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151. The role of Nagorno-Karabakh in the shaping of Armenian and Azeri identity

Author:
Ricardo Juan Torres
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
The paper discusses the effect of the 19th century rebirth of Armenian nationalism in the Ottoman or Western Armenia and Russian or Eastern Armenia and that of Azeri nationalism in Russian Azerbaijan with its ramifications in Iran and Ottoman Turkey on the formation of Armenian and Azeri identity from the late 1800s to the present and the key role of Nagorno-Karabakh - called Artsakh by the Armenians - from the beginning of the 20th century, using the theories of Anthony D. Smith.
Topic:
Nationalism, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Identity
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

152. The Russian invasion to Ukraine: An agribusiness perspective

Author:
Hugo Krajnc
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Argentine Council for International Relations (CARI)
Abstract:
It is quite relevant that the arguments used to justify the Russian invasion to Ukraine do not highlight economic components. Although it may be difficult to assert that such decision was also driven by economic issues, it is quite hard as well to deny that those were not involved, given the traditional Russian geopolitical perspective.
Topic:
War, Economy, Conflict, and Agribusiness
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

153. On the Design of Effective Sanctions: The Case of Bans on Exports to Russia

Author:
Ricardo Hausmann, Ulrich Schetter, and Muhammad A. Yildirim
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
The John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
Abstract:
We analyze the effects of bans on exports at the level of 5’000 products and show how our results can inform economic sanctions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. We begin with characterizing export restrictions imposed by the EU and the US until mid May 2022. We then propose a theoretically-grounded criterion for targeting export bans at the 6-digit HS level. Our results show that the cost to Russia are highly convex in the market share of the sanctioning parties, i.e., there are large benefits from coordinating export bans among a broad coalition of countries. Applying our results to Russia, we find that sanctions imposed by the EU and the US are not systematically related to our arguments once we condition on Russia’s total imports of a product from participating countries. Quantitative evaluations of the export bans show (i) that they are very effective with the welfare loss typically ∼100 times larger for Russia than for the sanctioners. (ii) Improved coordination of the sanctions and targeting sanctions based on our criterion allows to increase the costs to Russia by about 60% with little to no extra cost to the sanctioners. (iii) There is scope for increasing the cost to Russia further by expanding the set of sanctioned products.
Topic:
Sanctions, European Union, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

154. Trade Liberalization, Collective Bargaining and Workers: Wages and Working Conditions

Author:
Bastien Alvarez, Gianluca Orefice, and Farid Toubal
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII)
Abstract:
Using large scale data on Eastern European workers, we show significant and sizable deteriorations of their wages and working conditions in regions that faced large tariff liberalization and strong erosion of collective bargaining over the process of accession to the European Union. Import tariffs liberalization reduces workers' wages. The deterioration of working conditions is mostly driven by increased labor demand due to the improvement of Eastern countries' international market access. The erosion of collective bargaining worsens wages and working conditions.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Tariffs, Collective Bargaining, and Wages
Political Geography:
Europe and Eastern Europe

155. Estonia as an Area of Russian Influence: Analysis and Synthesis of the Kremlin’s Methodology of Exerting Influence on Tallinn’s Political and Social Stability

Author:
Jacek Bil
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Polish Political Science Yearbook
Institution:
Polish Political Science Association (PPSA)
Abstract:
Russia's hostile actions against the Estonian state structures take the form of soft power, which can be observed in such areas as the activities of the Russian-speaking minority, media coverage, or through the use of coercion when it comes to fuel sales. This article presents qualitative methods of measuring Russian influence on Estonia. An observable trend in international relations is replacing hard power with soft power, commonly used against states within the sphere of interest of certain geopolitical entities. It is more difficult to identify the latter and prove it results from an aggressor's deliberate actions. Information warfare, including disinformation and propaganda, is one of the means Russia uses to exert political influence. By accepting the offer of a political and military alliance with the Western world, the Baltic States have become a threat to the Kremlin's imperialist aspirations. Russia's direct military actions against Estonia and the other Baltic states would have provoked a strong reaction and could even have led to military confrontation. However, the Russian government wishes to avoid it and, for the time being, limits itself to soft power measures.
Topic:
Hegemony, Regionalism, Strategic Stability, Foreign Interference, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Estonia

156. Telling America’s Story in Communist Times

Author:
Jonathan B. Rickert
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
American Diplomacy
Institution:
American Diplomacy
Abstract:
During my three tours of duty in communist Eastern Europe (USSR 1960s, Romania 1970s, and Bulgaria 1980s), U.S. diplomats were inhibited in their contacts with local citizens. Most of us spoke the local languages and longed to establish links with a broader range of people. Although that was not impossible, any relationship that was outside of accepted channels was likely either terminated by the local authorities or came to be controlled by them. Visits to post by American experts in the cultural, educational, scientific, and other fields were always welcome, since they helped open doors to people whom it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to meet otherwise. In the case of the USSR, the 1958 U.S.-Soviet Cultural Agreement was a great boon. The size and importance of the Soviet Union meant that relatively large numbers of prominent Americans, including politicians, passed through Moscow. Those visits gave at least some local citizens a window on our country that helped to contradict the pervasive anti-American propaganda that the government promoted. Traveling U.S. exhibitions during my time there, such as “Hand Tools U.S.A.”, exposed ordinary citizens in provincial cities to Russian-speaking American guides and to our culture and values.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Memoir
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Soviet Union, and United States of America

157. The Ukraine Crisis and China-India Relations

Author:
Amrita Jash
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
On March 25, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprise visit to India after stopovers in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC], March 25). The visit was the first by a high-level Chinese official to India since December 2019 and the ongoing border standoff that broke out in May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The sudden stopover, which was not announced in advance, generated speculation over Beijing’s intentions, particularly as it occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia initiating its “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24. This resulted in international condemnation and boycotts, and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S., the European Union, Japan and others on Russia. However, countries such as China and India, made an exception by choosing neutrality in condemning Russia. But did this shared position make any difference in improving China-India ties? Hitherto, relations have not substantively improved, notwithstanding the modest progress in the recent border talks. Following the 16th round of Corps Commander level talks on July 17, China and India stressed the “four-point consensus” they had reached on the resolution of the border issues (Xinhuanet, July 29). This “consensus” was further cited as the reason for the disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point-15 in Gogra-Hot Springs (Global Times, September 9). Notably, the disengagement followed a year-long impasse in the talks process and coincided with both countries’ participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Political stability, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Ukraine, India, and Eastern Europe

158. 16 + 1: China’s Push Into Central and Eastern Europe Loses Momentum

Author:
Filip Jirouš
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Since its inception in 2012, the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC; 中国—中东欧国家合作, Zhongguo—Zhong Dong Ou Guojia Hezuo), better known as the 16+1 or 17+1 initiative, has often been described as a security risk with the potential to divide European structures and make them serve the interests of the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC). The 16+1 is a Sinocentric economic cooperation initiative comprising China and 16 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, which share only a mutual Communist past as a common denominator (in 2019, Greece, which is heavily indebted to China, joined, and the platform was briefly renamed to 17+1). Apart from several different formats such as inter-party dialogues and think tank conferences, the 16+1 holds annual summits attended by state heads, with Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) and then Li Keqiang (李克强) the official highest-ranking PRC representatives in attendance. In comparison, two other, similar, Sinocentric regional platforms — China-CELAC Forum (中国-拉共体论坛, Zhongguo- Lagongti Luntan); and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC: 中非合作论坛, Zhongfei Hezuo Luntan) — are regularly attended by President and General Secretary Xi Jinping (习近平) (China-CELAC Forum, March 1, 2018). Thus far, FOCAC has generated the greatest level of interest from participating regional countries (China Brief, December 3, 2021). By contrast, several CEE countries have distanced themselves from the 16+1 platform: in 2021, Lithuania quit the group and this May, a Czech parliamentary committee urged the government to consider making the same move.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asia

159. The Enemy of My Friend Remains My Friend: China’s Ukraine Dilemma

Author:
Horia Ciurtin
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
State media in China remains equivocal about the level of destruction and mayhem caused by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the Chinese government has stated it will meet the challenge of overcoming strained global supplies resulting from the conflict, and has emphasized that the nation’s food security will be ensured (People’s Daily, June 2; China News Service, May 27). Nevertheless, given Ukraine’s position as a global agricultural supplier, China has not fully appreciated the scope of the problem. At a broader level, the war is a litmus test for China’s ability to navigate geopolitical troubles along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Thus far, the conflict has underscored the difficulties facing China in moving beyond convenient cordialities to play the role of a benign ‘balancer’ in global politics. In its relationships with Moscow and Kyiv, Beijing is entangled financially with both sides. Furthermore, China is now exposed to secondary sanctions due to its economic entanglement with Russia. At the same time, its investments, construction projects and supply chains that traverse Ukraine risk destruction as the war drags on.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Investment, Supply Chains, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
China, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Asia

160. China and Russia: Shackled to a Corpse?

Author:
John Van Oudenaren
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
China Brief
Institution:
The Jamestown Foundation
Abstract:
Almost as soon as Russian tanks began their bloody crawl toward Kyiv, debate ensued over whether Chinese leaders had advance knowledge of the Kremlin’s war plans. The broader Chinese foreign policy community was certainly dumbstruck as U.S. warnings of an imminent Russian attack on Ukraine were discounted as geopolitical ploys (Global Times, February 18; Stimson, February 28). However, given the highly personalized nature of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership— President Xi Jinping has met with his counterpart Vladimir Putin 38 times since 2013 — the top leadership was assuredly not entirely in the dark (FMPRC, December 15, 2021). As competition with the U.S. has intensified under Xi, Russia has consolidated its position as China’s most consequential strategic partner. However, China is increasingly concerned that Putin’s war and the resultant international backlash are severely damaging Russia. Some elites have also condemned Russia’s brutality and unilateral aggression, which underscores mounting anxiety that China is tied to a partner that is both weaker and more belligerent than it had previously realized (China Times, March 1). In the current situation, Xi comes off poorly regardless of how much foreknowledge he possessed. If he was naïve about Putin’s designs, he looks weak for allowing a lesser partner to drag China into a confrontation with the West. If Xi cut Putin a blank check for aggression, this may intensify muted but pointed domestic criticism of his foreign policy acumen including his decision to privilege ties with Russia over relations with the West, which are more integral to China’s economic and technological development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Asia