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2. “Open” Telecom Networks (Open RAN): Towards a Reconfiguration of International Competition in 5G?
- Author:
- Mathilde Velliet
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- In line with the anti-Huawei diplomatic campaign of the Trump and Biden administrations, the United States has promoted an alternative: Open RAN, a concept defined by "open" network architectures. At the intersection of 5G geopolitics and standards, what risks and opportunities does Open RAN present for European technological sovereignty? The Radio Access Network (RAN) is the radio part of a mobile telecommunications system that enables the connection between a mobile device (such as a phone or computer) and the core network. While traditionally a single vendor (such as Huawei, Ericsson, or Nokia) provides a “proprietary” or “closed” solution for this part of the network, Open RAN (Open Radio Access Network) is a concept describing disaggregated architectures that divide the RAN into several bricks connected by open interfaces. The objective is to allow the operator to buy these hardware and software bricks from various suppliers, and to choose freely the most suitable option for each part. In the current context of a concentrated 5G market, dominated by three major manufacturers and even facing the risk of an Ericsson-Nokia duopoly with the exclusion of Huawei from many countries, telecom operators emphasize the flexibility and diversification of suppliers allowed by Open RAN, which would allow both more innovation and cost reduction. In line with its diplomatic campaign against “unreliable” Chinese suppliers, the United States has actively promoted Open RAN as an alternative. However, Open RAN seems far from being a panacea for Europe: in addition to the difficulties that remain in terms of maturity, security, performance and transparency of the specification process, it risks increasing European dependence on foreign suppliers. Although Huawei is not part of the international bodies working on Open RAN (such as the Telecom Infra Project or the O-RAN Alliance), many companies close to the Chinese political and military authorities are. Beyond the question of supplier security, American lobbying is linked to the commercial opportunity that Open RAN represents for American companies, currently leaders in the cloud, software and generic hardware components…even though they do not have a major 5G champion. Open RAN is therefore an issue at the crossroads of the geopolitics of 5G and standards, to which the European Union is beginning to provide a common political and analytical response, despite the diversity of positions among member states.
- Topic:
- 5G, Telecommunications, and International Competition
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
3. Europe and the Geopolitics of 5G Walking a Technological Tightrope
- Author:
- Julien Nocetti
- Publication Date:
- 01-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The acute Sino-American tensions which started in 2018 have been coupled with controversies around 5G technology, exemplified by the spotlight placed on Chinese equipment manufacturer Huawei and the security risks associated with its use. For Europe, the 5G challenge at the international level is drawing a very complex landscape. Just like artificial intelligence, 5G materializes a very strong geopolitical sensitivity around the control of critical technologies. 5G is indeed critical because of its expected quasi-ubiquitous use, the gradual shift towards network technologies based entirely on software, and the potential strengthening of already dominant players (including digital platforms via cloud services). The United States-China rivalry is limiting the European Union’s room for action, against a backdrop of security considerations and low levels of investment. The continent’s various players (the European Commission, the main European powers, private players such as Nokia and Ericsson) have not adopted a uniform stance, reflecting an entanglement of technological dependencies on China and the United States. Meanwhile, the issue of semiconductors, symbolizing both the technological decline and the renewal of the EU’s ambitions, is fully integrated into the development of 5G. These chips constitute the "muscle" of the system and trigger new geo-economic challenges in which Europe must still find its place.
- Topic:
- European Union, Internet, 5G, Telecommunications, and Digital Sovereignty
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
4. Convince and Coerce: U.S. Interference in Technology Exchanges Between its Allies and China
- Author:
- Mathilde Velliet
- Publication Date:
- 02-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- The tough-on-China policy adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations has – and will increasingly have – important consequences for Washington’s allies, both on their infrastructure choices (5G, submarine cables...) and on their technological exchanges with China. Indeed, the U.S. objective of slowing down China’s technological development has been translated into multiple policies, primarily targeting China but also – directly or indirectly – U.S. partners. On the one hand, Washington deploys a range of coercive and incentive tools to prevent its allies from adopting certain technologies, supplied by Chinese companies and « untrusted » by American authorities (in terms of cyber, data or infrastructure security). Case studies of U.S. efforts against the deployment of Huawei’s 5G or Hengtong Group’s undersea cables reveal a similar strategy, combining direct diplomatic pressure, a threat awareness campaign, and financial incentives. On the other hand, in line with the United States’ historical use of the extraterritoriality of its law and its position as an economic superpower to influence its allies’ decisions, Washington seeks to restrict transfers of critical technologies from allies to China. As the main manufacturers (along with the United States) of these technologies, American allies are increasingly constrained by these legal and diplomatic restrictions, which target one of their main trading partners and tend to extend beyond strictly military or cutting-edge technologies. For example, in order to limit sales of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, U.S. authorities are combining changes to the American export control regime with diplomatic efforts (bilaterally and multilaterally) to persuade allies to align their own export policies with those of the United States. While the Biden administration appears to be placing greater emphasis on cooperative and incentive approaches, it seems likely that the multidimensional U.S. strategy serving these two objectives will continue, and even be strengthened. Among allies (and especially in Europe), this trend has raised awareness of the security challenges posed by certain Chinese suppliers, but also of the risks associated with the growing coercive practices of the great powers.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Internet, 5G, Semiconductors, and Submarine Cable
- Political Geography:
- Japan, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
5. NATO and 5G: what strategic lessons?
- Author:
- Andrea Gilli
- Publication Date:
- 07-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- NATO Defense College
- Abstract:
- Thanks to their higher speed, larger data volume, lower latency, and capacity to sustain very high density connections (including machine-to-machine communications), 5G networks are set to unleash a major economic revolution, potentially adding trillions of dollars to the global economy (at least according to recent forecasts). From smart cities to Artificial Intelligence (AI); telemedicine to driverless cars; virtual reality to the Internet of Things (IoT); Industry 4.0 to all manner of applications that will comprise this new ecosystem, 5G ushers in enormous opportunities. 5G communications still require significant investments, both for research and development of key technologies, and for building the supporting infrastructure. Moreover, the next generation of telecommunications raises several important questions about the political economy of spectrum allocation and standard definition, their military applications, the role of Chinese companies and the attendant cybersecurity risks. These are all relevant topics for NATO from which the Alliance can draw some strategic lessons.
- Topic:
- NATO, Military Strategy, Data, 5G, and Internet of Things
- Political Geography:
- Europe, North America, and Global Focus
6. China in Europe and Transatlantic Security
- Author:
- Andrew A. Michta
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Andrew A. Michta argues that the governments of Central and Eastern European countries will need to weigh the benefit to them of continued economic engagement with China, especially in the area of 5G.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, Economy, Transatlantic Relations, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America
7. China-U.K. Relations Grow More Strained Over Huawei and Hong Kong
- Author:
- Taylor Butch
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- The Jamestown Foundation
- Abstract:
- In October 2015, People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping visited the United Kingdom at the request of Queen Elizabeth II, marking the first time that the PRC head of state had done so in ten years. In the lead-up to the visit, both Chinese and British officials had publicly acknowledged the significance of this meeting, calling it a “golden era” in relations between the two countries. Five years on, U.K.-China relations remains steady, but there are increasing signs of tension in the relationship. Rising controversies over Huawei’s role in 5G infrastructure, and Beijing’s actions to suppress opposition in Hong Kong—as well as tensions over the origins of the coronavirus pandemic—lie at the heart of this downturn in relations.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, COVID-19, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and Hong Kong
8. Technology Strategies in China and the United States, and the Challenges for European Companies
- Author:
- Laurence Nardon
- Publication Date:
- 10-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
- Abstract:
- As international relations are increasingly reorganized around the US-China rivalry, the tensions between these two great powers are shaping a growing number of sectors, and the exchange of sensitive technologies in particular. This is a critical issue for European companies today. Indeed, European companies, as manufacturers, importers and exporters, risk finding themselves at the heart of the deepening technological competition opposing the United States and China (Éric-André Martin). The United States has a long history of using multiple regulatory instruments in managing the export of dual-use technologies, in particular towards China. Even beyond the Trump administration’s aggressive positions, these regulations are expanding and increasingly strict, hinting at a potential protectionist technological warfare (Pierre Girard). Despite China’s progress in innovation (5G, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things), and an expansion of measures meant to protect intellectual property rights both for domestic and foreign firms, Beijing’s predatory industrial practices and the weight of the Chinese Communist Party on the economy and society clearly live on (John Seaman). French and European companies are thus hindered both by the prohibition of re-exporting American technologies and products enacted by Washington and by Beijing’s predatory practices. How much leeway do European companies have? What role should the European Union (EU) play in the face of such challenges? Since 2016, new propositions to reform the EU export-control regime regulating dual-use items are being intensely debated (Sofia Bournou). The three chapters of this report examine the norms currently in place in the United States, China, and Europe, and delve more deeply into specific case studies: the battle between the Trump administration and Huawei (Marion Welles), the problems facing European companies in China (Laurence Nardon and Mathilde Velliet), and the case of the communications satellites (Jean-François Bureau). The conclusion of this report draws up a list – of great interest for decision-makers – of the infrastructures and technologies that will be critical for European strategic autonomy in the years to come (André Loesekrug-Pietri).
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, European Union, Internet, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America
9. 5G Security: The New Energy Security
- Author:
- Kristine Berzina
- Publication Date:
- 11-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
- Abstract:
- Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
- Topic:
- Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Europe, and United States of America
10. Finding a European response to Huawei’s 5G ambitions
- Author:
- Valentin Weber
- Publication Date:
- 05-2019
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
- Abstract:
- This policy brief suggests that European countries should institute national reviewing boards overseen by intelligence agencies to vet Huawei equipment. If that is not feasible due to a lack of resources or capabilities especially among smaller countries, European governments should consider pooling resources and create a common reviewing board. This would also prevent duplication of efforts on national levels. European authorities should also demand from Huawei to clearly separate its international from its domestic business operations in order to further reduce the risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of European mobile networks.
- Topic:
- Security, Science and Technology, Business, 5G, and Huawei
- Political Geography:
- China and Europe