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1. Baltic and Nordic States Assess the Russian Military Threat

Author:
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The newest intelligence reports by the Baltic and Nordic states jointly warn about the aggressive intentions and reconstitution of Russia’s armed forces. All of the documents assume the successful implementation of plans for larger Russian land and airborne forces till the end of 2026. However, these reports differ in the estimates of when the political moment and Russia’s conventional capabilities may permit it to initiate open conflict with NATO. Despite their informational and analytical contents, these reports may affect the Baltic region states’ capabilities development plans and their decisions about whether to increase defence spending.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

2. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Mobilisation in Wartime

Author:
Andriy Stavytskyy
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
As Russia’s war in Ukraine enters its third year, we launch a new series of briefs on various aspects of the conflict. Many of the authors of these briefs are based in Ukraine. The war shows little sign of ending. Ukraine is fighting for its survival and is determined to drive Russia from its territory, while Russia continues to hope that it can mobilise sufficient resources to outlast the west’s support for Ukraine. Although there have been important developments at the tactical level—for example, in the increased use of drones by both sides, in Ukraine’s successes in diminishing Russia’s naval power and in its ability to strike targets inside Russia—there has been little movement on the front lines for many months. Both sides have been forced to adjust, operationally and strategically, to the prospects of a drawn-out conflict. In the first brief of the series, Andriy Stavytskyy examines Ukraine’s need to mobilise, prepare and train half a million men to relieve those who have fought since the start of the full-scale war. This will not only challenge the military but will also have profound economic effects.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Economy, Mobilization, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

3. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Russia’s Attempts to Undermine Mobilisation

Author:
Maryna Vorotyntseva
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia conducts information and psychological operations to undermine and discredit Ukraine’s mobilisation, damage the morale of Ukrainian citizens, and weaken their willingness to defend their state. In support of these efforts, the Russian military and special services distribute both real and fake photographs and video content on social networks. In addition, the Russian special services use current and former male citizens of Ukraine who have voluntarily switched sides to produce malign content. The recent discussions about and promulgation of new laws related to Ukraine’s mobilisation have offered Russia further opportunities to spread disinformation.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Disinformation, Mobilization, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. Making Sense of Multinational Cooperation

Author:
Ina Kraft
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Institution:
Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Multinational cooperation is a prominent characteristic among the armed forces of European states. However, despite its prevalence, a shared understanding of this phenomenon is lacking in the research community. Furthermore, studies often restrict their focus to examining the effects of cooperation, neglecting the essential exploration of its underlying conditions. To overcome these limitations, this article develops a categorisation of multinational cooperation into structures, processes, and activities. It concludes that multinational cooperation in Europe can be categorised into three distinct phases (1990-2004, 2005-2013, 2014-) with significantly varying underlying motives for cooperation, particularly since the ‘wave of multinational cooperation’ in Europe following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in 2014. By introducing a novel framework for comprehending military cooperation and presenting an empirically informed overview of recent shifts in cooperation across Europe, this article aims to invigorate further research in the field.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Multinational Corporations, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Russian Military Reconstitution: 2030 Pathways and Prospects

Author:
Dara Massicot
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the Kremlin’s antagonism toward Ukraine and the West sharpens, it will be critically important for policymakers and warfighters to anticipate, monitor, and respond to Russia’s military reconstitution progress in the years ahead.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

6. Europe’s Conscription Challenge: Lessons From Nordic and Baltic States

Author:
Sophia Besch and Katrine Westgaard
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine reminds European countries about the importance of manpower, many are once again weighing the promise and perils of compulsory military service.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Armed Conflict, Conscription, Regional Security, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

7. British Power in Baltic Weather: The UK’s Role in Nordic-Baltic Security and UK-Estonia Defence Cooperation

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius and Alice Billon-Galland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
For many decades, the United Kingdom has been an important player in the Nordic-Baltic region, and today it aims to increase its contribution to security and stability of the region. The UK has long been an attractive partner for countries in the region that seek to maintain strong relations with the geopolitical heavyweight possessing a similar outlook on the security environment, transatlantic relations, utility of military force, and the threat from Russia. Given London’s interest for global engagement and its limited means, ensuring continuous and reliable British involvement in the region is a priority for Nordic-Baltic states. This report analyses the objectives, priorities, and constraints of the UK’s defence policy in the Nordic-Baltic region at a critical juncture for Euro-Atlantic security, as Russia continues its war of aggression against Ukraine and China grows increasingly assertive in the Indo-Pacific. It provides the political and strategic context of British engagement in the Nordic-Baltic region, with a particular focus on the challenges that British defence strategy and capability plans face as a result of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It then explores whether other key security players, such as Germany or France, could eventually take a stronger lead in the Nordic-Baltic area and how that would impact the UK’s involvement and leadership. It discusses the arrangements aimed at enhancing the UK’s military footprint in Estonia — in the framework of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence — that were developed in the run-up to and after NATO’s June 2022 Madrid summit. This analysis is put into the context of expectations from the Baltic states and plans of the Alliance for stronger forward defence in the region that are subject to discussions in July 2023 Vilnius summit and may generate additional demand for the UK’s regional military presence. The report also explores how minilateral formats, such as the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), fit into the regional security architecture and how London seeks to leverage them to sustain its leadership role. Finally, it highlights some key aspects of the UK-Estonia bilateral defence cooperation and analyses its opportunities, challenges, and prospects.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Estonia, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

8. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept: One Year On

Author:
LSE Ideas
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This Strategic Update summarises a roundtable discussion held at LSE IDEAS in July 2023. Contributors to the discussion were: General Sir James Everard, Stuart Austin, Professor Gordon Barrass, Professor Christopher Coker, Tom McKane, Hugh Sandeman, Susan Scholefield, and Peter Watkins. None of the content of the Strategic Update is attributable to any one individual. One year on from NATO’s Madrid 2022 summit, this Strategic Update address the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept and its implications for the future, especially regarding Russia’s war on Ukraine. The paper addresses the misalignment between preparations for defence and the real state of its armed forces, the UK’s symbolic support for Ukraine versus its capability, the concepts of resilience and deterrence, and finally the future of NATO’s relationship with Russia.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, Deterrence, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

9. Tempting Armageddon: The Likelihood of Russian Nuclear Use is Misconstrued in Western Policy

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
This article tracks and assesses the evolution of Russian nuclear threats in the Ukraine crisis, the related interplay between Moscow and Washington, the factors driving Russian thinking on nuclear use, the nuclear options available to Russia, and why US-NATO leaders and hawkish observers dismiss these options as impracticable. We conclude that the probability of Russian nuclear use, although conditionally modest, is rising as Ukraine’s armed forces push forward toward Crimea and the Russian border while also increasing their retaliatory attacks on recognized Russian territory. On its present trajectory, the crisis will soon run a risk of nuclear conflict greater than that experienced during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Topic:
NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Armed Forces, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. The attack-reconnaissance squadron as a new formula and a new quality of the attack helicopter squadron of the Polish Armed Forces

Author:
Sylwester Lubiejewski
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Security and Defence Quarterly
Institution:
War Studies University
Abstract:
This paper takes a comprehensive look at the current state of army aviation attack helicopter squadrons of the Polish Armed Forces. The aim of the article is to present a concept for the functioning of the attack reconnaissance squadrons of the Polish Armed Forces, which takes into account the identified requirements of the Land Forces of the Polish Armed Forces in relation to army aviation on the battlefield and the current limitations in the functioning of the attack helicopter squadrons of the Polish Armed Forces. To meet this aim, qualitative research included interviewing, observation and the collection and qualitative analysis of texts and documents. The study revealed that it is necessary to organise attack-reconnaissance squadrons with a modular organisational structure including: a headquarters, a command company, three attack-reconnaissance companies, an aviation maintenance company and a supply company, capable of conducting autonomous operations in independent directions (areas). The squadrons should be equipped with new attack-reconnaissance helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles as well as equipment for their technical and logistical support that will be part of their individual subunits. The results of the research are the basis for further, in-depth research on the issue of improving the functioning of attack helicopter squadrons, so that they are fully capable of supporting the land forces of the Polish Armed Forces in large scale combat operations.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Aviation
Political Geography:
Europe and Poland