Search

Begin New Search Political Geography Eastern Europe Publication Year within 3 Years

91. Moldova, land of the European Union's partnership mission

Author:
Florent Parmentier
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Sharing 939 kilometres of borders with Ukraine, Moldova is closest to the epicentre of the war that began on 24 February 2022. From the very first weeks onwards, the Moldovan authorities had to build reception facilities for Ukrainian refugees fleeing the fighting in the south and east of the country. In diplomatic and strategic terms, this war has also played a role in accelerating events, since in June 2022 Moldova was, against all expectations, recognised as candidate country to the European Union. The credit for this European rapprochement goes largely to the leadership team headed by President Maia Sandu. He later, with her party (Party of Action and Solidarity, PAS), has led the nation's dynamic forces along this demanding path of transformation, despite the many difficulties that the country faces. The war has already changed Moldova’s geopolitical situation, which has to contend with a great number of hybrid threats from Russia. In other words, beyond the success of the European Political Community Summit, organised at Castelul Mimi on 1 June last, and the many political signals received on this occasion, Moldova still needs assistance on the road to European transformation. This is why the Europeans decided to launch a partnership mission on 31 May last in Chisinau together with the High Representative Josep Borrell, the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister Nicu Popescu and the then Home Affairs Minister, Ana Revenco.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Regional Integration, Hybrid Threats, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Moldova, and Eastern Europe

92. The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Exhaustion of the 1945 World Order: Tracing the Origins, Examining the Consequences

Author:
Manuel Becerra Ramírez
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
I n the early hours of Thursday, 24 February 2022, the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin launched what it called a “special military operation” on Ukrainian territory. On 21 February 2022, Russia officially recognized the two selfproclaimed people’s republics that had established themselves in earlier rounds of fighting. This was supposedly based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, which provides for legitimate individual or collective defense. Later that year, Russia annexed them outright. Of course, in reality, Russia’s invasion violated the UN Charter and the principles contained therein. This constitutes a disregard for the norms that emerged after World War II as understood by the proponents of the “rules-based international liberal order” and others. The UN Charter privileges the solution of conflicts by peaceful means. Legitimate defense is only permissible in the face of a current attack, not a hypothetical one (this is why, for example, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which was termed a “preemptive war” by the George W. Bush Administration). Moreover, the UN Security Council (with what is effectually an endorsement or legitimization function) must always be aware of such actions.
Topic:
History, Conflict, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

93. Awakening Peripheries in the Great Power Clash Zone: Can Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia Come Together?

Author:
Jakub Korejba
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Baku Dialogues
Institution:
ADA University
Abstract:
This essay explores the consequences of the fact that states of Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia face a structural problem of the same nature: they are all located at the periphery of the main centers of global development and, for a major part of their contemporary history, were subject to external structural forces that perceived them as objects of great power rivalry (the “Eurasian Rimland,” as Halford Mackinder put it) and not as subjects of international politics. These countries are or at least should perceive themselves as a bridge between the East, West, North, and South due to their location between the “Eurasian Heartland” (also Mackinder) and the coastal “Sea Powers” (Nicholas Spykman). Unfortunately, this also puts them exactly in the “clash zone” of virtually every potential conflict between maritime and continental powers. This specific position has historically determined conditions for their development (or the lack thereof), and for a long time made the development of direct horizontal ties between them impossible. For most of their history, the political, economic, and cultural ties that they could have potentially maintained with each other were either non-existent or vertical, effectuated through the respective geopolitical center that dominated them. Although now formally independent for more than 30 years, this still remains the case—as most of the countries located in those three areas finds themselves not strong enough to challenge the old, new, or potential hegemon interested in keeping them in a subordinated condition. From the point of view of Moscow, Beijing, Brussels, or Washington, it makes little sense to let Warsaw, Baku, or Astana elaborate the sort of horizontal ties with each other (or others in their respective neighborhoods) that could potentially make each of them more (much less fully) resistant to the pressure of great powers still intent on instrumentalizing as a playground for their ongoing power struggle.
Topic:
History, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Rivalry, and Periphery
Political Geography:
Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and South Caucasus

94. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations

Author:
Dimitri Minic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Russian army is very critical of its war in Ukraine. Not just of the first phase of the failed special military operation (SVO), which was inspired by the theorization of bypassing, but also of the strategic deterrence phase that preceded it. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations Download 0.98 Mo Russian military theorists have commented on the profound lack of preparation not just for the SVO, but also—in many areas—for the heterotelic war the SVO has become. The Russian army’s weaknesses vis-à-vis the Ukrainian army are generally, and sometimes quite directly, recognized. The Russian military elites have made numerous recommendations for improving Russia’s military performance, primarily focusing on the ground and aerospace forces. Meanwhile, the Russian army has mostly adapted (more or less successfully) to the difficulties it has encountered in the last year and a half in Ukraine. Although the Putin regime is authoritarian and intent on reducing freedom of expression in Russian society, the existence and tolerance of a certain amount of truth-telling at this level of the military apparatus indicate that the Russian army’s and state’s ability to adapt should not be underestimated.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

95. Envisioning a Long-Term Security Arrangement for Ukraine

Author:
Eric Ciaramella
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The moment has arrived for Western leaders to offer a practical vision for Ukraine’s long-term security. This paper lays out a detailed proposal for a sustainable multilateral security arrangement in which Ukraine has a strong military that is backed by legally codified pledges of support—training, equipping, and defense industrial cooperation—from the United States and Europe. The model outlined in this paper draws on official Ukrainian government proposals and lessons from the United States’ security relationships with close partners that are not treaty allies, notably Israel. It prioritizes a strategy of deterrence by denial: by fielding a robust, modernized, and well-trained military, Ukraine can raise the cost of future aggression to such a point that Russia would lose confidence in its ability to achieve its objectives there through force.1 Independent of battlefield developments, Ukraine and its partners must negotiate a long-term security arrangement now. Reaching a consensus sooner rather than later on a framework makes more sense than putting off controversial decisions until large-scale hostilities end. A security arrangement has the potential to undermine President Vladimir Putin’s conviction that Russia can outlast Ukraine and the West. It can also assure Ukraine that it will be able to defend its sovereignty even if it does not liberate its entire territory this year. Many of the elements contained in this proposal can be implemented during wartime—indeed, some of them are already in place—and strengthened after the war. The proposed security model is not necessarily an alternative to NATO membership, which enjoys strong support from Ukraine’s leaders and public. The allies have promised the country an eventual place in NATO, but they have made clear that this will not be on the agenda while the war is ongoing. Even once the war ends, they are unlikely to move swiftly to admit Ukraine. Therefore, the proposal here seeks to enhance the country’s ability to defend itself as it remains outside of NATO for the foreseeable future. At the same time, it emphasizes the critical role Ukraine’s EU accession will play in its long-term security. The United States must lead the conversation on a future security arrangement. Not only does its unparalleled capacity for security assistance and multinational coordination make it vital to the success of the arrangement, but a clear long-term U.S. pledge to Ukraine would also prompt Europe to increase its commitments, thereby ensuring proper burden-sharing. The proposed arrangement would be flexible enough to encompass commitments from the EU as a collective, from individual member states, and from other countries. To make the U.S. commitment to Ukraine credible and durable, the Biden administration must work with Congress to secure broad bipartisan support. This study identifies five elements that are critical to a future security arrangement: Strong political and legal codification that ensures the arrangement will endure regardless of electoral cycles and leadership changes in the United States and Europe A predictable, multiyear pipeline for military supplies that enables Ukraine to plan and sustain a future force structure capable of deterring Russian aggression Support for Ukraine’s defense industry, as well as targeted defense industrial investments in the United States and Europe to prepare for a long war and an extended period of Ukrainian military reconstitution Mechanisms for political consultations, information sharing, and coordination to ensure that Ukraine’s military needs are met in a timely fashion Clear linkage to Ukraine’s EU accession process and postwar reconstruction Much of the public debate to date has focused on Ukraine’s request for security “guarantees” in response to the failure of the previous “assurances” encapsulated in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. To avoid confusion, and in light of the historical baggage these terms carry, this paper uses “arrangement” or “commitment” to refer to the future legal and political framework in question.2
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

96. Separatisms and Social Integration Processes on the Example of Estonia

Author:
Agata Włodarska-Frykowska
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The article seeks to analyze political and social separatisms in contemporary Estonia and to outline integration processes in the country. The Russian national minority has been a factor that has significantly influenced the existing divisions in the interior of the country since the creation of the independent and sovereign Estonian state. Despite the passage of more than 30 years after regaining its independence, Estonia is still struggling with internal separatist mechanisms, whilst strongly developed and strengthened integration processes have significantly influenced its social consolidation. Changes in Estonian society are apparent, the sense of Estonian identity keeps strengthening and representatives of national minorities, primarily the Russian one, have increasingly improved their linguistic competence in Estonian. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to build Estonian statehood, subjectivity and identity in the shadow of the difficult relations with the Russian Federation.
Topic:
Minorities, Separatism, and Social Integration
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Estonia

97. The importance of the United States in Poland’s military security policy in the context of the war in Ukraine

Author:
Łukasz Jureńczyk
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The subject of the article is the importance of the United States in Poland’s military security policy in relation to the war in Ukraine. The article begins with an introduction discussing its main assumptions and a synthetic historical background of the importance of the US for Poland and its security. The main part of the article is divided into two parts, the first one discussing the importance of the US in Poland’s military security policy after the Cold War. The second part is devoted to the change in the importance of the US in this policy in connection with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and the main factors that determine this change. The aim of the article is to identify and analyze the changes in the importance of the United States in the Polish military security policy as a result of the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022. The main research problem is whether the importance of the US in Poland’s military security policy increased as a result of the war, and if so, because of what main factors? The thesis of the article states that the war in Ukraine increased the importance of the US as the main external guarantor of Poland’s security and defense. This is due to the leading role played by the United States in military support for Ukraine and strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, in the absence of leadership from Western European powers. The research included interviews with scientists and analysts from research centers in Washington and New York.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Poland, and United States of America

98. Cultural Security in the Context of the Analysis of the Religiosity of Belarusian Students

Author:
Viktoryia Baretskaya
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
Religion can become an instrument of manipulation and destabilization in society, everything depends on people who have access to the levers of power, the position of Church hierarchs and the level of religious literacy of the population. The article is devoted to the study of the concept of the correlation of national identity and Christian universalism, as well as the model of Church–State relations in the modern social teaching of the Russian Orthodox Church, in the context of the analysis of some aspects of the religiosity of the Belarusian student youth, namely quantitative indicators of trust in the Church, attendance of divine services, and confessional affiliation.
Topic:
Security, Religion, Culture, Students, and Identity
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Belarus

99. Russian Disinformation and Propaganda Campaign Justifying the Annexing of Crimea in 2014

Author:
Oksana Voytyuk
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
On February 26, 2014, the Russian Federation annexed the Crimean Peninsula. Russia's offensive actions have been condemned in the international arena, but this has in no way changed the decision of the authorities in the Kremlin. In order to prove the credibility of the occupation of Crimea, the Russian Federation launched a disinformation and propaganda campaign aimed primarily at the internal arena, ie at the Russians. The aim of the article is to analyze selected statements by Vladimir Putin regarding the annexation of Crimea and to try to answer the question of whether disinformation and internal propaganda were effective in convincing Russians that the occupation of Crimea was an act of restoring historical justice. For the purposes of the article, research methods appropriate for international relations were used.
Topic:
Propaganda, Annexation, Disinformation, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Crimea

100. Characteristics of calculating the power of states in Eastern Europe: a powermetric approach

Author:
Erwin Metera
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Journal Article
Journal:
Nowa Polityka Wschodnia
Institution:
Faculty of Political Science and International Studies, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
Abstract:
The conducted research indicates the elements characteristic of power relations among states in Eastern Europe by describing them in mathematical terms. Using existing assumptions and resulting universal powermetric models, the study adapts them to the specifics of the region, enabling the implementation of the negative role of the imports of Russian energy resources in calculating the power of individual states. The role of trade links based on the two main energy resources – natural gas and crude oil – has been indicated. Imports of these raw materials from Russia, which constitute a significant part of the balance of resources used in the energy sectors of the importing countries, are the source of reduction of the geopolitical position of these states in the region, in relation to the position held by the Russian Federation. By taking into account the negative impact of trade in energy resources due to their use by the Russian Federation as a tool in achieving geostrategic goals, the conclusions obtained in the study allow for an increase in the accuracy of existing powermetric models in research on power distribution in Eastern Europe.
Topic:
International Relations, Geopolitics, Trade, Power, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eastern Europe