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11. Urban Security Exchange: Data, Design and Innovation for Urban Security

Author:
Renata Avelar Giannini, Katherine Aguirre, and Isabel de Sola
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Igarapé Institute
Abstract:
The Urban Security Exchange: Data, Design and Innovation for Urban Security was held on January 22 and 23, 2018 in San Salvador, at a critical time for Central American countries. On one hand, in early 2018, the capitals of the Northern Triangle countries – Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador – reported significant reductions in their high homicide rates; while on the other, these positive results highlighted the complex efforts necessary to maintain this downward trend amidst the struggle against violence. Effectively, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras present some of the highest homicide rates in the world. In 2018, El Salvador leads the ranking and its capital, San Salvador, is one of the most violent cities on the planet. Nevertheless, such cities were able to reduce their homicide rates between 2016 and 2017. In El Salvador, the rate dropped by 34%, in Honduras, 22% and in Guatemala, 4%. This context of persistently high homicide rates in spite of reductions was a key element throughout the discussion endorsed by the Urban Security Exchange.
Topic:
Crime, Law Enforcement, Violence, and Police
Political Geography:
Central America, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador

12. Point of No Return: The Fear and Criminalization of Central American Refugees

Author:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Publication Date:
06-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
The purpose of this study was to ascertain the challenges faced by Central American migrants who returned home after failing to gain asylum or other international protection in the United States or Mexico. Cristosal interviewed individuals who fled from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras under threats of violence and persecution and had been deported back to their country of origin to determine why they fled their homelands, why they could not secure asylum, and on their situations post-return. In the context of mass migration from these countries, the study used in- depth interviews to understand the different ways in which people experienced the violence and fear that forced them to flee and how their responses upon “voluntary return” or deportation back to their country of origin were shaped by that same violence. While there are many studies on the flight of persons from the Northern Triangle of Central America (NTCA), little is known about the experience of refugees who cannot secure protection in another country and are deported to their home country, from which they originally fled. What are the psychosocial, security, and human rights consequences for people who migrated out of fear for their lives and were then forced to return to the situation that forced them to flee?
Topic:
Migration, Regional Cooperation, Immigration, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, Central America, North America, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador

13. The Mixed Motives of Unaccompanied Child Migrants from Central America’s Northern Triangle

Author:
Matthew Lorenzen
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Journal on Migration and Human Security
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
A growing body of literature has argued that the distinction between forced and voluntary migration can be, in practice, unclear. This literature points out that each individual migrant may have mixed motives for migrating, including both forced and voluntary reasons. Few studies, however, have actually set out to analyze mixed-motive migration. This paper examines the mixed-motive migration of unaccompanied minors from Central America’s Northern Triangle states (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador), using data from a small 2016 survey carried out in 10 shelters for unaccompanied child migrants run by a Mexican government child welfare agency. Using this survey, the paper identifies the immigrating minor’s motives, which are oftentimes mixed, and details differences by nationality, gender, and age groups. Some of the key findings include: Around one-third of the child migrants surveyed had mixed motives, including both forced and voluntary reasons for migrating. Violence appears most often as a reason for migrating among minors with mixed motives, as opposed to the search for better opportunities, which appears more often as an exclusive motive. Significant differences between the three nationalities are observed. Relatively few Guatemalan minors indicated violence as a motive, and few displayed mixed motives, as opposed to Hondurans, and especially Salvadorans. The minors fleeing violence, searching for better opportunities, and indicating both motives at the same time were largely mature male adolescents. The minors mentioning family reunification as their sole motive were predominantly girls and young children. The results indicate that binary formulations regarding forced and voluntary migration are often inadequate. This has important implications, briefly addressed in the conclusions. These implications include: the need for migration scholars to consider forced reasons for migrating in the context of mixed-motive migration; the fact that mixed motives call into question the established, clear-cut categories that determine whether someone is worthy of humanitarian protection or not; the need to have in-depth, attentive, and individual asylum screening because motives may be interconnected and entangled, and because forced reasons may be hidden behind voluntary motives; and the need for a more flexible policy approach, so that immigration systems may be more inclusive of migrants with mixed motives.
Topic:
Migration, Children, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Central America, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador

14. The Impact of Taxes and Social Spending on Inequality and Poverty in El Salvador

Author:
Nora Lustig, Margarita Beneke, and José Andrés Oliva
Publication Date:
01-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Global Development
Abstract:
We conducted a fiscal impact study to estimate the effect of taxes, social spending, and subsidies on inequality and poverty in El Salvador, using the methodology of the Commitment to Equity project. Taxes are progressive, but given their volume, their impact is limited. Direct transfers are concentrated on poor households, but their budget is small so their effect is limited; a significant portion of the subsidies goes to households in the upper income deciles, so although their budget is greater, their impact is low. The component that has the greatest effect on inequality is spending on education and health. Therefore, the impact of fiscal policy is limited and low when compared with other countries with a similar level of per capita income. There is room for improvement using current resources.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Poverty, and Income Inequality
Political Geography:
El Salvador

15. The Central American Humanitarian Crisis and US Policy Responses

Author:
Kevin Appleby, Leonir Chiarello, and Donald Kerwin
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for Migration Studies of New York
Abstract:
The Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS), a nonpartisan think tank/educational institute focusing on the study of international migration, and the Scalabrini International Migration Network (SIMN), a not-for-profit organization focusing on protection and development programs for migrants, traveled to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico from August 15 to 22 to visit migrant shelters operated by the religious Congregation of the Missionaries of St. Charles Borromeo, Scalabrinians. The delegation toured migrant detention and return facilities, met with public officials and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and assessed how the US-Mexico policies of deterrence and interdiction have impacted the region and particularly those seeking to flee the record levels of violence in the Northern Triangle states of Central America.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Migration, Regional Cooperation, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
United States, Central America, North America, Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador

16. The role of ex-rebel parties in building peace

Author:
Clare Castillejo
Publication Date:
03-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution
Abstract:
Political parties can play an important part in shaping the direction of post-conflict peacebuilding, and parties that emerge from rebel movements have a particularly central role to play in this regard. While such groups are often uniquely placed to articulate the grievances that underlie the conflict and channel these into political processes, they are also able to remobilise for violence and undermine progress on peace. This report discusses existing knowledge about the ways in which rebel groups transform into political parties and the factors that shape their contribution to peacebuilding. It then examines three cases of political parties that have emerged from rebel groups – the FMLN of El Salvador, UCPN (Maoist) of Nepal and SPLM of South Sudan. In each case it explores how the internal dynamics of the group and its relationship to society, the nature of the peace settlement, and the broader local and international context determine the group’s engagement with democracy and peace processes. Finally, the report examines how international actors can support rebel-to-party transition and the integration of these parties into peace processes and political systems in ways that promote a sustainable and inclusive peace.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Peacekeeping, Political Parties, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Africa, Asia, Nepal, Latin America, El Salvador, and South Sudan

17. A Medium- and Long-Term Plan to Address the Central American Refugee Situation

Author:
Dan Restrepo and Silva Mathema
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
It is impossible to understand the flow of refugees emanating from Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador—collectively, known as the Northern Triangle of Central America—without understanding the security and economic conditions in each of the three countries. Despite important differences, the three Northern Triangle countries are among the poorest in the Americas and the most violent in the world. Based on statistics from the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, or UNODC, Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador were three of the five most dangerous countries in the world in 2013—the last year for which U.N. statistics are available. That year, Honduras had the world’s highest per capita homicide rate, at 90.4 homicides per 100,000 people; El Salvador ranked fourth, with a rate of 41.2 homicides per 100,000 people; and Guatemala was fifth, with a rate of 39.9 homicides per 100,000 people. Since then, the situation in El Salvador has dramatically worsened following the 2014 breakdown of a 2012 truce between two of its largest and most powerful street gangs: MS-13 and Barrio 18. In 2015, El Salvador became the most dangerous country in the Western Hemisphere, with a homicide rate of 108.5 per 100,000. This made it 24 times more dangerous than the United States, which had a homicide rate of 4.5 per 100,000 in 2014. The violence in some of these countries’ cities is even worse. For example, San Salvador, the capital city of El Salvador, averaged one murder every hour in August 2015—the highest number of murders since the end of the country’s horrific civil war in 1992.5 The 2015 homicide rates in both Honduras and Guatemala improved to 62.5 and 29.2 homicides per 100,000 people, respectively.
Topic:
Migration, Border Control, Refugee Crisis, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, Honduras, El Salvador, and United States of America

18. A Short-Term Plan to Address the Central American Refugee Situation

Author:
Philip E. Wolgin
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Over the past half-decade, rising violence and structural poverty in the Northern Triangle region of Central America—which encompasses El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala—have pushed thousands of children and families to flee for safety. These three countries are some of the most dangerous on the planet, with high rates of homicide and specifically femicide—the killing of women and girls. Violence, corruption, and extortion play a big part in everyday life. Since 2014, more than 120,000 children and another 120,000 people in family units from this region have arrived in the United States seeking protection. The flow of these asylum seekers peaked in fiscal year 2014 before dipping, perhaps temporarily, in FY 2015. This drop occurred not because conditions improved in the region but because of a sustained effort by the U.S. government—with the help of Mexico and the Northern Triangle countries—to stop people from making the dangerous journey or to intercept them on the way to the United States. This year, in FY 2016, the numbers of children and families arriving in the United States have begun to rise again as conditions in the region continue to deteriorate. This report lays out short-term recommendations for ensuring that all asylum seekers who reach the United States receive a full and fair shot at protection. The recommendations are structured to follow the process that children and families go through when seeking protection: arrival in the United States, custody determinations and detention, and proceedings in the immigration courts.
Topic:
Migration, Border Control, Refugee Crisis, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Central America, North America, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and United States of America

19. Strategic Insights: Fragile States Cannot Be Fixed With State-Building

Author:
Dr. Robert D. Lamb
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The problem with the way the international community thinks about and responds to fragile states is not that we do not understand “fragility,” its causes, and its cures, but that we think of them as “states,” as coherent units of analysis. As a result of this strategic level mistake, efforts to build state capacity to contain violence and reduce poverty are at least as likely to destabilize the country as they are to help. The U.S. military should consider the destabilizing potential of its efforts to build capacity, train and equip security forces, and provide support to diplomacy and development when its partners and beneficiaries are officials of fragile states. State formation has always been an exceedingly bloody endeavor. Most stable countries worthy of the term “state” that are stable, including wealthy, Western, liberal, or democratic nation-states, came into being through complicated social processes, including war, ethnic cleansing, or genocide. That violence was followed by an institutionalization of the values and social priorities of the victors, combined with some degree of accommodation for the vanquished across and within the new state’s borders. State formation, in other words, has always been a matter of violent exclusion followed by pragmatic inclusion. In all successful states today, those processes have resulted in stable formal political systems, with a significant degree of internal consensus over how those systems should be governed. Today, a quarter of the world’s population, and half of the world’s poor people by some estimates, live in places commonly referred to as “fragile states,” beset by conflict, poverty traps, low social cohesion and, in many cases, cycles of violence and terror. These pathologies are not contained within the borders of fragile states, however. As it is ritually noted in most articles on state fragility, these are places that often generate dangerous spillovers: regional tensions, international terrorism, transnational organized crime, an inability to contain outbreaks of disease, and other problems generally associated with the term “instability.” But fragile states are not “states” in the same sense as those that are stable. They developed differently. They went through periods of tribal governance and warfare and, in some cases, territorial consolidation, as European states did, but then most were subjected to colonization by distant powers or severe domination by regional hegemons, in both cases with foreigners imposing borders and manipulating local politics, elevating one set of elites at the expense of populations with whom they did not share a tribal, ethnic, or national identity. When those foreign powers left (or reduced their footprint), the empowered elites either held on to power or were removed from power by their former subjects. In both cases, the internal fragmentation of views about governance—who should govern and how—remained and in all fragile states continues to be one of the most important determinants of fragility. The most common international responses to these pathologies tend to be exploitation by regional powers, containment by developed countries concerned about spillovers of violence, and capacity building of national institutions by international development agencies attempting to address the “root causes” of fragility by building state structures capable of governing the way “states” are supposed to govern. Looking at these two sets of countries—well governed, legitimate, and stable on one side, with poorly governed, illegitimate, and unstable on the other—it is understandable to conclude that, if only fragile states were more legitimate and better governed, they would also be more stable, peaceful, and prosperous. Post-conflict reconstruction, stabilization, poverty reduction, and other efforts to improve the quality of life for people living in fragile and conflict environments tend, therefore, to focus on building the legitimacy and capacity of state institutions, both military and civilian. Efforts to reduce the spillover of violence and terrorism likewise have key elements of state-building. When, however, has state-building ever worked? That is, when has foreign assistance to formal state institutions and civil society over an extended period of time, in places whose borders were drawn by, and whose elites were elevated by, foreign powers but where local populations do not agree with each other over basic questions of legitimate governance, ever resulted in the establishment of a stable state, one that is no longer “fragile” (in the usual definitions) or at significant risk of a return to violent politics? Consider the places often cited as state-building success stories. When I have asked proponents of state-building to name unambiguous successes, the responses most commonly include Germany and Japan after World War II, East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and sometimes Rwanda. But Germany and Japan were already states with highly developed bureaucracies that were largely left in place after their military forces were defeated. These were not cases of state-building but of state recovery and, in truth, they have little to teach us about how to stabilize fragile states. The borders of East Timor and Kosovo came into being as a result of wars; they are clear examples of state formation still in progress, and it is difficult to call Kosovo a success story when that country’s stability continues to depend so much on an international presence. Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Rwanda have made progress, but they have not been stable long enough to be considered stabilized, and certainly they continue to appear on lists of fragile states. Moreover, some post-conflict countries that have done things “right” according to the typical state-building script have dramatically regressed into violence—El Salvador is an excellent example—whereas some that have done things “wrong,” such as Laos, have managed to remain stable for more than 40 years. As a thought experiment, consider the following two possibilities. A fragile state is territorially fragmented along ethnic and sectarian lines, there are frequent civilian attacks between identity groups, the parliament and ministries are dominated by one group at the expense of the others and, as a consequence, there is constant low-level violence punctuated by periods of intense internal war and repression by the majority ethnic group, which nevertheless enjoys international recognition and assistance as “the” government and the “partner” whose “capacity” is to be built. Years of pouring resources into that government and its security forces serve only to strengthen one group at the expense of the others, providing counsel (and few incentives) to treat the other groups better while giving them the capacity to treat the other groups worse, thereby increasing the potential for conflict. Yet, even in such places, there are some stable, reasonably well-governed territories and communities that maintain a great degree of independence from the central government, with consensus on how they want to be governed, capable of collecting the resources they need to do so (in some cases democratically), and able to defend themselves against external aggression. Somaliland is an excellent example, but most fragile states have similar communities (large percentages of Afghans, for example, have reported that the conflict this past decade simply never affected their community). Such places look suspiciously like they are engaging in classic state formation, and doing so with neither support from their national governments nor recognition from the international community—whose support of their national governments often undermines local, successful state formation. I am not arguing that the international community should try to break up fragile states into more stable territories. Outsiders are not likely to be any more effective at redrawing the borders of fragile states today than the outsiders who drew the modern borders of those counties in the first place. But when a country falls apart in a civil war such that the state can no longer be said to be relevant in some areas of the country, or when the elites in control of national governing institutions fail to support or recognize the legitimacy of large segments of their own populations, due consideration should be given to those areas of the country that manage to stabilize on their own and govern the areas they control in ways that are more consistent with international norms than the central government is or had been. State-building is ineffective, and breaking up states is dangerous. International support to (if not recognition of) subnational state formation in fragile states is, therefore, among the more promising ways to think about how best to respond to fragile states. ***** The views expressed in this Strategic Insights article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This article is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** Organizations interested in reprinting this or other SSI and USAWC Press articles should contact the Editor for Production via e-mail at SSI_Publishing@conus.army.mil. All organizations granted this right must include the following statement: “Reprinted with permission of the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College.”
Topic:
Security, Democratization, Development, and Fragile/Failed State
Political Geography:
El Salvador and United States of America

20. Behind the Numbers: Insecurity and Marginalization in Central America

Author:
Matthew Budd and Marcela Donadio
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Americas Quarterly
Institution:
Council of the Americas
Abstract:
With 11 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2012, Nicaragua stands out as a relatively fortunate exception in a region whose homicide rates rank among the world's highest. Its northern neighbors all recorded rates at least three times greater: with Guatemala at 34.3 murders per 100,000 citizens; El Salvador at 41.5; and—at the top of this grim list—Honduras at 85.5. To the south of Nicaragua, only traditionally stable and more developed Costa Rica recorded a lower rate (8.8). Panama registered 17.6 murders per 100,000 in 2012.
Political Geography:
Central America, Guatemala, and El Salvador