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41. Moldova in the EU's Eastern Partnership: Lessons of a Decade

Author:
Martin Sieg
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
In Moldova, the weakness of the Eastern Partnership has been over-reliance on incentives, rather than a lack thereof. Veto players who hid their true interests by claiming allegiance to the European cause hijacked the EU’s soft power. The EaP’s shortcoming was lack of means and readiness to make these key opponents of political reforms keep their commitments. Its core challenge is how to overcome the resistance of these veto players who have been obstructing transformational goals.
Topic:
Politics, Reform, European Union, Partnerships, and Oligarchy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Moldova, and Eastern Europe

42. Under Pressure: Can Belarus resist Russian coercion?

Author:
Anaïs Marin
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Belarus is traditionally considered to be Russia’s closest ally, and their alliance is a cornerstone of post-Soviet integration projects, both military (the Collective Security Treaty Organisation - CSTO) and economic (the Eurasian Economic Union - EAEU). But bilateral relations have entered a different and more conflictual phase. The paradigm shift started in 2014, when Belarus invoked its constitutional neutrality pledge to refuse to side with Russia in its ongoing conflict with Ukraine and the West. Playing this card allowed President Lukashenka to appear as a security guarantor both in the eyes of Belarusians and the West. Irritated by such autonomy, Moscow indicated that it now wants more for its money. Russia is no longer ready to subsidise the Belarusian economy in exchange for its neighbour’s fleeting geopolitical loyalty. In linking, in 2018, the resumption of economic privileges to ‘deeper’ political integration within the Union State that the two countries nominally established 20 years ago, Russia stepped up the pressure. Yet Vladimir Putin made Belarus an offer he knew Aliaksandr Lukashenka would refuse: the Belarusian president had repeatedly stated that Belarus’s sovereignty was ‘not for sale’. Given its dependence on Russia and current economic hardships, Belarus might not be able to resist Moscow’s ‘coercion to integrate’, however. Its capacity to uphold its sovereignty is being challenged from outside, while Lukashenka’s regime survival is under stress from within: in the wake of the 9 August presidential election, unprecedented opposition forces emerged which the Belarusian regime started cracking down on.1 Should repression intensify, leading the West to reintroduce sanctions, Minsk’s efforts of the past years towards normalising relations with Brussels and Washington would come to nothing. Yet renewed (self-)isolation of Belarus is exactly what Russia needs to reach its strategic goal of keeping Belarus in its orbit, and extract more concessions from its fragile leadership. This presents the EU with a dilemma it knows all too well: how can it support Belarus’s efforts to preserve its independence, without increasing the resilience of Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime or making Russia more assertive?
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus

43. Stand by Me! The Sino-Russian Normative Partnership in Action

Author:
Alice Ekman, Sinikukka Saari, and Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It has become commonplace to describe the relationship between China and Russia as ‘a marriage of convenience’,1 in particular in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, this popular metaphor hides very different – even contradictory – interpretations of the nature and future of the relationship. Perhaps depending on one’s take on arranged marriages, the deepening relationship between these two states is seen as ‘stable and successful’2 and ‘durable’,3 or on the contrary, as a ‘mere’ convenient arrangement doomed to be a temporary solution.4 It seems that fuzzy and often misunderstood marriage allegories bring more confusion than clarity to understanding and explaining complex relations between states. Shared norms and worldview would certainly indicate a steady and long-term arrangement whatever the marriage metaphor used. The Sino-Russian partnership is dense and multidimensional, and it is rooted in shared norms. International norms – the standard of expected state behaviour – reflect the underlying values of the global system, and underpin international cooperation in the political, economic and security-related fields.Sino-Russian normative cooperation aims at redefining and re-interpreting existing international norms in a way that reflects their shared principles, worldviews and threat perceptions – ‘like-mindedness’ as Chinese official communication refers to it.5 Both China and Russia share a conviction that today's international order is unfairly dominated by the US and the West, and that the current international norms and their interpretation reflect Western values that should not be considered universal. They are both convinced that these need to be changed, and that the time is ripe for this. For Beijing and Moscow, a post-Western era of global governance looms on the horizon. This shared reading of the present and predilection for such a future global order has been translated into dynamically evolving normative cooperation between the partners at multilateral level. Two other important and shared convictions are, first, that neither party represents a threat to the other regime’s survival (and even has an interest in supporting the other regime) and, second, that the West would like to see the regime in both China and Russia challenged (and under the right circumstances is ready to contribute to this). The shared worldview and threat perception help to smooth out the differences between the two countries: when their interpretations differ, they show mutual self-restraint and acquiesce rather than go against each other in the name of national interest. This Brief examines the normative dimension of Sino-Russian cooperation – i.e. how the two countries advance their understanding of international rules and norms together in the international arena. It studies how the two countries advance their understanding of appropriate state behaviour internationally in three areas: human rights, non-intervention and cyber-governance. All three issues are united by a common thread – states’ sovereignty – a robust version of which both vigorously defend. As a result, in these three areas, their cooperation is particularly strong and proactive.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Norms
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

44. The Outsider: Russia in the Race for Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Julien Nocetti
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
When analyzing the global state of play around artificial intelligence (AI), Russia so far looks like an “outsider” compared to the two technological leaders, the United States and China. Yet, like the European Union, Russia exhibits two apparently contradictory but fundamental trends: it is trying to reap the benefits of technological interdependence—digital, scientific, financial etc.—while also protecting its internal market and thereby achieving the “technological sovereignty” it so ardently desires. Russia’s state-led approach is compounded by the same problems that afflict Russia in the conventional digital sector: lack of investment, weak integration into international scientific and normative networks, political pressure on private companies, dependence on global technological value chains and brain drain. Might these factors lead us to underestimate Moscow’s potential in AI? This paper argues that although these weaknesses are significant, continue to hold Russia back and threaten to amplify pre-existing asymmetries of power with the United States and China, Moscow intends to preserve niches of expertise that it can deploy in foreign policy and domestic governance. The Russian authorities have also handed big parts of AI development to the armed forces and the defense industry, as part of modernization plans and for asymmetric use.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

45. The Russia policy conundrum: Who blinks first?

Author:
Hugo Klijn
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
On 28 September the Netherlands’ Russia policy was debated in Parliament. This policy (updated most recently in the government’s ‘Russia letter’ of December 2019) boils down to a twin-track approach of, on the one hand, exerting pressure through EU sanctions and NATO deterrence and, on the other hand, identifying common ground dossiers and engaging in people-to-people contacts. To date, this long-standing policy has not led to satisfactory outcomes. The debate took place against the backdrop of a Clingendael opinion poll indicating that the Dutch public has different threat perceptions of Russia. Anyway, the debate was rather uneventful and lawmakers focused mostly on topical issues such as the ongoing MH17 trial, Belarus, developments around Nagorno-Karabakh and the poisoning of Alexey Navalny. It may be a source of comfort that the Netherlands is not the only country struggling with its Russia policy. The list of accusations and grievances against Russia is growing, but its leadership flatly denies all wrongdoing and does not seem much impressed by Western responses which have not resulted in a change of behaviour. Under a veneer of unity, European countries are divided on Russia and the debate often hovers between two, typically Russian, eternal questions: kto vinovat (who’s to blame) and chto delat’ (what to do).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Sanctions, European Union, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Netherlands

46. Protests in Russia: Supporting Systemic Change Prior to 2020’s Elections

Author:
Marina Solntseva
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Russia postponed its national vote on constitutional changes to July 1, 2020. Due to restrictions on freedom of movement and assembly from COVID-19, mass protests are unlikely to result. Nevertheless, managing growing social discontent may well be the Kremlin’s next big challenge as it prepares for September’s regional and parliamentary elections. Given its upcoming EU presidency and Council of Europe chairmanship, Germany could make a positive difference in protecting human rights and EU values in Russia.
Topic:
Human Rights, Elections, European Union, and Protests
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

47. Both Russian and American Publics Sense a Transatlantic Rift

Author:
Dina Smeltz and Lily Wojtowicz
Publication Date:
03-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Building over the last few years, disputes between the United States and Europe over trade, climate change, and nuclear weapons were on full display at the annual Munich Security Conference last month. Russian leaders have tried to exploit these strains between the United States and its allies. In Munich, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov of Russia suggested that the European Union and Russia build a “shared European home.”[1] Sidelining the United States through deepened ties with Europe has long been a strategy of the Kremlin to weaken the West’s united front against Russia’s regional and international aggression.[2] Findings from a new US-Russia binational survey, conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the Levada Analytical Center, reveal that publics in both countries have noticed cracks in the US-EU relationship.[3] While Americans have long expressed support for NATO, a majority say that unity among NATO allies is weakening. At the same time, Russians’ impressions that transatlantic security links are weakening contribute to their sense that the United States is now in a weaker global position.
Topic:
International Relations, NATO, Public Opinion, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

48. Hungarian-Russian Economic Relations

Author:
Veronika Jóźwiak
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Hungarian-Russian economic relations are based on the energy industry. Hungary’s efforts to build closer political relations with Russia after 2010 did not result in a marked increase in bilateral trade, investment, or greater Russian influence outside the energy sector. EU economic sanctions imposed on Russia and the introduction of counter-sanctions in 2014 caused a significant drop in Hungarian exports to Russia. However, this has not resulted in substantial losses to the Hungarian economy.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Hungary

49. Hybrid Threats in EaP Countries: Building a Common Response

Author:
Kakha Gogolashvili, Valeriu Pasa, Mikayel Hovhannisyan, Viktor Ohiienko, and Julya Sahakyan
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Four non-governmental organisations from Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine conducted a joint study assessing hybrid threats that the EaP countries are currently facing. The project aimed to study the hybrid threats which affect Eastern Partnership states and elaborate recommendations to actively engage civil society in countering them. The project envisaged the creation of a team of experts from Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Ukraine, which would travel to the capital cities of the mentioned states and meet all relevant stakeholders from government, parliament and civil society. The meetings resulted in the collection of all necessary information, opinions and ideas on the state of institutional and legal measures taken in the countries on countering existing hybrid threats. The team of experts also undertook desk research based on accessible open sources and interviews conducted with different stakeholders, among them government officials, experts and civil society organizations. The research and study visits provided the ground for four country reviews to be written by the experts. Their reports have been integrated mutatis mutandis into the present policy paper, followed by a comparative analysis of threats and institutional responses, similarities and distinctions in the policies of the four mentioned countries. The paper also explores the role and areas of potential engagement of civil society. To effectively counter the hybrid threats, a joining of efforts of official bodies and non-state actors is required. It also needs reinforced international cooperation on a government and civil society level. The paper recommends the governments establish active cooperation among and with the EU countries with the aim of analyzing, exchanging knowledge and countering jointly, where appropriate, hybrid threats. The cooperation should target the development of an appropriate legal environment and adequate institutional capacity. Civil society itself should become more organized and consolidated. The paper advises the EaP CSF to conduct work on consolidating the efforts of civil society in the direction of strengthening the resilience of EaP countries, especially in countering attacks aiming to discredit and weaken the Europeanisation of the mentioned countries. It was advised that the EaP CSF contribute to facilitating the capacity building of civil society organizations so as to help them to actively engage in countering hybrid threats. Despite the existing differences between EaP partner states as regards their foreign policy priorities and geopolitical orientation or trade arrangement, all of them seek closer cooperation with the European Union, peaceful co-existence, and the chance to develop efficient economic ties within the wider region. Continuation of Europeanisation and interaction with EU institutions, supporting democratic transformation, economic and regulatory convergence, social cohesion and human capital development, institutional and state build up, has become irreversible thanks to the success of the EaP. The sources of the new hybrid threats predominantly aim at discrediting and weakening the motivation of the EaP partner states to further integrate with the EU. Indeed, EaP partner states understand the importance of this cooperation and are interested in countering, jointly where possible, any adverse action or attempt to disengage them from that process. Based on the results of the study, we propose a set of recommendations for the governments of EaP states, EU and NATO institutions and their member states.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civil Society, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia

50. Countering Hybrid Threats: Stronger Role for Civil Society in Post 2020 EaP Roadmap

Author:
Kakha Gogolashvili, Mikayel Hovhannisyan, Elkhan Mehtiyev, Andrei Yahorau, Valeriu Pasa, and Viktor Ohiienko
Publication Date:
01-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The objective of the project, in the framework of which this policy paper was developed, is to promote the wider involvement of civil society in the policy area that can and should benefit from a multi-stakeholder approach through all stages of the policy cycle in the upcoming period in order to maximize the impact of joint actions and activities. The paper has an ambition to advise on how civil society should and could be involved in formulating, implementing and monitoring the future deliverables in the area of hybrid threats in the post-2020 Road Map for the EaP policy, including developing specific deliverables with concrete benchmarks for individual countries in a regional perspective. The paper feeds directly into the debate on the new EaP Road Map and structured consultation opened by the EU institutions, and builds directly on the recommendations from the EaP CSF policy paper "Advancing Eastern Partnership: 23 Civil Society Ideas for the Policy beyond 2020". It will be distributed to its target audience in Brussels, EU member states and EaP countries. Further advocacy and discussion with stakeholders in Brussels is planned during the 11th EaP CSF Annual Assembly on December 6, 2019. The paper is a result of the joint research conducted by a team of experts representing CSOs from all six EaP partner states. The team conducted desk research and held consultations with stakeholders and experts in their respective countries. Each of them contributed to country reports and proposed recommendations for the development of cooperation on prevention and countering hybrid threats throughout the EaP area. The findings of the study covered the comparative analysis of hybrid threats in EaP countries, the response of the governments, cooperation between EU and EaP countries on countering hybrid threats, civil society engagement and, finally, the suggestions on the development of cooperation between EU and EaP partner states. The research resulted in concrete recommendations for the governments of the respective countries, EU institutions and member states and for civil society, which is advised to intensify its engagement in countering hybrid threats and in developing a common response.
Topic:
Civil Society, Government, European Union, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Eurasia, Caucasus, and Georgia