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51. The Role of Egyptian Female Entrepreneurship in the Digital Era post-COVID-19

Author:
Doaa Salman Abdou
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The current “cloud revolution” accelerates the digitalisation of economies as it expands business opportunities, thus boosting the economy and enhancing business activities. During the COVID-19 pandemic, digital economy countries had the opportunity to sustain many activities remotely, while many developing countries fell into poverty and were forced to face a surge of unemployment. There were more unemployed females than males, and the female participation rate was lower than for males. Digitalisation can accelerate female entrepreneurs’ participation in the labour market and allow them to increase their productivity growth. It can therefore help increase their standard of living, decreasing poverty and creating economic stability (Van Praag & Versloot, 2007). COVID-19 challenges the dreams of many entrepreneurs across the globe to sustain their business using technology but even more so in developing countries as their access to technology is lower than in developed countries because it is not affordable and in some rural areas not available. In this context, not all countries have been affected in the same way. As a result of the epidemic, women’s employment decreased the most throughout the Americas (a reduction of 9.4%). The Arab States saw the second-largest drop in the number of employed women, with women’s employment falling by 4.1% and men’s by 1.8% between 2019 and 2020 (ILO, 2021). The pandemic widens the gender gap rather than closing it. Such a shock urges a reduction of the digital divide, as it is considered a necessary tool and not a luxury. Such a tool can keep businesses going and help them recover after the global shock, especially for women who had to stay at home with their children. Women, youths and people with medium and low skills experienced a decline in employment worldwide in 2020. Female workers were disproportionately affected compared to male workers, with unemployment accounting for 38.9% of total employment before the COVID-19 crisis but rising to 47.6% of the total workforce (ILO, 2020). The lockdown due to the pandemic pushed women to learn how to benefit from digitalisation as it has a direct link to both poverty alleviation and women’s empowerment, especially in developing countries, where it plays a significant role in gender equality and economic development.
Topic:
Entrepreneurship, Feminism, Pandemic, COVID-19, Digitalization, and Gender
Political Geography:
Africa and Egypt

52. New Dynamics, Old Problems: Turkey’s Rapprochement Overtures in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Nicholas Danforth
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
Over the past year Turkey has slowly worked to reduce tensions with regional rivals, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. There are limits to how far this process can go. It may produce détente but not a deeper realignment. Even though it has not led to elections, the ceasefire and ensuing political process in Libya have benefited and benefited from this reduction in tensions. Western governments should support any steps that lessen the risk of military conflict, but should not offer concessions to Ankara in pursuit of this goal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Rapprochement
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, United Arab Emirates, and Mediterranean

53. Egypt Faces Severe Economic Problems

Author:
Sara Nowacka
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In August, a year before the end of his term of office, Tarek Amer, head of the Egyptian Central Bank, resigned. This was a consequence of the deepening economic crisis caused by a decline in the country’s currency reserves and the impact of global problems on Egypt, which is dependent on food imports. Capital-intensive investments, mainly in the energy and real estate sectors, will exacerbate Egypt’s situation. Given the size of its population, economic collapse would have a significant destabilising impact on the EU’s southern neighbourhood.
Topic:
Economics, Currency, Economic Stability, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:
Middle East and Egypt

54. Financing Pledges and Managing Expectations

Author:
Margareth Sembiring
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies
Abstract:
The aim of Egypt’s chairmanship of the latest climate change conference was on the implementation of financing pledges to realise specific goals for mitigating the climate crisis. Yet, limited success was achieved. Going forward, it is necessary to manage expectations and to redirect efforts into what is deliverable.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Finance, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:
Africa, Egypt, and MENA

55. US Aid to Egypt: The Challenge of Balancing National Interest and Human Rights

Author:
Murad Ali, Mairaj ul Hamid, and Sadia Sulaiman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Society of Social Science Academics (SSSA)
Abstract:
The United States provides generous aid to developing countries around the world. However, one of the conditions for aid giving is to first make sure that the receiving country is not involved in human rights violations. In this respect the US has also passed legislation in 1970s that clearly forbids aid, both economic and military, to a country involved in human rights violations. While such legislation is in place, the actual practice of aid giving often ignores the human rights violations. In this article, we focus on the US aid giving to Egypt and explore whether the US took into consideration the aspect of human rights violation by the latter. Examining US economic and military aid to Egypt over an extended period of several decades covering various regimes including that of President Sisi, we conclude that the US has consistently ignored the aspect of human rights violations as the country is vital for safeguarding US foreign policy goals in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Development Aid, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
North Africa, North America, Egypt, and United States of America

56. The Geopolitics of Seawater Desalination

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Élise Cassignol
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Water desalination is gradually emerging as the leading solution to cope with increasing water stress: i.e., the imbalance between water demand and quantities available. The United Nations estimates that by 2025, two-thirds of the world’s population will be affected by such challenges. The causes of water scarcity are multiple, including climate change, intensive agriculture, and population growth. This requires states to rethink their water policies, which are central to preserving their stability, resilience and sovereignty. A real “boom” in desalination industries is at work. The majority of Gulf countries now largely depend on desalinated water for their inhabitants’ consumption: in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 42% of drinking water comes from desalination plants producing more than 7 million cubic meters (m3) per day, in Kuwait it is 90%, in Oman 86%, and in Saudi Arabia 70%. In 2022, there were more than 21,000 seawater desalination plants in operation worldwide, almost twice as many as a decade ago, and the sector’s capacity is growing at between +6% and +12% per year. By 2030, desalination capacity in Middle Eastern countries is expected to almost double, as part of plans announced in the region to prepare these economies for their transition to “post-oil” and to foster resilience. Saudi Arabia’s desalination capacity is set to increase from 5.6 million cubic meter (m3) per day in 2022 to 8.5 million m3 per day in 2025, and it will have to cover more than 90% of the country’s water consumption. The same holds for the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Israel, where the production of desalinated water will more than double by 2030. With the rise of available solutions to meet all such needs, these technologies are now in demand on virtually every continent, while the Middle East today represents only 50% of installed capacity worldwide. In Africa, large-scale projects have recently been announced in Algeria and Morocco, countries that until now have had sufficient resources. Other countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Kenya supply many cities with desalinated seawater. This is also the case for Cairo. In the Indo-pacific region, particularly in China and India, the needs for desalinated water are increasing, driven by growing industries and decreasing available water. In 2020 alone, the construction of more than 35 desalination plants was announced in China, as well as six in the Philippines, and six in Taiwan. In the Americas, the west coast of the United States stands out with important projects in California, and Texas is not far behind. In Latin America, new projects are emerging in Peru and Chile, driven mainly by the needs of the mining industry, while in Mexico the demand for desalinated water notably comes from the population. Finally, island areas stand out for their strong needs for desalinated water: Cebu in the Philippines, Cape Verde, the Canary Islands and the Maldives are increasingly using desalination capabilities. European firms still lead, but Asian or local players are taking off There are many industrial players of varied size, although some have emerged for more than ten years as undisputed market leaders: in France, they include Engie and Veolia, whose merger with Suez opened up new prospects in the Americas, the Middle East and Europe; but there is also IDE Technologies, the Israeli champion of desalination; Korea’s Doosan Heavy, China’s Abengoa, and Spain’s Acciona. More recently, companies in emerging countries have distinguished themselves by obtaining large-scale contracts. This is particularly the case of Gulf players like the Emirati company Metito and the Saudi firm Advanced Water Technologies. Egypt also has industrial actors. Overall, the technology of reverse osmosis is largely mastered, while production differentiation concerns capacity, operational costs, electricity consumption and plant life.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Water, Industry, and Desalination
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Gulf Nations

57. COP27: Will Egypt Bring New Life to Climate Conferences?

Author:
Thibaud Voïta
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The COP26, held at the end of 2021 in Glasgow, was emphatically heralded as “the last best hope for the world to get its act together”. Many elements are pointing to a particularly difficult COP27, among which the unfinished work of the Glasgow COP, the worsening of the climate crisis, the tensions in the hydrocarbon markets, and the risks of economic recession. This COP in Sharm-El-Sheik is nevertheless the first hosted outside the European continent since 2016 and the first under the aegis of a rapidly changing UN Climate Change. It takes place on the African continent and, like the COP28 chaired by the United Arab Emirates, is held in a country that wants to be a hub for all types of energies. Therefore, the role of gas in the energy transition has become a central topic. Finally, African countries are pushing for a greater contribution from rich countries to the fight against climate change, especially regarding the financial adaptation, and the acceleration of implementation efforts (rather than announcements of new initiatives).
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Gas, Renewable Energy, Energy, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
North Africa and Egypt

58. Retain, Restructure, or Divest? Policy Options for Egypt’s Military Economy

Author:
Yezid Sayigh
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Egyptian military has been on a dramatic expansionary trajectory since seizing power in July 2013. Having previously been an economic backwater, the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and other military agencies have spearheaded the enormous state-led investment strategy that President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has pursued since he came to office in 2014. The military controls a vast economic portfolio. It manages a significant share of the overall volume of publicly contracted infrastructure and housing. It builds industrial zones and produces capital goods, consumer durables, transport and heavy goods vehicles and parts, and information technology equipment. It undertakes associated retail, owns commercial media companies and hotels, and is rapidly increasing its stake in agriculture, fisheries, and mineral extraction. As of September 2021, the military even has a monopoly on the production of school meals. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) has formally controlled the use of state land by any civilian individual or entity, whether private or public, since 2001. The Ministry of Military Production (MOMP) is now one of two bodies that approves the import of foreign goods or services by government agencies. Military representatives sit on national boards, including for planning and sustainable development; feed into policy direction in several sectors, including the manufacturing industry, telecommunications, digital transformation, market development for electric vehicles, and rural development; and head major presidential initiatives, including the Long Live Egypt (Tahya Misr) development fund and the company responsible for constructing Egypt’s new administrative capital. Plans are underway to increase the capitalization of military companies by inviting private investment through the Egyptian sovereign wealth fund. What I have called an “officers’ republic”—comprising thousands of senior EAF retirees embedded in government ministries and agencies, regulatory and operational economic authorities, local government, and state-owned enterprises—complements the formal military economy. Military agencies and companies provide significant economic benefits. Military-managed public investment in transport infrastructure, for example, facilitates the movement of people and goods and expands access to external markets and investment opportunities. The construction of social housing for low-income groups addresses a serious shortage and assists government efforts to regenerate the informal settlements and slums where approximately one in seven Egyptians live. New industrial zones and extensive agricultural greenhouse projects attract investors, both domestic and foreign, contributing to economic growth and employment. And lower middle–class customers benefit from the expanding range of locally made consumer goods at affordable prices, alongside cheap meat and poultry imports, subsidized health services, and free food baskets for the poor. Why, then, should Egypt reconsider the military’s role in the economy?
Topic:
Armed Forces, Economy, Business, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

59. Throwing Down the Gauntlet: What the IMF Can Do About Egypt’s Military Companies

Author:
Yezid Sayigh
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Until recently, both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank were wholly reticent to say anything about the involvement of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) and other military agencies in Egypt’s civilian economy. This is a longstanding problem. By turning a blind eye to the diversion of resources to the military sector and to the increasingly significant impacts on the economy and public finances, these international financial institutions (IFIs) have undermined the effectiveness of their own programs and allowed their resources to be invested in support of suboptimal policies by the Egyptian government. There is a question of propriety when international assistance allows distorted policy incentives to continue or even intensify and disregards the fact that much of the hype about global growth in the Egyptian economy obscures the very real constraints imposed on private sector development. It is high time to throw down the gauntlet: IFIs and their governmental sponsors should tackle the reality of military involvement systematically in their programs and policy recommendations, and they should confront the issue head on in their dealings with Egypt’s authorities. Reticence persists but is starting to dissipate. A report released by the World Bank in December 2020 noted that military agencies account for an appreciable proportion of all state-owned enterprises producing capital goods; consumer durables and apparel; materials; food, beverages, and tobacco; automobiles and components; retailing; media and entertainment; semiconductors and intelligent transportation system equipment; and technology hardware and equipment.1 The IMF went further in a July 2021 review of its loan agreement with Egypt, in which it referred to the presence and role of Egyptian military companies for the first time ever.2 Significantly, it included them explicitly in its assessment of state-owned enterprises in general—many of which, the report noted, are “registering weak financial performance while some are benefiting from an uneven playing field”—and implied that military companies should come under the same broad reform policies that the IMF proposes for the public sector as a whole. Now that the IMF, in particular, has broken its former silence, it should refine its approach so as to tackle the Egyptian military’s economic role in a more targeted and consistent manner—hence making its approach more effective and sustainable. This requires a mix of measures. The first set involves bringing military agencies and companies within the scope of recommendations proposed by the IMF for Egypt’s civilian public sector and state-owned enterprises as a whole. These first measures therefore engage with IMF recommendations and Egyptian government policy initiatives relating to broad questions of ownership, regulation, and financing strategy. The second set of measures tackles the specific aspects of the legal, regulatory, and judicial frameworks that enable the military’s activities in the civilian domain. Unless they are revised, these enabling frameworks will impede wider reforms, but the Egyptian government and IMF have, for the most part, neither reviewed nor addressed them to date.
Topic:
Regulation, Economy, Business, IMF, Civil-Military Relations, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, North America, and Egypt

60. How Huawei’s Localization in North Africa Delivered Mixed Returns

Author:
Tin Hinane El Kadi
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Trade between China and North Africa has increased significantly since the early 2000s, but it has largely reproduced patterns of unequal exchange. Since they were unveiled, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Chinese government’s 2016 Arab Policy Paper have signaled the promise of a qualitative shift in China’s engagement with the region. China has committed to increase investments in high-value-added sectors and to boost cooperation in science and technology with countries across North Africa. The digital space is a notable aspect of recent China–North African partnerships. Chinese tech firms are becoming ever more important actors in North Africa through the Digital Silk Road, the digital component of the BRI. North African governments see the Digital Silk Road as an opportunity to help bridge the digital divide and bolster their own national efforts to build digital economies and create high-quality jobs for the millions of unemployed university graduates across the region. In recent years, the region has become home to notable Digital Silk Road projects such as smart cities, satellite navigation centers, data centers, and network infrastructure. Huawei’s localization strategies in Algeria and Egypt show that, far from imposing a one-size-fits-all blueprint on other countries, as Beijing is often depicted as doing in U.S. and European media and policy discussions, Chinese tech players adapt their engagement depending on local development agendas. Flexibility, customization, and services tailored to local demand have been cornerstones of Huawei’s localization strategies in North Africa. Accommodating local development priorities is central to Huawei’s success in globalizing its business ventures. The Chinese firm has responded favorably to Algeria’s and Egypt’s attempts to leverage foreign companies for conducting more value-added activities within their respective economies. Among other things, Huawei opened its first African factory in Algeria, employing Algerians to assemble products for and beyond the Algerian market. It also launched an OpenLab for conducting research and development (R&D) activities in Egypt and established partnerships with several universities in the region to train local students. However, closer scrutiny of Huawei’s localization in both Algeria and Egypt indicates that the company improved its brand image without engaging in meaningful capacity building. For all its success at winning the hearts of government officials across the region, Huawei has engaged in training, manufacturing, and R&D in a way designed to maintain the firm’s technological edge. The Chinese tech giant has managed to localize seemingly developmental activities in North Africa without contributing much to technological upgrading. North African governments should take lessons from China’s playbook of how it became a technological superpower. This means adopting policies that could maximize the benefits of Chinese and non-Chinese investments by ensuring positives spillovers and protecting potential local tech champions. Increasing economic integration across North African countries and moving beyond fragmented bilateral commercial negotiations with China are two steps that may help level the playing field with the Asian giant.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Telecommunications, Huawei, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Algeria, North Africa, and Egypt