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2. The Bronze Soldier Crisis of 2007: Revisiting an Early Case of Hybrid Conflict
- Author:
- Ivo Juurvee and Anna-Mariita Mattiisen
- Publication Date:
- 08-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- This report revisits the spring 2007 crisis in Estonia, centred on the World War II memorial known as the Bronze Soldier statue. The crisis is well-known both in Estonia and abroad. It was one of the first wake-up calls to the cooling of relations between Russia and the West. It also involved the first use of wide-ranging cyber-attacks against a state.
- Topic:
- Security, History, Cybersecurity, Resilience, Hybrid Warfare, and Hybrid Threats
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Eurasia, and Estonia
3. China’s Influence Activities in Estonia
- Author:
- Frank Jüris
- Publication Date:
- 09-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- China’s influence activities aim to create a positive image of China and to counter any kind of criticism. Influence activities in countries with big Chinese communities can mobilise the Chinese diaspora for the party’s benefit—there are plenty of examples from Finland and Sweden. But where this is not possible, propaganda work may fall to the CPC Central Committee’s International Liaison Department, which is responsible for exchanges with foreign parties. The International Liaison Department has been active in its interactions with Estonian politicians. Today, three former government ministers work for Powerhouse, which offers lobbying services for the Chinese company, Huawei. To a large extent, China’s influence activities in Estonia have so far gone unnoticed. This article aims to fill this gap.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, and 5G
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, Estonia, and Baltic States
4. Preparing for Crises in Estonia: Improvement Options for Civilian Food and Emergency Goods Supplies
- Author:
- Ivo Juurvee and Ramon Loik
- Publication Date:
- 02-2020
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- The Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications and the Estonian Ministry of Rural Affairs commissioned the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) to compile a list of civilian food and emergency goods supplies, estimated average amounts of supplies at home and in stores, and calculations for the price of national emergency goods supplies and logistics. In addition to the quantities of food and industrial goods, the contracting authorities were interested in the legal issues of stockpiling and the possibilities of storage and distribution. Water, fuel, and drug supplies were not covered by the studies. In the course of the research, the experts also reviewed the solutions of Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Lithuania and other countries and took into account the recommendations of international organisations. The experience of other countries suggests that involving businesses and maintaining the operation of trading networks in the event of a crisis are of key importance. It is reasonable to organise logistics centrally, as crisis transport cannot be ordered separately by ministries and local authorities. Recommendations for the division of tasks between the state and local governments: State-level tasks: Ensure that the goods required in a crisis situation exist through purchases or pre-contracts. Ensure the timely delivery of required food products and emergency goods to distribution points in municipalities (e.g. through pre-contracts with logistics companies). Support local authorities in planning the distribution of goods and test their preparedness by organising special exercises. Local government-level tasks (preparations for distribution of goods): Have an overview of the population and where people are. Coordinate with the state-level to identify the locations of existing and potential additional distribution points that should be situated in the vicinity of shopping centres or other locations people are familiar with visiting. Plan the local distribution of supplies and find relevant partners.
- Topic:
- Security, Defense Policy, Food, Crisis Management, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Estonia and Baltic States
5. Estonia’s Partners in the EU Coalition Machinery: Maximising Influence in the EU through Coalition-building
- Author:
- Kristi Raik and Josef Janning
- Publication Date:
- 01-2020
- Content Type:
- Policy Brief
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- This policy paper examines Estonia’s partners in the European Union with the aim of identifying ways to enhance its influence on policy-making. Effective coalition-building is also important for the EU as a whole, since it can improve the Union’s capacity to take decisions and act. The paper highlights that: Estonia has a relatively strong position in the EU, considering its small size and limited resources. It is particularly well-connected with the Nordic-Baltic partners and should seek ways to use this grouping more effectively as a means to reach out to larger member states and shape decisions in the Union. The main challenge is to build stronger links with France and Germany, something that has become all the more important due to Brexit. Teaming up with other countries that are better connected to Berlin and Paris, such as Finland, Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium, is one way to pursue this goal. It is too early to draw conclusions about the impact of the latest change of government in Estonia on the country’s influence and image among partners in the EU. However, the research interviews show some indications of a weakened position. Estonia should avoid losing its reputation as a results-oriented member state that takes into consideration the priorities of others while pursuing its own interests in a constructive manner.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, and European Union
- Political Geography:
- Europe and Estonia
6. Russians in Europe: Nobody’s Tool – The Examples of Finland, Germany and Estonia
- Author:
- Anna Tiido
- Publication Date:
- 09-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- This analysis calls for European governments to pay greater attention to the resilience of their societies, starting with the integration of minorities. It is also important to continue work to increase awareness of Russian influence. The paper analyses the issue of Russian speakers in the EU based on the example of Finland, Germany and Estonia. Although the Kremlin’s “Russian World” policy sees all the people connected to Russia as a homogeneous group, the minority groups analysed are quite diverse. The media preferences and habits of Russian-speakers are connected to language, naturally, and these communities are one of the targets of Russia’s actions. At the same time, Russia also targets non-Russian audiences. It promotes propaganda that is tailor-made for specific countries, based on existing conditions. The grievances of Russian-speakers are one such tool, but they constitute one of many available—and not the main one.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Integration, Social Cohesion, and Resilience
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Finland, Germany, and Estonia
7. The Russian Orthodox Church: Faith, Power and Conquest
- Author:
- James Sherr and Kaarel Kullamaa
- Publication Date:
- 12-2019
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
- Abstract:
- Until recently, the Russian Orthodox Church was a subject that interested few outside expert circles. That dramatically changed in late 2018 when the Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople granted autocephaly (independence) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. The reverberations of this decision — religious, political and geopolitcal — underscore the importance that the Church once again plays in Russian policy. In this report, we consider the role that the Russian Orthodox Church has played as an adjunct to an imperial policy stretching back over many centuries. Today, the Russian Federation has a secular constitution. But as much as in tsarist times, the Church regards itself as one of the pillars of Russia’s political order. As much as in the time of Catherine the Great, it is also a protagonist in its wars of identity and the rewriting of the history of former imperial subjects whose experience of the relationship between church and state is different from Russia’s. This diversity is well brought out in the report’s two case studies, Ukraine and Estonia. In both countries, local Orthodox churches embodied distinctive cultural traditions and values until they felt the full force of Russian control, tsarist and Soviet. Since 2014, Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine has revived many historical controversies. It also has raised entirely new security concerns about the borderline between faith and politics. These concerns are summarised at the conclusion of the report, which closes with a section on policy recommendations.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Politics, Religion, International Affairs, Governance, and Christianity
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Estonia
8. OSCE Principles in Practice: Testing Their Effect on Security Through the Work of Max van der Stoel, First High Commissioner on National Minorities 1993–2001
- Author:
- Marianna M. Yamamoto
- Publication Date:
- 01-2015
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
- Abstract:
- This monograph tests the OSCE approach to security. The OSCE approach to security encompasses all areas that can cause tensions and conflict between States, and is the result of a sustained effort by almost all of the world’s democracies on how to achieve both security and individual freedom. An important basis of the OSCE security concept is that international security cannot be achieved without the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms. The study first extracts from official OSCE documents a set of principles designed to achieve international security, and then uses the work of the first OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), Max van der Stoel, to test the effectiveness of the principles in practice. From 1993 to 2001, HCNM Max van der Stoel applied OSCE principles in cases involving minority tensions with a high potential for international conflict, and this experience provided the means to assess the practical effects on security when OSCE principles are implemented. The study examined three cases that involved potential conflict: Ukraine and separatism in Crimea; Estonia and tensions regarding the Russian minority; and Macedonia and tensions regarding the Albanian minority. The study found that in each of the three cases, the implementation of OSCE principles reduced national and international tensions involving minority issues, and increased security. The increase in security was seen within each State, between States, and in the region, and reduced the potential for conflict within and between OSCE States. The results were particularly significant in view of the instability, conflicts, and tensions of the post–Cold War period; the OSCE’s ongoing institutionalization during the period; and the limited resources and tools available to the OSCE and the HCNM. The study identified and articulated twenty OSCE security principles that addressed national and international security. The principles addressed the rights and responsibilities of State sovereignty; a comprehensive, cooperative, and common security approach; the prevention of security threats and the peaceful resolution of issues; the protection and promotion of individual rights and freedoms through democracy, the rule of law, and the market economy; rights and responsibilities pertaining to national minorities; the development and advancement of shared values; and processes and mechanisms. The monograph extended the research on the OSCE principles to express an OSCE security concept. The OSCE security concept is a security framework based on the idea that security depends on the development and implementation of principles guiding three areas: how States deal with each other and resolve problems; the protection and promotion of individual rights within States; and the processes and mechanisms to review and advance values, principles, and commitments. The study showed that the implementation of OSCE principles in Ukraine, Estonia, and Macedonia significantly increased security in those three countries and the OSCE region. The study found that the OSCE principles and the OSCE security concept constitute a significant body of thought and practice regarding security, and respect for the individual. The OSCE principles, the OSCE security concept, and the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities merit further examination, development, and application to national security policy and practice. The application to national security policy and practice is relevant to all security threats and problems.
- Topic:
- Security, Cold War, International Cooperation, and Conflict
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Estonia, Macedonia, and Crimea
9. Cyber War I: Estonia Attacked from Russia
- Author:
- Kertu Ruus
- Publication Date:
- 01-2008
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- European Affairs
- Institution:
- The European Institute
- Abstract:
- Suddenly, the lights go out. Communication lines fall silent. Internet connections are lost. People venturing into the congested streets discover that banks are closed, ATMs are malfunctioning, traffic lights are jammed. Radio and TV stations cannot broadcast. The airports and train stations are shut down. Food production halts, and the water supply starts rapidly diminishing as pumps stop working. Looters are on the rampage; panic grips the public; the police cannot maintain order. This grim picture is not the opening scene of a Hollywood fantasy, but the beginning of a cyber attack, as described by Sami Saydjari, president of Professionals for Cyber Defense, to a Congressional homeland defense subcommittee in April 2007. In vivid terms, he described how a superpower can be reduced to third-world status by a cyber take-down of a nation's electronic infrastructure. The defense expert called his description “a plausible scenario” – and one for which the United States is unprepared. Even if military computer systems are usually protected against outside interference, most civilian electronic systems remain vulnerable to a massive assault that enjoyed the sponsorship of a state.
- Topic:
- Security, NATO, and Science and Technology
- Political Geography:
- Russia, United States, Europe, and Estonia