Number of results to display per page
Search Results
12. Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine
- Author:
- Eric Ciaramella
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Working Paper
- Institution:
- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Abstract:
- The moment has arrived for Western leaders to offer a practical vision for Ukraine’s long-term security. This paper lays out a detailed proposal for a sustainable multilateral security arrangement in which Ukraine has a strong military that is backed by legally codified pledges of support—training, equipping, and defense industrial cooperation—from the United States and Europe. The model outlined in this paper draws on official Ukrainian government proposals and lessons from the United States’ security relationships with close partners that are not treaty allies, notably Israel. It prioritizes a strategy of deterrence by denial: by fielding a robust, modernized, and well-trained military, Ukraine can raise the cost of future aggression to such a point that Russia would lose confidence in its ability to achieve its objectives there through force.1 Independent of battlefield developments, Ukraine and its partners must negotiate a long-term security arrangement now. Reaching a consensus sooner rather than later on a framework makes more sense than putting off controversial decisions until large-scale hostilities end. A security arrangement has the potential to undermine President Vladimir Putin’s conviction that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. It can also assure Ukraine that it will be able to defend its sovereignty even if it does not liberate its entire territory this year. Many of the elements contained in this proposal can be implemented during wartime—indeed, some of them are already in place—and strengthened after the war. The proposed security model is not necessarily an alternative to NATO membership, which enjoys strong support from Ukraine’s leaders and public. The allies have promised the country an eventual place in NATO, but they have made clear that this will not be on the agenda while the war is ongoing. Even once the war ends, they are unlikely to move swiftly to admit Ukraine. Therefore, the proposal here seeks to enhance the country’s ability to defend itself as it remains outside of NATO for the foreseeable future. At the same time, it emphasizes the critical role Ukraine’s EU accession will play in its long-term security. The United States must lead the conversation on a future security arrangement. Not only does its unparalleled capacity for security assistance and multinational coordination make it vital to the success of the arrangement, but a clear long-term U.S. pledge to Ukraine would also prompt Europe to increase its commitments, thereby ensuring proper burden-sharing. The proposed arrangement would be flexible enough to encompass commitments from the EU as a collective, from individual member states, and from other countries. To make the U.S. commitment to Ukraine credible and durable, the Biden administration must work with Congress to secure broad bipartisan support. This study identifies five elements that are critical to a future security arrangement: Strong political and legal codification that ensures the arrangement will endure regardless of electoral cycles and leadership changes in the United States and Europe A predictable, multiyear pipeline for military supplies that enables Ukraine to plan and sustain a future force structure capable of deterring Russian aggression Support for Ukraine’s defense industry, as well as targeted defense industrial investments in the United States and Europe to prepare for a long war and an extended period of Ukrainian military reconstitution Mechanisms for political consultations, information sharing, and coordination to ensure that Ukraine’s military needs are met in a timely fashion Clear linkage to Ukraine’s EU accession process and postwar reconstruction Much of the public debate to date has focused on Ukraine’s request for security “guarantees” in response to the failure of the previous “assurances” encapsulated in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. To avoid confusion, and in light of the historical baggage these terms carry, this paper uses “arrangement” or “commitment” to refer to the future legal and political framework in question.2
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
13. The importance of the United States in Poland’s military security policy in the context of the war in Ukraine
- Author:
- Łukasz Jureńczyk
- Publication Date:
- 03-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
- Institution:
- Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
- Abstract:
- The subject of the article is the importance of the United States in Poland’s military security policy in relation to the war in Ukraine. The article begins with an introduction discussing its main assumptions and a synthetic historical background of the importance of the US for Poland and its security. The main part of the article is divided into two parts, the first one discussing the importance of the US in Poland’s military security policy after the Cold War. The second part is devoted to the change in the importance of the US in this policy in connection with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the main factors that determine this change. The aim of the article is to identify and analyze the changes in the importance of the United States in the Polish military security policy as a result of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. The main research problem is whether the importance of the US in Poland’s military security policy increased as a result of the war, and if so, because of what main factors? The thesis of the article states that the war in Ukraine increased the importance of the US as the main external guarantor of Poland’s security and defense. This is due to the leading role played by the United States in military support for Ukraine and strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, in the absence of leadership from Western European powers. The research included interviews with scientists and analysts from research centers in Washington and New York.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Poland, and United States of America
14. The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: From Full-Scale War to Conflict Resolution and Post-War Recovery
- Author:
- Yuri Yakymenko, A. Bychenko, Makysm Bielawski, V. Zamiatin, and Oleksiy Melnyk
- Publication Date:
- 06-2023
- Content Type:
- Journal Article
- Journal:
- National Security and Defence
- Institution:
- Razumkov Centre
- Abstract:
- For 570 days, Ukraine has been living in a full-scale war against the russian aggressor, defending its freedom, independence and very right to exist. During this time, our country has suffered losses and destruction on a scale unimaginable on the European continent after the World War II. Towns and villages wrecked to the ground, tens of thousands dead, artificially created environmental disasters and constant nuclear blackmail, the deportation of Ukrainian children – an outright act of genocide against the Ukrainian people, systematic destruction of the country’s energy, transport and agricultural infrastructure, the war against the civilian population, the war-induced migration and demographic crisis are just a few points in the long list of disasters caused by russian aggression.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Economy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
15. Serbia on Edge
- Author:
- Richard Kraemer
- Publication Date:
- 03-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
- Abstract:
- The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans
16. Lessons for Taiwan from Ukraine
- Author:
- Sascha Glaeser
- Publication Date:
- 10-2022
- Content Type:
- Commentary and Analysis
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- The Russo-Ukraine war is analogous in several ways to a hypothetical war between China and Taiwan. Like Ukraine, Taiwan is a relatively weak state, threatened by a neighboring great power with a sizable nuclear arsenal who makes historical claims to its territory, and has some backing from the United States. Ukraine’s experience provides several lessons for Taiwan. War remains an instrument of statecraft that great powers use in pursuit of their perceived national interests; smaller, weaker states should plan accordingly. In Taiwan’s case, that means continuation of the status quo which has helped provide peace for decades. Taiwan should assume the United States will not engage in direct conflict with China on its behalf. This assumption should encourage Taiwan to focus its military strategy on securing an advantage by acquiring more anti-access, area-denial capability and reforming its reserve force to help it deter or resist an invasion. While Ukraine shows Taiwan could expect an outpouring of global humanitarian and military aid if attacked, its island geography and the likely course of the war means it might not manage to receive or access those supplies, and should therefore maintain strategic stockpiles of weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, and other supplies. The United States and others will likely impose economic sanctions on China. However, sanctions are unlikely to alter China’s behavior in any meaningful way if it has already committed to war.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Taiwan, and Asia
17. American Interests in the Ukraine War
- Author:
- Joshua Shifrinson
- Publication Date:
- 09-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Defense Priorities
- Abstract:
- Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America
18. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War
- Author:
- Luke Coffey
- Publication Date:
- 07-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
19. Russia Can Still Be Defeated, But Time Is Short
- Author:
- Can Kasapoglu
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- At Davos last May, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sparked a controversy when he argued that Kyiv must cede territory to Moscow to achieve peace. Kissinger may well be correct to assert that a stable balance between Russia and Ukraine will require some trade-offs based on the principles of Realpolitik. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that Putin—a former KGB officer who considers the collapse of the Soviet Union to have been the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century—launched this war simply to secure a border readjustment. Putin’s essay, published in April 2021, expresses his view with admirable clarity: Ukraine, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is Russia. In sum, he launched this invasion to subordinate Ukraine to Moscow—totally and permanently. We should also not conclude that Russia’s battlefield setbacks have been so severe as to deflect Putin from his original goal. After he failed to subordinate Ukraine swiftly with a quick knockout blow directed at the capital, Kyiv, he moved to Plan B: a strategy of exhaustion. He is now determined to grind Ukraine down slowly and deliberately with the expectation that eventually it will have no choice but to bow to his iron fist. For its part, the West should thwart Putin’s strategy by safeguarding Ukraine’s political and economic independence. Kissinger’s comments did not bring us closer to achieving that goal. If members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) follow his lead and attempt to cajole Kyiv into ceding territory now, while Russia still believes it has the upper hand on the battlefield, their efforts will only whet Putin’s appetite for expansion. Putin will begin to entertain compromises acceptable to the West only when he comes to believe that failure to do so will lead inevitably to catastrophic losses for Russia. The bad news is that the military balance on the ground right now will not lead him to such a conclusion. If NATO members act quickly, however, there is still time to shift the dynamic in Ukraine’s favor—but it will not be easy.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe
20. Six Months after the Russian Invasion, the West Needs Better Clock Management
- Author:
- Peter Rough, Luke Coffey, and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
- Publication Date:
- 08-2022
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Hudson Institute
- Abstract:
- Ukraine’s status as a borderland between Europe and Russia has often confined it to the periphery of Western strategic thought. For many, Ukraine constitutes the southeastern edge of the European continent, but not its heartland. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, Ukraine sits at the center of his strategic vision for Eurasia. Far from a backwater, the country is the key to his imperial aims—a prize for which he has risked his army and bet his rule. In Putin’s mind, if Russia were to control Ukraine, Moscow would dominate the Black Sea—and so would be in a stronger position in every connected region, from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus and from the Balkans to the Caspian Basin. Russia would also complete its breakout into the Eastern Mediterranean, long a priority of Moscow, by securing the connection between its warm water ports in the Black Sea to its new bases on the Syrian coast.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
- Political Geography:
- Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe