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1. What is Serbia’s “Project 5000” and why Should we be concerned?

Author:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This paper examines the potential consequences and concerns surrounding Serbia’s “Project 5000,” emphasizing why it warrants attention not just from neighboring states in the Western Balkans but also from NATO. Given the geopolitical landscape, any escalation of conflict within this region directly impacts NATO’s strategic interests, considering its significant presence in the Balkans. Moreover, Russia’s overt military backing of Serbia and its advocacy for a militaristic approach towards Kosovo are of particular concern. This stance by Russia can be interpreted as an attempt to embolden Serbia to adopt a military intervention in Kosovo, serving dual purposes for Russia: shifting international focus from the brutal invasion of Ukraine and undermining NATO’s credibility and influence in the region. The unfolding situation underscores a broader strategy by Russia to exploit regional tensions, thereby challenging the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Such maneuvers not only threaten to destabilize the Western Balkans but also aim to fracture European unity and weaken NATO’s strategic coherence, particularly as it pertains to its eastern flank and broader engagement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Serbia

2. Getting Off the Back Foot: Guiding Principles for a Proactive Western Strategy on Belarus

Author:
Artyom Shraibman
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
For decades, the West has been unable to build an effective strategy on Belarus due to the country’s limited geopolitical importance, an inexorably deeper dependence on Moscow, and the glaring absence of leverage over Minsk’s strategic decisionmaking. This paper proposes a different paradigm for approaching the issue. Instead of passively reacting to Minsk’s actions, the West should broaden its planning horizon and create more specific incentives for Belarus to follow a different trajectory in the future. The overriding goal of a more proactive Western strategy should be the eventual emergence of a democratic Belarus that is no longer fully dominated by Moscow in the military and political realms. Such an ambitious goal would have tangible and lasting benefits for the new European security landscape amid the prospect of a long war in Ukraine. Skepticism in Western policy circles about the viability of such a scenario is entirely understandable. Yet it is not entirely clear whether Western policymakers have registered the significant differences between Russia and Belarus at the societal level and divergent strategic interests of the Russian and Belarusian regimes. At the same time, it is essential for Western policymakers to keep their expectations in check and to avoid an overestimation of their capabilities. The Belarusian crisis cannot be resolved in the foreseeable future by Western efforts alone. Moreover, there should be no illusions about the fact that Belarus, much like Ukraine, holds a special place in the worldview of the Russian ruling elite and President Vladimir Putin personally. The Kremlin’s long-standing obsession with keeping the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) away from Russia’s borders plays into the same attachment to keeping the Belarusian regime in as tight an embrace as possible. Therefore, until Moscow either changes its foreign policy priorities under a new leadership or simply becomes unable to keep Minsk under its control, it would be naïve to expect that the Russian leadership will simply offer any Belarusian government greater leeway to shift its geopolitical orientation. At the same time, it is conceivable that a qualitative increase in military assistance to Ukraine and a more effective economic pressure campaign against Russia could disrupt Belarus’s trajectory and make Minsk more amenable to the incentives that the West can already offer. But an overnight breakthrough seems highly unlikely. This paper, therefore, focuses on more realistic recommendations with longer-term effects.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, and Belarus

3. The Concept of "Putinism" and its Impact on the "Normalization" of Georgian-Russian Relations

Author:
Malkhaz Mikeladze
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In view of the ongoing aggression in Ukraine, the Russian elite is formulating conceptual approaches to justify the inevitability of the escalating confrontation with the West and to encompass the foreign priorities of the Russian Federation. Within expert circles, this combination of approaches is increasingly labeled as “Putinism,” with the belief that its main components will have a decisive impact on Russia’s relations with other countries, including Georgia. Amidst the ongoing polarization of Georgian society, the normalization of relations with Russia emerges as one of the most important issues, a normalization process that has triggered radicalization and sharp confrontation between the government and opposition, further complicating the depolarization process and civil dialogue recommended by the European Union. These challenges themselves seem to be obstacles to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Therefore, the article aims to review the basic principles of “Putinism” and provide a pragmatic evaluation for the “normalization” of Georgian-Russian relations.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Normalization, Vladimir Putin, and Polarization
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

4. Overview of the Russia-Ukraine War: Strategies and Expectations of the Conflict Parties

Author:
Mamuka Zhvania
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Non-objective and confusing viewpoints on the ongoing war in Ukraine often reverberate within the information sphere, and consequently in society, contributing to the dissemination of disinformation. Common suggestions include the notion that the West is weary of supporting Ukraine, Russia’s defeat is not advantageous for them, and that the West is endeavouring to compel Ukraine towards negotiations. The given article aims to elucidate the ongoing developments in the war and present a persuasive response to pertinent questions regarding the dynamics of hostilities and the strategies employed by the parties involved. The following is an analysis of the current stage of the Russia-Ukraine war, including its potential duration, the resources available to each party for conducting warfare, reasons for the delayed assistance from the West, and projections for the future.
Topic:
Disinformation, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

5. Where Georgia's U-Turn Comes from and Where it is Heading

Author:
Kakha Gogolashvili
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Commentary and Analysis
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
For 30 years, Georgian governments have pursued European integration, reflecting the will of the majority. They have implemented European standards and reforms, culminating in 2022 with the ‘European Perspective’ and EU candidate status in 2023. Then, unexpectedly, the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party began to ignore EU recommendations, prioritizing state sovereignty and independent decision-making. This stance, reminiscent of Putin’s “sovereign democracy,” led to controversial actions like resisting judicial reforms and improving the election code. Instead of aligning with the EU, the government began strengthening its economic ties with Russia, even after the invasion of Ukraine. The most notable action was adopting the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, mirroring Russia’s 2012 law aimed at controlling civil society and the media. This provoked protests, divided society, and alarmed international partners, increasing Georgia’s isolation from the democratic world and its vulnerability to authoritarian powers, especially Russia. Thus, the key questions are: Why has GD chosen this risky path? With most Georgians supporting European integration, how should the EU and the international community respond to GD’s policies steering the country away from Europe?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Ukraine, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

6. Tit for tat: A turn in the Russian-Ukrainian war

Author:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:
Ukrainian forces are expanding their incursion into Russia's Kursk Oblast, a surprise not seen since World War II. The Russian response has been traditional and disorganised. If Russia fails to repel the advance, Ukraine could regain control over the conflict and set new negotiation terms.
Topic:
Security, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Incursion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

7. Toward Innovation-driven Growth: Innovation Systems and Policies in EU Member States of Central Eastern Europe

Author:
Alexandra Bykova, Viktrória Döme, Richard Grieveson, Francesca Guadagno, and Doris Hanzl-Weiss
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This study builds on our previous analyses of a new growth model for the EU member states of Central and Eastern European (CEE), focusing on fostering innovation-driven development. We aim to explain the types of innovation systems and policies that enhance domestic innovation capabilities, drawing on global best practices. A critical evaluation of the current innovation landscape in EU-CEE countries is conducted, particularly in the context of the green and digital transitions. The study assesses the strengths and weaknesses of both national innovation initiatives and opportunities provided by EU industrial and technology policy frameworks. Based on these insights, we offer actionable policy recommendations to promote innovation-driven growth, enhance productivity, and boost economic convergence over the medium term, taking into account the unique political and historical contexts of the EU-CEE countries. Additionally, we prepare country-specific briefing notes tailored to the individual development needs and opportunities of each nation.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Economic Growth, Innovation, Economic Competition, and Convergence
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

8. Right-Sizing the Russian Threat to Europe

Author:
George Beebe, Mark Episkopos, and Anatol Lieven
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Western leaders, including U.S. President Joe Biden, have frequently framed the invasion of Ukraine as the first step in a Russian plan of broader European conquest. However, a close examination of Russian intent and military capabilities shows this view is dangerously mistaken. Russia likely has neither the capability nor the intent to launch a war of aggression against NATO members — but the ongoing brinkmanship between Russia and the West still poses serious risks of military escalation that can only be defused by supplementing military deterrence with a diplomatic effort to address tensions. An analysis of Russian security thinking demonstrates that Putin’s stated views align with long-standing Russian fears about Western encroachment, given Russia’s lack of natural barriers to invasion. As Putin has come to view NATO as increasingly hostile to Russia, aggressive Russian action in defense of its claimed “sphere of influence” has become a factor in European security. However, contrary to many Western analyses, this does not mean that Russia views future wars of aggression against NATO member states as in its security interest. This does not imply naivete about the danger of Russian aggression, as reflected most recently in its illegal invasion of Ukraine. But it highlights the fundamental differences between Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine, which it has long regarded as both critical to its national security and integral to its history and culture, and its views of NATO countries, where the cost-benefit balance of aggression for Russia would be very different. Understanding Russian incentives also requires assessing Russia’s actual military capabilities compared to NATO. As frequently reiterated by NATO leadership, such an assessment shows that Russia is at a decisive conventional military disadvantage against the NATO alliance. While Russia would do damage in a conventional war with NATO, it would almost certainly suffer a devastating defeat in such a conflict absent nuclear escalation. NATO has a greater than three-to-one advantage over Russia in active-duty ground forces. NATO also has even greater advantages in the air and at sea. The alliance has a ten-to-one lead in military aircraft and a large qualitative edge as well, raising the probability of total air superiority. At sea, NATO would likely have the capacity to impose a naval blockade on Russian shipping, whose costs would dwarf current economic sanctions. While Russia has clear military superiority over individual NATO states, especially in the Baltics, it is extremely unlikely it could exercise this advantage without triggering a broader war with the entire NATO alliance. However, NATO’s powerful military deterrent alone cannot create stability in Europe. Paradoxically, an excessive reliance on military deterrence is likely to increase instability by inducing Russia to rely increasingly on its nuclear force as its primary basis for deterrence. Unlike conventional forces, Russia and NATO possess roughly the same amount of nuclear weapons. Washington must work to defuse this increasingly unstable dynamic by restoring diplomatic lines of communication between Russia and the West.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

9. Rethinking the U.S.–Belarus Relationship

Author:
Mark Episkopos
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Belarus is commonly seen as a Russian outpost on NATO’s eastern flank, with its president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, cast as a categorical opponent of Western interests. This narrative became ascendant in the West after Russia’s full–scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, a fuller examination of Belarusian foreign policy under President Lukashenko reveals a more nuanced picture of a country that, despite its historic ties to Russia, has consistently demonstrated a willingness to engage with the West. Lukashenko has sought to pursue what he calls a “multi–vector foreign policy,” straddling the great powers to best safeguard Belarus’s national sovereignty and its interests. This multi–pronged approach has shifted decidedly in recent years, however, with Lukashenko drifting into the Russian camp, as evidenced by Minsk providing logistical support and safe passage to Russian troops in its war on Ukraine, and allowing Russian tactical nuclear weapons on Belarussian soil. But these policies did not occur in a vacuum. They were, rather, a direct result of American efforts to isolate Belarus through a maximum pressure campaign which began in the aftermath of the 2020 re–election of Lukashenko. Western policies aimed at isolating Minsk have had the counterproductive effect of pushing Lukashenko closer to Moscow and Beijing, in an effort to counteract what he sees as a Western program of driving regime change in Belarus. Western governments, particularly Washington, should recognize that maximum pressure will backfire by pushing Belarus closer to Moscow. An alternative strategy based on resetting relations with Belarus and enabling the return of Lukashenko’s multi–vector foreign policy holds the promise of preventing the further integration of Belarus and Russia and possibly even reversing some of Putin’s moves to pull Belarus into the Russian orbit. To execute this strategy, the United States should: Explicitly disavow regime change and the training of anti–Lukashenko dissidents as U.S. policy goals in direct talks with Belarussian officials, conditioned on Belarussian assurance that it will not use its territory as a staging ground for attacks on NATO Establish a piecemeal approach for sanctions relief with Belarus as progress is made toward resetting relations Pursue bilateral cooperation with Belarus, including the resumption of energy trade, American investment, and other cultural arrangements. Pursuing the soft reset prescribed in this paper will not be easy, but the alternatives would leave the United States in a weaker strategic position by needlessly heightening Minsk’s dependence on its Russian neighbor. Steps toward reaching a new understanding with Belarus can instead bolster eastern European stability and enhance NATO’s eastern deterrent posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, Bilateral Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Belarus, and United States of America

10. Ukraine, Gaza, and the International Order

Author:
Faisal Devji
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The ongoing crises in Ukraine and Gaza show the urgent need for a new internationalism that comes to grips with the increasing independence of middle and smaller powers around the world. Such a vision must reject the effort to re-impose a failed framework of unilateral U.S. primacy, or an effort to shoehorn multiplying regionally specific conflicts into an obsolete model of “great power competition” that recalls the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. In both Ukraine and the Middle East, the United States has been unable to impose its will either militarily or diplomatically. Smaller nations have successfully defied American–backed military force. Even more concerning, a significant share of the global community has failed to follow the U.S. diplomatic lead and support the U.S. interpretation of international norms. But opposition to the United States has not been supported by a superpower peer competitor to the United States, along the lines of a Cold War model. The current emerging world order is instead characterized by “regionalization,” a situation where middle and even small powers around the world feel free to circumvent or even defy U.S. interpretations of global norms based on more local interests and regional security concerns. The stage was set for the current situation by the U.S. attempt to assert unilateral power during the War on Terror in ways that appeared to give the United States alone a de facto exemption from global norms and institutions. These actions reduced the legitimacy of the post–World War Two international order that the United States had helped to create, and led many in the international community to seek alternatives to a system that seemed to grant the United States almost arbitrary power to define the rules. The U.S. foreign policy establishment must come to grips with the newly deglobalized and regionalized world order. A failure to do so poses a grave threat to U.S. power and influence, as relationships with key emerging powers such as India, or even traditional U.S. allies in Europe and Asia are not immune from the kind of de–globalizing and regionalizing forces seen in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Topic:
Cold War, International Law, National Security, Hegemony, Grand Strategy, Armed Conflict, International Order, Russia-Ukraine War, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Israel, Eastern Europe, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America