of EU spending rather than the benefits, and add to the perception of the EU budget in terms of net balances, rather than value added. The financing of the EU budget must be reassessed in the light of the July 2020 decision to launch the Next Generation EU programme. Budget resources could include a plastics charge, a carbon border adjustment mechanism, a digital tax, revenues from emissions trading and a financial transactions tax. We evaluate these options against four criteria: whether the origin of the revenue can be assigned to a particular member state; whether the revenue can be raised in isolation or requires pan-European tax coordination; whether the new resource can help reduce tax distortions in the EU; and whether the resource is related to EU policies. Revenues from emissions allowances fit these criteria best. Carbon emissions do not primarily cause damage only where they occur. Taking the EU cap on emissions as a given, additional emissions in a particular member state should be regarded as a negative externality on other member states. Emission reduction objectives are set at EU level. Whoever auctions off an allowance, wherever the corresponding emission occurs in the EU, and wherever the resulting good or service is consumed, the impact on common policy outcomes is the same. In this regard, proceeds from the sale of emissions trading system allowances are not that different from customs duties. Compared to the ETS, the other candidates for EU own resources are less convincing. Carbon border adjustments are intended to limit international competitive distortions rather than to generate revenue. Digital taxes and minimum corporate taxes are best left to the process underway in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. On a financial transactions tax there is no agreement within the EU. Total ETS revenues up to 2050 would approach €800 billion in a realistic scenario and possibly even €1.5 trillion assuming the scope of the ETS and the share of auctioned permits are increased. ETS revenues therefore would be largely sufficient to repay the Next Generation EU debt. However they would generate distributional effects, and so part of the revenues should finance grandfathered rights that would accrue to the member states. The EU can tackle the distributional issues involved in the reform of own resources.
Topic:
Budget, European Union, Finance, Tax Systems, COVID-19, Decarbonization, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Europe

213. Why has COVID-19 hit different European Union economies so differently?

Author:
André Sapir
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
All European Union countries are undergoing severe output losses as a consequence of the COVID-19 crisis, but some have been hurt more than others. In response to the crisis, EU leaders have agreed on a Recovery and Resilience Fund (RFF), which will help all EU countries, but those hit hardest will benefit most. This Policy Contribution explores why some countries have been hit economically more than others by COVID-19. Using statistical techniques described in the technical appendices, several potential explanations were examined: the severity of lockdown measures, the structure of national economies, the fiscal capacity of governments to counter the collapse in economic activity, and the quality of governance in different countries. We found that the strictness of lockdown measures, the share of tourism in the economy and the quality of governance all play a significant role in explaining differences in economic losses in different EU countries. However, public indebtedness has not played a role, suggesting that that the European Central Bank’s pandemic emergency purchase programme has been effective. We used our results to explore why some southern EU countries have been more affected by the COVID-19 crisis than some northern countries. Depending on the pairs of countries or country groupings that we compared, we found that differences in GDP losses were between 30 and 50 percent down to lockdown strictness, between 35 and 45 percent to the quality of governance and between 15 and 25 percent down to tourism. This could have implications for the allocation of the RRF between recovery and resilience expenditures. Supporting the recovery through a combination of demand and supply initiatives is important to ensure that countries rebound as quickly as possible from the COVID-19 crisis, without leaving too much permanent damage to their economies. But in many countries, especially some of the southern countries hit hardest by the COVID-19 crisis, resilience is a major sticking point. Too often, in some of these countries, the poor quality of governance has had a negative impact on their resilience, as the relatively large size of their GDP shocks has demonstrated. It is crucial therefore that RRF programmes devote sufficient attention (and resources) to improving the quality of governance in these countries.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Macroeconomics, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

214. European Union recovery funds: strings attached, but not tied up in knots

Author:
Jean Pisani-Ferry
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union’s plan for aiding recovery in member states hit by the coronavirus crisis has been rightly hailed as a major breakthrough for the bloc. But there is much less clarity on the plan’s economic aims, its priorities and the content of the contractual arrangements it should entail between the EU and member countries. The plan’s main plank, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is widely seen as a short-term Keynesian stimulus. The EU debt is expected to be repaid through contributions from member states, but this has not stopped the resulting transfers as being seen, including by national governments, as money from heaven. There has also been controversy over the conditions attached to grants and loans. Such fuzziness over objectives and overloaded procedures can derail the RRF. The EU needs to make an effort to provide clarity from the outset and put the plan on the right track. It should acknowledge and emphasise that the main goal of the RRF is not to contribute to immediate relief or a Keynesian stimulus, but to foster structural transformation, especially in less-advanced and harder-hit member states. The EU should hold back from trying to impose through overall policy conditionality its reform agenda on the member states. Instead, there should be a narrow-conditionality approach in which reforms that strongly complement intended investments should be identified and bundled with that investment. A grant aimed at encouraging decarbonisation in the transport sector, for example, would, be made conditional on the elimination of transport fuel subsidies. Therefore, in national recovery and resilience plans, each bundle of investments and reforms should be focused on the limited set of policy measures that need to be implemented to maximise the impact of EU-financed investment. Meanwhile, complementarity across objectives should be addressed through a dialogue with each member state on the sectoral allocation of EU funding and the overall architecture of their recovery and resilience plans. And the EU should emphasise when relevant the cross-border dimension of investment plans and find ways to encourage member states to cooperate on the design and the implementation of their plans.
Topic:
Governance, Budget, European Union, Macroeconomics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

215. Russian grand Strategy and the COVID Crisis

Author:
Andrew Monaghan
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The sense of Great Power competition and challenge to the liberal international order that characterised the Euro-Atlantic commu- nity’s debate through the 2010s has become more acute in 2020. Government responses to the spread of COVID-19 have provided much ammunition for those who describe a weakening of the liberal order and the threat posed by authoritarian regimes. And the sense of competition between the powers was il- lustrated by the race to create a vaccine, redolent for many of the Cold War era, with Russia’s “Sputnik V” vaccine controversially being registered first in August. Yet the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic sug- gests a new stage, with a greater emphasis on emer- gent bipolarity in international affairs. If Russia was the original point of focus in the “New Cold War/ Cold War 2.0” of the 2010s, attention has now shift- ed to the rise of China. In September 2020, then-US Secretary of Defence Mark Esper stated that China is now the main concentration for his department, and that departmental attention would be on the Indo-Pa- cific region. Other senior officials consider Russia to be “bursts of bad weather”, while China represents “climate change”, the greater long-term adversary. China’s economic recovery – already returning in late 2020 to growth while the US, UK and Eurozone re- main in red and facing surging debt – is seen to be the foundation for a more assertive international activity.2 What, then, of Russia? What has the crisis meant for Russian strategy? Does the pandemic change Mos- cow’s view of international affairs and its international posture?
Topic:
Grand Strategy, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

216. The Projected Economic Impact of COVID-19 on the U.K. Creative Industries

Author:
Alice Gambarin and Osman Ismail
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Oxford Economics
Abstract:
This report explores the short-term effects of Covid-19 on the financial sustainability of the creative industries in the UK. Along with the tourism sector, Creative Industries (CIs) are among the most affected by the current Covid-19 crisis. Creative workers, one of the more vulnerable sectors of the workforce, are already seeing devastating impacts on their income, not only in turnover terms, but also in their charitable contributions and sponsorship. Leaving behind the more fragile part of the sector could cause irreparable socio-economic damage. We find that the Creative Industries are projecting a combined £77bn turnover loss over the course of 2020 compared to 2019 (-31%). This is expected to translate into a GVA shortfall of £29bn in 2020 compared to 2019 (-26%), over half of which is in London. In 2020, CIs are projecting a 122,000 drop in employment among employees (despite the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme - JRS) and a further 287,000 job losses among self employed workers, compared to 2019 levels. In total, 409,000 CIs jobs are considered at risk, 27% of which are in London and 20% are in the South East.
Topic:
Economics, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Socioeconomics
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

217. Green COVID-19 Recovery and Transatlantic Leadership: What Are the Prospects?

Author:
Paul Hofhuis
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Green COVID-19 Recovery and Transatlantic Leadership: What Are the Prospects? OCTOBER 20, 2020 By: Paul Hofhuis, Senior Research Associate, Clingendael Institute As the US presidential election rapidly approaches, an important question is the prospects for (renewed) transatlantic cooperation, especially in the areas of green recovery to the economic effects of the COVID-19 outbreak, tackling climate change, and addressing these issues through multilateral approaches. In analyzing ambitions and initiatives on both sides of the Atlantic in three connected policy arenas, this brief argues that while a Democratic victory provides greater opportunity for collaboration, underlying structures for cooperation among societal stakeholders in the United States need to be reinvigorated to diminish polarization in society, which could continue to block the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Leadership, Economy, Green Technology, Transatlantic Relations, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

218. The new China consensus: How Europe is growing wary of Beijing

Author:
Janka Oertel
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Since the onset of the covid-19 crisis, there has been a new convergence of EU member states’ assessment of the challenges China poses to Europe. The Sino-European economic relationship lacks reciprocity, and there are mounting concerns within the EU about China’s assertive approach abroad, as well as its breaches of international legal commitments and massive violations of human rights in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Overall, there is growing scepticism about the future trajectory of the relationship, which provides an opportunity for a more robust and coherent EU policy on China. In its remaining months, the German Council presidency could use this momentum to create institutional structures to improve the EU’s capacity to act. In doing so, it will be crucial to ease concerns about Franco-German dominance of the China agenda – especially those of eastern and southern European countries – while enabling all member states to become more engaged in shaping the EU’s future approach to China.
Topic:
International Relations, Human Rights, European Union, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

219. Crisis presidency: How Portuguese leadership can guide the EU into the post-covid era

Author:
Susi Dennison and Livia Franco
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
Portugal’s plans for the EU presidency centre on European priorities for the pre-coronavirus world. These include the completion of the monetary union, the UK-EU relationship after Brexit, the EU’s relationships with Africa and India, climate change, digital transformation, and social inequality. The Portuguese EU presidency should handle these issues in line with European voters’ perceptions of the new reality created by the coronavirus. Many Europeans have lost confidence in the transatlantic relationship, fear for Europe’s place in a world dominated by US-China competition, and want the EU to provide global leadership and shape the international order. Portugal can help the EU develop a foreign policy strategy that takes account of these changes.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Transatlantic Relations, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Portugal, and United States of America

220. Europe’s pandemic politics: How the virus has changed the public’s worldview

Author:
Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
As covid-19 raged, speculation grew that the crisis would restrengthen public support for the state; faith in experts; and both pro- and anti-Europeanism. New research reveals these all to be illusions. Instead, the crisis has revolutionised citizens’ perceptions of global order – scrambling the distinctions between nationalism and globalism. One group – the DIYers – sees a nineteenth-century world of every nation for itself; the New Cold Warriors hear echoes of the twentieth century and look to Trump’s America to defend them from China; the Strategic Sovereigntists foresee a twenty-first-century world of blocs and regions. This last group are the largest and represent a new form of pro-European who believe Europe will need to support its own sovereignty through joint foreign policy, control of external borders, and relocalised production. This moment represents a new opportunity for European cooperation – but the continent’s leaders must make the case carefully to avoid provoking a backlash of reintensfied Euroscepticism. Rather than a ‘Hamilton moment’ of proto-federalisation, we are instead living through a ‘Milward moment’ of strong nation state identities searching for protection in a dangerous world.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Politics, Crisis Management, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe