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811. From a Common to a National State(s) and the Lithuanian-Polish Dispute

Author:
Alfonsas Eidintas
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
On the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the restoration of the independent states of Poland and Lithuania, we will return to a fundamental question, namely, whether the relationship between our contemporary states, which had already become hostile during the restoration process, is a time of missed opportunities? Or maybe the interests of both sides were simply so different that it was impossible for them to agree on a matter of major importance – state territory (partly also on the issue of national minorities) – and to balance their interests, thus avoiding conflict and a particularly hostile bilateral relationship which lasted until the tragic developments for both Poland and Lithuania in 1939-1940, when our countries fell victim to two tyrants.
Topic:
Nationalism, Minorities, Conflict, and State Building
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Poland, and Lithuania

812. The Georgian Herald Samizdat Journal

Author:
Aleksandra Gryzlak
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
From the very beginnings of Soviet rule in Georgia, the communists were not very popular throughout Georgian society and treated as occupants. Almost all active forms of resistance ceased to exist after the bloody suppression of the August Uprising of 19241. The massive purge of the Georgian intelligentsia that followed deprived the nation of its patriotic elites. Only after the death of Stalin and in the wake of Nikita Khrushchev’s famous speech in 1956, did the situation change. Khrushchev’s words of accusation and criticism, leveled at Stalin for his cult of personality and other mistakes, were treated in Georgia as an attack on their nation and an element of Russian chauvinism. It gave rise to a series of mass protests in Tbilisi in March 1956, that were brutally dispersed by the army. Approxi- mately 150 people died as a result2. During the 1950s and 60s, Vasilii Mzhavanadze was the leader of the Georgian Com- munist Party. In keeping with Khrushchev’s strategy of somewhat reduced control over the national republics, one could observe a consolidation of power by the ruling elite in Geor- gia3. This led to the spread of corruption, bribery and other illegal economic operations. Despite a weak economy, according to official statistics, the average Georgian’s savings in the 1970s were nearly twice that of the average Russian. Also, during this time, a very high number of educated specialists – who while graduating, did not take job assignments were still able to live reasonably well. Another phenomenon characteristic for the 1950s and 60s was a growing sense of nationalism. Symptoms of this included a relatively small number of national minority representatives able to gain access to higher education in the Georgian Republic, as well as clear-cut Georgian control over local and national party structures. The situation did not change after the fall of Khrushchev.4 Only in the early 1970s, did things start to change. In 1972, the key position of the First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party was passed to the former Minister of the Inte- rior – Eduard Shevardnadze, who began his rule with a broad campaign against corruption, overgrown bureaucracy, nepotism, and the so-called “second economy” (black market). Harsh administrative methods used in this campaign brought some positive effects – especially in the agricultural sector – but also resulted in a negative reaction from Georgian society5. Shevardnadze was also supposed to fight against growing Georgian nationalism. Campaigns, that condemned such things as reluctance to learn Russian lan- guage and promotion of national chauvinism in culture, were initiated. The teaching cur- riculum of the subject of history was also put under siege by the new authorities.
Topic:
Agriculture, Communism, Corruption, Human Rights, Nationalism, and Culture
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, and Georgia

813. The Privatisation of the Polish Banking Sector

Author:
Hubert A. Janiszewski
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
The Polish banking sector, at the outset of the Balcerowicz reform plan, was com- posed of the central bank (NBP), 9 regional commercial banks (which had spun out from NBP back in 1988): the state savings bank – PKO BP; the state bank handling foreign com- merce – Bank Handlowy SA; the state bank handling retail foreign exchange transfers – PeKaO SA; the state bank for financing the agriculture sector – BGZ; and a number of small cooperative banks – BRE SA a bank financing export industries established in 1986; and a single private bank, albeit with equity provided by state enterprises – BIG SA. The Ministry of Finance faced a formidable task, firstly to restructure the banking sec- tor – primarily commercial banks and at a later stage privatize the whole sector in order to i.a make it market oriented, flexible and serve large chunks of the rapidly privatizing economy as well as to cater to the needs of the population. It should be stressed – to give the full description of the sector, that the percentage of bad loans in all the above-mentioned banks (except BIG, BRE and probably PKO BP) was between 30 to 50% of their portfolios! It was therefore decided by Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz and his key staff, that prior to their privatization, restructuring of the banks was the key for their success. The major problem with restructuring was a lack of funding, which was not available as the Polish state was bankrupt and private resources were by far too small, and politi- cally inaccessible; moreover the parliament would not allow creation of additional debt by way of equity injections to the ailing banking sector. Under those difficult conditions Balcerowicz managed to pass through parliament a set of legislation on restructuring the economy including banks, which allowed for the provision of banks with so-called restructuring bonds (a special law had been enacted called the “Law on financial restructuring of banks and enterprises”) to strengthen their balance sheets and force them to individually, over time, repay such new debts. In order to guide and help the banks with the restructuring, with the assistance of the British Government, the so-called British Know How Fund was created, whose purpose was to provide professional advice and assistance to all commercial banks. This advice was strengthened by a so-called “twinning arrangement”, under which each of the nine commercial banks was provided with a “twin partner” in the form of an established western bank. Among the banks that participated in this scheme were the Allied Irish Bank (twinned to WBK based in Poznan), ING (Bank Śląski in Katowice) and the Midland Bank (Bank Za- chodni in Wroclaw). The whole operation was launched in early 1990 and was completed by early 1993, thus most of the commercial banks were potentially ”ready” for privatization with substan- tially improved balance sheets. Parallel to the above, all the other banks embarked on the restructuring of their balance sheets, if only in order to stay competitive in the market.
Topic:
Privatization, Finance, State Capitalism, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

814. The Role and Activities of the Eastern European Group within the United Nations System

Author:
Boguslaw Wind
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Thank you very much for the invitation and thank you for allowing me to speak to you about the United Nations and its role in Central and Eastern Europe. This is probably the first time in the history of our conference that we are discussing the United Nations. I will argue that there is a lot that we as Eastern Europeans can do together and how our coop- eration within the UN can be more fruitful and useful for all. I would like to first discuss how we can cooperate better in the General Assembly, Security Council and the United Nations Secretariat. Where are the opportunities? Where are the challenges? What else should we consider and be aware of? Let us begin with the historical context: what has been the role of the UN for Central and Eastern European countries? During the communist era, we were denied indepen- dence or sovereignty, thus the real interests of our countries were not represented on the global stage. There were of course communist embassies, very close coordination with Soviet diplomats, and weekly or even daily instructions coming from Moscow. This was the case until 1989. Then communism collapsed and our countries regained their inde- pendence and sovereignty. Initially, in the early 1990s, the UN was visibly present in East- ern Europe as a result of civil wars and ethnic conflicts. UN peacekeepers were a familiar sight, serving on various missions seeking to reestablish peace and stability. Then, I would argue, the role of the United Nations in our regional diplomacy and politics declined as the 20th century drew to a close and the 21st century began. This was due to the very powerful roles played by the European Union, NATO and the OSCE. These organizations eclipsed in importance the seemingly distant United Nations in New York City. Now, the situation is changing again, and we are witnessing a resurgence of the UN’s impact on Polish and European diplomacy. The UN is gradually reestablishing its role as useful platform through which Poland can play an active and leading role in promoting the political and economic interests of our region. It is particularly noteworthy that the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Jacek Czaputowicz spent the majority of May 2018 in New York – not enjoying the beautiful Big Apple, but working long hours, leading the various debates within the Security Council – giving Polish foreign policy a critical platform on the world stage.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and United Nations
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

815. Introduction to the Round Table on Building a Modern and Robust Banking System: Poland’s Experience after 1989

Author:
Stefan Kawalec
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Poland was the first country of the Soviet bloc in which a non-communist government was created following the period of the cold war. This was the government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki called into being on September 12, 1989. The government announced imme- diately that the economic system would be changed. The government did not propose a third way. It said that a market economy would be introduced, based on private ownership with a freely exchangeable currency. After this transformation of the socialist economy into a capitalist economy was announced, the government acted very quickly to realize this goal. The change of the economic system entailed a great undertaking, consisting of the creation of a banking system adapted to the needs of a market economy. In the socialist economy, there was no money in the true sense of the word. Money served only a certain limited purpose related to the distribution of consumer goods, but not for all such goods. A significant portion of consumer goods were distributed through the use of ration cards, special coupons or through informal channels such as sales made under the counter. En- terprises had their inputs and outputs rationed. The simple fact that an enterprise had złotys on its account did not give the enterprise the right to buy the necessary goods, if the rights to obtain such goods were not included in the appropriate distribution list. Having złotys was also insufficient for purchasing goods from abroad. For that one needed foreign currency -- which also was rationed in accordance with the distribution lists.
Topic:
Communism, Democracy, Finance, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

816. Independence by Muslim Communists: “Narimanovshchina”, the Downfall of National Communists in Azerbaijan

Author:
Shahla Kazimova
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
After the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan in April 1920, the country had undergone major sovietization. The troops of the 11th Red Army, which were allegedly supposed to be sent to support fighting in Anatolia, but stayed in place, brought the totalitarian reigns of terror and repression. An occupation regime was introduced in the country. Despite formal independence Azerbaijan was subject to the decisions of the Russian Bolsheviks. In order to take over the country, the Soviets proclaimed a local puppet-government on April 28, 1920, comprised of local communists, with a prominent local politician – Nariman Narimanov – as the chairman. He was also appointed the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. The choice of Narimanov was not incidental. He was the most renowned and influen- tial Azerbaijani communist, heard of both n the Caucasus and among central authorities in Moscow. He was in favour of the sovietization of Azerbaijan, which he deemed as the first step towards spreading revolution among the Muslim East.1 Recent studies on the history of the sovietisation of Azerbaijan clearly show that the Soviet government wanted to use the leader of the Azerbaijan communists as a symbol of the revolution from the very be- ginning, although it did not intend to give him real political power. Stalin’s letter of August 16, 1919, to Foreign Affairs Commissioner Georgy Chicherin, testifies to these plans "Karakhan’s presence in the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (hereinafter Narko- mindel), Armenian in origin, the only “man from the East” who was supposed to represent Mus- lim nations outside, does not sound good, distorts harmony in our Eastern policy, weakens the strength and effect of our policy in the eyes of the nations of the East and above all Muslims... Taking this into account, during a visit in Moscow, I proposed to Lenin’s companion to raise the question in the Central Committee of changing Karakhan to someone from the Muslims, even with medium party preparation. Narimanov is for me one such Muslim, and this is not a problem if he lacks a global political vision: after all, he will not lead the politics but CC and Narkomindel. Narimanov is important as a banner. Such a change of scenery, or at least the removal of Karakhan from the East Department and bringing a Muslim to the forefront, I find an absolute necessity. If this is interesting, I can inform you that comrade Lenin expressed his full support. Such a change would be immediately noticed among Muslims (...). To object to the fact that Narimanov does not know the Far East, that he is old and slow, for me is not decisive, because I never thought that Narimanov would be in charge of Eastern policy. I repeat, he is just a banner and decoration for me" In the light of these data, questions arise about who Narimanov was. An idealist, naive romantic, cynic or cheated politician? To try to answer these questions, it is worth a closer look. Because Narimanov was the face of the sovietisation of Azerbaijan, the answer to the above questions will also answer to whether the Azerbaijani Socialist Republic was indeed independent.
Topic:
Nationalism, Religion, Minorities, and Independence
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, and Azerbaijan

817. The Rebirth of Polishness in the Baltic States as a Result of the Crisis and the Collapse of the USSR: The Case of Lithuania

Author:
Marcin Wakar
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
In turn, the term glasnost’, that is transparency, referred to various areas of life, but above all to media policy. The top-down pressures as well as personnel changes in the leading editorial offices led to the disclosure of information that has been censored so far. However, as noted by Canadian historian David Roger Marples: “In general, more progres- sive reportages could be found in the central press rather than in individual republics, with a notable exception to the Baltic states”8. Although perestroika in the initial years contained processes with varying effects, it finally ended in defeat. The failure of perestroika cou- pled with the success of glasnost, therefore made it impossible to cover up the first one. Additionally, it all happened during a lack of political unity in the Kremlin9. What’s more, Gorbachev’s policy led to a situation in which: „A sense of national identity was growing significantly in each of the republics belonging to the USSR. It also had a huge impact on the mood of all groups of national minorities, reflected in the desire to revive and preserve their mother tongue and national traditions”10. Thus, an increase in the consciousness of belonging to a particular nation was, on one hand, a factor leading to the desire for independence by societies of individual republics, and on the other hand, had a decisive influence on the revival of the identity of national minorities in their territory.
Topic:
Communism, Nationalism, Minorities, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Poland, and Soviet Union

818. The Structure of Government Elites within the Regime of Alaksandar Lukashenka

Author:
Francisak Viacorka
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
his paper reveals the structure and trends within Belarus government elites in the period between 1994 and 2017. Belarus remains one of the least free and under-reformed post-Soviet countries yet it seems to have a strong functional bureaucracy. Seventy-еight per- cent of ministers and state committee chairs are employed according to their professional ca- reer background. The share of appointees with specialized education rose from 71.9% to 86% during Lukashenka’s presidency. So the author assumes that in the case of unrest or political transition, a bureaucratic apparatus composed of specialized professionals could play a stabi- lizing role. This research also shows slight indigenization1 and westernization of Nomenklatura2. The number of officials born in Belarus increased from 71.9% to 81.4%, and those from the west- ern Horadnia region increased from 4% to 20%. At the same time, the research revealed, that the Government continues to have an inadequate representation of women (<5%), and other parties (<11%); meanwhile, it has an increasing presence of professional military (from 15% to 20%).
Topic:
Government, Minorities, Transition, and Elites
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

819. National Independence versus Societal Trauma: Can a Nation Enslaved by its Past be Independent?

Author:
Magda Stroniska
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
Human history is a mixture of positive developments and setbacks, many of them of tragic proportions. Some historical events may have a dramatic and long-lasting im- pact on large groups of people. Sometimes entire nations have suffered the effects of what is referred to as societal, historical, collective or cultural trauma. While such historical traumas have been acknowledged in literature, little is usually done to assist societies or groups that have been affected in dealing, in practical terms, with various symptoms of post-traumatic psychological issues that affect individual members of the group, who, in turn, determine the behaviour of the group as a whole. This paper suggests that survivors of societal traumas, just like people who go through personal tragedies, need help in order to overcome the effects of their experience or face the risk of repeating the cycle of violence, often becoming the perpe- trators themselves. While the focus of this paper is on Polish historical traumas and how they influence the choices made by Polish society today, some observations may be applicable to post-traumatic societal behaviours in general.
Topic:
Nationalism, Trauma, Violence, and Independence
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Poland

820. NATO’s 2018 Brussels Summit: A View from the United States

Author:
Matthew Rhodes
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Warsaw East European Review (WEER)
Institution:
Centre for East European Studies, University of Warsaw
Abstract:
NATO leaders billed their last full formal summit two years ago in Warsaw as a “break- through summit.” Speaking at a parallel experts forum, Polish President Andrzej Duda named the event the second most important in his country’s post-communist history, be- hind only NATO accession itself. In addition to the headline decision for Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) in the Baltic region, the Alliance adopted special declarations on strength- ening “resilience” and strategic partnership with the European Union. In contrast, the next leaders’ meeting in two weeks in Brussels is expected to be less about conceptual innovation than practical steps to implement existing commitments. At preceding ministerials and other occasions, the Alliance’s leading member, the United States, has pushed for further focus on mobility, stability, and burden-sharing in particu- lar. Nonetheless, recent tensions in other aspects of transatlantic relations have injected a measure of drama and raised the stakes for the summit’s success.1
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America